Join War on the Rocks and gain access to content trusted by policymakers, military leaders, and strategic thinkers worldwide.
In the public perception, it seems like a big deal for Germany to publish a military strategy for the first time. But let me pour a little cold water on that. A form of military strategy has always existed. Where today we have a National Security Strategy paired with a military strategy and Plan for the Armed Forces, the past offered the White Paper, Defence Policy Guidelines, and the Bundeswehr concept, which spelled out the armed forces’ structure in more concrete terms. Yet even the new military strategy, released in late April, reads more as analysis than as a clear set of operational instructions for the Bundeswehr. It sets no concrete force-building targets to review annually and trigger a political response when not met.
Despite this, the analysis does contain some positive points suggesting a shift in the military’s mindset. The Bundeswehr’s focus on the threat Russia poses is sensible, as is the recognition that Europe must provide its own conventional defense within NATO, as the United States clearly has other priorities.
Furthermore, the description of the networked, multi-domain battlefield, the importance of AI and drones, and the integration of a more transparent situational awareness with rapid decision-making is accurate. Modernizing the Bundeswehr’s capabilities in these areas is absolutely essential. The mention of capability development in long-range precision weapons also reflects lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War. The fact that Germany is increasing its relevance by shouldering greater burdens within the alliance is noteworthy. However, given its central geographic location and economic strength, Germany should have done this long ago. This overemphasis on leadership aspirations, therefore, points to a serious shortcoming. In reality, Germany is currently unable to fulfill its NATO obligations, particularly as a logistics hub.
I see it as positive that Germany is approaching European defense from a position of national strength, rather than trying to compensate for missing capabilities through cooperation. National capabilities make cooperation resilient in the first place. Using this to make technological independence possible at the European level once again highlights the uncertainty of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Berlin has thus sought to signal to Washington — particularly with an eye toward next month’s NATO summit in Ankara — that Europe is ready to shoulder conventional defense on its own and relieve the United States of this burden. Germany will take the lead. The United States benefits from a strong Europe, and for Europe, Russia is the greatest threat — even if President Donald Trump sees it differently. At the same time, however, the approach of the strategy sends another signal: The Indo-Pacific and the Near and Middle East are not priorities.
The analysis is not convincing in some respects, as it ignores how China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the so-called CRINK alliance) cooperate militarily and technologically against NATO’s values and interests in every theater. Emphasizing this connection would strengthen NATO’s global significance and pressure Germany into changing its friendly policy toward China.
Although the strategy focuses on the Bundeswehr, it would have been wise to emphasize European burden sharing and the greatest possible efficiency regarding interoperability and standardization in Europe. On one hand, Europe should seek to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and prioritize strategic enablers for capability development that, until now, only the United States has provided. On the other hand, Germany would make it clear that, while it aspires to be the strongest land force, it will deploy its capabilities only in the interest of Europe as a whole. This should lead to greater trust within Europe.
The aim here is to prop up leadership claims with a document, rather than to prove them by taking on responsibilities Germany could already shoulder today. The military strategy is thus a document shaped by politics rather than military advice. It combines hubris and despondency instead of translating sound counsel and the demands of the modern battlefield into actionable steps.
Time is of the essence. The German public has recognized the Russian threat and allocated funds for a turning point in security policy and now expects rapid capability development to match the geopolitical power shift, the current threat landscape, and America’s changing priorities. Germany can realign its security policy, but if policymakers keep ignoring or delaying military advice, they will forfeit this “turning point.” Previous documents failed for the same reasons: a flawed threat analysis or a policy that favored a tame peacekeeping force instead of an army built for action, deterrence, and leadership in Europe.
The current military strategy carries this failure in three fatal flaws: an inconsistent timeline, no operationalization of the battlefield’s technological and economic transformation, and no structural changes within the Bundeswehr.
Both the Russian threat and the increased manpower needed to address the threat are urgent issues that cannot wait. According to the strategy, the Bundeswehr is supposed to be capable of defending Germany by 2029. Key capabilities such as full connectivity and digitization, AI-supported multidimensional situational awareness, far-reaching precision strikes, air defense across all domains from ballistic missiles to drones, and ensuring industrial and logistical sustainability, will not be in place until 2035 — the year NATO mandates the five percent defense spending target. Several of Germany’s neighbors, such as Poland, the Baltic states, Denmark, and Finland, are already moving toward that target.
Under the new strategy, the Bundeswehr will not expand into Europe’s strongest conventional army, thereby deterring Russia, until 2039. However, given the acute threat from Russia that German intelligence agencies are already forecasting, it is not enough to be ready for defense by 2029 and to reach full strength by 2039. Where is the sense of urgency and the ambition of a leading nation to be ready for defense today and to take on more responsibility?
The Bundeswehr is far from meeting the personnel and equipment commitments already needed for NATO today. If the United States withdraws conventional forces from Europe, the planned 460,000 soldiers, including reservists, will not be enough. Military leaders know that the German Army alone requires over 200,000 active-duty soldiers to ensure deterrence and sustainability. Under this unambitious plan, Germany can neither contribute to alliance defense while maintaining national defense simultaneously, nor sustain this effort in the long term. Yet there is a lack of urgency to immediately address this problem — doing so would include introducing conscription or a general mandatory service. The federal government agreed to a new version of the volunteer service and set the recruitment targets so low that they could easily be met, in order to avoid a new debate on conscription.
One lesson learned from Russia’s war on Ukraine is that modern conflict takes place in a multidimensional battlefield characterized by the technological and economic dimensions of warfare.
Combat is characterized by a constant cycle of rapid innovation — adaptation, integration into the armed forces, and up-scaling production. Technical efficiency is becoming increasingly important. Just as logistics, resource management, and reducing technological dependencies (such as cloud services, AI, 5G, and satellite internet) are becoming significant. The military should factor in the technological and economic transformation of the battlefield. Supply lines, production capacities, and resource depots will become prime targets in modern warfare. It is also necessary to consider what lessons China draws from the Russo-Ukrainian War, as the German defense industry is heavily reliant on Taiwanese semiconductors and Chinese rare-earth elements. Yet there is hardly any mention of this in the military strategy.
Boosting innovation capacity through adaptation, integration, and up-scaling implies that military strategy itself demands the urgently needed structural reform of the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry of Defense. After all, certifying a drone currently takes 18 months in Germany. It is impossible to build up capabilities without changing procurement structures and taking them into account.
It is no secret that victory and defeat in modern war depend on willpower, resources, and technological efficiency. The Bundeswehr should transform from a peacetime army into a combat-ready force. The goal of building the largest army in Europe is unachievable without structural changes within the Bundeswehr and the Federal Ministry of Defence. Special funds are being misappropriated far too often, and “more of the same” is being ordered. The Bundeswehr needs a revolution in its structures, procurement, and mindset. Drone capabilities should be integrated into every branch and unit of the military. We need more personnel in the field of electronic warfare and a new professional profile: the mil-tech soldier, who tests innovations more quickly and implements adaptations using a “try and develop” approach. The Bundeswehr needs a major structural reform. Otherwise, a “Jena and Auerstedt” disaster looms.
These deficiencies raise several questions. For whom was the military strategy written? For the Bundeswehr? No, because the chiefs of the army, navy, air force, and Cyber and Information Domain Service, as well as soldiers, are well aware of what the modern battlefield looks like, what capabilities it requires, and what kind of personnel it needs. The assessments — the genuine military advice — would therefore differ from the strategy’s considerations: an increase in military readiness, conscription, training for the general population, drone integration, and new job profiles for military-technical officers. Was the military strategy’s intended audience the German population? Hardly — it was barely noticed here. What matters more to the public are concrete political steps. Will conscription be introduced? Can drones be shot down over critical infrastructure? Is there basic defense training in schools, as in Latvia? When will German households receive a brochure on how to behave in the event of war, as in Sweden? These are the questions the public asks. The military strategy was therefore written primarily as a foreign policy tool.
The United States has always demanded leadership from Germany to reassure itself that Europe is shouldering its share of the burden. Yet European Union member states view Germany’s pretensions with suspicion, as behind the bold rhetoric, there is mostly hot air. The military strategy is meant to convince allies at the upcoming NATO summit that Germany is finally stepping up — a label affixed to its claim to European leadership, but only on paper, with no real move toward operationalization.
I remain skeptical about its implementation. The strategy is yet another analysis that hits on the right points, but by the time it is supposed to be implemented in 2039, we will be in a different geopolitical situation. The greatest threat from Russia will come between 2026 and 2028. Germany should immediately act upon concrete measures and methods for building its capabilities and strengthening deterrence. Yet the federal government is not implementing conscription — it is misappropriating the special fund. It is not supplying the Taurus as a long-range precision weapon to Ukraine out of fear of escalation — and it is thereby withholding the means identified as particularly important in military strategy. It is not discussing the scenario of a “state of tension,” a special provision in the German Constitution, but instead lulls the population into a false sense of security.
The German defense minister is undermining the widely praised doctrinal shift toward a “one-theater approach,” in which the NATO area, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific become interconnected security spaces rather than separate theaters. It is the defense minister himself who dismissed Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and categorically refused to support the United States, stating, “That is not our war.” The defense minister fails to recognize that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea work closely together and very much see themselves at war with the West. Anyone who wants to be a leader must take responsibility and adopt a clear stance. Yet the federal government still cannot agree on whether Ukraine’s victory over Russia is the goal of its support. When democracies are under attack, they must be willing to win. That is why a central statement is missing from the military strategy: We are building up our Bundeswehr at a pace that will allow us to win in the event of an attack on a NATO country.
This is the expectation held by our European allies, who have long demanded Germany assumes greater military responsibility. This is the request the United States has made of us for a very long time. This is the standard we should hold ourselves to. A military strategy is only valuable when military advice is heard unfiltered and if it changes the thinking and concrete actions of policymakers.
Germany is a master of making grand announcements and asserting its claim to leadership. Its military strategy also reflects this claim. Will Germany live up to it? I have considerable doubts.
Roderich Kiesewetter is a member of the German parliament (Christian Democratic Union) and a retired colonel. He served almost 30 years in the Bundeswehr in various commands, staff functions, and foreign operations. Since 2009, he has been member of the Bundestag and serving as representative of foreign affairs for the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union caucus since 2014.
Image: Sgt. Herbert Roberson via Wikimedia Commons
.jpg){kind=link}