In 2024, Jonathan Ping and Joel Odota wrote “Will China Intervene Directly to Protect its Investments in Africa?,” where they argued that instability in countries China makes economic investments in have pushed Beijing to take on an increased security role across the continent. A year later, we asked them to revisit their arguments.Image: The Forum on China–Africa CooperationIn your 2024 article, “Will China Intervene Directly to Protect Its Investments in Africa,” you argued that political instability in some African countries poses economic risks that China might be unwilling to bear, potentially pushing Beijing toward greater involvement in security and investment protection. A year later, what is Beijing’s security strategy in Africa?China is deepening its military footprint in Africa, notably in Uganda and the Sahel. In Uganda, Beijing has deployed a military attaché, Col. Zhang Hao, and his deputy, Col. Li Hai, who recently met with Ugandan Chief of Defence Forces Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba and President Yoweri Museveni’s son, to discuss expanding military cooperation. Shortly after, Kainerugaba led a delegation to China, resulting in a bilateral agreement covering joint exercises, professional training, and technology transfer. In November 2023, Uganda and China also launched two defense-related ventures with Norinco, focusing on unmanned aerial vehicle production and explosives manufacturing. These moves coincide with Uganda’s upcoming 2026 elections, raising speculation about succession plans and China’s strategic timing. Economically, China’s pivot from Ugandan railway to oil projects may reflect the military relevance of energy infrastructure.Meanwhile, China appointed its first defense attaché to the Sahel, Col. Maj. Chen Xuming, amid growing support for junta-led regimes like those in Niger and Burkina Faso, as Western influence wanes. Despite its rhetoric of a “peaceful rise,” China’s growing role in African security — through state-backed arms deals and private security firms — suggests a shift toward more assertive influence.
Members-Only Content
This article is reserved for War on the Rocks members. Join our community to unlock exclusive insights and analysis.
In 2024, Jonathan Ping and Joel Odota wrote “Will China Intervene Directly to Protect its Investments in Africa?,” where they argued that instability in countries China makes economic investments in have pushed Beijing to take on an increased security role across the continent. A year later, we asked them to revisit their arguments.Image: The Forum on China–Africa CooperationIn your 2024 article, “Will China Intervene Directly to Protect Its Investments in Africa,” you argued that political instability in some African countries poses economic risks that China might be unwilling to bear, potentially pushing Beijing toward greater involvement in security and investment
