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Recent developments indicate that the United States has begun redeploying critical missile defense assets — including elements of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and Patriot batteries — from South Korea to the Middle East. As Washington navigates an increasingly volatile global security landscape, the need for “strategic flexibility” is understandable. South Korea remains a committed partner in the Indo-Pacific and recognizes the gravity of the threats facing our allies elsewhere. Yet the manner in which such decisions are handled raises a fundamental question about alliance trust. It also should prompt Seoul to think hard about what it should do next, both at home and in regards to the conflict in the Middle East.

The strategic significance of THAAD extends beyond the defense of the Korean Peninsula. While it remains a cornerstone of South Korea’s layered defense against North Korean provocations, the system also contributes to the broader allied missile defense architecture. Information collected at the THAAD site in Seongju supports the early detection and tracking of missile threats, strengthening situational awareness for regional defenses and serving as a critical node in the broader U.S. missile defense network. Any relocation of such assets inevitably carries implications for the alliance’s overall detection and response posture — and, by extension, the security of the American homeland and credibility of its deterrence.

The political and economic costs South Korea bore to host these assets should not be forgotten. The 2017 deployment triggered sweeping economic retaliation from China, with the Lotte Group — a major South Korean conglomerate that provided the land for the THAAD site — alone absorbing losses estimated at roughly $1 billion. South Korea accepted these diplomatic and economic burdens in order to anchor the region’s missile defense architecture.

Neither the U.S. nor South Korean governments have disclosed the specific logistical details of the consultation or the removal process. But against that backdrop, if such assets are removed through what is effectively a courtesy notification — a consultation pro forma rather than genuine consultation — the political consequences in Seoul will be corrosive. In the recent redeployment of THAAD launchers to the Middle East, Washington moved forward with the transfer despite the South Korean government’s expressed oppositions. While a notification occurred, it was a communication of a completed strategic reality rather than a joint deliberation. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung recently acknowledged the decision, noting that although the government expressed opposition to the removal of the systems, “It is also the reality that our position cannot be fully enforced.” His remarks point to a structural weakness in the current consultation framework: A consultation that functions as a courtesy notification is not a partnership — it is a signal of imbalance.

At the same time, South Korea continues to demonstrate significant good faith toward the United States, even when doing so carries domestic political sensitivity. The Korean government recently authorized the export of high-resolution mapping data to Google, a step long requested by American technology firms but resisted for decades because of national security concerns. On March 12, the Korean National Assembly passed a landmark legislative package designed to facilitate $350 billion in Korean investment in the United States, supporting supply-chain resilience in industries ranging from semiconductors to shipbuilding.

The alliance has shown before that potential friction can be transformed into institutional cooperation. In a 2025 column in the Washington Post, I warned that immigration enforcement actions at a Hyundai facility in Georgia risked discouraging Korean investment in the United States. Our two governments subsequently established the Korea-U.S. Visa Consultation Group, creating a mechanism to replace ad hoc crisis management with a predictable and professional dialogue.

Nevertheless, what began as a question of missile defense on the peninsula is now cascading into a demand for South Korean naval assets in the Strait of Hormuz, creating a cumulative drain on regional readiness. As Washington looks to allies to help secure critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Seoul faces a strategic dilemma: how to support freedom of navigation without overextending its own forces or becoming directly entangled in a regional conflict.

A recent poll indicates more than 60 percent of the South Korean public opposes deployment of South Korean naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, further complicating the incumbent government’s position. In the political arena, the debate is limited to whether or not to deploy — a rather simple proposition for a much more complicated geopolitical reality, as two thirds of South Korea’s oil imports passes via the strait.

As a leader of the South Korean opposition Reform Party, I propose that South Korea provide “iron” to protect the principle of freedom of navigation, specifically to the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea does not need to choose between passivity and deployment. It can contribute in a way that is both meaningful and sustainable.

Rather than diverting limited naval assets from the Indo-Pacific, Seoul can provide scalable, defensive capabilities designed to protect commercial shipping from asymmetric threats alongside logistics, maintenance, and industrial support. This contribution could prioritize defensive hardware, including capabilities such as advanced surface-to-air missiles and directed-energy systems. For instance, the Cheongung-II (M-SAM) system has demonstrated ongoing success and near-perfect interception rates in recent Middle Eastern deployments. Additionally, the Block-I laser system offers a high success rate for a revolutionary cost of approximately $1.50 per shot, providing a sustainable counter to the low-cost asymmetric drone threats that currently force partners to expend million-dollar interceptors. Just as South Korea has emerged as the arsenal of Europe by becoming NATO’s second-largest weapons supplier, it is well positioned to extend that role to maritime security in the Middle East. In doing so, South Korea can strengthen the operational capacity of partners already present in the region.

This approach protects a global public good — freedom of navigation — while maintaining a clear boundary between contribution and direct combat involvement. It allows South Korea to uphold alliance commitments without compromising its own regional readiness or exposing itself to unnecessary strategic risk.

Alliance trust is not sustained by requests alone, but by reciprocity and respect. If South Korea is expected to shoulder a greater responsibility for global security, then decisions that affect its own defense must be made as matters of joint determination — not unilateral adjustment.

A durable alliance is not one in which burdens are simply shifted, but one in which they are shared with clarity, consultation, and strategic balance.

Jun-seok Lee is a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and leader of the Reform Party. He previously served as the youngest-ever leader of the ruling People Power Party and was a 2025 presidential candidate. As a member of the ROK-U.S. Congressional Caucus, he is a frequent contributor to bilateral policy discourse.

Image: Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea via Wikimedia Commons