Russia remains parked in Ukraine’s east where Moscow-backed separatists continue to create mayhem. Meanwhile, the western allies are maintaining a general consensus that has led to the political isolation of Russia, the slow ramping up of economic sanctions, and the symbolic but important reassurance of nervous eastern European members of NATO – accomplishments trumpeted by President Barack Obama in the State of the Union address. The recent increase in the Russian presence in eastern Ukraine is reason for reviewing options. The problem is that, given the risks involved, the only realistic and thus most likely effective option is long-term, patient resolve to stay the course. Nevertheless, there is a growing chorus in the United States that believes the next steps should be to send military aid to Ukraine. This would be a risky gamble at this time, not worth the potential dangers.
The United States and Europe hold overwhelming political, economic, and military advantages over Russia. Russia, in fact, grows weaker by the day –as made evident by the recent S&P downgrade of Russian credit to “junk” level. Russia is fundamentally weak in terms of its unsustainable long-term force projection and the erosion of its economy. However, Russia does not need to apply much pressure to keep Ukraine destabilized enough to maintain significant leverage over Kiev’s future alignments; one should anticipate this standoff lasting for some time. It is unclear how adding fuel to the fire would help. As Matt O’Brien wrote recently in The Washington Post:
Russia, in other words, is doomed as long as oil is cheap and sanctions are in place. It could survive either alone. But together, they destroy Russia’s economy and its ability to borrow to cover that up. And unlike, say, 2008, when oil prices rebounded rather quickly, this crisis could last awhile. After all, if you think Putin is going to back down in Ukraine anytime soon, well, think again: he’s already pushed pro-peace oligarchs who’ve lost a lot of money the past year to his outer circle, if that.
In other words, this crisis requires strategic thinking and patience, not tit-for-tat tactical reactions which are insufficient to achieve a balance of power in eastern Ukraine and unlikely to foster a diplomatic resolution.
Yet momentum, at least in Washington, is moving in the opposite direction: the assumption appears to be that it is America’s job to fix the problems of eastern Ukraine, even if that risks escalating the conflict. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, last week argued that, “…Mr. Putin will settle only when the costs of continuing the war are too high. Supplying arms to Ukraine will raise the costs to Russia, increasing the likelihood that a real settlement can be negotiated. The time for doing so is now.” Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in recent Senate testimony said, “Our support for Ukraine must enhance its security capabilities and support the new government’s ambitious reforms, because Ukraine will need to restore security and implement dramatic economic changes to emerge from the current crisis.” Strobe Talbott and Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution insisted, “Washington needs to do more to get Russia to change course. That means giving the Ukrainian military sufficient means to make further aggression so costly that Putin and the Russian army are deterred from escalating the fight.” They call for $3 billion to be allocated over three years to support Ukrainian defense efforts by providing lethal but defensive military equipment to the Ukrainians (which would somehow come to operate without Americans needing to be there). They also argue that, the United States should garner commitments within NATO for more military equipment for Ukraine.
Strobe Talbott and Steven Pifer are contributors to a longer joint study by the Brookings Institution, the Atlantic Council, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Their report details the argument for the United States to provide lethal defensive equipment to Ukraine. What is notable about this report is the number of Democratic Party national security luminaries who signed it: Michele Flournoy, a likely choice for Secretary of Defense should Hillary Clinton win the White House; Jan Lodal, a senior defense department official during Bill Clinton’s presidency; and Ivo Daalder, a former advisor to President Obama, U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council, and a veteran of the Clinton National Security Council. Former SACEUR Admiral James Stavridis (ret.) and Dean of The Fletcher School also lent his considerable weight to the report along with General Charles Wald (ret.), former deputy commander of U.S. European Command, and John Herbst, a former ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
As these proposals rolled out, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Alexander Vershbow, also a former senior American diplomatic and defense official, and a primary architect of NATO enlargement, visited Tblisi, Georgia last week and tweeted, “All tools in place to help #Georgia move from #NATO partnership to membership. W/ necessary political commitment, I’m sure it will happen.”
These tactical responses to Putin’s reckless behavior are well-intended, but risk producing dangerous outcomes for the United States while doing little to change the situation in Ukraine. It would take time to adequately equip and train Ukrainian armed forces in an impactful way – even with relatively modest items like counter-battery radars and anti-tank missiles. Advancing weapons into Ukraine is precisely the kind of evidence that Putin wrongly says justifies his illegal actions. There is every reason to believe that Russia would respond not with negotiation, but perhaps with more, and even deadlier, war. NATO allies in Europe will also consider how Russia might react and will likely not be as bullish as escalation advocates hope. Indeed, already on Monday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel signaled her opposition to this approach saying: “Germany will not support Ukraine with weapons. I am convinced this conflict cannot be solved by military means.” If anything, American delivery of military equipment to Ukraine could actually serve to take European allies off the hook for playing their role in further isolating Russia, opting to let the United States pay the price and take the risks.
Consequently, the United States risks undermining existing consensus in NATO and the European Union by putting military aid to Ukraine on the agenda. Already there are frays over who contributes and pays for the new NATO reinforcement spearhead force announced this last September. Holding NATO and EU consensus steady while collating power advantages with patience is perhaps the most significant strategic need at this time. Fundamentally, none of these proposals for military escalation address what Ukraine truly needs – tens of billions of dollars of guaranteed loans to cushion destabilizing but necessary economic reforms. No one, it seems, is lining up to write that check.
Flournoy told The New York Times, “One of the best ways to deter Russia from supporting the rebels in taking more territory and stepping up the conflict is to increase the cost that the Russians or their surrogates would incur.” The assumptions-behind this national security thinking completely ignore the alternative outcome or what comes next – that this approach is precisely the trigger that provokes a dramatic escalation by Russia. This thinking also indicates a belief that, in effect, if America leads on this, the other NATO allies will fall in line. One can certainly hope these things will happen – but hope is not the basis of sound strategy. Even if the military assistance contemplated achieved an elusive balance of power in eastern Ukraine, given the higher degree of Russian interests in the region, there is every reason to think Moscow would see this as a challenge to overcome American technology, challenging America’s credibility and that of NATO. What, then, is the plan?
Speaking at a recent Senate hearing, Henry Kissinger said, “I’m uneasy about beginning a process of military engagement without knowing where it will lead us and what we’ll do to sustain it…I believe we should avoid taking incremental steps before we know how far we are willing to go.” He added, “This is a territory 300 miles from Moscow, and therefore has special security implications.” Kissinger’s views accurately explain the situation and why escalation carries dangers not worth the costs – at least as the situation now stands. Regrettably, in the debates over Ukraine and Russia too much time is spent arguing about what should be done, and not enough time is spent understanding what is actually driving the interests of the states involved – including that of America and its allies in Europe.
Advocates of escalation in Ukraine are sustaining a respectable and logical extension of a worldview that governed the last two decades of American policy towards Europe, which culminated in the false promises of NATO’s 2008 declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would one day join NATO. That worldview, however, ran into the ditch in eastern Ukraine last March. Military escalation at this time would entangle America in a conflict adjacent to a declining, paranoid, and nuclear-armed Russia. What Russia has done in eastern Ukraine is unacceptable and the Russian people will eventually look back and wonder what their “leadership” was thinking. Now, however, is not the time to risk making a bad situation even worse by launching America onto a slippery slope of dangerous military escalation.
Sean Kay is Robson Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan University where he is Director of the Arneson Institute for Practical Politics and heads the International Studies Program. He is also an associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University. His most recent book is America’s Search for Security: The Triumph of Idealism and the Return of Realism.
Paul from Jersey 
Sean Kay 
Forward Thinker 
Andrew 
Geno Suen 
mscoyote 
Jacob Rabas 
R M Reddicks 
Bohdan A Oryshkevich 
RichardM 
Tim Smith 
John Haas 
Whatever Putin may say about justifying his and Russian behaviors in Ukraine, the invasion of one sovereign country by another sovereign country – despite failed attempts to mask that invasion as a domestic uprising, which would in any event actuate a response in force by the sovereign Ukraine government – military assistance to a friendly state isn’t as precipitous as might be argued, isn’t as technically complicated (a sturdy 14-year-old can manage a Stinger or Javelin), and is well within the range of normal relations between friendly states with an eye on a “domestic insurrection.” It might, moreover, convince an unconvinceable Putin – “I foresee all risks” – that the ante has been raised beyond his power to meet, particularly with oil prices and his economy both cratering out. No matter domestically: his popularity will remain intact, regardless of his behavior, a retreat, whatever he does: he’ll shape the news to reflect a great triumph.
That is a thoughtful comment. Thank you.
There are many, as there were prior to WW2, who mask their cowardice with philosophic, high sounding appeasement. It only encouraged Hitler and Stalin and is encouraging Putin. Bullies only understand force and only back down when they fear losing. Handing over your lunch money only invites the same demand tomorrow. Problem is the west has become soft and comfortable. They fear standing up for what is right. So like the crowd in the school yard who puts their heads down hoping they will not be next if only they do not make eye contact or draw attention of the bully, we in the west dither.
I would just point out that it isn’t a foregone conclusion that the twin assumptions of low oil and continued sanctions are going to persist beyond another six months or so.
First, consider that the price of crude oil has jumped over 19% in the past four days, signifying a potential bottom of the market. More important, consider what the Secretary-General of OPEC and others have recently noted, that the deep cuts to spending by oil companies will eventually lead to lower production growth. Underinvestment now means the market is likely to overcorrect and we could see a significant price spike in the near future–well over $100 a barrel ($200 if you listen to OPEC). If Russia can sit tight for now and tap into its massive foreign reserves (in the neighborhood of $385 billion according to Forbes), it will be able to weather the storm.
As far as sanctions go, just look at the leaked memo from the EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini–suggesting that EU governments should start talking to Russia again about global diplomacy and trade–for a good sign that many members are now on the fence. While the EU agreed to extend the first round of sanctions, targeting Kremilin officials, the more important sanctions targeting the Russian economy don’t come up for a vote until later this spring. If current trends continue it may be a long shot to bank on those getting unanimous support from EU member states.
With all that being said, I’m not sure arming the rebels is the best strategy, but it seems quite possible that Putin’s Russia can sustain its present course in the Donbas much longer than many experts care to admit. The $10-$15 billion in loan guarantees that Kiev needs is probably the most prudent first step. We can agree on that. I would just be careful to assert the “realistic and thus most likely effective option,” when it is based on predicting oil markets, OPEC, and the EU.
Thank you! Those are really important inputs. I appreciate it. I definitely agree on your point on the variability in the oil markets.
Sean,
I think your looking at this from a truly western perspective and on a winner takes all motive. Do not forget that Russia, has the ‘soon’ to be largest economy in the world, China to work with. The recent Gas deals with China speak volumes to Europe and the consequences of meddling in Ukraine, Russia’s backyard.
I don’t believe sanctions are really going to have much of an effect, especially since land, influence and power will yield far more than short term sanctions. Everyone knows, including the Chinese, that the US has an unsustainable economy, hell bent on printing dollars to keep our economy going and mask the real unemployment we have domestically. With all this debt, it really is our country that needs to tighten up and get our finances straight before we go spending more money on lower yielding adventures such as Ukraine.
As soon as de-dollarization happens with the non-aligned world, We are in for some major hyper inflation…
Thank you for your article. I agree. The US cannot afford to be drawn into a war in the EU that the EU has no stomach for. If Russia moves farther into the Ukraine than the Russianized eastern provinces they will have another expensive guerilla war on their hands and the EU will make sure the arms flow. There is no certainty that Russia can control the warlords they are supporting now. Ukraine is practically as feudal as Russia. Russia is in worse economic shape by far than the US in spite of doomsayers. And, as always, the conqueror will find the land belongs to the peasants. And the ‘peasants’ in all Russia’s satellites are hungry and restive. Patience is called for here. And continued economic pressure.
Hi Sean! Great article. It’s good to see some pushback to this broad movement to escalate the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. I honestly don’t know what these folks are thinking. It’s been quite clear from the start that the Russians are not going to skulk off quietly into the night on this one. I have almost no doubt that arming Ukraine will lead to a broader war. I also have a hard time believing that these foreign policy luminaries haven’t read the literature on offensive and defensive weapons. There is no clear distinction between an offensive and defensive weapon. If I give someone anti-battery radar that allows me to destroy all of your artillery, certainly that makes an offensive march much easier. The Russians certainly are not going to take that distinction seriously.
Make no mistake, arming the Ukrainians is a short step to a state of war not only between the whole of Ukraine and Russia, but it raises the stakes between the United States and Russia as well. I’m sure Americans would not be debating the niceties of offensive and defensive weapons if our troops (and there are of course Russian troops and citizens in E. Ukraine) were killed by American supplied “defensive weapons” on the border between the US and Mexico. The morality of the conflict is important, but in this case the Russians think they are in the right (and it’s not just Putin, public opinion in Russia is behind him). We can try to argue otherwise, but that’s not going to change the facts. So if we arm Ukraine and Russia goes all out arguing that a full scale invasion is necessary to stop a “growing and gathering threat” (a la Bush Doctrine), then what are we going to do? Respond in kind? (meaning a real NATO-Russia war) We need to think this through an assess what we really want to get out of this situation. Is the American public, who for the most part is blissfully unaware of what is happening in Washington, Moscow, and the Donbass really ready for this? I fear that most of the country does not take war seriously because they’ve offloaded all of the human costs unto the volunteer military and their families and the financial costs onto future generations. It’s easy to get up on your high horse and shout “something most be done!” when its not you that will ever be expected to do anything!
Since the end of the Cold War our realist thinking muscles have atrophied substantially. That’s dangerous. We have been used to fighting 3rd rate powers with no capability to strike back except through terrorism (Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, et al). Thinking of Russia in these terms is extremely dangerous. For the most part, the world is still unipolar. But, the world is still bipolar on nuclear weapons (with Russia being the other pole of course). Paradoxically, Russia’s weakness on other measures of power makes it more likely that it would use nuclear weapons in what it would regard as an existential conflict (even if “just” at the tactical level). Hopefully cooler heads will prevail. At this moment that conflict is contained in Southeast Ukraine. Let’s keep it that way.
Jacob Rabas, I much appreciated your post.
I found Mr. Kay’s article to be a (not so thinly veiled) call to “defeat Russia”. Just not by using arms. It seems an argument quite within the realm and divisions of old cold warriors.
I think that is incumbent for the EU to act and not for the USA to fill the void.
I also think that it is incumbent to diversify the pressure upon the Russian Federation so that it is beleaguered on multiple fronts and so that Ukraine does not bear the brunt of all the fighting.
I would argue that providing weapons for the Ukraine is strategic thinking. It was not oil prices alone that brought down the USSR, but oil prices coupled to an arms race. In fact, many have said that this was Reagan’s strategy. Russia spends a huge fraction of its budget on military. It is growing in power while NATO and the US shrink. Russia is giving the rebels tanks, missiles, guns and supplies. It also has to provide economic support for the population. The Crimea, for example, was costing Ukraine $2 billion a year and Russia has to pay that, and more, because the industry of the Crimea, tourism, is tremendously depressed. The financial burden of arming to parity to the West is proportionally far less than it is to Russia. Yes, Russia will also send more arms. However, that will just make their financial problems worse. They will have to cut into social programs, which are what is keeping Putin’s popularity afloat.
Don’t be misled into thinking this is just Ukraine, it’s not. Just looking a Igor Girkin, aka Strelkeov former military leader of Donetsk and admitted FSB colonel. Girkin started in a Russian unit in Bosnia, the unit that occupied Visegrad at the time of the massacre there. He also was in Chechnya during the destruction of Grozny, and Georgia when Russia seized one of their provinces and control of another, and then Crimea and Donetsk. A history of aggression spanning many years. Let us not be deceived into the myopic reasoning of Neville Chamberlain. Putin is threat to the world and will remain so as long as he is in power. Therefore, by all means, arm Ukraine.
For neocons, every year is 1939 and every foreign leader that behaves aggressively is Adolf Hitler. Not worth arguing with.
Putin is responding to a perceived threat to Russia. NATO should never have openly stated its long-term intention to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO.
Any NATO expansion into the former Soviet Union poses a severe threat to Russian security. Even the Baltic states (which were not originally part of the USSR before being annexed in 1940) should not have been brought into NATO, especially not with Finland and Sweden remaining outside the alliance.
Spheres of influence and buffer states are still important to Russia, which has a strong collective memory of being invaded twice in the last century.
To bring peace to Ukraine, NATO should state publicly that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO without explicit prior Russian agreement. That will allow Ukrainians to view their country’s relations with the West in a realistic light, and they can form a national policy which reflects that reality, instead of chasing an EU/NATO membership mirage.
For a US audience to understand Russian feelings about Ukraine and Georgia, think back to the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Now imagine how the prospect of Canada and Mexico joining the pro-Soviet Warsaw Pact in the near future would have been received by the American government and people. Then you’ll understand.
You believe twitter and social media above easily available evidence about who is fighting in the Ukraine.
There is no actual evidence anywhere that Russia has troops in the Ukraine.
No actual evidence anywhere to prove anything useful about the Malaysian airplane tragedy.
Just a facebook conversation for you lot.
Based on my best guess, having read a number of sources, I would say that it is likely that there are Russian “advisors” assisting the Donbass rebels and probably some special ops providing intel and whatnot. A good number of those fighting for the rebels are Russian citizens. Some may be paid by the Kremlin, oligarchs, civic organizations etc. Many families in the Donbass have relatives across the border as well so it wouldn’t be shocking that some would come over to join the fight. That said, I certainly do not think the the entire rebellion is an astroturf operation by the Kremlin. A critical mass of people in the Donbass really did hate the Maidan, saw the revolution as illegitimate, and were horrified when the Ukrainian Army came in. Russia’s putting its thumb on the scale for those people, but it certainly didn’t come from nowhere. That’s true.
An excellent article. Kissinger’s questions, in particular, need reflecting upon. We are so focused (and not for the first time) on whether we want to take this step, of whether we will escalate our pressure from sanctions to supplying weapons, no one’s asking, “OK. We supply the weapons. Suppose Putin doubles down. What then? Tell me how this ends.”