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When the U.S. military launched its war against Iran in Feb. 2026, it did not just dismantle Iranian military capabilities. It shattered the illusion that the United States would consult with its closest allies and that an ally’s refusal to grant base access can stop an American war in motion. Rather than the much discussed “outward flows” of military assets from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East, it is the anticipated “inward flows” of U.S. military assets that could be more consequential in times of crisis.
Focusing on the early days of the fallout of this intervention, I argue that the South Korean government should move beyond the legalistic debates of the past and begin to proactively formalize a logistics-focused role to navigate the inevitable pressures of a regional crisis. The traditional barriers of host nation consent are dissolving under a new era of “flexible realism,” leaving Seoul with a stark choice: Define its own contribution now or have it defined by the fait accompli of U.S. operational requirements later.
The crisis in the Gulf provides a sobering case study for the future of strategic flexibility. As the United States surged its capabilities to the region in early 2026, the Gulf states publicly notified Washington that their territory could not be used for attacks. Notably, Saudi Arabia directly assured Iran in mid-Jan. that it would not allow its airspace or land to be used for offensive purposes. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reiterated this message. . Since Iran had explicitly warned that it would consider any military base hosting offensive U.S. military assets a legitimate target for attack, the Gulf states feared Iranian retaliation against critical infrastructure like desalination plants.
What Gulf capitals signaled to Washington ex ante in private is unknown. Regardless, this proved largely beside the point once the war began. That is, the gap between this public reluctance and operational reality became irrelevant the moment U.S. assets were already in place. The United States established a de facto multi-layered missile defense system by deploying additional Patriot and THAAD batteries across the region. Specifically, they were deployed to the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, the Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. In addition, Washington maneuvered to distinguish between “offensive” weapons and “support” infrastructure. The Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, for example, became a hub for E-3G Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft and KC-135 refueling tankers. These assets were essential for the strikes that enabled fighters to reach targets deep within the Iranian interior. Classifying these as defensive or logistical assets, the U.S. military effectively bypassed the host nation’s refusal while maintaining the operational capacity to strike. Satellite imagery confirmed a sharp increase in early warning and aerial refueling aircraft, that is, assets that were indispensable for coordinating hundreds of sorties deep into Iranian territory. In effect, the Gulf states provided the core infrastructure for the strikes despite their official stance of neutrality. Recent analysis shows that enablers such as the Airborne Warning and Control System and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers were the center of gravity for U.S. operations against Iran. Their classification as supportive rather than combatant was a key diplomatic workaround that was rendered meaningless once Iran began systematically targeting them as high-value offensive enablers.
The ex post operational realignment among the Gulf states followed Iran’s retaliatory campaign against Arab neighbors. After suffering missile strikes and resulting casualties in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the United Arab Emirates ended its neutrality. It began urging Arab nations to act alongside Israel and the United States in self-defense. In Kuwait, key infrastructure, including its international airport, was targeted, while in Bahrain, the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama sustained drone and missile damage. Kuwait maintained that its involvement was strictly limited to the “protection of sovereignty,” but it nonetheless transitioned into a defensive cooperation system with the U.S. Central Command. Qatar continued to seek an exit strategy for the conflict even after the Al Udeid Air Base was targeted by missiles. While Qatar condemned the strikes on its territory, it remained wary of the conflict escalating into a full-scale regional war, especially due to the gas fields it shares with Iran. Now more than two months into the war, some states, not least the United Arab Emirates, have become quite vocal about the United States “finishing the job.” Its decision to leave the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries shows that the war exacerbated Emirati frustrations with multilateral and regional institutions, incentivizing it to withdraw and capitalize on its expanded oil production capacity and posture geopolitically closer to the United States.
It is worth mentioning that U.S. alliances in the Gulf are characteristically different from those treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. For instance, the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement is grounded in logistics and arms sales rather than mutual defense, while the treaty between the two countries centers on burden-sharing and regional strategic depth. Due to their comprehensive security commitment, traditional allies that host U.S. bases should have more veto power, as demonstrated by NATO allies. Yet, once the Combined Forces Command or Indo-Pacific Command embarks on a high-intensity surge, the overriding demands of the war effort may render an ally’s refusal to grant access moot.
This scenario could easily be repeated on and near the Korean Peninsula. Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, which serves as the legal basis for the stationing of U.S. Forces Korea, stipulates that “The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.” While Washington has regarded the “right to dispose” as a comprehensive authority allowing it to determine the structure and missions of U.S. military forces based on global strategic needs, Seoul has long argued that “mutual agreement” requires specific prior consultation and consent before introducing new weapons systems or diverting military capabilities to regional conflicts. A diplomatic arrangement addressed this issue in 2006. A joint statement between South Korea’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice included the phrase, “The two sides made it clear that the United States respects the [Republic of Korea’s] position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”
That 2006 understanding has been eroded in practice. Between March and Oct. 2025, the U.S. Army redeployed two Patriot batteries and approximately 500 personnel from South Korea to support operations in the Middle East. After Operation Epic Fury began, additional Patriot components and munitions stationed in Korea were repositioned for U.S. operations against Iran despite Seoul’s stated opposition. President Lee Jae-myung acknowledged the gap directly. “The U.S. Forces Korea may dispatch some air defense systems abroad in accordance with its own military needs. While we have expressed opposition, the reality is that we cannot fully push through our position.” A 2025 joint fact sheet reaffirmed the 2006 statement but added little specificity. There were no threshold conditions, no notification protocols, and no veto points that would make “mutual agreement” operationally meaningful. In short, Washington’s unilateral moves have outpaced the legal architecture. The operational gap now matters more than the doctrinal one.
There is reason to believe a South Korean refusal may no longer serve as a functional barrier for U.S. military operations in the region. According to strategic directives embedded in the U.S. National Security Strategy and U.S. Defense Strategy, the United States intends to utilize U.S. Forces Korea as a “first island chain” force. The consolidation of fighter squadrons at Osan Air Base and the assignment of permanent deployments at Kunsan Air Base are a case in point. Moreover, the United States has already decided to establish one of the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force commands in Japan and is considering the deployment of a Multi-Domain Effect Battalion to South Korea. Equipped with a long-range hypersonic weapon, the Multi-Domain Task Force will have the capability to strike not only North Korea but also Beijing and major Chinese ports. Hypothetically, given these enabling conditions, once U.S. forces launch from these bases, they may well become legitimate targets for the People’s Liberation Army. If China launches a preemptive strike to prevent U.S. air superiority, South Korea will be drawn into the war regardless of its intentions.
Besides, the conventional argument against strategic flexibility that off-peninsula U.S. Forces Korea redeployment would create a security vacuum, inviting North Korean opportunism, is being questioned from within the defense community. For example, a report that analyzes North Korean media from 2005 to 2025 reveals that Pyongyang frames the evolution of U.S. Forces Korea not as a retreat, but as a “multi-purposing” of assets. Namely, North Korea perceives this shift as a strategic refinement designed to maximize U.S. combat effectiveness on the Korean peninsula. Because strategic flexibility increases the operational utility of U.S. Forces Korea, it runs counter to North Korea’s longstanding demand for its withdrawal. There are concerns that strategic flexibility heightens the risk of simultaneous conflicts across multiple regions and the involvement of South Korea, which will further destabilize the peninsula. Accordingly, Pyongyang rejects the security vacuum argument as superficial and unrelated to diminished deterrence against North Korea. One could argue that if Pyongyang itself does not believe redeployment creates a security vacuum, the abandonment logic that has anchored Seoul’s reluctance is at least partially inverted. Rather, North Korea may feel an even greater sense of threat upon witnessing THAAD or Patriot missiles deployed on the Korean Peninsula being used in actual combat and recognizing the mobility and global reach of the U.S. military. In effect, the South Korean government has more room than it has assumed to define a calibrated, narrow set of out-of-area roles without invoking North Korean escalation.
Among the many lessons to emerge from Operation Epic Fury, the following is clear. To manage the risk of entrapment while maintaining the robustness of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, Seoul should begin to take proactive measures rather than dwell on U.S. strategic consistency. Defense authorities must engage in direct discussions about South Korea’s role as a “model ally.” Broadly, this should include issues such as which bases will be used for what purposes during near and out-of-area operations. Recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue, South Korea could aim for a joint strategic framework with the United States that is developed through iterative Track 1.5 and 2.0 dialogues to coordinate expectations before a crisis occurs.
Specifically, Seoul should concentrate on a logistical support package rather than a high-intensity intervention, defined by the threshold conditions under which each category of support activates. First, non-combatant evacuation should be automatic, covering U.S., Korean, and third-country nationals transiting through Korean territory in any regional contingency. This builds on the U.S.-South Korean noncombat evacuation operational planning architecture codified in U.S. Army Field Manual 90-29 (1994) and refined through routine U.S. Forces Korea exercises since. Second, aerial refueling should be permitted with prior consultation when U.S. aircraft are engaged in defensive operations (i.e., defending allied territory, intercepting incoming threats, supporting noncombatant evacuation operations from another theater) and reserved in cases of offensive operations against a third state, where National Assembly notification applies. Third, intelligence sharing should expand on existing missile launch and maritime traffic data exchanges with two features. One, a peninsula-based common operating picture feed to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and two, a Korean opt-out provision for intelligence products specifically tied to offensive U.S. operations. Each threshold should ideally have a triggering condition, a South Korean approval level (Ministry of National Defense, Blue House, National Assembly), and a notification window. When this is agreed upon, it could be codified in a bilateral agreement that will substantially complement the 2006 Ban–Rice statement.
This middle path will likely draw domestic pushback from both conservatives who demand full participation and progressives who may not want any involvement at all. Importantly, this is only a starting point. Despite much ink spilled on op-eds invoking various security concerns, particularly related to the Strait of Hormuz crisis, a sincere, national debate to sort out the pros and cons of strategic flexibility has yet to take place. Until discussions mature, logistical support is the most realistic and thus ideal way to fulfill South Korea’s alliance obligations while protecting its national interest.
South Korea does not enter this negotiation empty-handed. Camp Humphreys is the largest U.S. power projection platform in the Pacific, and the 2025 Joint Fact Sheet secured a $150 billion Korean shipbuilding investment that the U.S. industrial base cannot easily replace. These assets give Seoul real leverage, but only if it uses them to shape, rather than simply react to, the next operational fait accompli. Moreover, a successful wartime OPCON transfer will likely depend on an alliance bargain that at a minimum, sketches an outline of what South Korea will and will not do off the peninsula. The window for that bargain is opening and closing.
Bo Ram Kwon, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul. She joined in 2013 and works on U.S. security and defense strategy, the U.S.-South Korean alliance, the nexus between U.S. foreign policy and American politics, and economic sanctions.
The views expressed in this article are of a personal capacity and do not reflect the position of the South Korean government or the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses.
Image: Simon Saravia via Wikimedia Commons
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