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In 2024, John Stanko and Spenser Warren wrote, “Russian Threat Perception and Nuclear Strategy in its Plans for War with China,” where they explained some of the potential tensions between Russia and China that could make armed conflict between the two countries a possibility. Two years later, we asked them to revisit their arguments. Image: Wikimedia CommonsIn your 2024 article, you explained some of the potential tensions in the Sino-Russian partnership that could make armed conflict between the two countries a possibility. Two years later, have any new tensions emerged between the two countries? Are Russia and China stronger partners than they were two years ago, or are there more points of tension between them?  No new tensions have emerged, but the existing ones we highlighted do remain. Russia’s continued economic reliance on China in consequence of Western sanctions relating to the conflict in Ukraine may exacerbate some of these existing tensions. We also mentioned the Arctic as a source of potential Sino-Russian tension, and Russia has continued to encourage Indian activity in the region as a counter to China, showing at least some continued anxiety about China’s growing power relative to Russia’s.However, the recent decision by U.S. President Donald Trump to join Israel in launching an offensive against Iran has strengthened the basis for cooperation between China and Russia. These military actions were taken without input or authorization from the United Nations Security Council and in violation of the UN Charter, serving as a harsh reality check on Russian and Chinese visions of an ongoing transition to a multipolar world order. Washington’s apparent shift from America First back to International Police as the primary point of administrative focus and the return of an overt regime change agenda in American foreign policy has caused concern, if not alarm, in Moscow and Beijing; unsurprisingly, both the Russian