Commander Matt Schnappauf’s recent piece on the release of the British Strategic Defence and Security Review pointed out something that has been clear for a while now: The Royal Navy has been in steady decline for over a decade. He points out that the new document offers glimmers of hope, but does it really? Few of those who have identified this state of affairs have closely examined the Royal Navy’s decline as reflected by its abysmal force structure. All too often, analysts and pundits bemoan the current state of something without investigating how that state was reached.
So how did the Royal Navy get here?
First the numbers: In just the last five years the Royal Navy’s fleet of warships decreased by 17% (89 to 65). To put that in perspective, that would equate to the U.S. Navy of 2009 (283 ships at the time) falling to 234 ships today instead of the 272 in the current fleet. The Royal Navy force that sortied to the Falklands 33 years ago was bigger than the entire Royal Navy of today. It had three more operational aircraft carriers (versus none today, although two are under construction), patrol aviation (versus none today), and far more frigates and destroyers. Perhaps that is one reason the Argentinians have raised the issue of the Falklands/Malvinas again.
Compare this with Japan. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force numbers 107 major warships, including logistics ships and submarines. They sail four helicopter destroyers (which are really light aircraft carriers), 13 patrol aviation squadrons, and the latest and most advanced AEGIS equipped destroyers, a submarine force, and they have a respectable amphibious warfare capability to boot. It has double the numbers of frigates and destroyers of the Royal Navy. Critics of this comparison might respond that Japan needs such forces because she is an island power. Exactly.
The decline of the Royal Navy is not just due to governmental parsimony and expensive weapons systems. It is just as much, if not more, the result of the ascendency of the British Army in the London budget battles during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During these conflicts, Britain decided its army was more important to its interests than any other service. Short term operational commitments became long term policy. As long ago as 2008, respected commentators on British defense such as Michael Clarke, Colin Gray, Hew Strachan, and Sir Max Hastings lamented this prevailing trend and the flaws it revealed in Britain’s strategy. Nonetheless, the decline continued, perhaps through not-so-benign neglect and a poorly considered focus on the close fight instead of the long game. I know of another major power that has a similar problem, although not quite as acute.
Keeping a weather eye on the horizon, as all sailors do, it is true that there may be some good news in the offing with the most recent moves by the Cameron government vis-à-vis aircraft carriers, anti-submarine warfare ships, and aircraft. But if history and recent policy choices teaches us nothing, we must remain vigilant to the trends of decline that have been threatening our collective maritime security. After all, one cannot have a 1000 ship navy by oneself. Unless, perhaps, one is China.
John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Professor of Military History and has served on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College since July 2000, retiring from the naval service in 2004. His most recent book, published by Praeger, is entitled Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns.
Image: Ministry of Defence, L(Phot) Will Haigh
John T. Kuehn 
Is there a solid strategic rationale for Britain having an 89 ship navy? I think the answer assumed here is yes, but it is not argued. What is the strategic basis for a larger Royal Navy, specifically?
If the Britain of today simply does not need the navy of yesterday, then naval decline may well be the appropriate trajectory.
Let me tackle Kuehn mistakes.
1) The carriers, destroyers, frigates of 1982 are nothing compared to the ships today. A Type 42 cannot match the capabilities of even 2 Type 45s. Type 21s and 22s then cannot match today’s Type 23s or even some RFA ships.
2) Kuehn writes as if Argentina can successfully mount an invasion right now. In 1982, the UK was not provoking Argentina and had a small platoon-size force there without air defence or naval support. Today, the UK has a minimum but capable tri-service for there, backed up with intelligence and rapid reaction forces if need be. Today, Argentina has retired its some of its combat aircraft, oes even have personnel working 24/7 and its ships and submarines sink or hardly leave port.
3) Blaming the British Army for the Royal Navy’s decline is like blaming the DWP’s budget due to to DFID’s or even FCO’s expenditure. The British Army could like wise blame the RAF for its lack of support in Afghanistan–not enough CAS or faster medical evacuation.
4) It’s always more more ships and submarines sir. More is better. Even where there was more in the 1990s or 1980s, the ships as stated above were not so capable–even HMS Conqueror fired a WWII era torpedo–as today’s ships. Nor were they even sailing much or conducting wide global patrols especially due to maintenance.
5) Relating to the above, as I’ve said elsewhere, you can have 89, 890, 8900 or many ships but who is to man them? People still complain there aren’t enough Type 45s. But even Hansard questions and answers show today’s Type 45s (and other RN ships) are not 100% man. To put it is the spirit of materialistic Christmas, you can ask Santa for more toys, but where are the kids to play with them?
Forces review UK, I would agree with you on the Falklands issue, it regularly comes up but the debate always seems to start with the assumption that Argentina with a smaller and older AF and Navy somehow takes the islands against what are now well prepared defences and we have to fight to take them back.
A successful surprise attack, at present in just a non-starter. If Argentina bought a whole new AF and Navy from China or Russia and had a decade or so to train on using it, we would have to up our game but at present that is a big if..
In terms of increasing numbers of ships, yes you would have to recruit and employ more sailors to man them the cost of a bigger navy is not just buying more toys and keeping the Clyde yards busier, but the cost of manning the ships as well. If the decision is taken to do that it can be done, within existing defence budget it means shrinking Army further, other option is spending more on defence, but as we are already spending the most in the EU I see no public appetite for that.
Tim, Very good point. I think it probably more appropriate for a British person to respond, say someone like Geoffrey Till, and I did try to give vectors to some of these types of folks who had made the arguments you seek in the RUSI issue I mentioned in this brief piece. However, the primary argument has to do with economics and geography. Britain absolutely is dependent on the sea for its economic life blood and still has considerable off-island interests as well, never mind the Commonwealth. If the US Navy were healthier and larger then piggy-backing on its security makes sense, but in an age when the US Navy is in decline as well it makes no sense to let one’s own force structure and capability decline. Relying on other nations, even friendly ones, to protect one’s national interests can be, and right now is, a risky approach to security. That said, the “ambush” was more about how we got here and I have plenty of company in my position that sees an over focus on the so-called war on Terror as contributing to all sorts of declines in all sorts of institutions, one of which is the Royal Navy. Thank you for your comment. John T. Kuehn
I find this interesting, but the reality of Britain’s situation is that the country is still in decline as a great power. Since the depression in the 70s that forced the IMF bailout, along with the austerity of the Thatcher years, the country could sustain its large naval fleet, on top of the army. While budget battles reflect an increasing emphasis on rapid reaction, a fleet without significant capacity for global intervention is a drain on national resources. Now if the British focused exclusively on Europe, then the situation would be different, and we might avoid the hole left by the US repivot to Asia.
All in all, I agree with Tim by saying its a natural trajectory, and that Britain is now finding its way into a new role, especially in lieu of Brexit.
Considering no one has invaded England since the Normans, maybe the question should be, why does the UK need a navy at all?
England imagining it’s still a world power is the problem. The proper mix of force structure, more emphasis to the army, and such, are not the real problems. Even though The City may be a financial powerhouse (for a while longer), the UK doesn’t have the economy or tax base on which to support a larger military. Part of righting that sad state is to give up the financial drain from the last of its remaining colonial vestiges (like the no-longer needed coaling station called the Falklands). If not, the Grand Duchy of Fenwick could beat the Royal Navy!
The decline in numbers has not been happening over the past decade or so though there has been a blip down it is part of a long term trend, which can be measured back to 1945 (or some would even say 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, when the RN finally accepted they could not win an arms race with the USN).
Initially post 1945 the RN had the enormous fleet built for the war and the British Empire was still a global power if a declining one, but the Imperial part of the operation took a killer blow in 1950 when newly independent India decided to be really independent and pulled its forces from the occupation of Japan and declined to take part in Korea.
The majority of the imperial interests had gone by the time of the evacuation of Aden in 1967 and the withdrawal ‘east of Suez’. The decline in the RN takes longer as once ships are built the tendency is to keep them in service, and many of the ships that fought in the Falklands were from an earlier era and already planned to be pensioned off with no replacement.
1967-89 saw a commitment to the Cold War with hunting submarines in the GIUK gap and the army in Germany. 1990-2000 saw a peace dividend and decline in all services, but the army still had a commitment in Ulster and a new commitment in the Balkans so was spared what would otherwise have been harsher cuts.
2001 onwards and the war on terror was ruthlessly exploited by some in the army in their traditional war with the other services and with the treasury. It is even alleged that the intervention in Helmand in 2006 was a way of protecting Army numbers at heart, ‘if we don’t use them they will be cut’ says General.
The British public are willing to spend slightly more than anyone else in Europe on Defence because of history and tradition but now that the imperial commitments are gone are not going to spend much more than that. So if we are going to have an independent nuclear deterrent unlike the Japanese example, money will be tight. So do you prioritise the Army or Navy, I would argue the Navy but I understand how that looks difficult to politicians when body bags are coming back from Helmand every other day.
Now that the wars in the desert are over, the discussion can be about where the threat is from?
The Royal Navy in 1982 didn’t have patrol aviation. Nimrods belonged to Royal Air Force.