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The recent wave of meetings between U.S. officials and allies in the Indo-Pacific have been studies in the duality of American diplomacy under President Donald Trump. Although headlines have focused on mounting American calls for allies to spend more on defense to counter China, the drama of intra-alliance affairs has been offset by an undercurrent of relief. Unlike the vitriol directed at NATO allies, Washington’s pressure for Pacific partners to do more underscores their centrality in U.S. security thinking and has helped assuage regional apprehensions of abandonment.
While the Trump administration’s affirmations of Washington’s defense commitments are welcomed, the relative relief felt by Indo-Pacific partners is premature. Just as houses can be felled by termites as well as sledgehammers, the U.S. alliances in Asia are being undercut from within and risk ruin from rot rather than rancor. Amid the overhaul of U.S. government institutions, many of the key offices, mechanisms, and especially personnel integral to the health of the U.S. alliance system have been diminished or dismissed. Whereas the crisis in trans-Atlantic affairs is apparent to all, the comparative placidity of Indo-Pacific alliances has created a false sense of continuity that is neither real nor actionable. Arresting this degradation requires moving beyond the optics of the current moment. Attempting to fortify the alliances through momentary appeals to the Oval Office compounds the key source of instability in U.S. foreign policy. It detracts from the long-term, systemic investments needed to sustain progress in the alliance system. Moreover, confining the character of American commitments to the White House neglects alternative government avenues to strengthen international partnership.
By exercising its constitutional authorities and innovative uses of its budgetary powers, Congress can revive its underutilized role in foreign relations and take meaningful actions to advance the credibility and capabilities of America’s Indo-Pacific alliance network. Likewise, while not a replacement for federal initiatives, individual U.S. states can leverage points of global engagement like the state-partnership program to buttress American partnerships abroad.
Platitudes vs. Process
At the Shangri-La Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth painted a stark picture of a looming conflict with China. While the content of the remarks was jarring for many, regional commentators saw the secretary’s mere presence at the Indo-Pacific security gathering as offering “some comfort to governments seeking signals of continuity in U.S. policy.” This routine and its reactions have followed an increasingly common pattern in the Indo-Pacific. Amid the upheaval in American foreign relations, Indo-Pacific allies have been bracing for the furor directed at so many other U.S. partners. Yet, rather than recriminations, Trump administration officials have championed America’s regional responsibilities by reaffirming its “ironclad” commitments to the Philippines and embraced the U.S. role as an Indo-Pacific power through increased military activities in places like Palau. Even amid mounting American pressure to increase defense spending, allies at home and abroad have been reassured by this rhetoric and expressed hopes that the long-awaited American “pivot” to the Indo-Pacific may finally be afoot.
Yet, it is a mistake to assess the health of America’s Indo-Pacific alliance network on the flinty statements of political elites alone. Although pronouncements like Hegseth’s affirmation of U.S. commitments can reassure allies and bolster the deterrent value of security pacts, alliances cannot survive on rhetorical power alone. Defense cooperation is a process that requires a sustained program of collaboration to ensure functionality amid shifting political and strategic conditions. It is in these substantive areas, beneath the optics, where the rot in the Indo-Pacific is beginning to take root.
The high-level visits like secretary Hegseth’s trip to Japan and the Philippines and military exercises like the trilateral air and naval drills held with South Korea and Japan that have punctuated Washington’s Pacific posture do not occur on a whim. They rely on months and sometimes years of planning to organize. Through decades of regularized cooperation, the United States has cultivated the close institutional and interpersonal ties that make such coordination possible in peacetime and essential in a conflict. However, these advantages have been eroded amid the culling of U.S. foreign policy institutions. Just over six months into the second Trump presidency, many key ambassadorships and administrative positions remain vacant. These absences have been compounded by personnel cuts at the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. Such efforts may save money, but they have removed many of the people and offices responsible for working with partners and have stymied the careers of key personnel with experience and networks in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, even where institutions remain in place, new regulations pose barriers. For example, rules aimed at preventing defense personnel from engaging with think tanks will curtail valuable exchanges between Washington and its allies.
This loss of experience and curbing of engagements will hinder collaborative endeavors and unravel the personal connections needed to navigate complex inter-governmental relationships. This can be particularly significant in the Indo-Pacific, where informal institutions and personal relationships can play an important role in regional security affairs. Existing initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness may be able to endure for a while through inertia. But American absenteeism at routine levels of engagement will sap future undertakings and hamstring the ability to respond to emerging threats like cybersecurity, AI, and drones.
Furthermore, even as orders for military kit swell, there are increasing concerns among industry observers over America’s manufacturing capabilities that could leave its allies exposed to gaps in their own military defenses. Aid to Israel and Ukraine, as well as ordnance-heavy campaigns in Yemen and Iran, have depleted key sectors of the U.S. arsenal. Not only do these reduce U.S. stockpiles, but they also mean that many of the orders for American arms submitted by allies will go unfulfilled.
The AUKUS trilateral security agreement is emblematic of this dilemma. The pact is floundering amid growing doubts over America’s inability to deliver the nuclear-powered submarines that are the centerpiece of the agreement. Nor is Australia alone in suffering from Washington’s overstretched capabilities. During June’s conflict with Iran, U.S. missile defense teams were redeployed from South Korea to the Persian Gulf. The move did not go unnoticed in Seoul and fed questions about the value of the American alliance even as Washington pressed South Korea to do more. Although not as prominent as delays to the AUKUS submarine program, the redeployment of the missile defense teams highlighted the constraints on U.S. capabilities and its inability to simultaneously defend its partners in Asia and the Persian Gulf.
Alliances Beyond the Oval Office
Since Trump’s return to office, the debate over America’s alliances has centered on trying to navigate the caprice of a cantankerous administration. While the administration has been supportive of U.S. Indo-Pacific partners in rhetoric, but neglectful of the personnel and mechanisms that sustain alliances, alternative actions outside of the White House can help give this rhetoric substance and make the Indo-Pacific posture an effective tool for countering Chinese actions.
In the United States, the credibility of American commitments can be strengthened by Congress reasserting its role in foreign policy. U.S. defense treaties are approved by the Senate and Congress can play a key role in the stewardship of American alliances. Concern over China’s assertiveness and support for U.S. Indo-Pacific allies and partners remains a rare point of bipartisan action in Congress. Visits to the region by bipartisan congressional delegations to reaffirm U.S. commitments are important symbols of the broader support that allies continue to enjoy in Washington. This form of outreach should not only continue but be joined by bipartisan efforts at home to strengthen popular understanding of the alliance system and the important role that partners play in the American defense architecture. Congressional leaders cannot be deaf to the groundswell of isolationism within the general population and how this trend may color public reactions to a future Chinese attack on an Indo-Pacific ally or partner. Senators and representatives should be as resolute in championing the importance of allies in their home states and districts as they are when visiting Tokyo or Taipei.
Congress can also take several specific actions to strengthen the credibility of American defense treaties. In 2023, Tim Kaine and Marco Rubio led for the inclusion of a bipartisan provision in the National Defense Authorization Act that prevents the president from unilaterally withdrawing from NATO without congressional support. This measure should be extended to the Indo-Pacific and U.S. treaties with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Affirming that defense treaties approved by Congress cannot simply be voided by a presidential statement or executive order would bolster the integrity of American commitments and reflect the binding nature of treaty obligations. For Republicans in Congress, such an action would not only address the current moment but also provide a check against the potential abandonment of allies by a future Democratic administration as happened to Taiwan under President Jimmy Carter. Such a measure would reflect the robust support for Indo-Pacific allies that the White House has voiced and establish a broader U.S. commitment to the region that will last beyond the Trump administration.
Moreover, Congress can also apply additional measures through the National Defense Authorization Act to redress key points of uncertainty stemming from the White House. For example, in 2019, a provision was included to prevent the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. This measure can be reintroduced to forestall a future drawdown and reflect the deterrence role that physical presence plays.
Effective use of Congress’s budgetary powers can also advance alliance capabilities. Even as the Trump administration urges allies to spend more, this push has been paired with a call to buy kit that is “made in America.” While reflecting the administration’s economic priorities, U.S. military systems are not always affordable nor the best fit for the needs of partners. Instead of momentary splurges on American kit intended to win the president’s fleeting favor, allied defense investments should be strategic undertakings dedicated to building sustained enhancements in their national defense. Congress can help address this issue by not only expanding aid or funding existing commitments, like Pillar II of the AUKUS agreement, but also by allowing greater flexibility in how U.S. funds are used. By either directly purchasing foreign-made weapons systems and transferring their ownership to allies or permitting allies to use U.S. funds to purchase equipment from other international partners, Congress can best advance allied capacity by allowing the purchase of equipment that best fits their needs and budgets. Such steps have been employed as workarounds to support Ukraine, and could be systematized and integrated into a more adaptive approach to military assistance. Ultimately, while allied systems may not be “made in America,” the ability of partners to deploy unique and indigenous capabilities that complement rather than replicate the U.S. military, will lessen the burden on American forces and increase overall alliance effectiveness.
Furthermore, as the United States looks to expand the defense-industrial base to meet the needs of great-power competition, allies can play a key role in this process. By allowing Indo-Pacific allies with enhanced industrial capacity to produce in-demand weapons systems like missile interceptors under a license, Washington can help defuse the current bottleneck in production while building a trans-alliance supply chain in critical systems that is both secure and resilient. Existing initiatives like American backing for the Luzon Economic Corridor, which has been endorsed by the Trump administration, are ripe for such endeavors and Congress can spearhead this push through legislation like Sen. Andy Kim’s Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience Authorization Act.
Lastly, while individual U.S. states cannot fill the role of the federal government in supporting allies or partners, they can play an important part in maintaining these relationships and their functionality. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program has grown into a global endeavor that pairs the national guard from U.S. states with individual U.S. partners. The Philippines is the only U.S. treaty ally in the Indo-Pacific to participate in the program, but other regional partners like Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia participate as well. Expanding the range and frequency of these engagements through the State Partnership Program can sustain the relationship building process while cultivating the bilateral links needed to make security cooperation effective.
Likewise, joint economic initiatives, like Taiwan’s partnership with Arizona to build a $100 billion chip plant, illustrate the wider benefits of American partners and facilitate cooperation in important areas like emerging technologies. Incidents like the immigration raid at the Hyundai plant in Georgia show that such initiatives are still beholden to administration priorities. However, joint economic and technology projects are nevertheless key mechanisms for building the political substance of alliance relationships beyond treaty commitments.
A Defense Posture, If You Can Keep It
Although overshadowed by his memorable warning of an “Iron Curtain” falling across Europe, the purpose of Winston Churchill’s 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri was not to warn of the darkness infecting Europe, but to call for the creation of a “fraternal association” of militaries capable of ensuring peace. Churchill advised that for this association to succeed, it required not only friendship, but also building the mechanisms of routine security cooperation that would be needed in the face of dedicated adversaries. By investing in these mechanisms, the United States deterred Soviet aggression and ensured American security throughout the Cold War. Alas, these same sinews are now withering in the Indo-Pacific. By touting America’s commitments while neglecting the undergirding that gives them substance, the Trump administration is creating an ironclad illusion that could court disaster for both Washington and its allies.
Yet this fate is not inevitable. Through alternative defense mechanisms like the State Partnership Program and exercising Congress’s latent foreign policy prerogatives, it is possible to not only preserve the alliance system but cultivate a robust and resilient defense posture that is less dependent on the White House.
Gregory H. Winger is an associate professor in the political science department at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.
Miguel Alberto Gomez is a senior research fellow in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.
Lauren Sukin is the John G. Winant associate professor in U.S. foreign policy at the Department of Politics and International Relations and Nuffield College at the University of Oxford.
Image: Petty Officer 2nd Class Alexandria Esteban via DVIDS
