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In his long-awaited nuclear deterrence speech, French President Emmanuel Macron laid out his new doctrine of “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée) and — for the first time in history — offered to deploy the French Strategic Air Forces to European countries. “In the same way that our strategic submarines dilute naturally in the oceans,” the French president said, “our strategic air forces will also be able to be spread deep into the European continent.”
The proposal to deploy French nuclear forces on allied territory may appear similar to the forward deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. But the resemblance is misleading. U.S. forward deployments are designed primarily to strengthen the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence. France’s new doctrine of “forward deterrence” likely serves a different purpose. Rather than reinforcing an extended deterrence guarantee, dispersing nuclear-capable aircraft across allied bases would improve the survivability of France’s airborne nuclear forces during crises, when French bases could be vulnerable to missile attacks.
A more useful comparison is dispersed air operations. Concepts such as Sweden’s Bas 90 system or the U.S. Air Force’s agile combat employment model illustrate how distributing aircraft across multiple locations can complicate enemy targeting and preserve strike capability.
Forward nuclear deployments can strengthen extended deterrence in several ways. First, they can bolster nuclear warfighting capabilities, which can be employed to counter an adversary’s military forces, thereby contributing to deterrence by denial. Second, they can make the threat of nuclear escalation more credible. The proximity of nuclear weapons to the front line increases the likelihood of their use against an invading force before friendly troops are defeated. Third, forward nuclear deployments can demonstrate a commitment to using nuclear weapons to defend allies by showing a willingness to bear the economic and political costs of the deployments. Finally, they can increase the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence by offering low-yield, flexible response options for controlling escalation and achieving war termination.
However, as Macron’s speech makes abundantly clear, French forward nuclear deployments will not serve any of these purposes:
Our doctrine […] rejects the idea of flexible nuclear response. French nuclear capabilities are strategic and exclusively strategic because these are weapons of a whole other kind than those that can be used on a battlefield. France, since François Mitterrand, has abandoned any notion of tactical use of nuclear weapons and we will not go back on this.
Furthermore, Macron emphasized that there will be “no guarantee in the strict sense of the term.” A background dossier published by the French ministry of the armed forces and veteran affairs ahead of the speech also states that France does not intend to replace NATO extended nuclear deterrence, even though French nuclear deterrence also has a European dimension. Finally, Macron said in 2025 that France will not finance the security of others.
But if extended nuclear deterrence as well as U.S. forward nuclear deployments and NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements are poor frameworks for thinking about French forward deterrence, how can we make better sense of the new doctrine? In his speech, Macron indicated the answer would be “dispersal across European territory.” He explained this would provide “a sort of archipelago of forces [that] will complicate the calculations of our adversaries.”
The idea behind dispersed air operations is relatively simple: Combat aircraft operate from designated military air bases. Those bases are not only large and visible, but they are also relatively few due to decades of spending cuts. Combat aircraft, in other words, are highly concentrated at a small number of air bases. As a result, these bases will be prime targets for missile strikes in the opening phases of a military conflict — after all, denying an adversary the use of air power is likely to provide a significant military advantage. In military parlance, preemptive strikes on an adversary are also called offensive counter-air operations.
However, if it is possible to disperse combat aircraft from a small number of permanent bases to a large number of temporary bases before and during military conflict, this will pose targeting dilemmas for an adversary and, in turn, increase the survivability of the dispersed combat aircraft. Essentially, dispersal is a form of a shell game: Fighter jets are dispersed from their main operating base to several temporary airfields that are usually inactivated. They can fly their sorties from there, land at a different temporary airfield for refueling, rearming, and receiving mission updates, and fly more sorties until eventually recovering at another temporary airfield or their main base. This makes it very difficult for an adversary to target the planes on the ground because the number of potential targets is so high and since most of the airfields will be empty most of the time. Sweden has perfected this type of operational concept and even designed the Saab Gripen around the requirements for dispersed operations, but other states are catching up.
In the face of Chinese missile threats to U.S. and allied air bases, the U.S. Air Force started experimenting with dispersed operations as part of the “rapid raptor” concept in the early 2010s. This idea, which was initially developed by pilots and weapons officers, allows for deploying four F-22 stealth fighters to basically any forward operating location in the Indo-Pacific by putting all the necessary support to maintain the aircraft in an austere environment into a single C-17 cargo aircraft. In 2015, U.S. Air Force leaders outlined how dispersed or “untethered” operations could enable the success of airpower in an anti-access and area-denial environment. Finally, in 2022, agile combat employment became U.S. Air Force doctrine and has also been adopted by NATO.
Nothing about dispersed operations is new. During the Cold War, NATO aircraft frequently trained to operate from highways in West Germany. However, Russia’s war against Ukraine and the success of the Ukrainian Air Force in leveraging dispersal to continue air operations under the threat of Russian missiles have led Western air forces to rediscover the necessity of dispersed operations in order to sustain the fight in high-intensity warfare.
The French Strategic Air Forces (Forces Aériennes Stratégiques) consist of approximately 40 nuclear-capable twin-seat Rafale B F3-R fighters which are organized into two squadrons that operate out of the Saint-Dizier Air Base located about 200 kilometers east of Paris. In March 2025, Macron announced that by 2035, two new squadrons of nuclear-capable Rafale in the most modern version — the F5 — will be based at the Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur Air Base in eastern France, which was a nuclear-capable base until 2011. France’s air-launched nuclear weapon, the ASMPA (Air-Sol Moyenne Portée-Amélioré) cruise missile, is stored in Saint-Dizier as well as at French air bases in Istres and Avord. These two also serve as dispersal bases, resulting in a total of three operating bases for the French Strategic Air Forces.
The Naval Nuclear Aviation Force (Force Aéronavale Nucléaire) operates single-seat Rafale M fighters based on France’s Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, but nuclear weapons are no longer deployed to the carrier under normal circumstances. When the carrier is in its home port, the aircraft operate out of the Landivisiau Naval Аviation Base in northern France. They can conduct independent nuclear strike missions or integrate with a Strategic Air Forces strike group.
In the past, the French air leg was probably fairly survivable. At that time, Russia lacked the conventional military capabilities to target the operating bases of the French Strategic Air Forces, and the Russian leadership did not consider the French deterrent to be directed at Russia. However, according to a recent study conducted by RAND Europe, Russian perceptions may be shifting as a result of France’s staunch support for Ukraine and changing rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia. France is also becoming more active in the High North and the Arctic, meaning its nuclear deterrent could become an important part of Russia’s nuclear calculation. Moreover, the new Oreshnik intermediate-range missile, which Russia used in an attack against Dnipro, Ukraine in November 2024, presents a novel threat to NATO air bases, including those of the French Strategic Air Forces. Although Oreshnik’s conventional submunitions did little damage in Ukraine because they were used against ground forces spread over a wide area, “the Oreshnik makes perfect sense for attacking dense targets like air bases, where its conventional submunitions can deal significant damage,” according to military analyst Decker Eveleth.
France would still have its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines that would guarantee its second-strike capability after a successful attack on its nuclear air leg. However, the nuclear-capable Rafale fighters assume a special role in French nuclear doctrine because they are the most likely delivery platform for the final nuclear warning strike. They are also suitable for conducting nuclear signaling, thus making their survivability similarly important as that of the submarines.
Given the increased threat to the French Strategic Air Forces, the ability to disperse combat aircraft over a wider geographical area — the European continent — could allow France to address the emerging vulnerability of its nuclear air leg.
French analysts Emmanuelle Maitre and Étienne Marcuz have underscored the strategic logic of deploying France’s airborne nuclear forces on allied territory. Access to partner bases in a crisis, they argue, would yield significant operational benefits by providing greater resilience through dispersion, extending its effective reach through forward positioning, and opening up multiple penetration axes that would complicate an adversary’s defense planning. To be sure, dispersion could also heighten exposure to missile strikes in a crisis if the fighter jets were positioned closer to enemy borders. However, as French air bases can now be attacked with Oreshnik missiles, the benefits are likely to outweigh the risks.
An Atlantic Council study by Greg Weaver has also discussed the need for dispersal concepts regarding NATO’s dual-capable F-35A Lightning II that form part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. According to nuclear policy expert Jon Wolfsthal, these concepts originated under President Barack Obama’s administration as a response to Russian violations of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty that threatened NATO air bases.
Just like other Western air forces, the French air force has already exercised the agile combat employment concept, known as MORANE (mise en oeuvre réactive de l’arme aérienne, or “reactive deployment of air assets”) in France, with deployments to Germany, Croatia, and Sweden, including in cold weather. The deployments announced by Macron in his recent speech would therefore primarily put this already existing practice on a more explicit doctrinal foundation, with a special focus on the nuclear dimension. But in contrast to U.S. forward nuclear deployments to Europe, which have endured since the 1950s, the deployment of the French Strategic Air Forces to allied countries will only be “temporary,” as the official English translation of the speech clarifies.
Although U.S. forward nuclear deployments and those announced by Macron appear similar, they are conceptually different and should not be confused. As the historian James Cameron has noted, the original intent of U.S. forward nuclear deployments was to make a nuclear first strike more credible. To this day, the purpose of these deployments is to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitment. French “forward deterrence,” on the other hand, is likely more about increasing the survivability of its Strategic Air Forces, especially in a crisis. Therefore, dispersed air operations concepts like agile combat employment are a better framework to make sense of France’s new nuclear doctrine.
Nevertheless, France’s new doctrine of “forward deterrence” could be mutually beneficial for France and its allies. Forward deployments would send a powerful strategic signal to allies and adversaries alike that threats to European security could prompt a French nuclear response. As Macron noted in his speech, host countries for the French Strategic Air Forces “will gain a strong link with our deterrence.” But the practical benefits of the deployments will depend on the details, namely, whether the temporary deployments will encompass only nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets or also ASMPA cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. This is the key question that will determine whether “forward deterrence” is simply a political gesture or a meaningful survivability measure, because dispersing only the jets without the warheads is unlikely to generate substantial operational and deterrence benefits in a crisis scenario.
So far, the answer is ambiguous. While many commentators suggest that the deployments will only include aircraft, Macron noted that “forward deterrence” requires “specific means of communication,” which could refer to dedicated nuclear command, control, and communication to enable nuclear operations by forward-deployed combat aircraft. Another possibility is deception operations, in which France would deploy aircraft carrying nuclear cruise missile “mockups” to allied countries. France must clarify the scope of the deployments if the benefits of “forward deterrence” are to be fully realized.
Forward-deployed French Rafale fighters will also require air refueling and conventional support from allied air forces to reach their targets and penetrate enemy air defenses. Allied combat aircraft, particularly the F-35A Lightning II, with its low observability and advanced sensors, are well-suited for this escort role. For this reason, it is no surprise that Macron mentioned the possibility of allied conventional participation in French nuclear activities as another element of “forward deterrence.” However, while allies already provide conventional support for nuclear operations in the NATO context, as demonstrated in the annual Steadfast Noon exercise, France has relied solely on its own military capabilities thus far and has no experience with allied participation in its nuclear mission. The exact details of this envisioned participation still need to be discussed, and potential pitfalls should be addressed.
Finally, the forward deployments, together with France’s announcement to increase its quantity of nuclear warheads and stop disclosing the size of its nuclear arsenal, could undermine its image as a responsible nuclear power of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Until now, France has held itself to a high standard in terms of nuclear norms and transparency and maintained its arsenal according to the principle of “strict sufficiency.” Although the underlying spirit of sufficiency was still present in Macron’s speech, “forward deterrence” is unlikely to go down well in the Global South and may well spark turmoil at the 2026 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in April and May. This could also create problems for European non-nuclear states like Germany and Sweden, which have historically considered themselves bridge-builders in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty context. Therefore, a coordinated European diplomatic effort is necessary to address the potential diplomatic repercussions of France’s new nuclear doctrine.
Many of these topics are likely to be sorted out in the strategic dialogues that France will set up with the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, and potentially other European countries. For these dialogues to succeed, however, it is important to understand what French forward deployments are and are not. To this end, dispersed operations can provide a useful framework of reference.
Frank Kuhn is a doctoral researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and is currently a visiting fellow at the Swedish Defence University’s Department of War Studies, Strategy Division. His research interests include nuclear deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation, and military technology, strategy, and operations. He is also a former Center for Strategic and International Studies nuclear scholar.
The author thanks July Decarpentrie, Étienne Marcuz, and Lukas Mengelkamp for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this article represent those of the author alone.
Image: Airwolfhound via Wikimedia Commons
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