Episode Notes:

For almost two weeks, protestors in the largely Druze region of Suwayda in southwest Syria have been denouncing the government and even calling for Bashar al Assad’s resignation. Here to tell us why, and where it might end, we’re joined by Makram Rabah. Makram is an assistant professor of history at the American University of Beirut and author of Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory.

[:45] Druze during the Syrian Civil War

[3:05] Rising tensions

[5:29] Current protests

[8:35] What's next

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth, and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the Warcast, the members-only podcast for what you need to know now. For almost two weeks, protestors in the largely Druze region of Suwayda in southwest Syria have been denouncing the government and even calling for Assad's resignation. Here to tell us why and where it might end, we're joined by Makram Rabah. Makram is an Assistant Professor of History at the American University of Beirut, and author of Conflict on Mount Lebanon: The Druze, the Maronites and Collective Memory. Welcome to the Warcast.

Makram Rabah: Hello. How are you all? All is well.

Nicholas Danforth: To start us off, give us a little background on the situation of the Druze community throughout the course of the war. I think the understanding people have is that things have largely gone pretty well between them and the government, but also this isn't the first protest in the region.

Makram Rabah: First of all, one has to define who the Druze are. The Druze are a kind of a Muslim sect, they're a heterodox Muslim sect, which basically spreads across the Levant, both in Lebanon and Syria, as well as in Palestine and Israel. Interestingly, the whole discourse of the Syrian regime, particularly that of Bashar al-Assad, is that the Bashar al-Assad, in quotation, secular regime, gives a kind of protection for the minority groups in Syria, including the Druze, the Alawites, the Christians in general.

The protests in Suwayda in particular are not new. First of all, historically, this is a region that has always rebelled against central power. Going back to 1910 under the Ottomans, and also famously for the 1925 rebellion led by the Druze Arab rebels, Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, against the French Mandate. So when the war started, the Druze decided to stay on the fence and see what's happening, until basically they got involved in a way in the revolution. They were not all in because contrary to what people assume that the Druze in Lebanon are united in a way against the Assad regime, in Syria there's a lot of factionalism, and this is why. And more importantly, the regime has consciously tried to contain them by keeping subsidies up, by letting them run their own their own ... Because they are more or less a peripheral region. And because they are the buffer zone between Damascus as well as Daraa and the Jordanian boundaries.

However, the Druze in general, and particularly the Druze of Lebanon, are very outspoken against Bashar al-Assad. And at a certain moment, the Assad regime tried to subdue this kind of let's call it closeted rebellion in the Druze areas. I call it kind of what we call a timid opposition. They are opposing at the same time they ... First of all, the Druze took a decision not to allow any of their people to go outside Syria and fight with the Syrian army. This was very instrumental because this started to destroy the whole rhetoric about the alliance of minority.

Nicholas Danforth: And when did this happen?

Makram Rabah: This happened around the same time when Hezbollah started to get involved through Iran and Hezbollah in fighting in 2014 in 2015. The peak of it was when the Russians came into the scene. So they said that, "We will stay in the army, but we will only fight and die fighting for our land and our regions." And this was a big blow, because first of all, they did not go all out and they did not announce full mutiny. At the same time they were no longer willing servants of the Assad regime.

Ironically, this didn't last long because what happened is that Assad tried to punish the Druze by actually unleashing the ISIS, because the ISIS, who are in the Badiya or in the Syrian Desert right next to the Druze, were originally in other parts of Syria. And as everyone knows, the Syrian regime at a particular moment in time, they started moving around these jihadi terrorists by giving the option of going on air-conditioned buses and moving locations. And this led to them actually penetrating these areas and committing massacres and abducting civilians in the Druze regions.

The Druze are a very savvy group. This is why they haven't acted because they know that the international and the regional factors are not to their advantage. First of all, their access to weapons and their access to resources is limited. So what we're seeing right now isn't actually new, it's a continuation of a series of protests and demonstrations.

However, what is particularly interesting, as someone who belongs to the Druze as well as an academic expert on the Druze, is that a change in their rhetoric. Originally, they used to associate with their sectarian identity, that we are rebelling as Druze. We see for the past year there's a new underlying tone or a narrative that talks about the Druze as part of a bigger Syrian nation. And what they're saying that we demand reform on a large national scale. In addition, that this demonstration now talks about honor and dignity, but it connects honor and dignity to the access to food, to healthcare, and to proper governance, meaning in a way they're telling us that dignity and honor cannot exist with Bashar al-Assad being in power.

Nicholas Danforth: So take a step back here for a second. Give us just a little background on where the previous protests over the past year came from and what's motivating the change now.

Makram Rabah: Protests in general, the Druze protests in general, are against the fact that the establishment of the regime is incapable of providing any kind of services. In addition, many of these pro Baath, pro Assad militias, are running these smuggling operations and drugs. And in addition, that Hezbollah and Hezbollah and the Syrian regime are running a very big network of Captagon drugs smuggling and manufacturing. So in order to get access to Daraa, one has to go through these Druze areas. The Druze do not like the fact that many of their people are being recruited to these militias, and ultimately now drugs is on the street.

So it's a kind of a defense mechanism. First of all, the Druze will never allow their areas to become targets, and this is why they're trying to clean it up. But the natural progression of these movements, especially that previously, in the last five years, we had the militant movement led by Sheik Wahid al-Balous, who was later killed by the regime. He had the kind of a Spartan outfit, mostly from Druze clerics who were willing to fight. And this was a bad idea because when you decide to fight, you're fighting a more sinister and more complete army. And eventually they killed him, and thus the Druze went back to the less violent political movement.

So what we are seeing right now is based on the fact that the Druze are suffering like the rest of the Syrian people. And more importantly, Nick, what I have seen is that we are now witnessing a new generation of Syrian Druze who are bred and homegrown, because most of the Druze activists who were leading the demonstrations in the early 2011, especially in Damascus and in Suwayda, have actually fled the country and now living in United States or Europe or even in the Arab world.

Now these people, first of all, this is their call. Many people are claiming that there's a regional reason for the Druze acting. Yes, this might be the case because I strongly believe that the international community, particularly US administration, has realized that Syria is part of the war in Ukraine because we have information that the drone technology that is being supplied to Russia is being given by Iran in Syria, and thus being sent to Russia from Syria. And a lot of attempts by the international community, particularly the Europe as well as some of the Arab Gulf countries, they have tried to normalize relations with Assad under the premise that drug smuggling into their countries will die down.

This has proved the opposite, and this is why we see a doubling back from some Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. These are all factors that contributed in one way or another to the demonstrations that we are seeing on the streets of Suwayda at the moment.

Nicholas Danforth: And so how do these end? What happens next?

Makram Rabah: Well, I don't want to be pessimistic, but I don't think that such demonstrations are enough because you cannot uproot a regime just by having one part of Syria rebel. However, the good news is that other parts of Syria is joining. And ultimately I think that the Kurdish Qamishli region and the [inaudible 00:08:59] region, which is the Alawite region, is rebelling, which means that the whole narrative of the alliance of minorities is no longer there.

And this is something to everyone who is listening, be it the policymaker or a normal citizen, the Syrians, just like Lebanese and all people who are living under oppression, they have done what they could do. You cannot blame the neck for not being able to defeat the sword. We have done what we can do. The international community, however, has faltered a number of times, particularly when they rewarded Assad for using chemical weapons by keeping him in power, be it under the Trump administration or previously under Obama.

So ultimately what will happen is that we will not be able to only remove dictatorships by going to the streets because I think, and unfortunately, that the Assad regime is waiting for the right time to punish the people of Syria and the Druze. However, the Druze and the international community, they should realize that you cannot actually negotiate with a madman. And this is what the Bashar al-Assad regime and the people supporting him, including Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, is doing.

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you very much for joining us in the Warcast.

Makram Rabah: Thank you very much.