America soon will be conducting unconventional warfare (UW) again, if it is not already. Despite the numerous times it has conducted such operations in the past, the perils remain the same. The internal tensions among U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), CIA, State Department and other government agencies still exist. These tensions ultimately come to a head when the culminating event of unconventional warfare occurs: The overthrow of the current regime and transition to power of those we have aided.
Unconventional warfare includes “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” The United States conducted UW not only recently in Iraq and Afghanistan but also during the Cold War in Tibet, Angola, Nicaragua and Indonesia. Despite multiple experiments in UW, the United States has difficulty coalescing SOCOM-led military preparations, CIA-led cover intelligence activity and State Department guidance into stable and lasting governance for partner nations.
Operation Enduring Freedom offers many examples, but the most prominent occurred when Army Special Forces (SF) conducted operations alongside Hamid Karzai. Jason Amerine, an SF team leader, was tasked with conducting the initial link-up with Karzai. This was a classic mission for Army SF and one that Amerine received because he had specifically planned a full-scale UW campaign around Karzai. Amerine was unaware that the CIA had pre-empted his efforts. As Eric Blehm writes,
The leader of the CIA’s only Pakistan-based Jawbreaker team with the intent to operate in Southern Afghanistan [said] ‘We’re here to facilitate your work with Karzai. We’ve scheduled for you to meet him and his men tomorrow morning at ten.’ Facilitate? thought Amerine. What the hell does that mean?
The CIA’s lack of communication (which may have been intentional) immediately sowed seeds of distrust with the SF team.
This kind of cross-over between CIA covert activities and SOCOM-shaping operations has been typical in the years since 9/11, but it is uniquely problematic in a UW setting. For example, in operations where the goal is to find, fix and finish a target, the CIA and SOCOM (via Joint Special Operations Command) have typically been on the same page. This blurring of Title 10 (laws exclusive to the U.S. Armed Forces) and Title 50 (which relates to war and espionage and has traditionally governed CIA action) takes on a different dynamic when these entities must utilize the same set of assets to accomplish concurrent missions, as in UW.
In some rare cases, this dynamic is symbiotic, with interagency partners using SF shaping operations to further their intelligence gathering goals. Unfortunately, it is too often the case in America’s vast (and recent) experience that the dynamic becomes one of competition and outright hostility. In UW, it is quite possible that the strongest guerrilla commander in a partner country will also be the most likely to hold political power and keep it. It is logical that while SOCOM works to build military capacity, the CIA builds intelligence capability and attempts to uncover vulnerabilities in advance of a planned coup.
This idea of building capacity within a partner force extends beyond military and intelligence activities. In one of its many case studies of UW, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) notes that, in addition to a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, many insurgencies seeking to become viable ruling forces set up shadow governments. These governments “often adopt other attributes of states, including national identity and legitimacy, revenue generation and provision of social services.” Since these basic structures contribute to the populace accepting the rule of an American partner force after the culminating event, it would make sense that America would send its governance and development experts from the State Department and USAID to shape these operations.
The leap from these parallel missions to the next phase of stable governance is where American UW falls flat. Before the culminating event, coordination has often been lackluster due to both institutional bias and overly protective compartmentalization policies. After the culminating event occurs and the dust settles, there has too often been a collective shrugging of the shoulders about who is ultimately responsible. No one knows who is in charge, and those who ought to be in charge (State, USAID) don’t really know how to interact with CIA and SOCOM, let alone their new foreign allies.
It would make sense for SOCOM and CIA to come together, share as much information as possible and present a unified view to the State Department after the culminating event occurs and the partner force has assumed political control. Critically, SOCOM and CIA would stay on in their respective roles developing the military and intelligence infrastructure of the new government, while State would necessarily become the primary governmental adviser to the new ruler.
In order to make this process viable, all actors need to come together in a well-planned training event that establishes the interagency team far in advance of the culmination of UW. This event needs to accomplish two things: It needs to provide every agency with an appreciation for UW; and it needs to breed familiarity and trust.
Both USASOC and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) run exercises that fit this bill. Exercise Robin Sage and Exercise Derna Bridge are multiple-week UW exercises meant to test the judgment and capabilities of potential special operators when training indigenous forces. These exercises highlight requirements of successful UW, from training in basic tactics to reporting human rights violations. An appreciation for the shaping operations required for UW will provide a substantive basis for interagency cooperation, and the best way to effect that appreciation is through joint training.
One potential solution is to integrate CIA, State and USAID into Robin Sage and Derna Bridge. In so doing, special operations students will gain exposure to their counterparts and their capabilities. Importantly, they will also begin to understand the mindset and approach of their State, CIA and USAID colleagues. Robin Sage and Derna Bridge are immersive experiences that should strip away any pretense or ulterior motives in the participants as well as provide a glimpse into the real-world working conditions expected of those shaping U.S. spheres of influence around the globe.
This is particularly pertinent for State Department and USAID employees. It is important for those who will facilitate governance to see the shaping operations that will take place prior to their arrival. This provides context when working with a new government and ensures that promises made by SOF and CIA can receive reasonable follow-through from State and USAID. Additionally, it builds appreciation for the need to embrace non-Western styles of governance and work through the host nation’s systems. Trying to overlay Western-style democracy always and everywhere is a sure recipe for disaster.
The inculcation of familiarity and trust is equally important at the outcome of this training. The intent of placing all interagency actors into the same high-stress scenario is to foster dialogue and come to a common understanding of the mission’s end-state while acknowledging that each agency will take a different approach to mission accomplishment. An added benefit is that, should the United States conduct real-world UW, some of these participants would see each other again, building on previous relationships rather than starting fresh under the most difficult of circumstances.
Unconventional warfare has been an effective instrument of American foreign policy for many years, but the inability to conduct a successful transition from UW to legitimate governance has typically created more problems than it has solved. Through modification of well-established, rigorous training programs, it is possible to bring the expertise of American special operators, intelligence agents and governance specialists to bear in a manner that benefits both the United States and her partners.
Steve Thomas served as an Armor officer in the 101st Airborne Division, including a tour as a Scout Platoon Leader in Khost Province, Afghanistan. He currently serves as a private-sector consultant to the Marine Corps. He enjoys classical political philosophy and Maker’s Mark with two ice cubes.
48REPINS 
Steve Thomas 
CBCalif 
Rick 
Something rarely discussed in terms of UW.
My only comment would be for the author to look at SF doctrine on UW in order to understand the importance of establishing a shadow government up front and working on developing this organization for the transition. I do not think the author is aware of the detailed body of knowledge that exists on UW that can be found in the ARIS Project (http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html) In particular he might want to consider Chapter 9 “Shadow Government” in this book: Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare, http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/UndergroundsS.pdf. But that said this is an important contribution to the discussion of UW.
One point on the use of the term culmination. That usually implies that there is no remaining relative combat power (supported by logistics) to continue the mission. Perhaps that is what the author intends to imply -we culminate in UW before we complete the mission. However, what we have to keep in mind is that in these situations we cannot have total control – the indigenous elements are in the lead and we need to support them as they transition to the legitimate government. But of course as we know from history this is the most difficult, messy and complex but most important activity in any revolution, resistance and insurgency. But we have to be able to get comfortable with not being in control. As Paul Tompkins says it is like being in the back seat of the taxi cab – you can tell the driver where to go but it is up to him to get there.
About the taxi, that is not always that way. What if you tell the driver how to go where you can get? I realize that the comparison is not that effective, because it depends in how is the context in what you are engaged: sometimes it is easier, sometimes not. The fact is that it should be important if we apply the “lessons learned.” Due to the chaos that appears through the many commentaries I am reading, it looks like we have learned very few lessons. We must be more humble and revise all the theories we have created, to be really flexible in how we confront each case.
Dave,
Thanks very much for the detailed comments. Truth be told, I had not seen the body of SF doctrine until the editor here pointed me to it. I will absolutely continue to read and learn. I suspect UW will become an American instrument of choice sooner rather than later, so everyone involved needs to get trained and get on board.
To quote and question: “Both USASOC and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)<" appear to be two military organization preforming the same mission. That is simply not a cost effective way to shape manage a military. One branch of the service, and only one should have responsibility for Special Operations, and since it is a ground force function — that branch should be the Army. The Marine Special Operations Units should be disbanded, it budget and manpower authorization transferred to the Army along with any material equipment they possess.
These overlapping responsibilities and duties resulting from the post (Iraq and Afghanistan) war mission and budget struggles now going on in the DOD needs to be brought under control. This country does not need two armies and should not have to carry the costs associated with that falsely created need.
Second, I was intrigued by the seemingly conflicting statements in the notation by the writer that:
"Unconventional warfare has been an effective instrument of American foreign policy for many years, but the inability to conduct a successful transition from UW to legitimate governance has typically created more problems than it has solved."
If an effort creates more problems than it solves, than how can it have been an effective instrument of Foreign Policy, unless the objective was something other than good governance?
This a question, not an opinion statement, as in my opinion the Army needs to be (at least in part) structured and manned so as to be able to concentrate performing an increased number of Special Forces and Special Operations types missions, rather than again being assigned the essentially unachievable Foreign Policy / political goal of intervening and occupying a foreign land and pacifying its hostilely resisting people.
I would generally agree that MARSOC duplicates USASOC efforts in the UW world; the Marine Corps would be better served reconstituting a healthy Recon capability.
As for the question about UW’s effectiveness, I’ll try to clarify. I think UW is effective insofar as the “foreign policy” goal is to effect regime change. But you are absolutely correct that if we can’t properly shape the environment (ie prepare the partner force to govern well then get out of the way) after regime change, it’s not worth conducing UW in the first place. It may, as you point out, be detrimental.
CB: I think that you better revise your point of view. USASOC and MARSOC are two different forces with different specialties. They can work together, as is the case of SEALS and MARSOC, but I do not think that in the first case they superpose their operations; it would be better that they work in a joint way. I think it is time to end the discussion about Army vs Marines and viceversa. It would be more appreciated by our country if we can work together, for the best of America.
It is not a case of rivalry between the services. It is a duplication of capabilities. There is no need to have two forces inside SOCOM that specialize in the UW mission. SEALs have begun to move away from any UW that is not littoral. This leaves a fairly defined line between their mission set and that of the other SOCOM forces. MARSOC has taken on the task of developing a UW force without the benefit of over half a century of experience that the US Army has. I have much respect for our MARSOC brethren, but in a time of resource constraints, they are superfluous without a redefinition of their mission.
USASOC and USSOCOM have begun to put in place the lessons learned from the failed transition (Phase 7) of Unconventional Warfare. Their working relationship has continued to improve and the leaders and members of each formation are working hard to rectify the noted shortcomings.
The larger issue that I have seen are highlighted in this article. USAID and DOS. I recently asked both officials at the Pentagon and DOS/AID who was working the transition phase of UW campaigns and neither provided a response that took ownership of it.
As a US SF Soldier the transition phase is something we are taught to begin planning for as soon as we begin the planning cycle. However, we are not the experts in this area. While SF Soldiers will never say they can’t do something, there is a limit to our experience and abilities that will impact the success of Phase 7.
As UW becomes more and more the way that future wars will be fought and US SF returns to its roots, the need for this to be further addressed will only become more apparent.
Without a proper end-state and plan to achieve it all other efforts, as excellent and good intentioned as they may be, will end up for naught.