The Pink Flamingo on the Subcontinent: Nuclear War between India and Pakistan
A “pink flamingo” is the term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe predictable but ignored events that can yield disastrous results. Hoffman argues that these situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to “black swans” — the unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown.
The tense nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous pink flamingo in today’s world.
The Indian subcontinent — home to both India and Pakistan — remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-armed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real possibility.
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh). Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the brink of war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis.
These stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today.
Since 2004, India has been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick armored assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours.
The problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start and help to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons program — and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more than 200 nuclear warheads — more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time.
It is not simply the pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistan’s arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways. Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons — on its own soil if necessary — to counter Cold Start’s plan for sudden Indian armored thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers, and increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis.
Beyond the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistan’s growing tactical nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and the prospects of local commanders being given decentralized control of the weapons — a “use it or lose it” danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current arms race.
Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure from the United States and immense restraint exerted by then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory strike averted.
The chances of such Indian government restraint in a similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-level dialogue between the two states — last August’s planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after disagreements about Kashmiri separatists.
There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures between the two sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for the future. Neither nation’s military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold.
The United States should also reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove vital in the next crisis. Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their well-researched estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored invasion. And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the U.S. government’s recent outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.
A nuclear war between India and Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. The damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions, and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global problem. There are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But the stakes of a war between two of the world’s most hostile nuclear powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well worth making.
Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University. Both also serve as Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council. Their column appears in War on the Rocks every other Tuesday.
Kurt NY 
Bharat Karnad 
Bihari Krishna Shrestha 
NHA 
An excellent and concise summary of the situation.
My feeling is, however, given the ‘crisis fatigue’ already in place across the Western world’s electorates and political elites, the chances of adding yet another item — in the form of the preventive measures you recommend — are somewhere between slim and none. If nothing else, that’s because the locale for this possible war is about as far away from the centers of the US and Western polities as it can be while still being on the same planet.
I think the best the US/West could do now, in the practical sense, would be to have in place plans for various degrees of postwar intervention (rescue missions and salvage work).
Given the numbers of possible casualties involved, I doubt there’s much we could really do for the survivors of a full-blown nuclear exchange on the subcontinent, but we should at least be concerned with retrieving the unused portions of both nations’ arsenals, so as to keep them from falling into even more unstable hands.
The real risk is posed not by nuclear weapons themselves but the intransigent embrace of terror tactics as a form of national policy by the Pakistanis. Do we really believe the raids on Mumbai or the Kashmiri parliament were conducted without the active participation of the Pakistani government?
Pakistan and India have a long existing rivalry but the true exacerbating factor in all of this is Pakistan’s continuing use of terrorism. We have experienced this irresponsibility in Afghanistan where hundreds of Americans have been killed and injured by attacks planned, supported, and sponsored by Pakistani ISI.
Pakistan is a cancer.
A bit paranoid really. If there’s anything the last few wars and almost wars like parakram, kargil or Mumbai have shown is that India has a huge capacity for restraint. So the scenario painted may have a low probability. That leaves kashmir or the LOC. Pakistan is not going to use a nuclear weapon there and India has a no first use.
In fact Pakistan tries its best to keep the conflict below conventional level, at least for the time. The danger is defi of nukes falling in the wrong hands. That I believe is the pink flamingo out here
What is the strategic benefit to Islamabad for mumbai? Almost initiating a larger conventional conflict they are unlikely to win, which leads to a nuclear exchange. I personally don’t see the policy line there. I don’t doubt that group was sponsored by the Pakistani state in some fashion, but that does not make it an instrument if Pakistani policy.
Please see my fictional India-Pakistan nuclear scenario…
http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/indo-pak-tensions-a-fictional-nuclear-war-scenario/story-gundIhC1iC0amJjMFYo3AN.html
Hindustan Times, October 8, 2015
Indo-Pak tensions: A fictional nuclear war scenario
Pink flamingo maybe the the current buzzword but perhaps elephant in the room is more appropriate.
Whitewashing the fact that India agreed to a UN plebiscite on Kashmir in 1947 – still yet unactioned. Then the funding of Mukhti Bahini in East Pakistan leading eventually to the 1971 Bangladesh war. This is verified by Indian writer Sarmila Bose.
The Delhi attacks and Mumbai attacks were admitted by one of their own govt members was done by RSS minded military personnel. Infact the blowing up of the Samjhota Express initially blamed on Pakistan was masterminded by Col Purohit. Similarly Hyderabad mosque and 5 other terrorist events blamed on Pakistan was eventually found to be false flag operations.
As a nation perhaps a tenth of the size of india it has every right to be vary. Look at the treatment meted out to Nepal and previously Sri Lanka? Who sponsored the tamil tigers as a part of their doctrine of strategic depth? And who then went and cleared that up?
But let us not allow truth to spoil a good story. Manmohan Singh didnt show restraint – he was presented with evidence at the sharm el sheikh summit of indian involvement in terror including Balochistan – verified by former US defence secretary Chuck Hagel.
If there is sincerity in conflict resolution then a comprehensive look at issues is imperative. Not a PR exercise on a behalf of a govt whose Prime Minister was not even allowed to visit the USA due to his involvement in the Gujrat Massacres and forcible conversions of Christians and Muslims alike.
Hi,
Your comments and response is really appreciated, as we guys are much more relaxed and its really a privilege to be under the tutelage of PAKISTANI DEFENSE forces and yes we know that the sovereignty of our country cannot be challenged by few ill-minded people. As this country is in very strong hands safeguarded by PAKISTAN ARMY AND ISI which are very well equipped than any defense forces in the world.
well if we see the current scenario situation in India is more hostile than Pakistan.The rising issue of intolerance for Muslims and other minorities is on rise.So i disagree with people here that only Pakistan has issues.India for many years is having a cosmetic surgery of secularism and now this skin is going out and world is watching its face.The exploitation at line of control is done by India recently not Pakistan.Muslims and other minorities are burnt by India just for prejudice.On the other hand we are now entering in to a peaceful era after a long battle against terrorism.Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism and always discourages such instances.What if the Indian nuclear weapons gets in to the hands of extremist groups in India.No body talks about it but can see that they are having issues of intolerance and extremism on rise.
When it was established beyond any doubt that Pakistan backed militant were behind two terrorist attacks in India particularly the one of Indian parliament?
A nuclear war can be averted if India quits its reluctance to resolve long lasting disputes. Pakistan has certain fears, at the top, Indian military doctrine CSD is threatening Pakistan with its military strikes on Pakistan and Pakistan having weaker side can’t sustain such attack. Hence TNWs has a role there. Besides that, Pakistan cannot afford massive spending on its military and weapons tech so it only modernizing its nuclear arsenal in order to maintain full spectrum deterrence. India has opted a belligerent policy against Pakistan and BJP government wants to coerce. So Pakistan has the only reasonable option against Indian aggression that is reliance on its nukes.
A lot of conspiracy theorists here today… You guys are all too close to this, try and be a little more objective. Competition like this is rarely one sides ‘fault’.
This is typical of the kind of articles that pass as deep analysis in Washington (and Western security enclaves, generally) when, actually, they are entirely bereft of the basic understanding of the socio-political reality in the Indian subcontinent. So, here’s a very brief historical analysis (elaborated at much greater length in my books – most recently ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’ [Oxford University Press, 2015), ‘India’s Nuclear Policy’ [Praeger, 2008], and ‘Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security’, 2nd ed., [Macmillan India, 2005, 2002].
The partition of British India in 1947 resulted in an ethnically and religiously cleansed Pakistan (with the mass of Hindu population driven out) and an India that retained its composite character, including a large bloc of Muslims who today constitute the largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia. For Islamabad the “unfinished” business of partition revolves around the two-thirds of the erstwhile “princely state” of Jammu & Kashmir, whose future was legally decided by its Maharaja, per the “transfer of power” rules agreed upon by the departing colonial power, Britain, and the leaders of the freedom movement, who acceded to the Union of India rather than join his kingdom with the rump state of Pakistan. Pakistan then decided to force the issue by deploying a force of irregulars to overturn the accession resulting in a limited military conflict. The UN-imposed ceasefire that obtained the present territorial division of that state followed India’s taking the dispute to the world body. The referendum promised in the UN security council resolution that both parties accepted first required Pakistan to remove its military and police forces from the third of the state it had forcefully occupied, which didn’t happen thereby nullifying the UN resolution. Subsequent and regular elections in Indian Kashmir since then have validated the people’s support for the state’s legal union with India.
Pakistan, however, did not stop contesting India’s control of the larger part of Kashmir, initiating all the “so-called wars” to try and wrench it from India. It repeatedly failed until in 1971 it lost the eastern portion of the country, which Islamabad had hugely misruled resulting in irreversible alienation of the people, a violent freedom struggle and the emergence, with India’s military assistance, of independent Bangladesh. The leadership of the Pakistan Army – an army with a country of its own – seethed unable to do much about the conventional military superiority India enjoyed. The unique feature about India-Pakistan ties, however much these may now and again sour, is that the sharp end of the animus is blunted by vibrant kith and kinship relations of the divided Muslim community which politically dictate how far either side can militarily go in hurting the other. Hence, all the India-Pakistan wars without exception have resembled “riots” not real “wars”, with the militaries as per unwritten rules of road, engage occasionally in “wars of maneuver” not “wars of annihilation”. No India-Pak “war”, the 1999 Kargil border skirmish apart, has lasted more than a fortnight or so, or extended beyond a 30-mile-wide corridor on either side of the border (and then mostly in the desert areas where armor and mechanized units can rumble unhindered unlike in the Punjab where the network of canals hinder rapid movement by mobile forces), or been particularly comprehensive in the wherewithal used – both sides have desisted from counter-city bombardment, for example).
But Western analysts and commentators are not clued into this socio-political reality in which conflict is automatically curtailed, or simply won’t bring it into their analyses and assessments as that would undermine the interests of Western states keen for geostrategic reasons in sustaining a role for themselves as mediators and balancers.
The insertion of nuclear weapons into this milieu does not change the basic character and nature of India-Pakistan conflicts other than marginally. The military hostilities were always way short of total, but nuclear weapons have their political uses. An N-arsenal burnishes the image of the Pakistan Army managing the country’s nuclear weapons program as the guardian of the Pakistani state and society, and affords the Pakistan government the international political and diplomatic leverage that comes from periodically raising alarms about the nuclear flashpoint, which Western thinktanks peddle for self-serving reasons. (Indeed, the head of a Washington thinktank once refused to publish a paper by me explicating the above thesis – and later explicated in my books and other writings — to counter the flashpoint theme his outfit has been embroidering over the years, saying “it would close the doors in Islamabad”!) So, why have Indian and Pakistani analysts taken to iterating the flashpoint line and, thereby, legitimating Western concerns of a region on the nuclear boil? Plainly stated, because those among them in the academia and the thinktanks have to do so for reasons of brightening their professional prospects, and for India and Pakistan-based analysts because it gets them short-term attachments at American thinktanks and enables them to get on to the Western-funded seminar/conference circuit.
So, why is the N-flashpoint thesis nonsense? Innumerable nuclear war games over the years conducted by the Gaming & Simulation unit of the National Security Council in Delhi have proved that crossing the nuclear weapons threshold, in any rational sense, is almost impossible. To argue that Pakistan will wilfully ignore the uncertainty and definite escalatory risks attending on violating the nuclear taboo, and disregard the horrifically unbalanced “exchange ratio” in case of nuclear war that could quickly become total– the destruction of several Indian cities for the certain extinction of the Pakistan state and society, and trigger first use even if on its own territory against aggressing Indian armor and mechanized forces, is to believe one of three things: that the threat of “massive retaliation” (promised by the Indian nuclear doctrine) is incredible, or that the Pakistan Army is essentially irrational, will court the risk of a kind it has not done before, even going against its own record of pragmatic actions in past conflicts that have actually injected credibility into its deterrent stance and legitimated its possession of nuclear weapons as weapons of the very last resort. Or, that the Pakistani posture, apparently bolstered by the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons, is an over-stated bluff.
The evidence suggests it is a bluff Pakistan will persist with owing, as explained above, to continuing politico-diplomatic payoffs in the external realm, and internally because it burnishes the Pakistan Army’s self-image – no small thing in a country widely perceived as a near “failed state”. If it is not a bluff then Pakistan stands to lose its all. “Pink flamingos” in terms of nuclear hostilities in South Asia are a mirage. The insider-assisted capture of Pakistani nuclear weapons is, however a “black swan”.
For many years now, the situation between India and Pakistan has been “some war some peace” that is sufficient to keep the whole south Asian region on tenterhooks for decades, ever since the two countries have been created. Kashmir is the sticking point. While India insists on bilateral approach, the two countries are decidedly unable to work out a compromise. But despite comments to the contrary, the two countries do remain a flash point for nuclear holocaust in south Asia in particular. Therefore, US, China, EU and UN must get together to work out a deal to hold a referendum in the disputed state to settle the problem for all times to come. Anything else would be less than responsible on the part of the big powers.
Well after a decade of war in Afghanistan Western powers should realize that their aim of propping up India was a bad idea. The only work around now is to dish out a better nuclear deal to Pakistan.
Kashmir dispute is pending with the UN. It is complicating the situation in South Asia. India is holding on to the territory by force- 700,000 troops. Kashmiris are not giving up. The US in particular & the West, in general, is not keen in the resolution of the dispute. This perception is gaining ground by every passing day.
There is substantial merit in the argument that why issues, where Muslims are to benefit, are not resolved. Kashmir, Palestine are two visible examples. The possible grant of NSG membership to India, leaving Pakistan out will further give credibility to this argument.
Time has come for the US & the West to address issues and be fair in foreign and security policies.