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In 2024, Paul van Hooft and Tim Sweijs wrote, “Two-Theater Tragedy: A Reluctant Europe Cannot Easily Escape a Sino-American War Over Taiwan,” where they argued a war in the Indo-Pacific would likely draw in and weaken Europe, even if European states try to remain on the sidelines. Two years later, amidst heightened tensions in both theaters, we asked Paul to revisit their arguments.Image: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth FleetIn your 2024 article, you argue a U.S.–Chinese war over Taiwan would inevitably draw in and weaken Europe, even if European states try to stay on the sidelines militarily. How does Europe’s recent (semi-forced) willingness to strengthen their own defense and security capabilities affect your argument? What is different today than when you wrote your article?In the 2024 environment, we could still assume that the most likely risk for Europeans was that the United States would be forced to draw forces from the Euro-Atlantic towards the Indo-Pacific for a confrontation with China, presenting Russia with a window of opportunity for provocation or aggression. Now it is explicit that the United States will not prioritize Europe, with the current administration pushing Europe to provide its own conventional deterrence and defense (see, for example, the 2026 National Defense Strategy).At the same time, the limits in U.S. capacity have also become clearer and further justify the article’s argument to focus on Europe. The U.S.-Israeli 2026 attacks on Iran have underlined that the supply of air and missile defense interceptors is limited, as is that of precision weapons, such as Tomahawks. As the United States has diverted more naval assets to the Gulf and Indian Ocean, the already limited assets available to European NATO member states are even more constrained. Moreover, the administration is looking to ensure that European allies are also involved in securing the Gulf.