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Editor’s Note: This is the second article in a four-part series. The first article, “America’s Quantum Moment,” was published on Oct. 13, 2025. 

As quantum technologies move from proof-of-concept to deployment, supply chain resilience becomes just as critical as qubit coherence times. Resilience includes redundancy, domestic capacity, and timely alternatives when foreign manufacturers face disruptions or reprioritize their customers. Expertise and capital are key to driving technological innovation but mean little if a company or research lab does not have access to the necessary inputs and reliable supply chains.

Lack of access to one aspect of the supply chain can grind further research and development to a standstill, a red flag for investors and potential researchers. If the United States is to remain on the leading edge of quantum technologies, ensuring companies, government labs, and academic projects can consistently access critical supplies is a prerequisite.

As noted in the first installment of this series, we’re not disinterested observers — we have skin in the game. One of us is an active quantum scientist, commercializing quantum technologies, and investor at deep technology fund DCVC with portfolio companies in this space. We both regularly engage with companies in next-generation computation, advanced materials, space and defense technology, among others.

Mapping Quantum Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Quantum systems depend on components with no commercial-scale alternatives and lead times that constrain deployment timelines regardless of which qubit modality wins. A May 2025 NATO Transatlantic Quantum Community study identified critical vulnerabilities across four qubit types — superconducting, trapped ion, photonic, and semiconductor spin — and seven enabling technologies. The assessment used a five-metric scoring system evaluating supplier count within NATO (which has released a dual-use quantum strategy), research and development leadership, scaling capability, intellectual property position, and supply chain vulnerability. Components scoring 2.0 or above require immediate attention.

Cryogenics: The Dilution Refrigerator Bottleneck

Dilution refrigerators are the single most critical bottleneck for superconducting and some spin-qubit systems. These cryogenic systems cool quantum processors to temperatures below 10 millikelvin — hundreds of times colder than outer space — enabling the near-zero electrical resistance required for superconducting qubits to maintain coherence.

The market is dominated by three suppliers: Bluefors (Finland, with significant U.S. manufacturing in Syracuse, New York), Oxford Instruments (United Kingdom), and Janis Research (United States). Maybell Quantum (Colorado) is an emerging player in this market. Bluefors, the market leader, has shipped over 1,500 dilution refrigerator systems and 15,000 cryocoolers worldwide. Their Syracuse, New York, facility, which was the birthplace of the cryocooler, conducts all its cryocooler manufacturing. The company expanded its Syracuse facility in 2024 to an annual capacity of 20 systems, complementing 50 assembly bays in Europe. Bluefors reports lead times of 6–9 months and current production throughput of approximately one system per day. In 2024, Bluefors delivered 18 fully-wired systems to Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology in just 6 weeks, demonstrating surge capacity when demand justifies it.

But six-to-nine-month lead times become constraints when quantum computer builders are iterating on hardware every 12 to 18 months. If domestic dilution refrigerator and cryocooler production cannot meet demand surges — whether from defense procurement or commercial scaling — deployment timelines slip by quarters, not weeks. IBM’s Quantum System Two uses Bluefors’ KIDE platform, designed for systems exceeding 1,000 qubits. Google’s Willow chip and most other leading superconducting systems depend on similar infrastructure. Advances in spin qubits similarly rely on cryogenics. A disruption in dilution refrigerator supply would halt U.S. superconducting quantum development within months, and multisite operations can be one way to increase resilience.

Helium-3: Scarcity in the Coldest Corner of the Market

Helium-3 presents a different vulnerability: it is simply scarce and everyone in quantum needs it. Think of helium-3 as the specialized fuel for quantum refrigeration. Dilution refrigerators — the feats of engineering that cool most quantum computers — achieve ultra-low temperatures by mixing rare helium-3 and helium-4 (regular party balloon helium) isotopes. Without helium-3, these refrigerators cannot reach the extreme cold required for many quantum computers. Here’s the problem: Helium-3 doesn’t exist in meaningful quantities in nature. Helium-3 comes primarily from the decay of tritium, a radioactive hydrogen isotope. It comes primarily from nuclear weapons programs, where it’s produced as a byproduct when tritium (a radioactive material) decays over time. Small amounts can also be extracted from certain natural gas deposits, but these sources are extremely limited. There are also attempts to gather lunar helium-3.

The field has repeatedly identified helium-3 dependency as a discrete, high-priority risk. Bluefors emphasizes that its closed-loop systems preserve and recycle helium-3, mitigating some supply pressure, but any major expansion in quantum system deployment will require securing new helium-3 sources or developing alternative cooling approaches. There is a limited commercial helium-3 market without transparent pricing or reliable long-term contracts. If scaling to tens of thousands of quantum computers requires proportional helium-3 supplies, outside of the agreement with Interlune (under the Department of Energy Isotope Program), the United States has no clear plan to source it.

Rare Earth Elements, Critical Minerals, and Photonic Material Dependencies

Rare earth elements (those with atomic numbers 57–71) create a different kind of supply chain problem — not scarcity, but concentration. Despite their name, these elements aren’t particularly rare. The issue is processing them into the ultra-pure forms quantum systems require, with over 90 percent of high-purity rare earth processing occurring outside NATO territories.

Quantum systems need specific rare earth elements depending on their design. Photonic quantum systems require erbium and ytterbium for the optical components that generate, control, and detect individual photons. For example, Erbium-doped fiber lasers, widely used in conventional telecommunications to amplify signals transmitted through optical fibers at the 1550 nm wavelength range, which is ideal for long-distance fiber optic communications. These are expected to be relevant for quantum sensing and quantum networks. Neodymium-doped (Nd³⁺) amplifiers are used in classical and quantum optical systems, including lasers and fiber amplifiers. Nd³⁺ is known for its efficiency in generating light at the popular 1064 nm wavelength, used in both industrial and scientific applications.

Neutral atom systems, which trap individual atoms to encode quantum information, rely on critical minerals like alkali metals, elements like rubidium and strontium. China controls 69 percent of global rare earth reserves and dominates 90 percent of rare earth element processing. China recently expanded export controls on rare earths and metals. These controls apply to any “dual-use” items that contain .1 percent or more of the value of the exported item, or contain rare earths produced in China that are used in technologies related to “rare earth extraction, smelting separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, or secondary resource recycling.” The controls impact critical materials and equipment that are necessary for producing photonic components. While the volumes required are tiny — measured in kilograms per year, not tons — these controls are expansive and impact any amount of material exported from China.

Driving domestic acquisition and refinement of rare earth elements has been a focus of the Trump administration. Because quantum applications need small quantities, building such capacity could be a prime candidate for a “pilot program” or limited investment to build proof-of-concept before scaling for broader domestic production.

Lithium Niobate: The Hidden Crystal Risk

Lithium niobate presents a similar dependency for photonic quantum information processing. Lithium niobate (and a closely related material, barium titanate) is a specialized nonlinear optical material that makes controlling photons possible, to generate individual photons and route them through circuits—all with minimal loss of quantum information. Quantum technologies rely heavily on lithium niobate (or barium titanate) for electro-optic modulators, frequency converters, and integrated photonic circuits that manipulate individual photons. Japan’s Sumitomo Metal Mining and China’s CASTECH dominate commercial lithium niobate wafer production, with China controlling an estimated 60 to 70 percent of the market for high-quality crystal boules.

While several U.S. companies, including ADVR and HyperLight produce lithium niobate components, no American supplier has demonstrated the capacity to produce large-diameter, high-purity wafers at the scale photonic quantum computing will require. NTT Device Technology and Nanoln have made progress on thin-film lithium niobate-on-insulator wafers that improve performance and reduce material consumption, but both companies operate primarily in Asia. The authorities under the Defense Production Act could incentivize domestic lithium niobate production, but unlike semiconductor fabs requiring tens of billions of dollars, crystal growth and processing facilities for quantum applications represent modest investments — likely $100 to $300 million for meaningful capacity.

It’s not just about the making the material but also the know-how of processing these materials. The ability to etch and process lithium niobate (and diamond), while maintaining performance, is key to incorporating them in quantum devices. Intellectual property on these processes was developed in the United States. LightSynQ, recently acquired by IonQ, and HyperLight have commercialized these patents. Yet, most of the scaled-up production and manufacturing of these is on track to take place outside the U.S.

Semiconductors: the Common Denominator Across Platforms

Semiconductor fabrication affects nearly every quantum platform. Semiconductor manufacturing supply chains and fabrication facilities are cross-cutting risks. Control electronics for all qubit types — superconducting, trapped ion, photonic, neutral atoms — require specialized chips, including field-programmable gate arrays and application-specific integrated circuits. Ion trap fabrication, superconducting quantum chip production, and especially semiconductor spin qubits all require advanced fabrication capabilities. Spin qubits — which encode quantum information in the spin of electrons in silicon — face unique fabrication challenges. While they promise easier manufacturing because they use silicon like conventional chips, they require a special version: isotopically pure silicon-28. Regular silicon contains three isotope variants. One of them, silicon-29, has magnetic properties that destroy quantum coherence. Spin qubits need silicon-28 with silicon-29 removed — a purification process that’s expensive and specialized. Then this purified material must be fabricated into quantum chips using state-of-the-art semiconductor processes available in only a handful of facilities able to do this at scale with 300mm-scale processing tools. Recent roundtables have noted that Applied Materials and Intel (both U.S. companies) and IMEC (Belgium) could be valuable players given their fabrication capabilities and strategic interest in quantum.

Asian fabrication facilities dominate advanced-node production for control electronics, optical coatings, and photonic integrated circuits. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act attempted to address some of these gaps, but quantum-specific fabrication needs remain underserved. Multiple companies, particularly QOLab, have called for a dedicated quantum semiconductor line, akin to TSMC’s role in Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor manufacturing but optimized for quantum device integration. Applied Materials, for example, could stand up such a 300mm wafer-scale facility that aggregates demand across quantum modalities and serves a broad set of American companies. Such a facility could anchor a national platform and reduce reliance on foreign infrastructure, but it does not yet exist.

Specialized Components and Single Points of Failure

Specialized components present single points of failure. Several dependencies on ion pumps (used to maintain ultra-high vacuum), pulse tubes (critical for cryogenic cooling), and photodetectors (essential for photonic systems and readout in other modalities) have been flagged. Pulse tubes are manufactured primarily in the United States (Cryomech, SunPower), Japan (Sumitomo), Europe (AirLiquide, Stirling, Atlas Copco, Absolut Systems and Maybell are creating a manufacturing facility in Germany), and there are numerous smaller operations. Lithium niobate, a key material for photonic quantum systems, is primarily produced in Japan and China. Element Six, a subsidiary of De Beers and based in the UK, is the only proven Western supplier of electronic-grade diamond for quantum memory and sensing applications — critical for quantum networks and some sensing modalities. There is regular outreach from Chinese suppliers, such as Chenguang Machinery & Electric Equipment Co., offering advanced diamond substrates, likely targeting academic researchers constrained by Element Six’s limited capacity.

From Risk to Readiness: Policy Steps for Quantum Resilience

These supply chain gaps are not hypothetical. They determine whether quantum systems can scale from tens of units per year to thousands, whether deployment timelines compress from years to months, and whether the United States maintains the industrial capacity to support both defense applications and commercial markets. Policy interventions should address these chokepoints with the urgency they warrant — not in five-year plans, but in procurement decisions, manufacturing investments, and regulatory reforms executable within 18 to 24 months.

Prineha Narang, PhD, is an American scientist, engineer, and entrepreneur. She is a professor at UCLA, operating partner at DCVC, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation.

Joshua Levine is a research fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation.

Image: jbdodane via Flickr.