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When U.S. President Donald Trump floated the possibility of taking Greenland by force, European leaders reacted with outrage — and then, almost immediately, with relief once he backed down. Wolfgang Ischinger, the doyen of the Munich Security Conference, expressed similar relief when he described Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech there — chock full of conditionality on immigration and culture war tropes — as “reassuring.”

That sentiment may prove far more dangerous than any threats from Washington.

The trans-Atlantic partnership of days past no longer exists. After decades of considering aligned interests and close collaboration a fact of life, the relationship between Washington and what it long enthusiastically referred to as its “allies and partners” in Europe today bears little resemblance to what it once was. The recent episode surrounding Trump’s declared intent to acquire Greenland, by means of a military invasion if necessary, especially signaled to the world that a genuine geopolitical rift separating the two sides has emerged and shows no sign of going away anytime soon.

Yet, while French President Emmanuel Macron was quick to call the Greenland crisis a “strategic wake-up call for Europe” and reaffirmed his intent to work towards genuine European strategic autonomy, it does not seem as if Paris, Berlin, and others are actually planning to walk the walk anytime soon. Despite what by now amounts to conclusive evidence that a return to the harmonious trans-Atlantic relationship of the past is no longer feasible, neither Marcon, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, nor any other European leader has demonstrated a genuine commitment to strategic emancipation. To the contrary, most policymakers appear convinced that, if they just try hard enough to assuage Trump, everything will soon go back to normal. Their desperation for any sign of goodwill from Washington was on full display in Munich, where Rubio’s aforementioned speech received a standing ovation and was lauded as a recommitment to the “indissoluble [trans-Atlantic] bond,” although it de facto provided little evidence of a serious change in U.S. attitudes.

The bad news is that hoping for a return to the “normalcy” of days past is nothing but wishful thinking. The good news is that, even if NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s claim that Europe cannot “defend itself without the U.S.” might hold today, Europe has both the means and the opportunity to effectively adjust to its new geopolitical reality. It is high time that European leaders finally give up on the dream of restoring the trans-Atlantic partnership and abandon their identity as America’s junior partner.

A New Reality, Made in the USA

It is in its conception of alliances and treatment of allies — specifically those in Europe — that the second Trump administration has most evidently broken with the foreign policy establishment. Driven by voices in the administration calling for a more “realistic” approach in its dealing with others, Trump has abandoned the “allies and partners” thinking that characterized the foreign policies of his predecessors. Where former President Joe Biden and those before him treated U.S. alliance commitments as sacrosanct ends in themselves, the White House today espouses a very different perspective. Briefly put, alliances are means to an end only. And they are not always effective means either: Where Biden-era officials viewed them as unconditionally beneficial “shields of the republic,” Trump and his advisors are more skeptical, frequently highlighting dangers of entrapment and especially free-riding.

Yet, this has not led Trump to reduce U.S. alliance commitments and adopt a more restrained grand strategy. Far from being committed to reducing America’s global military footprint, Trump has instead devised his own brand of primacy — sometimes labelled “illiberal hegemony” — that perpetuates U.S. hegemony for purposes of rent extraction. The goal is not to carefully scrutinize the costs and benefits of individual alliances, but rather to make those being offered protection pay a steep price for it.

On top of these strategic recalibrations, express ideological hostility towards many states’ continued opposition to Make America Great Again-style populist nativism wreaked even further havoc on a relationship already pushed close to the breaking point. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2025 openly displayed the significant ideological rifts between the Trump administration and Europe on the stage of the most important meeting of trans-Atlanticists worldwide. Rubio’s speech in Munich was hailed for seeming more conciliatory, but as Nathalie Tocci argues, “beneath the surface, Rubio’s speech this year and Vance’s in 2025 were two sides of the same coin.” While Rubio was, as she describes, “more subtle and coherent,” that is not enough for comfort as “the message from Washington remains that Europe and the US should be defined by ethno-political values of culture, tradition and religion.”

The 2025 National Security Strategy clearly downgraded the priority of Europe to the benefit of a focus on the western hemisphere and called for the promotion of “European greatness” in the face of a threat of “civilizational erasure.” While the Trump administration clearly does not aim at a full withdrawal or abandonment of Europe, there is little doubt that it seeks to engage with a very different kind of Europe — namely, a vassal market that willingly accepts strategic subjugation and becomes a key destination for U.S. exports.

The (Lack of a) European Response

Needless to say, most European leaders and strategists have taken note of the profound changes that have taken place in Washington’s attitude towards Europe. Across the board, they have reacted with disbelief and, in not a few cases, anger. This was particularly true during Trump’s Greenland threats. Capturing the unexpectedly determined opposition they exhibited, Der Spiegel displayed various leaders as a sort of rustic European Avengers, applauding their newfound guts. One can only guess the factors that ultimately prompted the U.S. president to change his mind, but at least to a certain extent, European deterrence seems to have played a role.

Applause, whether in Munich or anywhere else, is misguided. For all their rhetoric, too many in Europe are already reverting back to viewing the trans-Atlantic relationship in the largely idealistic way that has remained predominant throughout Trump’s presidencies. After a missed opportunity to reform the alliance through trans-Atlantic coordination under the Biden administration — and also muting all debates over NATO’s future due to concerns about unity over support for Ukraine — many Europeans do not see any alternative to the American-led alliance for the continent’s security.

This does not mean that they do not acknowledge that the European contribution to NATO must change; the commitment made at last year’s NATO summit in the Hague to spend 3.5 percent of national GDP on defense and invest an additional 1.5 percent in defense-adjacent areas demonstrates that Europe’s sense of responsibility in NATO has changed. However, what has not changed is the trans-Atlantic reflex and the idea that European security cannot be imagined or constructed without the United States. Europeans have convinced themselves that the trans-Atlantic relationship can be saved if they just contribute enough themselves, and that it has to be saved at whatever price necessary.

The first steps taken by European leaders after the World Economic Forum in Davos, where Trump announced that the United States would not take Greenland by force, serve as a case in point. After the emergency meeting of the European Council dedicated to U.S.-E.U. relations in late January, E.U. Council President António Costa underlined the need for the European Union to implement the trade deal which it had accepted in mid-2025 after pressure from Washington, and after the Trump administration had reportedly linked the deal to security guarantees. The move, the hope in Brussels is, will go a long way towards normalizing trans-Atlantic relations.

Rutte’s remarks about how Europeans should “stop dreaming” about defending the continent without the United States similarly exemplify the lack of a genuine desire to break with the past. In Munich, the Secretary General doubled down on his embrace of subordination, noting that the United States would remain “absolutely anchored in the [North Atlantic Treaty] Organization.” Psychologically, the need for U.S. security guarantees is certainly felt more strongly in Tallinn or Helsinki than in Madrid or Paris. It is, hence, unsurprising, that the states most exposed to the threat from Russia are those most eager to generate goodwill in the White House, even if dependence and the exposure to risks are the price for it. But their stance is not unique: Even in western Europe, a similar mindset evidently continues to reign supreme.

Rather than accepting and reacting to the reality of Washington’s turn away from the trans-Atlanticism of the past, Europe is falling back into a lazy trans-Atlantic default mode where it is all too eager to forgo strategic autonomy and accepts subordination to Washington’s whims.

Caught Between Nostalgia and Defeatism

Why has Washington’s change in attitude and behavior not led to a more serious reaction and a willingness to actively reduce dependence on the United States? Part of the answer lies in nostalgia for the past. After the Cold War, many countries — Germany foremost among them — embraced not only the purported “end of history” but came to view harmonious relations among the advanced democracies on both sides of the Atlantic as a given. The emotional appeal of this idea is hard to understate, and it remains deeply influential. But the idea no longer reflects reality: Whatever may have been the case in the past, Washington clearly no longer believes that cooperation with Europe always serves the national interest of the United States.

The misinterpretation of the emerging definition of the U.S. national interest by strategic elites especially in eastern European and traditionally trans-Atlanticist European states is key to understanding their limited response. Die-hard trans-Atlanticists in Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, and elsewhere cling to the idea that not abandoning Europe and remaining present in European defense self-evidently serves Washington’s interests (e.g., because the military bases in Europe are important for its operations beyond the European theater and its alliances have historically been a power multiplier for the United States). Such thinking is illustrated by statements of high-ranking politicians like German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, who called the bond between Europe and the United States “rock solid” and warned against questioning NATO. The trans-Atlantic relationship is seen as a strategic necessity for Washington from which it could not possibly turn away for long. That Washington evidently disagrees is consistently ignored: The fact of the matter is that, instead of a benevolent senior partner perceiving a unity of interests, Europe is facing a predatory hegemon.

A more generous reading views the lack of a meaningful European response as a strategic bet that Trump’s confrontational rhetoric and especially his declared aim of reducing American responsibilities in NATO will be short-lived and not actually lead to a marked drawdown of American forces. Free-riding was an extremely lucrative arrangement for U.S. allies in Europe. To some, any effort to take over the critical functions of European defense, such as the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, could push the United States out when it might otherwise not act on its threats to do so; Rutte himself just recently called it “extremely important” for the position to be held by an American. But, of course, banking on a return to normalcy is a losing proposition.

Then there are states that make this strategic bet out of necessity, namely states that are particularly exposed to the threat posed by Russia and have stacked their entire defense on the United States. Given the lack of credible deterrence and defense capability by Europe alone, states like Lithuania reason that they have no other choice but to keep believing in Washington’s ultimate goodwill and hoping that hitting spending targets and concluding bilateral deals with Washington will appease the United States sufficiently to renew its assurances.

Finally, a significant element of defeatism underlies Europe’s evident geopolitical petrification. Rutte’s aforementioned claim, under a generous reading, captures Europe’s inability to defend itself alone today, but it does not account for the possibility of change in the future and, overall, vastly underestimates Europe’s strategic-military potential. There is no doubt that continuing reliance on U.S. technology and military infrastructure, lack of personnel, and underdeveloped strategic expertise will constitute massive challenges on the way towards autonomous European defense capabilities. However, the continent can, in fact, build what it needs in the medium- to long-term. It harbors a vast power potential that remains largely untapped, and its current military weakness is not due to a lack of opportunity but political will. The critical task for Europe consists in avoiding a defense gap in the short-to medium-term, but even here off-the-shelf acquisitions from non-European suppliers could go a long way towards shortening the time needed to replace essential U.S. capabilities.

The idea that Europe will “never” be able to defend itself without the United States ultimately rests on the faulty assumption that Europe’s capability will stagnate in the future. And statements on a purported European inability lead to a vicious circle: they undermine European ambition and kill meaningful initiatives before they can even fully emerge.

European Ends and Means

It is high time for Europeans to snap out of their current approach to the trans-Atlantic relationship, embrace the fact that things have changed, and take concrete steps to face a new geopolitical reality in which the senior partner is acting more and more like a predatory hegemon. Concretely, Europe should collectively rethink its ends and means for European security and the trans-Atlantic relationship, with one ultimate goal: achieving security in itself. In other words, Europe needs a genuinely European grand strategy.

The first step in this endeavor needs to be the definition of ends, meaning the objectives for Europe’s security and defense. Instead of seeing trans-Atlantic cooperation as the default mode for European security, the standard assumption needs to become that European NATO members have to carry the lion’s share for their security and defense, and that the United States could support this effort — but more as a defender of last resort than a central guarantor providing constant protection. In the medium-to long-term, NATO Europe should further develop ideas on how to phase out the U.S. contribution to European security completely.

Such a phase-out would be a positive development for both Europe and the United States: Europe gains agency and independence and is less exposed to changes in U.S. priorities, while Washington needs to worry less about stretching itself thin by guaranteeing the security of allies that do not carry their own weight. To be clear, this mindset shift does not imply total decoupling from the United States: The trans-Atlantic relationship can very well continue in other areas like trade, science, or civil society exchange. All of these areas have strengthened the link across the Atlantic for decades, but they are not conditional on the U.S. serving as Europe’s security provider.

Europe should then give itself the means to achieve these objectives. As necessary NATO reforms and a restructuring of European defense in general were neglected for too long, European states are now running out of time and need to set clear priorities. Similar to medical staff who decide in major health crises or grave accidents which patients need to be prioritized and saved, and where no hope is left, the continent should start approaching the issue of European defense with a triage mindset. In other words, NATO’s European members need to identify what can easily be fixed, what is in a grave state and needs urgent care, what can wait, and what cannot be saved. In particular, priority needs to be assigned to two kinds of defense gaps: first, the gaps that can be replaced relatively easily; and second, the gaps that are particularly vital but challenging to address.

Among the first type of priorities — addressing existing gaps that can be closed relatively easily — the recruitment issue stands out. To fully replace the U.S. presence in Europe, the continent would have to mobilize around 300,000 additional troops. Although recruitment remains a major challenge, many European states have actively revisited their conscription models, which might lead to an effective increase of troops to fill potential gaps in the next years. This includes, among others, noteworthy efforts in Poland, which will provide military training to 400,000 citizens in 2026 to enhance defense readiness. Progress will be gradual and encounter significant domestic political constraints, but overall, it remains one of the easiest gaps to fill.

Among the second type of priorities — targeting those gaps that are critical but harder to address — continued reliance on U.S. strategic enablers stands out, as it entails that any European defense effort crucially depends on U.S. support. Going forward, such dependence is unacceptable, and whatever can be done to diminish or fully resolve that dependence should rank highly among strategic priorities. Although very challenging, especially when it comes to the replacement of air capabilities, this work needs to start now. To this end, Europe should quickly seek to promote European military intelligence integration, the procurement of additional air lift capabilities and air tankers, and filling the gaps in aerial early warning platforms with existing (albeit less capable) alternatives to U.S. systems.

At the same time, any coalition of European states leading the effort to seize strategic autonomy — as discussed below, such a coalition would likely comprise a small core group centered around France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — needs to accept that there are gaps which cannot be addressed in the short-term but are tolerable for the moment. Nuclear defense is one of these gaps. To be clear, European states should think seriously about how to address the nuclear question in the long-term. There are essentially two options on the table: first, greater reliance on, and expansion of, the existing British and French arsenals; and second, that some states develop new nuclear capabilities. Most pundits seem to prefer the first, but it is unclear whether either London or Paris would be willing to shoulder the responsibility of providing extended deterrence in the United States’ stead. Although the idea is certain to encounter significant opposition, the best course of action might thus be one of national proliferation. In particular, a German nuclear weapon would do much to complement existing British and French arsenals and offer the continent protection against external predation. But other than the previously outlined priorities that address a pressing strategic need in the short-term, the nuclear question can relatively safely be relegated to a later point in time. After all, if Europe massively invests in conventional defense, this will go a long way towards deterring outside challengers, especially if the U.S. nuclear umbrella continues to exist for the time being, albeit in a somewhat weakened form.

Rethinking and Reorganizing European Leadership

All of these efforts will require ambitious political leadership and the ability to take challenging decisions. In our eyes, the best format for such leadership would be a European core group. With France, the United Kingdom, and Germany as Europe’s most important military powers at the center, this group could bring in Finland, Poland, Italy, and Spain to achieve geographical balance and balance of threat perceptions as well as the E.U. Commission to harness its potential for institutional initiatives and support. Focusing on a smaller sub-group of states rather than all E.U. member states makes sense particularly insofar as Europe cannot afford to lose time or ambition through lengthy searches for a lowest common denominator forced upon it by states such as Hungary who frequently block consensus on foreign and security policy-decisions. The fact that even Germany, traditionally opposed to the idea of a “multi-speed Europe,” proposed for six major E.U. economies to bypass the unanimity rule to accelerate decision-making in defense-industrial matters, signals openness for such a political reorientation. Notably, article 44 of the Treaty on European Union allows for the delegation of a task to a select group of able and willing states.

In addition, Europe seizing the mantle of leadership in matters of security will require a general rethinking of the division of labor of different security institutions and cooperation formats in the European security order. Most importantly, this means recognizing that, if NATO is to survive and remain effective, it will have to become a primarily European alliance. Accordingly, European leaders need to prioritize strengthening European NATO which, relying on NATO’s existing structures, could constitute the backbone of future conventional defense and defense planning. The European Union, meanwhile, can contribute to these efforts through new political initiatives, especially in realms like hybrid defense or defense funding. The above-mentioned European core group should take the lead in the alliance in terms of communication with the Trump administration, as well as other states, whether allies or adversaries. And to address critical operational gaps, it can serve as a focal point for the construction of smaller but highly effective coalitions of the willing as well as additional bilateral ties to advance European security goals.

Facing an Uncomfortable Reality

Of course, any genuine move towards strategic autonomy will require sacrifices. Increased spending on defense will come at the expense of other areas, such as welfare spending, industrial subsidies, or climate policy. And more European citizens will have to serve in their militaries instead of pursuing other careers. But their external surrounding leaves them little choice. Caught between a rock (U.S. unreliability) and a hard place (the Russian threat), there are no easy ways out, and recent public opinion surveys suggest that European citizens realize this and, hence, support the idea of strengthening European defense. To quote J.R.R. Tolkien, of course most Europeans wish these geopolitical upheavals “need not have happened in [their] time.” But they evidently do acknowledge that, at this point, “all they have to decide is what to do with the time that is given to them.”

Moritz S. Graefrath, Ph.D., is the Wick Cary assistant professor of international security at the University of Oklahoma and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities.

Gesine Weber, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zurich. 

Image: Midjourney