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America’s crippling strikes against Iran’s nuclear program in June have created a narrow window to avoid a strategic nightmare: namely, fighting China, Russia, and Iran all at once.

With Iran neutralized, strategic logic demands that the United States turn its sights on Russia next. But the Alaska summit between President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin complicated that course. Putin has exploited the diplomatic opening to intensify Russian attacks on Ukraine, without the prospect of more stringent U.S. sanctions or negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv.

To stop Russia from further weaponizing the peace process and slowly pushing its advantage in Ukraine, the United States should use the next two years to systematically weaken Russia primarily through diplomatic measures while accelerating European defense autonomy — enabling America to finally pivot toward China before it faces an unwinnable two-front war.

Win Some, Lose None

The Alaska summit left many questions unanswered, particularly regarding Trump’s shifting positions on a land-for-peace deal. It was the subsequent Washington summit with European leaders where Trump slightly clarified U.S. policy toward Ukraine and avoided the worst fears of skeptics. He did not blame Ukraine for the war, cut security assistance, or foist a pro-Russia deal on Kyiv. Instead, he reiterated his quest for peace and endorsed a European-led security guarantee for Ukraine while pushing Europe to assume more defense burdens.

In its quest to put Europe’s “defense house in order,” the Trump administration seeks to usher in a strategic rebalance that prompts European partners to assume most of the continent’s security responsibilities and meet the challenges of a deteriorating regional security situation without direct U.S. assistance. Both objectives are important as the United States looks to the Indo-Pacific region with growing alarm.

This approach reflects strategic necessity. America faces three adversaries: Iran, the persistent destabilizer, determined to develop nuclear weapons; Russia, the acute threat, invading Ukraine and threatening NATO; and China, the pacing challenge, attempting to topple America’s international leadership.

These competing threats spotlight America’s “strategic simultaneity” problem: How do you deter and, if necessary, defeat China and Russia simultaneously without exhausting your nation’s resources, power, and attention? You don’t. Instead, you sequence the threats.

Great powers from Byzantium to Venice to Habsburg Austria to Edwardian Britain have all survived by mastering the art of sequencing. This stratagem, as strategist Wess Mitchell elucidated, entails concentrating forces and focus against one opponent’s disruptive potential before turning to deter or defeat another more capable opponent. Israel recently demonstrated this approach, methodically dismantling Iran’s “axis of resistance” one proxy at a time — first Hamas, next Hizballah, then Iran itself (with America’s help) — rather than fighting simultaneous wars across multiple fronts against many enemies.

America has a comparable opportunity with its own unique set of challengers, but the window is closing.

Iran Down, Two to Go

Following Israeli and U.S. strikes in June, Iran’s nuclear program is “severely damaged,” set back by up to two years. For the first time in decades, America can shift its primary focus from the Middle East. Sequencing logic demands weakening one remaining competitor before risking an unwinnable two-front war. But which competitor?

Russia is the obvious choice. Moscow is weaker and moved first by invading Ukraine; it should be punished first. Continued degradation of Russian military power through support to Ukraine would likely deter — or at least force a rethink of — future aggressive gambits from Moscow or Beijing. Conversely, should Russia emerge from the war in Ukraine with territorial gains and a pro-Kremlin puppet government in Kyiv, the value of aggression would be validated everywhere.

The Sequencing Imperative

Since 2022, U.S. strategy has sought to punish Russia by backing Ukraine. But as Russia gradually masses enough manpower and munitions to bend the war of attrition to its favor, Ukraine cannot keep resisting Russia without solving its own manpower, materiel, and strategic and operational constraints. As Trump acknowledged in late August, Ukraine “has a fantastic defense, but is not allowed to play offense.”

America’s constraints compound this challenge. Munitions transfers to Ukraine and Israel without corresponding defense industrial overhauls have dangerously lowered U.S. stockpiles. Due to material constraints on America’s power, it ought to prioritize the Russian threat first through military and diplomatic levers. Near-term economic and diplomatic pressure can provide almost immediate relief, while a major upheaval in European security responsibilities and capabilities unfolds over the medium- and long-term.

Washington only has, perhaps, four years to implement the right sequencing. Years one and two should focus on helping Ukraine forestall Russian gains through continued intelligence support and military training, loosening the “review mechanism” that restricts Ukraine’s offensive long-range strikes into Russia, establishing European defense production foundations, and imposing systematic costs on Russia’s financial industry and energy trade, the two leading enablers of Moscow’s war effort. Enough pressure could degrade Russia’s wartime economy by 2027, when experts suggest Moscow may no longer be capable of sustaining the war in Ukraine.

Years three and four should fast-track European defense autonomy, freeing America to redirect its focus and forces to looming Indo-Pacific challenges. Through it all, Ukraine and Europe could receive selective transfers of munitions or advanced weaponry (when available and necessary), contingent on Europe assuming greater security responsibilities and making tangible investments in America’s defense industrial base.

While Europe may need up to ten years to achieve full defense autonomy, this phased approach ensures the transition begins and Russian military power degrades before other American threat alarm clocks start going off as early as 2027 (i.e., China’s planned military capability to invade Taiwan or Iran’s nuclear program restart). In either contingency, European countries will be better postured to deter or defend against Russian aggression, if necessary, for years, if necessary, alone.

Thus, America’s inescapable strategic constraints demand sequencing within sequencing: Western diplomatic pressure today; European defense autonomy tomorrow.

Sequencing, Part 1: Cutting Russian Lifelines

Despite a steady slew of sanctions imposed on Russia since 2022, loopholes still allow Russia to continue funding its war against Ukraine. To close these gaps, the United States and Europe should target Russia’s two war-funding pillars: its financial industry and energy trade. European leaders have long wanted Trump to impose more punitive measures against Russia, yet they also fuel Russia’s war machine, undercutting their own rhetoric. In recent weeks, Trump has pressed Europeans to live up to their own demands of America by halting oil purchases, purchasing U.S. weaponry, leveraging frozen assets, and strengthening sanctions. He is right to do so. In 2024 alone, E.U. countries purchased $27 billion worth of Russian energy. Major economies like France, Germany, and Italy still resist full cutoffs, while the European Union eschews secondary sanctions and remains skittish about using frozen Russian assets.

Start by sanctioning all Russian banks and their foreign subsidiaries. America should cooperate with the European Union, non-E.U. NATO members, and Japan to ban all transactions with Russian financial institutions (with very short-term exemptions for European countries winding down Russian energy purchases), and Washington should work with allied capitals to use the $330 billion in frozen Russian assets — not just the assets’ interest — to fund Ukrainian security, including European defense aid to Ukraine.

Next, the West should choke the flow of Russian energy. Last year, oil and gas accounted for 30 percent of Russia’s government revenues, even as Russia rerouted its trade at discounted prices ($60 per barrel) to hungry importers like China and India. Meanwhile, major holdouts Hungary and Slovakia continue importing Russian oil and gas, undermining broader Western pressure.

The European Union’s stated goal of ending Russian energy dependence by 2027 is insufficient for effective sequencing. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s more ambitious goal to end Russian gas imports by 2026 gets closer to the mark, though phasing out both oil and gas imports by summer 2026 would better serve strategic objectives. Anytime earlier would face stiff headwinds. Hungary and Slovakia lack adequate infrastructure for importing alternative sources after centering decades of energy policy around Russian imports.

Through summer 2026, however, the European Union can accelerate these transitions by increasing the holdout countries’ access to existing European liquified natural gas terminals and pipeline capacity, expediting approval for alternative energy infrastructure projects, financing pipeline investments, and offering a blend of financial incentives and strategic pressure to pressure the holdouts to import elsewhere. This blend could include the European Union prioritizing green transition funding (NextGenerationEU) disbursements for countries that demonstrate concrete moves toward Russian energy independence, while linking Cohesion Funding allocations to energy diversification timelines.

In July, the European Union set a new price cap on Russia’s oil exports: 15 percent lower than the average market price. The Trump administration should agree to the new price cap, persuade remaining allies and partners to accept it, and introduce a plan to tighten the price cap quarterly. It should expand “secondary sanctions” on companies facilitating the Russian oil trade and expand sanctioning of Russian shadow fleet tankers to match E.U. and British lists, which are nearly double the size of America’s and effective in stifling Russia’s energy trade.

Finally, Ukraine should be allowed to strike the energy infrastructure that sustains Russia’s war effort. The Pentagon should loosen restrictions on cheap, replaceable, and long-range weapons systems like the new Extended Range Attack Munition and Army Tactical Missile System, so Ukraine can target Russian oil refineries and key energy nodes. While Trump has already authorized Ukraine to receive 3,550 Extended Range Attack Munitions — with the first 10 to be delivered by October 2025 and the first batch of 840 to be delivered by October 2026 — delivery will have little impact unless the Pentagon lifts recent restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range U.S. and European weapons systems, particularly for energy infrastructure strikes. To maintain escalation control, the Pentagon could still restrict long-range strikes against purely military targets.

These steps would cut off Russia’s financial oxygen and accelerate the disintegration of its unsustainable war economy, weakening Moscow before it can regroup and press the advantage in Ukraine or elsewhere.

Sequencing, Part 2: The European Defense Buildup

The Russo-Ukrainian War has catalyzed Europe’s defense buildup. Germany, now the world’s fourth-largest military spender, exempted defense and security spending from constitutional debt rules, enabling billions of euros in defense investments and signaling its commitment to assuming a greater part of the European defense burden.

The defense surge has spread continent-wide. NATO allies pledged five percent of GDP for security and defense by 2035. The European Union allocated €150 billion for joint defense procurement. Results are promising: Europe’s annual ammunition production capacity is projected to reach two million rounds annually by the end of 2025, a sixfold increase from prewar levels. Europe’s leaders increasingly understand that peace requires strength. As German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius explained in August, Europe can only “talk about peace and détente [with Russia] on equal terms … [only] from a position of strength … from eye level.”

To make Europe “eye level” with Russia, the United States should collaborate in three areas.

First, establish a clear division of labor, where European allies manage most conventional capabilities while America provides “backstop” support in its areas of comparative advantage. European powers like the United Kingdom and France would forward-deploy “reassurance forces” near Ukraine, ready for deployment to western Ukraine during a ceasefire or escalation, where they would learn from Ukrainian forces and also provide rear echelon support. European partners would take a greater role in managing NATO–affiliated air and naval operations and patrols against Russian gray zone activities. Meanwhile, the United States would provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance overwatch, logistics and transport, nuclear deterrence, and stand-in forces. If done right, by 2027, the Europeans should handle day-to-day conventional deterrence and defense while America plays a specialized supporting role.

Second, accelerate defense industrial cooperation to transform European partners from consumers to producers capable of fighting without U.S. military equipment. This requires co-financing industrial capacity, breaking supply bottlenecks, and overcoming workforce shortfalls from years of “managed decline.” It also means sharing critical defense and dual-use technologies — such as 155mm artillery shells, long-range precision missiles, and air defense missiles — by extending AUKUS-style export control exemptions to key allies. Germany, France, and the Netherlands come to mind, particularly for established military equipment. Finally, integrate the “patchwork of national [defense] industries” into a cohesive, standardized European defense industrial base.

Third, surge in-theater munitions production through multi-year block-buy contracts from allied governments. European capitals should create or expand war reserve stockpiles to replenish munitions inventories, sending a sustained demand signal to industry. Pacific allies could join European procurement consortia, reducing costs and dependence on overstretched U.S. production capacity.

These steps won’t yield full European defense autonomy overnight, but they will fortify Europe’s ability to deter Russia so America can properly pivot to the Pacific.

Calculated Risks

This sequencing strategy carries risk, particularly the cost of reduced American attention in the Pacific before the critical 2027 “Davidson Window.” Although China hands, like Ely Ratner, acknowledge that China will struggle to execute a “short, sharp invasion” by 2027, Beijing continues building capabilities necessary for invading Taiwan, and could accelerate its timeline if it sees America focused on Europe before pivoting to the Pacific.

Pacific allies are already uneasy about America’s future commitment to the region. Australia and Japan have resisted U.S. pressure to spend more, with Japan scrapping ministerial meetings. Multiple allies have raised concerns about American disengagement from Asia and discussed strategic futures less dependent on America. Sequencing could deepen these fractures, giving China openings to exploit through economic and trade leverage. Yet, forcing Pacific allies to step up might also strengthen allied capabilities if they prepare to act more independently.

Sequencing also constrains U.S. diplomatic bandwidth. Intensive focus on European sanctions coordination and defense industrial cooperation reduces capacity for Asia-Pacific coalition-building and providing the military training and financing necessary to strengthen Pacific allies.

Iran’s nuclear recovery timeline poses another complication. While U.S. strikes likely set back Iran’s program by up to two years, some independent nuclear experts assess six months to one year for reconstitution. If Iran achieves a breakout nuclear capability while Russia remains militarily strong, sequencing fails by creating the three-front strategic nightmare it sought to avoid.

These counterarguments, however, strengthen the case for rapid execution rather than abandoning sequencing altogether. The above risks are real, but the alternative — waiting until China and Russia simultaneously prod the United States to war — remains more perilous. Sequencing would largely preserve U.S. munitions levels and buy time to prepare America for a Pacific fight while diplomatically punishing Russia and shoring up European deterrence. Choosing to sequence, however, requires acknowledging that the timeline for sequencing is narrower than desired, with smaller margins for error than historical precedents recommend.

Seizing the Strategic Window

With Iran neutered, European security improving, Ukraine holding the line, and Russia weakened, the United States has a rare opportunity to debilitate the Russian threat in the near-term while revitalizing Europe’s security architecture to deter Russia over the long-term, so America may finally concentrate its resources and attention on countering its great rival this century: China.

If the United States uses these next four years better than its adversaries, it will upend the strategic landscape. It will transform the Western alliance from protectorate to partnership. It will multiply America’s reach through increased allied capacity and burden-sharing. And it will prevent America from having to choose between defending Europe and the Pacific.

Nick Danby is a research associate at the Marathon Initiative and a U.S. Navy intelligence reserve officer. He served five years on active duty, completing tours in the Indo-Pacific and at the Pentagon, and later worked as a national security fellow in the U.S. Senate. He is currently a Gates-Cambridge Scholar pursuing an MPhil in Politics at the University of Cambridge.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Image: Midjourney