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Pyongyang has a long history of conducting irregular warfare and asymmetric operations: Look no further than the 1968 Blue House raid or the 1996 submarine incursion as the most pressing examples. More often than not, North Korea failed to achieve the intended objectives of its missions and lost its commandos. Despite failures, the regime pressed on, and now, over thirty years after the sub incursion, it has the combat experience of its special operations forces in Kursk to leverage. For policymakers and analysts, the more urgent question is that of transferability and operationalization of the Kursk lessons to the Korean Peninsula, and their overall applicability to North Korea’s future irregular warfare operations.
On the surface, it appears to be a dead end for the regime: The demilitarized zone and the Korean Peninsula are not Kursk. The forces that Pyongyang’s infiltrators will face in the south are different from those they faced in Russia. Seoul maintains trained counter-infiltration reserves, invests extensively in border monitoring systems and breach detection equipment, and regularly conducts exercises designed to prevent and counter North Korean amphibious and tunnel infiltration attempts. Both the entry into South Korea and operations within remain as challenging as ever.
Buried deeper, however, lie some of the lesser-discussed aspects of the Kursk and post-Kursk experiences of North Korean forces that expose Pyongyang’s dangerous calculus. Combined, these developments indicate that Pyongyang has been actively focusing on preparing its special operations forces for a new era of clandestine operations, tailored specifically to operating in a technologically dense environment — a domain in which its opponent excels. Given the emphasis on the drone component and its integration into infiltration operations, reconnaissance, and sabotage activities, there is an evident shift in North Korea’s irregular warfare doctrine, particularly in the terminal phase of operations. The regime is betting on increasing the complexity, lethality, and reach of its actions once its troops are in place. Simultaneously, while Pyongyang still remains bound by the constraints of successful operative insertion and weapons delivery, certain elements from the Kursk campaign — such as advanced camouflaging and drone-enabled infiltration corridor reconnaissance — indicate that Pyongyang is tailoring the lessons learned to that stage as well.
This trend is alarming. The cooperation between Russia and North Korea is not new and has already resulted in transfers of ballistic missile technologies, electronic warfare systems, and drones. Combined with the growing technological toolkit and experiences from Kursk, however, it is the irregular warfare component that — given further adaptation to the environment of the peninsula — makes the new era of North Korea’s asymmetric operations particularly threatening.
Historically, Pyongyang relied on gaps within the demilitarized zone, tunnels, and amphibious assaults to infiltrate its operatives. Nevertheless, harsh terrain, constrained logistics, and a high probability of detection have limited the scale and diminished the success of its operations. In the 1960s, North Korea repeatedly sent lightly armed two- to 12-person teams trained in guerrilla combat with a goal of subverting South Korea’s rear echelons. With limited logistical and destabilization capabilities, they preferred flight to fight after detection.
Maritime infiltration efforts have proven to be slightly more successful in terms of delivering weapons, explosives, and personnel, as well as evading South Korean detection. In the 1996 Gangneung incursion, the Sang-o class submarine used in the operation carried a wide variety of combat gear, including rifles, hand grenades, and a packable version of a multiple rocket launcher system. Pyongyang planned for its covert team to conduct reconnaissance on military facilities and power plants and make preparations to assassinate South Korean officials. The operation was not successful. After the sub ran ashore and later was detected by a civilian, the infiltration team retreated north and either self-eliminated or was consequently hunted down. Yet, it also exposed gaps in South Korean detection infrastructure and counter-infiltration forces.
The silver lining for Pyongyang was that North Korean special operations forces had no shortage of infiltration skills and were superbly trained in small unit tactics, demolition, and land navigation. They also developed methods to deliver equipment via maritime infiltration corridors. Their failures, however, indicate that they lacked situational awareness, quality communication infrastructure, logistical support, and modern gear — equally important factors that are needed to sustain and complete successful covert operations. Even the 21st-century assessments of North Korean special operations capabilities by the U.S. Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency highlight the same trend. South Korea has also enhanced its detection capabilities since the 1996 incursion, betting on technology and its naval and air forces, although the quality and quantity of its reserves have dwindled.
For an isolated and technologically inferior Pyongyang, a window of opportunity opened after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Moscow in June 2024. Shortly after, North Korea sent its special operations forces to Kursk to obtain what it lacked and receive the much-needed technological backing from Russia.
In this regard, the role of the Kursk campaign is undeniable. It was a quintessential opportunity for Pyongyang to see a modern, technologically dense battlefield. For this very reason, troops that fought in Kursk were selected from the most capable elements of its special operations forces: the 11th “Storm Corps.” Trained to fight on the peninsula and conduct offensive and infiltration operations along the Demilitarized Zone, the terrain they encountered in Kursk might have played into their hands. As it is comprised of agricultural fields, villages, and patches of heavy forest, it somewhat resembles the land infiltration corridors in the western part of the demilitarized zone, and particularly the valley floors near the Imjin River.
Simultaneously, North Korean troops have gained combat experience against well-trained Ukrainian troops, drone pilots, and special operations forces, indicating some exposure to NATO-informed training and Western equipment. In this respect, Kursk exposed North Koreans to operating against a technologically superior enemy that possesses a functioning command and control infrastructure, communications, and aerial reconnaissance capabilities. While not a direct match in terms of terrain and enemy force composition and tactics, these experiences are still transferable to the operating environment of the peninsula, considering further calibration and adjustment to the regional specifics.
Considering constantly heightened military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Kim family regime has never missed any opportunity to test and destabilize South Korea. Anecdotally, the political environment now favors this as well. While South Korea, under the new administration, is making overtures to Pyongyang, the regime has officially abandoned its goal of reunification and institutionalized the “two hostile states” framework. Now more than ever, these circumstances appear to be ideal for Pyongyang to conduct covert, below-the-threshold operations against South Korea, especially when coupled with its new Kursk experience toolkit and backing from Russia.
The Base Layer: Infiltration Tactics and Equipment
As history has shown, the success of the initial infiltration stages is dependent on South Korean detection capabilities and on overcoming an increasing technological gap. On these grounds, there are reasons to believe that the tactics and gear of North Korean special forces received an ample upgrade through the Kursk operation.
Russian special operations forces’ Telegram channels indicate that some North Korean units have conducted “shoulder to shoulder” combat operations and were exposed to various unconventional tactics of Russian special operations forces during infiltrations and raids on rear echelon Ukrainian positions. Russian propagandists also state that North Koreans leveraged their home-grown “underground warfare” infiltration tactics during combat, which could be referring to tunnel infiltration operations similar to a failed infiltration attempt via a gas pipeline by Russian special operations forces near Sudzha. There are, however, no recordings of North Korean forces participating in that particular assault.
Furthermore, while such evidence stems from pro-regime channels and does not offer any specifics besides pictures and text, North Korean reinforcements from the 94th and 92nd Special Forces Brigades did participate in combat alongside elite Russian forces in the battles to recapture Sudzha, successfully targeting Ukrainian supply lines and entrenchments. Accounts of Ukrainian soldiers from that period show that North Koreans were not only well-trained and successful in infiltrating their positions, but also well equipped with infiltration-focused gear that reduced their heat signature on night vision goggles and reconnaissance drones. Open-source footage further corroborates the use of advanced camouflaging techniques and weather conditions, thermal capes, and Russian-supplied extended cold weather clothing systems, suggesting a focus on all-weather survivability and adaptation to terrain conditions.
These observations fall in line with North Korean infiltration tactics designed around exploiting the weaknesses of South Korea’s high-tech detection systems — such as thermal observation devices used along the Demilitarized Zone and shorelines — leveraging terrain, vegetation, and bad weather conditions. While South Korea invests in these systems and surveillance drones to monitor border breaches, emphasis on the use of such equipment and tactics in Kursk similarly underscores Pyongyang’s understanding of one of the key developments of the war in Ukraine and challenges that it faces during the early stages of infiltration: battlefield transparency. As transparency becomes increasingly ubiquitous on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone, Pyongyang’s infiltration tactics and use of counter-detection equipment derived from Kursk are likely to reflect an adaptation to that threat in the future.
The scale of incorporation of such equipment and tactics in the Korean theater, however, is yet to be known. This will depend on how effectively North Korean commandos can calibrate them to the domestic environment, use them against South Korean counter-detection equipment, and ultimately produce them. While Russia deploys its own variations of thermal ponchos en masse, their effectiveness against evolving thermal cameras has been questionable. Even the U.S. Marine Corps is expected to procure such equipment only by 2027, and has outlined harsh non-detection threshold requirements, indicating both the importance of such gear for the drone-saturated battlefield and the challenges that come with it.
For North Korean commandos, a standalone upgrade in tactics and infiltration equipment resembles more of an enabler than a decisive breakthrough element of their future infiltration campaigns. In symbiosis with the drone component, however, it becomes the updated base layer, supporting both the initial and terminal stages of covert activities.
Near-term Scenario: Drone-assisted Infiltration and Reconnaissance
While the drone component and adaptation of North Korean troops to the drone threat are nothing new, the incorporation of drones into unconventional operations combined with tactics and gear from Kursk arises as the most transformative feature and the most feasible near-term scenario of infiltration and destabilization activities.
There is a convergence of factors that indicate prioritization of drone-enabled operations by North Korean leadership. Russian military bloggers state that drone-assisted infiltration operations fall directly in line with the North Korean leadership’s goal of training tens of thousands of troops in offensive and reconnaissance operations based on experiences gained in Russia. On the ground, Pyongyang’s emphasis on scaling drone production further supports this. The regime’s special operations forces stand at the center of this operationalization: Kim Jong Un has sent Col. Gen. Kim Yong Bok — the commander of North Korea’s special operations forces — to Russia with the sole purpose of “absorbing battlefield insights to bring back home,” thus completing the drone operationalization puzzle.
In the context of irregular warfare, the drone component, then, plays a twofold role. An addition of drone operators to the infiltration stage increases situational awareness of Pyongyang’s operatives and streamlines infiltration route planning. The terminal stage benefits from drone-enabled strike execution. Furthermore, in case of an enemy contact, the drone component would provide immediate support and precise indirect fire. All of these applications were tested during and after the Kursk operation and then brought back. November 2025 footage, for instance, shows North Korean drone pilots independently operating near Ukraine’s Sumy region. While there is limited evidence to confirm successful strike execution, assessments by Ukrainian military intelligence corroborate that these pilots are proficient in drone reconnaissance. They regularly conduct artillery fire and specialized reconnaissance operations against the positions of the Ukrainian armed forces near the Ukraine-Russia border.
Near-term deployment of the drone component is consequently supported by the evidence of training and preparations in the domestic theater. In July 2025, Russian instructors were believed to be training North Korean drone pilots near Pyongyang. According to Ukrainian intelligence, over 3,000 North Korean troops have already become military instructors, indicating active incorporation of the lessons learned in Kursk into domestic training programs.
Medium-and Long-term Scenarios: Sabotage Activities and Drone Ambushes
The drone component similarly opens the door to enhanced destabilization scenarios of sabotage and assassination of key figures, which already are major components of North Korea’s irregular warfare doctrine. Given successful infiltration, North Korean special forces could now capitalize on targeting South Korean supply lines, critical infrastructure, command and control centers, and government facilities that were previously unreachable via drones. Neutralization and assassination attempts on key political figures and government installations, which the regime believes would turn South Korea to chaos, similarly become more feasible with the help of drones.
The long-term destabilization scenario of drone ambushes, however, rests on further incorporation of Russia’s latest developments in drone warfare. Sleeper drones — including jam-resistant fiber-optic variants — could be used in drone ambushes and for hitting critical supply lines and command and control facilities. These drones are harder to detect due to their dormancy while awaiting the target’s arrival and work well for potential sabotage and destabilization scenarios. Some variants retrofitted with solar panels also allow for longer wait times, which could enable delayed and multi-layered destabilization operations.
Drone ambush and sabotage tactics were scaled by the infamous Rubicon regiment during the Kursk operation, indicating a possibility of an overlap and limited training of North Korean pilots. While some indirect evidence of this cooperation exists in Russian special operations forces-affiliated Telegram channels, it is difficult to fully verify these claims, and there are no official records of direct transfers of fiber-optic or ambush drones. Nevertheless, multiple sources state that both Rubicon and North Korean special operations forces played a central role in pushing Ukrainian soldiers out of Sudzha, and Pyongyang is also dispatching a fresh batch of pilots to Russia. Hence, further training in sleeper drone ambushes and transfers of associated tech should be constantly monitored and not ruled out. New evidence of training and operational deployment in Russia, in return, would signal an increasing probability of the drone ambush scenario within future North Korean irregular warfare operations.
The likelihood of each scenario depends not only on the successful infiltration but also on the observable evidence of how Pyongyang would try to address other constraints it faces.
For instance, the most critical chokepoints for the near-term scenario of drone-enabled reconnaissance, infiltration, and strikes are production and technology. These chokepoints, however, are being actively tackled by the regime with the help of its allies. The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team and the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis confirmed transfers of drone airframe designs, navigation and guidance systems from Russia. Pyongyang has also imported low-cost drones and drone assembly lines from China, indicating functioning imports and a growing domestic production capability even under sanctions. The logistical and sanctions chokepoints that previously limited continuous component resupply at scale are likewise diminishing. In addition to Moscow’s transport network, Pyongyang opened a direct road connection to Russia and is accelerating the opening of a bridge connecting it to China’s free trade zone in Dandong. The regime does not face the munitions constraint either, as it supplies Russia with drone cluster munitions of its own. Combined, these factors demonstrate that Pyongyang already has sufficient means and backing from its allies to deploy and scale the drone component within its irregular warfare forces, thus supporting the near-term scenario.
On a more technical level, there are other bottlenecks that limit the terminal stage and the medium- and long-term scenarios of sabotage and ambush: systems delivery, insertion of pilots, operational infrastructure, and signal range. While it is possible that each infiltrating operative could carry multiple drones, batteries, and explosive ordnance with an intention to assemble these drones once in the South, it is still conditional upon the initial infiltration success.
However, some of the observable indicators in this domain demonstrate Pyongyang’s ongoing attempts to mitigate these constraints. Sympathizers and clandestine operatives already present within South Korea could play a larger role in supplying components and establishing the necessary infrastructure for drone operations. This is supported by the regime’s new focus on creating sympathizers — including foreign nationals — inside South Korea to be used as agents. Any developments relating to the expansion of North Korean spy and smuggling networks, as well as maritime and tunnel infiltration channels, would correspondingly signal that Pyongyang is working on expanding its supply and infiltration ecosystem.
Since Russia has already transferred Pyongyang more advanced electronic warfare systems, the addition of Russian-derived drone signal repeaters and other communication equipment also arises as an indicator for the long-term drone ambush scenario is becoming more plausible. Operationally, repeaters would allow Pyongyang to overcome range limitations imposed by South Korea’s drone laws that prohibit drone flights within a three–five nautical mile radius of active airfields and military installations, consequently lowering the chances of pilot detection. Critically, the long-term scenario of drone ambushes could become even more possible as fiber-optic wire and batteries are now easily procurable on the open market and are deeply embedded into the ecosystem of China-Russia dual-use tech transfers, allowing for component spillover.
On paper, South Korea might appear to be ready to counter these developments. This year’s flagship U.S.-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises did include counter-drone drills. But the devil is in the details: The emphasis was put on countering larger one-way attack drones, rather than what North Korean forces have learned from Kursk. In the same vein, Seoul’s proposal for 500,000 drone warriors appears to lack an understanding of the evolving capabilities of North Korean special operations forces.
Pyongyang’s post-Ukraine clandestine operations and sabotage activities would differ from what Seoul has prepared for. The emergence and incorporation of light, easy-to-assemble first-person view drones and their use in coordinated and targeted attacks is what sets North Korean capabilities apart. It is not a marginal change. The regime has a new toolkit to intimidate and create panic, and the luxury of a choice to conduct limited or combined operations in case of an open crisis. Ukraine’s use of only 117 first-person view drones in its Operation Spider’s Web proves that even a limited deployment of drones in the enemy’s rear echelons could inflict disproportionate damage.
Response mechanisms should add all available countermeasures tailored specifically to what Pyongyang has learned and will learn in Russia. In the immediate realm, the identification layer should focus on establishing an integrated system of drone detectors and acoustic sensors around key assets — an approach that is particularly useful for detecting both first-person view and even fiber-optic drones that have no radio signature. Simultaneously, countermeasures to the sabotage scenario would benefit from anti-drone nets and signal jammers used by Ukraine. These solutions could provide an additional layer of physical protection for the most vulnerable military and logistical assets and critical infrastructure. Finally, deterrence and preparations for the medium- and long-term scenarios should likewise focus on identifying and neutralizing Pyongyang’s smuggling routes, intermediaries, brokers, sympathizers, and drone production enablers.
Seoul needs to understand that the post-Ukraine era is no longer a one-sided battle where investments into high-tech systems automatically guarantee long-term deterrence and safety. It also needs to understand that this era presents Pyongyang with an exploitable opportunity with a higher rate of return. Now is not the time to underestimate this threat.
Anton Ponomarenko is a Pacific Forum nonresident Kelly fellow and Stimson Center’s 38 North emerging scholar fellow. He is also a nonresident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies and a Kim Koo fellow at the Korea Society. His research focuses on cooperation and drone technology transfers between Russia, China, and North Korea, with analysis appearing in 38 North, the Diplomat, the Lowy Interpreter, and Asia Times, among others.
Image: KCNA
