Episode Notes:

On Tuesday, Russia refused to authorize the renewal of cross-border aid from Turkey into rebel-held Syria. To discuss, we’re joined by Mona Yacoubian, vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace.

[:41] What changed?

[2:04] Russian bargaining

[4:15] Russian-U.S. relations in Syria

[6:57] Humanitarian impact

[9:46] Possible Syrian exploitation

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the Warcast, the members-only podcast for what you need to know now. On Tuesday, Russia refused to authorize the renewal of cross-border aid from Turkey into rebel-held Syria. To tell us more about this decision and what it means for the country, we're joined today again by Mona Yacoubian. Mona is vice president for the Middle East and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace. Welcome back to the Warcast.

Mona Yacoubian: Thanks so much, Nick.

Nicholas Danforth: Now, there have been debates about this in the past. We've had you on to talk about debates in the past. Every time, it's they've ended with Russia ultimately reauthorizing this cross-border aid. Why has this changed?

Mona Yacoubian: It's a very good question. And, I mean, I will say if you'd asked me last week, I would've told you, yeah, I think there will be the same drama that we have seen. But ultimately, it will be resolved with a six-month technical rollover, which is essentially kind of unfortunately the way things have gone over the last year or so. This time, though, I think we are seeing something different. We're seeing a level of Russian intransigence that we have not witnessed before. So much so that indeed it is quite possible, unfortunately, that we could be seeing the end of the cross-border mechanism if the Russians continue to insist on not just a six-month rollover, but insist on sanctions, Syrian sanctions relief as part of that resolution. And unless there can be some kind of negotiated language behind the scenes with the P3 and other key elements of the security council, it's very hard to see that certainly the Russian draft, as it currently stands, is not going to be adopted. And the Russians are indicating that they're not interested in a six-month technical rollover.

Nicholas Danforth: So then talk us through the exact Russian position. They're saying they're not going to go over the six-month rollover and are instead pushing for something that, a more permanent solution, but one that involves sanctions relief for Damascus?

Mona Yacoubian: That's right. I mean, I think they're willing to allow for six months. Look, ultimately, the Russians have stated their opposition to the mechanism as a violation of Syrian sovereignty. And this is of course the Syrian government position as well. That said, the Russians have long understood the importance of this mechanism with respect to providing aid to the nearly 4 million Syrians in Northwest Syria. Not because the Russians care about the humanitarian conditions and the wellbeing of the Syrians in Northwest Syria, but rather because they want to preserve their relationship with Turkey. Now, we're seeing the Russians again adopt this harder line stance where they are insisting on other, really namely, Syrian sanctions relief as part of any negotiated, even just six-month extension.

So this is a hardening of the Russian position. I think what's interesting to note here, Nick, is what about Turkey? I mean, as an analyst, I've always said, "Well, they're going to play hardball until they don't, because ultimately they don't want to upset Ankara." But this might be different. I can't get into the minds of the Russians. I don't know what's going on behind the scenes. But I would note it is notable that Erdoğan recently, at least on paper, we'll see if it's comes to fruition, agreed to this accession of Sweden into NATO. The Russians can't be happy about that. And we're also understanding that the grain deal may also be in peril. It expires, I believe it's July 17th. So could this be Russian signaling to the Turks as well, possibly?

Nicholas Danforth: Well, and right. So there are two fronts on this, it seems like. There's the Russian-Turkish angle, and then there's the broader question of how much Russia's relations with the West can be compartmentalized in Syria from obviously everything else that's happening. What about that second front? I mean, as I said, I've been following the Turkish angle and I'm still not quite sure what's going on there.

Mona Yacoubian: Yeah, right. No, exactly. That's where I was going to go. I mean, I also think what we are seeing, we've seen increasingly as the war in Ukraine becomes more entrenched and as tensions escalate, we are seeing spillover impacts, and frankly, an erosion if not the complete inability now to compartmentalize. In addition to what we just talked about with respect to Russian-Turkish dynamics, again, connected to Ukraine, there is of course escalating tensions between Russia and the West, and very specifically between Russia and the United States. And I think this too is impacting how the Russians are postured on the cross-border. So that as a way of underscoring their anger at the United States, their unwillingness to cooperate on this, or the cross-border mechanism may become a casualty of that as well.

And I'd note we are seeing a very worrying trend toward escalating US-Russian tensions in Syria, where we've had multiple times in which senior US military commanders have noted a very disturbing trend of increasing aggressive Russian overflights of US bases in Syria. We've seen American military leaders talk about the fact that the Russians are not adhering to the deconfliction channels that have been in place for years, governing how our two militaries operate in this very closed, frankly crowded space. And just last week, we had an incident of Russians harassing US drones, not once, but twice, two days in a row. And so you're seeing an uptick in tensions there. And I should just note the US is also responding. So we've deployed F-22s most recently as an important signal to the Russians that we will not stand for that kind of aggressive action. So I think we should understand this cross-border drama in part in that context against the backdrop of rising US-Russian tensions as a result of Ukraine.

Nicholas Danforth: And now if a deal can't be struck if the cross-border mechanism closes, ends, what actually happens on the ground? I know we've talked about this before. You've said there are other ways to continue to get aid in, but they're just, they're not as efficient, they're not as effective.

Mona Yacoubian: Right. I mean, I think one cannot overestimate the importance of this Bab al-Hawa crossing, the one that we're talking about. 85% of UN assistance goes through that border crossing. And this is lifesaving assistance for some 4 million Syrians in Northwest Syria. Recalling as well, of course, the catastrophic earthquakes that took place in February of this year, and so the additional destruction and needs that will not be met. So it would be, frankly, nothing short of catastrophic if the mechanism is shut down and there's no plan B, there's no other way of providing assistance.

Nicholas Danforth: I mean, is there a plan B or what?

Mona Yacoubian: Well, this has been an ongoing debate in the humanitarian community, among international donors, because this drama that you and I are talking about today, Nick, this drama has played out many times, recalling that there were initially four such crossings. And over time, Russia and China wielding their vetoes have dwindled the number of UN crossings down to just the one. Essentially, even if there's an agreement this time, even if at the last minute there's some Hail Mary pass that's thrown and there's a six-month turnover, I think the writing is on the wall that this mechanism is not going to be renewed over time. And it's incumbent on the humanitarian actors, the UN, quite frankly, to think about what is the plan B?

And I think the bigger question that's going to be raised is, does the UN become emboldened to undertake decisions regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance in places like Northwest Syria without the express permission of the Syrian government and without UN security council approval? And that that's a huge question, and I think it's going to come into even greater relief. Or there'll be more of a spotlight put on it if the grain deal fails, because then you have issues of global importance with respect to humanitarian assistance. Could I add, though, there is one potential, I'm not going to call it a solution, but a wild card that could be played here. And that is that the Syrian regime ought to allow for assistance to come through Bab al-Hawa.

Nicholas Danforth: And why would they?

Mona Yacoubian: Why would they? Well, that's a good question. They would possibly, again, I'm not saying this is going to happen. They've already opened two additional crossings because of the earthquake temporarily. And those crossings are set to expire in mid-August. The Syrian regime could opt to do this, number one, to assert its sovereignty in this area. Number two, to seek to assert control over the UN assistance that comes in. And of course, that may well be a non-starter for the international community. But as the trend toward normalization with Syria has gained momentum, Syria was admitted to the Arab League, many Arab countries in the region have restored diplomatic ties, a decision by the Syrian regime to open Bab al-Hawa on its terms, underscore, could come in that context of this regime seeking to assert its sovereignty, seeking to assert that it is now essentially back in the fold of nations. But of course, again, that could well be a non-starter for many donors who would refuse to abide by the kinds of conditions one could imagine the Syrian regime imposing.

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you as always for joining us on The Warcast.

Mona Yacoubian: Thank you, Nick.