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In 2017, Brian Petit wrote “Playing Zone Defense: Niger and the Risk Versus Reward of Remote Operations” for War on the Rocks, in which he argues for a “zone defense” in Niger that involves a small, persistent U.S. special operations presence to support counterterrorism operations in the country. Seven years later, in response to the 2023 coup in Niger and the junta’s recent revocation of the status of forces agreement with the United States, we asked him to look back on his article.Read more below.In your article “Playing Zone Defense: Niger and the Risk versus Reward of Remote Operations,” written in December 2017, you argued for a small, persistent special operations presence in Niger to monitor threats and provide military assistance to the Forces Armees Nigeriennes against major terror groups. Is that presence still required in Niger? A “zone defense” presence is still a prudent measure in Niger and the broader Sahel region. This just got much harder. On March 16, 2024, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, the Nigerien ruling junta, issued an eviction notice for the U.S. counter-terrorism support apparatus inside Niger. In place for over a decade, this presence is a package that consists of U.S. military forces, bases, airfields (Agadez), overflight rights, security cooperation, and intelligence sharing. This disinvitation, if fully carried out, is a crippling setback for U.S. counter-terror efforts. Ongoing diplomacy will soon reveal if this is a wholesale break-up or something less, such as a Nigerien-dictated resetting of terms. Either way, an unwanted salvage job is now under way by U.S. diplomats and military leaders.How effective has the U.S. presence been in Niger over the past seven years?The U.S. security goal in such locales is to increase Nigerien capabilities to contain and manage the regional threats that, if left alone, could morph into transnational