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After failing to reach an agreement in the first round of talks in Islamabad, the United States and Iran are set to resume talks in the coming days. Via Pakistani mediation, U.S. and Iranian negotiators have reportedly made progress toward a framework agreement, though significant gaps remain and a deal is far from guaranteed. In the meantime, President Donald Trump has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports, while Israel is pressing ahead with its assault on the Lebanese border town of Bint Jbeil, even as it engages in direct talks with Lebanon in Washington. The two-week ceasefire with Iran is holding, but it remains tenuous.

Unlike what has been negotiated so far, an expertly negotiated ceasefire should be extremely specific about the character of the pause in combat operations, including dates, duration, redeployments, withdrawals, and monitoring mechanisms. The broader strategic issues of Iran’s regional influence and its nuclear program should not even be attempted in the rushed manner they were tackled in Islamabad. Rather, the United States and Iran should agree on a structured process with a clear timetable attached. The administration also needs to do far more to bring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into line on both the ceasefire and wider regional objectives, or he risks becoming a persistent spoiler. It is also time to sideline Special Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, whose negotiation track record has been underwhelming. They should be replaced with experienced State Department negotiators, supported by members of the intelligence community and nuclear experts. High-level political figures like the vice president traditionally appear for summit diplomacy only after the details are worked out.

Ceasefires should accomplish two goals. The first goal is a concrete pause in combat operations — the sine qua non of a ceasefire. The second, however, is even more important: a path to resolution of the political problems that got the parties into war in the first place. Many ceasefire negotiations claim success but fall short in one or both dimensions. We analyze the outcomes soberly and point toward better approaches for ending the war. For now, it appears that Trump wants this ceasefire, but Israel and even Hizballah may prefer to spoil it.

Trump claims that the war has accomplished the objectives he set out to achieve. But missile programs can and will be restarted, and Iran’s nuclear program was far easier to manage under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that Trump himself derailed.

Before the United States and Israel launched their assault on Iran, the country was led by an 86-year-old ailing autocrat who had the backing of the country’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, but also had to contend with career politicians and civil servants who appeared interested in pursuing a détente with the United States through diplomatic channels. The regime also was unpopular with a segment of the population seeking greater political freedom and reform, and it met every mass rally with brutal violence and further repression.

Today, the Islamic Republic looks very different. The Revolutionary Guards have emerged as the undisputed center of power, sidelining all political rivals and forcing through the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader — a process that would have been fraught with challenges in the absence of war. Khamenei, moreover, is but a strawman. He has not appeared on camera — let alone in public — since his appointment and is reportedly badly wounded and possibly incapacitated. If he ever recovers, he will likely harbor profound grievances toward the United States, having lost his father — previous Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — his wife, a son, a sister, and several other family members in the opening salvo of the war on Feb. 28. For this reason, among others, he is precisely the figure the Revolutionary Guards need: weak, unpopular, and likely to defer to the directives of his hardline handlers. And Iranian civil society will have an even harder time mobilizing a pro-democracy resistance in this climate.

Make no mistake: The challenges Iran poses to the United States and to the world are today far greater than they were only a few weeks ago. Through the war, the regime has discovered that it can leverage threats to commercial vessels wishing to transit through the Strait of Hormuz to extract revenue. This is a violation of international maritime law, but then again, even before the war, Tehran was highly selective in its adherence to such norms. Now that the hardliners are unrestrained, Iran is much more likely to take confrontational positions towards the Gulf states and any other actor who might stand in the way of its policies.

Trump, for his part, appears to want to wash his hands of the mess he has created. Shortly after the ceasefire was announced, he even shared on social media a post by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who said “safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will be possible via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.” This does not suggest a reopening of the strait, but rather Iran’s intention to indefinitely control this critical international waterway and pursue its plans to collect tolls from cargo ships.

The Gulf states are aghast at what they consider Iran’s unacceptable stance over Hormuz. Trump, who was their preferred candidate in the last presidential election, appears unconcerned about their vulnerabilities. In yet another bizarre moment, he said he is considering a “joint venture” with Iran to set up a toll system. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had previously described Iran’s idea to toll ships as ”illegal” and “dangerous”, but the president may simply want to bring the war to an end in a way that allows him to claim success and save face.

The hard truth is that no country is willing to put its military forces at risk in a complex naval operation and challenge Iran’s newfound determination to control the strait. Last week, Bahrain sought to pass a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have encouraged coordinated defensive efforts to deter Iran from restricting freedom of navigation through the strait, but Russia and China vetoed it on the grounds that it did not condemn American and Israeli aggression. With the Security Council divided over the responsibility for the crisis, there is no way to adjudicate the dispute within the international legal framework of the United Nations.

To make matters much worse, there is still no ceasefire in Lebanon. The country was dragged into the war unwillingly after Hizballah attacked Israel in response to the killing of Ali Khamenei. After securing the ceasefire with Iran, the Trump administration then stated that Lebanon was not part of the deal. Iran had seemingly forgotten about Lebanon in the frantic ceasefire negotiations, only to later insist that, absent a ceasefire there, its agreement with the United States would be null and void.

Israel has continued operations in Lebanon, carrying out heavy airstrikes against Hizballah and doubling down on efforts to capture border towns such as Bint Jbeil. In parallel, Israel and Lebanon have initiated talks in Washington, D.C., involving their respective ambassadors to the United States and Secretary Rubio. Lebanon is pushing to prioritize a ceasefire, while Rubio said that the talks are not about a ceasefire but about ending decades of conflict between Israel and Lebanon. By advancing a framework of comprehensive peace before a ceasefire, however, Rubio is putting the proverbial cart ahead of the ox, and effectively aligning with Netanyahu’s maximalist positions, which include a long-term buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Netanyahu may be using Lebanon to derail a ceasefire with Iran that he does not see as serving his interests. A truce that leaves a defiant regime in Tehran poses strategic and political risks for the Israeli prime minister. By sustaining military pressure on Hizballah, Netanyahu may be attempting to force Iran into a costly choice: either abandon the ceasefire in protest — a move that would be deeply unpopular at home and reinforce long-standing grievances among Iranians that their government prioritizes support for regional proxies over domestic welfare — or uphold the ceasefire, effectively abandoning Hizballah. This, however, would be seen by Hizballah as a betrayal and would underscore the futility of its confrontation with Israel, weakening both the group’s standing in Lebanon and Iran’s regional influence. Either outcome would represent a setback for Tehran. The Revolutionary Guards are more likely to prioritize the survival of Hizballah over de-escalation, but in that case, the ceasefire could collapse.

Hizballah, too, may have incentives to continue the war. The Lebanese government is pursuing efforts to disarm it, and according to a 2025 Gallup poll, nearly four in five Lebanese — 79 percent — support the effort. Yet protracted conflict with Israel may offer Hizballah a path to renewed relevance. Israeli plans for a new security zone in southern Lebanon, and the demolition of entire towns to prevent the return of civilians to the area, could invigorate popular support for Hizballah, as it revives its long-standing claim that it is the only force capable of resisting Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory.

Ceasefires are inherently fragile, in part because they require all parties to pull back from war at the same time. In civil wars, it’s often the insurgents that fragment, with some factions continuing to fight. Here, however, the central problem is strategic misalignment: The United States and Israel appear to be pursuing different objectives, and even Hizballah may conclude that continued fighting, however costly, may better serve its interests.

The ceasefire in Iran is holding for now, despite reports of violations, and talks between American and Iranian officials will continue. Still, there is a high likelihood that this fragile truce will break down, especially if Trump believes two weeks is enough to resolve a complex conflict. The Revolutionary Guards are increasingly defiant after what they view as a victory, and will seek to extract major concessions from the Trump administration.

The American president is, by all accounts, eager to end a war that could severely damage the Republican Party in the upcoming midterm elections. But if Iran overplays its hand in negotiations, and Trump’s ego is bruised, the agreement could quickly unravel.

Ceasefires that are undertaken before a complete surrender of either belligerent tend to be complied with only because the parties believe it is in their interest to pause violence. That interest can waver in the absence of clear parameters. These include specificity of terms and more serious, relatively unrushed talks. Specificity in ceasefires has always been essential. Dates and timelines for the suspension of combat operations must be clear to all. Weapons systems and forces can be visibly withdrawn from the area of operations, or at least decreased in readiness, signaling intent to comply. Monitoring mechanisms are also not to be neglected and can be achieved by remote sensing technologies, military observation groups, and joint commissions on compliance. Observers may recall the poorly structured French mediation during the August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, whose ambiguities enabled Russia’s continued advance while claiming compliance. A better model would be the 1992 U.N.-mediated ceasefire in El Salvador, which established a robust monitoring plan that gave both sides the confidence to end that war. Hazy terms and bluster will not sustain the peace.

Federico Manfredi Firmian is a visiting scholar at American University’s School of International Service. His research focuses on war, foreign policy, and the political economy of armed conflict. He is the author of War in Syria and the Middle East: A Political and Economic History (University of Texas Press, 2025) and the editor of Violence, Coercion, and the Politics of State Capture: Elites and Armed Actors in Vulnerable and Fragile States (Routledge, 2026).

Anthony Wanis-St. John is an associate professor at American University’s School of International Service. He is a conflict resolution professional who specializes in negotiations in hostile environments, particularly ceasefires and peace processes. He is the author of Back Channel Negotiation: Secrecy in the Middle East Peace Process (University of Syracuse Press, 2011) and a co-editor of Contemporary Peacemaking (Palgrave, 2022).

Image: Abbas Zakeri via Wikimedia Commons