The crocodile-infested shores of Darwin, Australia will soon be welcoming a new, long-term guest: the Chinese. The Northern Territory government signed a 99-year lease valued at US$506 million that will turn the daily operations of Darwin Port over to China’s Landbridge Group. The deal gives the Chinese firm 100-percent operational control of the port and 80-percent ownership of Darwin Port land, facilities of East Arm wharf (to include a marine supply base), and Fort Hill wharf. While Landbridge spends the next five years searching for an Australian partner company to hold the remaining 20 percent, the Northern Territory government will retain local ownership in the interim. The Chinese firm has further pledged to spend $35 million in the first five years to expand the port, and $200 million over the next 25 years.
Given an annual revenue barely in excess of $5 million from the Landbridge project, the Australians have made a risky decision with prospects of only minimal fiscal returns. As home to a rotational force of some 2,000 U.S. Marines (MRF-D), a military component of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia, Australia is betting Chinese access to the Darwin Port will not strategically endanger the presence and training of Australian Defense Force (ADF) units and their American counterparts. The cost-benefit calculations of welcoming Chinese investment just a few miles from U.S. and ADF forces simply do not add up: Greater risks to national security emerge amid limited economic benefits for the Northern Territory. Speculation about whether Darwin will ultimately transition from a Chinese-managed commercial port to a clandestine hub for Chinese espionage of Australian and U.S. forces, or even more seriously, an impediment to the U.S.–Australian security relationship in use as a Chinese naval logistics facility merit closer examination, given implications for Australian and American security and defense ties.
Experts on both sides of the Pacific have correctly noted the risks of the port transaction, a mistake that opens the continent to longer-term vulnerabilities at the hands of Chinese businesses and government-affiliated actors. Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, wrote for The Australian that the deal “threatens to undermine Australia’s relations with its closest security partner, the U.S., at a time when [Washington] is finally beginning to put serious effort behind its ‘pivot’ [to the region].” Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage expressed his own surprise that the Australian defense ministry agreed to the Landbridge deal, noting that Darwin is a natural “jumping off place” for ongoing U.S.–Australia exercises. Others point to questionable linkages between Landbridge CEO Ye Cheng and the Chinese Communist Party, given his membership in the People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory political body to the CPP dominated by Chinese businessmen. Analysts at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute have also identified close linkages between Landbridge and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Not only did the company form a military affairs office (wuzhuangbu, translated by some as “militia”) in August 2014, but former PLA officers populate key positions surrounding the CEO.
Yet, others, including Linda Jakobson of the Lowy Institute, offer a cause for caution in their analyses. She accurately notes that starting a military affairs office is not unusual; every large enterprise, university, and hospital in China has a similar militia-esque organization to provide basic security for daily operations. Australian Defense Secretary Dennis Richardson may have overlooked the potential for a signals intelligence listening station, but nonetheless refuted concerns of Chinese espionage since the commercial port Landbridge will be developing is but a small part of Darwin harbor. With the Australian naval base roughly four miles away, “the notion that the Chinese can establish a spy base there simply does not stand up to hard-headed scrutiny.” Frustrated by such speculation, Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin declared that if monitoring ship movements were the Chinese intention, it would be easier “to sit at the fish and chip shop on the wharf.” Chinese port-watching over fish and chips in Darwin would hardly be inconspicuous; setting up signals intelligence collection facilities would.
Assessments looking at the Landbridge purchase from either side of the harbor tend to reflect a misunderstanding of Chinese strategy. Darwin is not the first Chinese-controlled commercial port in a foreign country, nor will it be the last. Since the early 2000s, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have acquired stakes in or assisted in developing commercial ports and container terminals around the world. Take Hong Kong-based China Merchants Holdings International’s (CMHI) 85-percent stake in a port at Colombo, Sri Lanka, just 200 miles from India’s southern tip, or the firm’s ongoing Bagamoyo port development project in Tanzania. Cosco Pacific, another state-owned company, has invested in ports and terminals in Antwerp, Singapore, and Greece, among many others. In the case of Singapore, Cosco has a minority stake but manages and operates two berths alongside the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA). In Greece, not only was the Chinese acquisition of a container terminal at Piraeus port the largest modern foreign investment in Greece, but Cosco is presently finalizing a bid for a majority stake in the port.
Among China’s myriad overseas port projects, it is its investments in Djibouti that bear the most striking resemblance to current debates in Darwin. Just as Chinese commercial ports in Singapore, Greece, and Colombo failed to raise national security concerns, so too was Chinese investment in the Port of Djibouti largely overlooked. Like other host countries, Djibouti required investments to develop its port facilities and the Chinese proved to be a willing bidder. In 2012, CMHI acquired 23.5 percent of the Port of Djibouti for $185 million, an acquisition that included two-thirds ownership of the Doraleh container terminal, which placed a Chinese state-owned company just up the coast from Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. Naval Expeditionary Base and home to an AFRICOM task force.
When news of Chinese plans to establish a naval logistics center in Djibouti to support a stronger Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region recently emerged, the ties between business deals and political-military discussions became ever more opaque. While the direct linkages between a SOE-operated port and the planned naval logistics hub may never be fully known, it would not fall into the realm of the unreasonable to expect that the Chinese management at the Port of Djibouti grew close enough to the local government to facilitate conversations beyond the business realm.
In Darwin, unlike China Merchants Holdings, Cosco Pacific and other commercial port development companies, Landbridge is a privately held company. Since 2001, the firm and its eleven subsidiaries have invested in ports, petrochemical facilities, timber-trading, and real estate development predominantly in China, with only a handful of ventures abroad. Notably, Darwin is not Landbridge’s first investment in Australia; the Chinese company also holds a majority stake in Brisbane-based gas producer WestSide Corporation. While Landbridge may appear to have the flexibility that comes in operating as a private, rather than state-owned, enterprise, shareholder linkages to the central government and a Chinese-dominated board of directors may well ensure Landbridge’s business decisions are no less separate from Chinese strategic interests than the ventures of a state-owned enterprise. Without knowing the shareholder audience and their linkages to Beijing, the Landbridge-Darwin arrangement could just as readily be operating to fulfill state objectives — of espionage, of driving a wedge between Australia and the United States, and of laying groundwork for a future logistics center.
To be certain, the Landbridge-Darwin deal is not immediately about establishing Chinese logistics facilities. The chance for Chinese espionage on Australian and U.S. forces is real, particularly signals intelligence collection. So, too, is the likelihood that the Chinese presence will begin to drive a wedge in the U.S.–Australia alliance. As Djibouti has proven, despite strong reassurances from the Chinese that overseas basing is not one of Beijing’s priorities, a closer business relationship can yield the opportunity for discussions on military linkages. Thus, the immediate strategic risk posed for both Australia and the United States comes from whether the Chinese management at Landbridge uses the Darwin port as a means for wielding economic and political influence in Australia, wooing their hosts through business deals en route to establishing a future logistics center not too dissimilar from Djibouti.
If the port under Landbridge’s management opens strictly for business purposes, we should not expect much of an impact. The Northern Territories needed external investment, and the Landbridge-Darwin transaction supports the continued “going out” of Chinese companies in pursuit of high-profile infrastructure projects. Darwin may well become an important linkage in China’s expanded maritime silk road, a plan for “regional economic domination” which entails connecting the South Pacific to Shanghai, Singapore, and other maritime trade hubs north of the equator.
If, however, the port has a larger strategic endgame and will ultimately be used as a “diplomatic flashpoint” to drive the Australians away from their security ties to the United States, the Chinese could begin to hint to their Australian hosts that it may no longer be convenient for the U.S. Marines to maintain a presence in Darwin, let alone cooperate with the ADF in periodic training exercises. Signals intelligence and other forms of espionage conducted by the Chinese under the auspices of Landbridge’s daily port operations would weaken ADF and U.S. readiness, not to mention regional posture and preparedness. To send a clear message to the Australians, Landbridge could also apply pressure through its holdings in the Darwin port, causing a ripple effect in the economy to which Australians would no doubt be responsive.
Given that these possible developments would inhibit one of the most noticeable military components of the rebalance to Asia, not to mention directly endangering one of Washington’s most important regional alliances, the United States government should begin to encourage its counterparts in Darwin and Canberra to establish ground rules for the management of its high-risk, low-reward business venture at Darwin port. The continued presence of the U.S. Marines in Darwin should be a non-negotiable criterion for both Canberra and Washington; and, in the case the Landbridge management hints that the American military presence is no longer welcome, or if signs of covert intelligence operations are detected, perhaps it will be time for the people of the Northern Territory to rethink their business decision.
Lauren Dickey is a PhD candidate in War Studies at King’s College London and the National University of Singapore, where she focuses on relations between mainland China and Taiwan. She is also a member of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program at CSIS.
Photo credit: Ken Hodge
Honestly, I think the above article is mostly paranoia. Yes, the Northern Territory government made the decision to lease the port without going to the foreign investment review board, but the company is not an SOE and this is nothing more than a commercial lease to operate the port. This is obviously sovereign Australian territory where Australian law and the Australian people reign, and like any other commercial enterprise are subject to the Australian security services. Thus, I’m not really sure how much opportunity there is for gathering SIGNINT at Darwin; this isn’t like the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Any such activity would have to be just as clandestine as if it were operating in a port operated by Australian companies. Most of the personnel will almost certainly be Australian nationals. In any case, the PLA has dedicated SIGNINT satellite clusters that pass over Darwin 5 times a day.
In terms of this acting as a wedge disrupting ANZUS operations, again I struggle to see how much leverage this gives Beijing. All we are talking about is a commercial lease under Australian law, which can be sold or nationalised at any time. The Chinese government has nothing to do with any of this, and Landbridge does not own any of the infrastructure. This is only a lease to operate the port. So let’s plat out the scenario: crisis in the Ryukus, the US and Australia condemn Chinese actions, Washington begins to deploy more naval assets to Darwin, and now Beijing does, what, exactly? Orders Landbridge to shut down the port? There is literally nothing Beijing could do to prevent immediate nationalisation and seizure of the facilities. Yes, this would clearly anger Beijing considerably, and give them some form of Casus Belii over Australia, but domestically in Canberra such an action would unavoidably be viewed as an act of aggression by a hostile power, one that already has limited military means of coercion. At a lower end of the confrontation spectrum, how could Beijing use the port to leverage US presence in Australia? What, exactly, are they going to threaten us with? They’ll sell the lease? Why should Canberra care? They’ll shut down operations? We can forcibly nationalise it at any time. At best, it gives Beijing the opportunity to create a relatively minor incident between Beijing and Canberra, but by using that leverage it would permanently burn its diplomatic goodwill in Australia, revealing itself as a hostile power.
The US alliance is foundational to Australian security and grand strategy – just look at any number of defence white papers – and there is no way in hell it would be compromised over a $500m commercial lease. The very notion is ridiculous.
The most paranoid is the notion of Chinese basing in Darwin. The fact that you would compare the actions and events in Djibouti to Australia honestly strains credulity. A member of the ABC alliance, really, is going to be hosting Chinese military basing, just because Landbridge holds a lease to operate the port? The fact that you can even entertain such an idea illustrates just how little you have researched Australian policy, strategy and attitudes towards the US or China. I suggest any number of defence white papers – which outline the ADF’s strategic outlook – or any number of publications under the security challenges journal, operated by the institute of regional security.
Chinese companies have already invested billions is Australian infrastructure and real estate. Is this an attempt to wedge the ANZUS relationship? Or is it simply Chinese companies looking for assets which provide high yields and good capital growth when those returns are so low in China? I think we all need to realise that not every commercial deal undertaken by a Chinese company is an act of grand strategy.
Of greater concern must be the very recent cyber-attack of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology’s network (which has links to Defence and other security organisations), for which there’s apparently good evidence China was behind it.
For further info, see http://theconversation.com/cyber-breach-at-the-bureau-of-meteorology-the-who-what-and-how-of-the-hack-51670
A good reason why the ADF needs an enhanced cyber capability which, thankfully, is in the process of being developed.
Read ‘Ghost Fleet’ – I believe there are some parts in that novel (admittedly fiction) where Chinese access to port facilities in Hawaii are quite useful to them in that hypothetical scenario. I’d not be so sanguine about this development. Particularly in terms of the port’s location relative to USN and RAN operations, and the importance of SIGINT and ELINT. You are correct when you say that Australian government could re-nationalise the port, but that misses the point – the deal should never have been allowed to pass through government in the first place.
First of all, I’m not sure I would be citing Red Storm Rising for a realistic assessment of a FDR/GDR economic deal. We are talking about a novel after all.
Secondly, why? Where is the threat of SIGINT in this deal? How would it be implemented? Where? This is a lease to operate the port facilities, that’s it. There is, and will always be, a heavy Australian security presence throughout the port. How does this deal facilitate any SIGINT activities, whatsoever?
‘Ghost Fleet’ is not ‘Red Storm Rising’ – two different books by two different authors written in two different time periods (Ghost Fleet last year, Red Storm in about ’84-85). Ghost Fleet is about China, so not sure what you are on about re ‘FDR/GDR economic deal’.
Regarding SIGINT – once you have a foot print on the ground its a relatively straightforward matter to install and operate SIGINT facilities and sensors. These things don’t have to be that large and they can be installed covertly, operated by Landbridge personnel (who also just happen to be serving or ex-PLA), out of sight of Australian officials. Given that Landbridge will of course have a commercial right to secure their facilities (they own the port for 99 years) they could prevent local law enforcement or for that matter, other Australian personnel from gaining easy access.
Seriously, you really believe that once they are established on the ground they would NOT undertake intelligence gathering, given the close links they have with PLA and CCP??? How stupid would they have to be not to do that?
Dr Davis, I’m well aware that Ghost Fleet and Red Storm Rising are different books. The, rather obvious, point is that appealing to a novel as evidence in a conversation about the strategic implications of a commercial lease is about as useful as looking to Saving Private Ryan for an understanding of small unit infantry tactics. Ghost Fleet is a novel, designed to be entertaining. It’s not a realistic assessment of a future conflict. Nether was Red Storm Rising, which incidentally had heaps of ultra-cool stuff like a Soviet Airborne Division being secretly deployed to Iceland by a camouflaged merchant ship. Maybe NATO planners should have looked to Tom Clancy and taken precautions against just such a dastardly idea?
As for the threat of SIGINT, I think you’ve been watching a few to many James Bond films. Firstly, if you are going to gather signals intelligence over a reasonably large area you need a reasonably large series of antennae, depending on the bandwidths you are monitoring. So no, actually these facilities are rather large, and they also generate a rather large amount of radio traffic. So they are not easy to hide. Unless you want only reasonably local coverage, but in that case what are you going to actually get? RAN/USN forces are not going to be utilising tactical communications within the port, and their combat radars will not be operating. So what is this clandestine small scale SIGINT facility going to be compromising, exactly? Is it anything more than such a facility at the Chinese consulate could gather?
But just think about it a little harder for a second. If you were the PLA, and you wanted to gather ELINT on ANZUS activities in Northern Australia, you think the best way to do it would be to lease a port (hardly a great place to begin with considering there is already a significant customs and police presence) and then use ex PLA (who happen to be Chinese) personnel to install a clandestine SIGINT facility. And that isn’t going to be the very first place ASIO directs its counter-espionage activities? Rather obvious isn’t it? A Chinese run facility is going to be the very first place Australian authorities are going to look, and no, there is literally nothing they can do to prevent Australian security services from gaining access to any part of the port. This isn’t an embassy, all Landbridge has is a commercial lease. The PLA would be able to gather far more SIGINT from merchant vessels which frequent the port and are immune from detailed search and seizures. Additionally, a Yaogan satellite cluster passes over Darwin every 5 hours, and is capable of gathering a massive amount of wideband SIGINT over the whole of Australia, far, far, far more than any conceivable clandestine facility at the Port.
In any case, there are literally dozens of large pieces of Australian infrastructure like this that are owned, either in part or in full, by Chinese companies, some of them SOEs. Maybe they are all secret PLA SIGINT facilities?
Honestly, this is a silly idea. I’m sure the PLA has significant intelligence operations ongoing in Australia, but I’m equally sure they are a little more sophisticated and subtle than the kinds of operations you are musing.
From Australia’s War on the Rocks:
“Australian criticisms of the lease should have been ‘put to bed’ by responses from both the Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence and China experts. Dennis Richardson pointed out that the deal was exhaustively examined both by the Defence Department and ASIO, and it was ‘amateur hour’ to suggest there was an espionage risk. ”
“Australian critics have mainly not appreciated what the lease involves, the composition of the port of Darwin, or the nature of port operations more generally. The lease covers the principal parts of the port involved with international commercial shipping. It doesn’t include major parts of the port, such as the coastal shipping and fishing facilities around Frances Bay, the Darwin naval base, or Stokes Hill wharf. As well as being a major tourist venue, the latter wharf is still used by Australian Customs Vessels, RAN vessels and visiting warships.”
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-darwin-port-lease-setting-the-record-straight/