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Every time reports emerge about a potential reduction of U.S. forces or capabilities in Europe, the old continent falls into the same cycle of anxiety and panic. The same applies to announcements about delayed or suspended deployments, planned rotations, or broader force posture reviews.
A brief historical reminder here is necessary.
The 2014 Wales Defense Investment Pledge is still often misunderstood in Europe as little more than an American demand for higher defense spending. In reality, it reflected something broader already taking shape in Washington: the expectation that Europe would gradually assume far greater responsibility for conventional defense on its own continent. The debate was never just about cash. As one of the participants and witnesses of this debate on the NATO Council at the time, I can report it was about capabilities, readiness, and Europe’s ability to generate meaningful military contributions to collective defense. Yes, the spending component mattered. But the pledge was never simply about pleasing Washington, nor was European allies’ higher defense spending an end in itself.
The core message from the United States was much broader: Europe had to start preparing seriously for a future in which it would carry far greater responsibility for its own defense — and everything that comes with it.
That meant acquiring capabilities, rebuilding neglected military structures, restoring hollowed-out armed forces, and preparing for a strategic reality in which the United States could no longer indefinitely sustain two massive theatres simultaneously: deterring Russia in the Euro-Atlantic space while also focusing on the Indo-Pacific and China. This logic did not begin with President Donald Trump, even if his presidency expressed it more bluntly. It has since evolved into something much closer to a broader strategic consensus in Washington.
Washington was already signaling this openly more than a decade ago during the Obama administration. Today, as the United States increasingly prioritizes regions that are not Europe, more American strategists openly argue that Europe must carry a larger share of the burden for deterrence and conventional defense in Europe. It took seven years — and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — for the message to fully register in Europe. After 2022, it became impossible to ignore that Europe would have to step up. Not primarily to satisfy Washington, but because the continent was finally waking up from its long post-Cold War defense slumber. The realization was painful: rebuilding hollowed-out armed forces and neglected military capabilities would take far more time, money, industrial capacity, and political will than many Europeans had assumed. Which is why today’s lamentations about potential U.S. troop reductions in Europe in 2026 ring rather hollow.
Some reports now suggest that Washington may be preparing to reduce not only troop levels in Europe, but also the broader pool of U.S. forces and capabilities available to NATO, including in a major crisis. If true, this would mark something more consequential than merely a posture adjustment. It would amount to the practical implementation of a strategic logic Washington has been signaling to Europe for more than a decade: conventional defense in Europe must become far more European.
Still, even if such reports prove accurate, the fundamental point remains unchanged: as long as the United States remains committed to European defense — primarily, and hopefully, through NATO — and continues to provide the ultimate guarantee through its nuclear deterrent, the exact geographic posture of American forces, while not irrelevant, is secondary to the commitment itself.. The key factor is the commitment itself: that the United States would intervene, that it remains the ultimate guarantee of allied security, backed by assigned forces and nuclear deterrence.
None of this should come as a surprise. The underlying logic is no longer marginal in Washington. From Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s blunt remarks last year to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s thinking about a more regionally rebalanced “NATO 3.0.,” the direction is increasingly clear: Europe is expected to assume far greater responsibility for conventional defense in Europe as the United States prioritizes other parts of the world.
Force posture decisions will ultimately remain sovereign American decisions — though naturally of profound importance to European allies. Still, the current debate around possible reductions reveals a deeply unhealthy European tendency: a kind of European “hunger games” — a scramble in which countries compete against one another to secure a scarce U.S. military force presence, much like the dystopian contest in the film of the same name in which participants were forced into ruthless competition for survival under conditions of artificial scarcity.
The competition that results is often strategically incoherent. Instead of encouraging European cohesion, it triggers internal rivalries and political positioning precisely when Europe should be focused on coordination and collective capability-building.
A dangerous logic emerges: If one becomes more useful — or more politically aligned with the administration in Washington — perhaps one can secure a larger share of the remaining U.S. military footprint.
That dynamic itself is becoming a bigger problem than the actual force reductions.
Today’s language about “model allies” echoes — consciously or not — a familiar Rumsfeld-era distinction. The labels have changed. The underlying logic feels familiar. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states are once again portrayed as the serious allies — those investing in defense, buying American systems, supporting Washington’s broader strategic endeavors, and openly willing to host additional U.S. forces. In 2003, the dividing line ran through Iraq, with Central and Eastern European allies — and aspiring allies — openly backing Washington. Today, the geography is broader, and the theaters may differ. But the underlying expectation — that some allies are more willing than others to align with the United States — feels strikingly familiar.
But the more important question is no longer what exactly America intends by such messaging — it is what Europe itself does with it. Too often, the debate slips into a zero-sum competition for American troops, presence, and political attention: We are the better allies, move the forces from them to us. Politically, that may be tempting. Strategically, it risks reproducing precisely the kind of intra-European fragmentation Moscow has long sought to encourage.
That is not a healthy message for Europeans to send, nor a healthy competition to engage in. U.S. forces should be stationed where they generate the greatest deterrent effect, not distributed as rewards to the loudest or most politically accommodating allies.
Potential drawdowns should encourage Europeans to build strength together, rather than scrambling for Washington’s reassurance. The objective must be a NATO where Europe acts as an engine of power, not a dependent. Ultimately, the transatlantic bond is strongest not when Europe begs for protection, but when it stands as a capable partner on its own continent.
Vytautas Leškevičius is a Lithuanian security and defense expert with more than 25 years of experience in NATO, E.U., and transatlantic security affairs. He previously served as Lithuania’s permanent representative to NATO and led the team coordinating Lithuania’s first presidency of the Council of the European Union. He is the chief policy analyst at the Vilnius- based Geopolitics and Security Studies Center and is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Image: Sgt. 1st Class David Chapman via DVIDS
