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It’s 2028, and the Fujian carrier strike group has just left Yulin, China, for an unknown destination. The U.S. Navy’s “Hedge Strategy” has let commanders disperse unmanned systems across regional choke points as forward-deployed scouts. But days before contact with Fujian, an unmanned undersea vehicle in the Banda Sea transmits an error code and must head back to Yokosuka for repairs — a 3,000-mile, 15-day trip. A second platform, an unmanned surface vehicle, is overdue for a routine oil filter change in its propulsion system. Planners route it to Singapore, but the specialized technicians need visas to enter the country, and the bespoke parts sit in customs for weeks. While the Navy’s hedge force limps home or languishes in a foreign port, the Fujian slips away unmonitored.
As the Navy shifts from a decade of developing and testing unmanned systems to fielding them in the operational fleet, it will need to expand its maintenance options to support them. The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group will deploy this year with a medium-sized unmanned surface vehicle. Driven by the 2026 budget proposal that seeks to double autonomous system funding, the Navy aims to field 39 unmanned surface vehicles in 2027 and at least 30 in the Indo-Pacific alone by 2030. These platforms are central to the Chief of Naval Operations’ hedge strategy of tailored force packages, and forward-numbered fleets are already standing up dedicated unmanned task forces to command and control them. Yet for all the attention paid to the technology and its employment, the Navy still lacks a framework for fixing these platforms overseas. Absent a deliberate plan for forward-deployed maintenance, the Navy risks fielding a high-tech unmanned force that is logistically stranded and operationally irrelevant. The Navy should develop and implement a plan for forward repair and sustainment of its coming unmanned fleet — one that exploits the unique features of unmanned systems rather than assuming they behave like manned ships.
For decades, the Navy’s maintenance model has assumed a large, manned platform serviced at established industrial piers under clear legal and logistical frameworks. The hedge force fits none of those assumptions, and closing the gap will take three steps. First, the Navy needs an honest assessment of what these systems require to stay in the fight. Second, planners should reckon with the wartime vulnerability of large, centralized bases like Guam or Yokosuka, and use the flexibility unmanned systems afford to build out a distributed network of smaller, more austere ports. Finally, the service should establish the organizational, logistical, and legal blueprint to execute that distributed plan. Only by aligning the geographic, operational, and organizational realities of the new fleet can the Navy transform its conceptual unmanned fleet into a combat-ready one.
Experience with small and expendable unmanned aerial systems might foster a belief that all unmanned systems are inherently free of maintenance. They are not. While small tactical drones rely on simple electrical motors (no fuel or hydraulic systems) or are essentially single-use munitions, the medium and large unmanned surface and undersea vehicles entering the fleet are subject to the unforgiving maintenance realities of manned warships. Deployments spanning weeks or even months dictate routine and preventative maintenance. Oil filters must be cleaned, O-rings and gaskets replaced, and sacrificial corrosion control anodes swapped. The barnacles and algae that grow on underwater surfaces must be cleaned off to maintain performance, and topside steel requires corrosion control measures. Onboard sensors require periodic calibration and testing. Beyond routine wear, the maritime environment is inherently destructive: Wind, wave action, and the risk of collision ensure that even in the absence of combat, material failures and structural damage are inevitable. Unlike traditional ships, which rely on their crews — trained and equipped for onboard unit-level maintenance while remaining on station and mission capable — unmanned systems have no organic capability for on-station maintenance or casualty control. Consequently, they will require a port to bring maintenance personnel and parts to them. Unmanned systems have to be repaired and sustained somewhere.
That “somewhere” is likely not back “home.” Returning to the continental United States for repairs is time- and cost-prohibitive — fast and powerful manned warships do their mid-deployment repairs overseas for these reasons. The physics of power density means the smaller unmanned underwater and surface vehicles will struggle with transoceanic travel required to reach even the Navy’s most forward overseas bases like Yokosuka, Japan, from their potential operational areas. Even if unmanned systems can reach a forward location in a reasonable time, the large, static, and vulnerable bases are a risky bet for all the Navy’s repair capability. Recent events in Europe and the Persian Gulf demonstrate that large forward bases are not guaranteed sanctuaries. In the Middle East, Iran has shown the ability to strike U.S. and partner bases hundreds of times with cheap drones. In Europe, Ukraine has exposed the vulnerability of Russian naval stations and repair facilities, striking St. Petersburg’s Kronstadt Marine Plant, the Baltic Fleet’s repair dry docks. This strike came after years of missile and drone attacks on Russian Black Sea fleet facilities. To mitigate this vulnerability, the Navy should deprioritize maintenance at the large homeport bases in favor of distributed and smaller locations for unmanned sustainment.
Repairing unmanned systems in forward ports introduces a paradox: more location choices, but fewer onsite amenities. Shallower drafts and smaller footprints allow unmanned vehicles to use port locations physically inaccessible to large traditional warships, such as HMAS Cairns in Northern Australia or Papua New Guinea’s Lombrum Naval Base. Diesel-electric unmanned underwater vehicles can bypass regulatory and diplomatic restrictions limiting manned, nuclear-powered submarines. Because unmanned systems, even with a small forward maintenance team, require less shoreside husbanding infrastructure (provisions, lodging, and waste removal) than a 300-person crew of a destroyer, commanders can consider more potential repair sites, specifically smaller and more remote locations.
To exploit this flexibility, the Navy should address several legal, logistical, and security hurdles unique to unmanned systems. Unlike manned warships, uncrewed hulls lack a worldwide settled legal status, requiring individual host-nation agreements for transiting territorial waters. The United States asserts its unmanned systems have the same sovereign immunity as manned warships, but other nations disagree. The rights of archipelagic passage are critical given the number of archipelagic states in the Pacific, and the nuanced classification distinctions of unmanned systems may prevent their transit. If states do not recognize unmanned systems as warships, they may attempt to enforce other regulations, such as compulsory pilotage. Lacking an agreed legal regime, the Navy risks unmanned systems traversing long, wasteful routes, as well as alienating existing and potential partner nations and losing access to ports and repair facilities.
The Navy cannot rely on established infrastructure or existing husbanding contracts once host nations grant access to ports. The service should instead develop flexible, expeditionary logistics capabilities to move technicians, tools, and parts into unfamiliar locations. This will require navigating local and potentially complex host-nation customs and visa frameworks, especially when handling hazardous materials like lithium-ion batteries or sensitive electronic payloads. An advanced team on the ground in the days and weeks ahead of an unmanned system arriving in port could help to facilitate material transfer and pier setup.
Finally, force protection and unit security protocols will likely require U.S. personnel on the ground in any port. Even with a myriad of legal agreements regarding sovereign immunity in place with each host nation, the absence of an onboard crew to serve as security risks an overzealous customs official or port inspector from simply boarding an unmanned vessel. Likewise, these high-profile assets represent attractive targets for an adversary or non-state actor. A viable forward repair framework should therefore include expeditionary logistics and security capabilities to quickly stand up an unmanned repair hub.
The tyranny of distance is severe in the Indo-Pacific. Major U.S. hubs at Guam and Yokosuka are thousands of miles from potential flashpoints. While the growing facility at Subic Bay in the Philippines offers one proximate solution, the Navy should look further afield to ensure resilience and redundancy. Secure military ports in friendly countries, such as HMAS Cairns in Northern Australia or Lombrum Naval Base in Papua New Guinea, would provide increased security for unmanned vehicles operating in the southern portion of the area of operations, with both being beyond the primary range of Chinese cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles. If the Navy needs to balance operational proximity with moderate industrial capability for more significant repairs, it could explore partnerships with commercial or state shipyards in the region, such as Ba Son or Ha Long in Vietnam, or Surabaya and Daya Radar Utama in Indonesia. These locations offer the dry docks and crane lift capacity necessary for maintaining medium and large unmanned vehicles. Ultimately, the tactical situation will determine the exact location of unmanned sustainment on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the Navy should solve legal, technical, and organizational issues to access these ports ahead of time.
The Navy has two primary models for sustaining unmanned systems forward. The first is an organic, expeditionary approach leveraging newly established robotics warfare and dual-track surface warfare officers to mirror the maritime patrol and reconnaissance squadron model. Based in the United States or forward deployed with existing forces in Europe or the Pacific, personnel would periodically deploy alongside their platforms, perhaps from a semi-permanent forward base. This model aligns with the Navy’s broader push to return repair capability to the fleet, complementing “right to repair” efforts and the reactivation of shore intermediate maintenance activities. But it would demand a cascade of reforms such as standing up parent squadrons, creating and filling billets, building schools and training pipelines, and folding the new commands into existing global force management plans. It also runs into a knowledge gap. Because the final composition of the unmanned fleet remains undecided, it is difficult to develop a specialized training pipeline for platforms whose engineering requirements and operational numbers remain a moving target. Integrating new technology, novel operating concepts, and unproven organizational structures may deliver a significant leap in capability, but only if the institutional foundation can bear the load of so much at once.
The second model outsources repair and sustainment functions to private contractors. This pay-for-service framework saves money by offloading training, logistics, stockpile management, and personnel administration to an outside company, while granting the Navy platform agility as the technology base evolves. Although heavily used over the past decades, this model has come under scrutiny as the Pentagon grapples with the strategic consequences of original-equipment-manufacturer dependency. The drive for right-to-repair protections and the legislative pushes to reclaim intellectual property rights reflect a growing concern that proprietary restrictions keep sailors from performing even basic troubleshooting. However, these concerns center more on the service’s legal prerogative to repair than on a cost-benefit analysis of sustainment. A viable contractor model for the hybrid fleet could route work through a separate, third-party entity to sidestep manufacturer-specific intellectual property barriers, paired with efforts done at allied and partner bases alongside their own forces, in support of a regional sustainment framework. This would allow the Navy to leverage the cost savings and flexibility of outsourcing while ensuring a competitive field of providers can service a wide variety of systems across far-flung locations. This “lead sustainment integrator” model wouldn’t fully return repair ownership to sailors, but it offers a palatable middle ground — efficiency, professionalized expertise, and the geographic reach global operations demand, with enough distance from the original manufacturers to avoid the trap of vendor lock.
Ultimately, the Navy may find the optimal path in a combination of the two, or in models tailored to the demands of each theater. It could designate the Indo-Pacific as a testbed for organic, uniformed repair teams to ensure resilience in contested waters, while using a contractor-integrated model in Europe, and then evaluate the results of each and implement a general solution. Or a blended approach might prove more compelling: Private contractors could secure small logistics sites near likely ports, manage forward storage, navigate host-nation customs, and maintain large inventories. With a permanent presence, these commercial teams could build the local relationships and administrative familiarity that could simplify theater entry. Just before an unmanned system pulls in, service members would arrive as transient maintenance teams, do the technical repairs, and depart soon after the vessel returns to sea. This division of labor lets the commercial sector absorb the persistent administrative and logistics friction of a forward footprint, while reserving the technical work for military personnel with the legal and operational mandate to operate in non-permissive environments.
The immediate recognition of the necessity of an overseas unmanned repair framework is more crucial than the final architecture of the solution. As unmanned systems move from experimental programs to fleet assets, the Navy should align sustainment requirements with procurement plans and operational concepts. These platforms suffer environmental degradation and mechanical failure just like traditional ships, yet carry no crew to fix them on station. The nature of their operations and the tyranny of distance dictate that they be repaired where they fight: in remote, rudimentary ports, backed by a legal, logistical, and workforce playbook that returns them to operations quickly. The Navy should build a system that manages the hurdles of maintaining unmanned systems abroad and capitalizes on their unique advantages to minimize time off station and maximize their value to operational commanders. Without one, the Navy risks a hedge force that becomes a fleet of hangar queens.
Dan Justice is a U.S. Navy foreign area officer currently serving as a federal executive fellow with the RAND Corporation. Previously, he held roles in policy analysis, international armaments cooperation, and operational assignments.
The opinions expressed are those of the author alone and do not reflect the views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, nor the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.
Image: Jesse Monford via Wikimedia Commons
