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Foreign policy communities in open societies love to debate their own relevance. Analysts quarrel over whether their insights inform statecraft or merely decorate it, and governments alternately embrace and ignore them depending on the moment. One might assume that in China this dynamic hardly exists, that an authoritarian system simply compels its experts to fall in line and rewards those who echo the leadership’s priorities.

The reality is more complicated. China’s foreign policy experts neither operate in lockstep with the state nor stand wholly apart from it. As I discuss in my new book, their influence rises and falls with their institutional proximity to the party-state and, just as importantly, with how clearly the leadership signals that it actually wants expert input. Even “distant” experts can influence policy when demand spikes, while “close” experts can be sidelined with it doesn’t.

Understanding when and how Chinese foreign policy experts influence the formation of China’s foreign policy is essential for grasping where Beijing’s priorities come from and how they evolve. For analysts outside of China, treating these experts as players whose influence fluctuates with institutional proximity and state demand allows for a more accurate reading of the ideas shaping China’s policy agenda.

Foreign Policy Ecosystem and Demand for Expertise

Foreign policymaking in China is highly centralized. The Politburo Standing Committee decides upon strategic directions, while the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, chaired by Xi Jinping and supported by its office, integrates inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Military Commission, and the State Council. In recent years, Xi’s leadership over multiple central commissions has reduced bureaucratic fragmentation and concentrated authority at the top.

Beyond the party and the government’s inner circle of foreign policymaking lies an outer ring of institutions, specifically think tanks and universities. These actors provide analysis, policy advice, and public interpretation of foreign policy directions. They differ in their level of connection to the state, ranging from party-managed academies to independently funded research centers.

China’s foreign policy think tanks are integral components of the party-state system. Twenty-five institutions focus on international affairs, including party-affiliated, People’s Liberation Army-affiliated, government, local, and university think tanks. Historically modeled after Soviet precedents, they evolved in the 1980s and 1990s as China’s global engagement deepened. Since the early 2000s, they have proliferated amid “think tank fever,” responding to growing demand for expertise. These organizations provide background studies, host Track 1.5 dialogues, and circulate policy reports to ministries and party offices.

In addition, university-based international relations scholars play a substantial role in the outer circle of Chinese foreign policymaking. The field has developed rapidly since China’s opening and reform, with international relations departments emerging across major universities. Scholars serve in advisory bodies, conduct commissioned studies, and participate in dialogues with policymakers.

Observers of China’s foreign policy are keenly aware of the role that Chinese think tanks and scholars play within its foreign policy ecosystem. Think tanks’ institutional affiliations are well-documented, and a lot of research has explored channels through which Chinese think tanks can exert influence, ranging from direct participation in government work through briefing the Politburo or being seconded to China’s diplomatic missions, to exerting influence through leveraging personal connections, to submitting internal reports. Similarly, scholars have been characterized as influencing policy through forming an epistemic community, signaling policy, mirroring policy, or operating in a “free marketplace of ideas.” In authoritarian systems, scholars and think tanks are linked to the state in various ways. Their proximity to the state depends on institutional ties, such as formal affiliations, membership in policy advisory groups, and public recognition by ministries or party organs, as well as on how often they interact with policymakers. The state signals demand for expertise through funding priorities, policy documents, and leadership speeches.

My research shows that, in addition to proximity to the state, the extent to which the state signals demand for expertise also matters. The state’s signaled demand for expertise shapes foreign policy experts’ political opportunity structures, incentivizing them to voice their ideas. Originally developed in social movement research, political opportunity structures can be broken down into institutional arrangements, resource configurations, and policy environments. Adopting or changing policy measures that define expert involvement would affect the institutional arrangements, that is, the rules, norms, and procedures that enable expert involvement. Changes in funding patterns would affect the resources available to think tanks and scholars. Lastly, leadership statements outlining their relations to think tanks and scholars would affect the policy environment.

In practice, the state’s signaled demand for expertise comprises a structural and thematic dimension. Structurally, the state can signal different levels of demand for expertise to scholars and think tanks. Between 2013 and 2016, for instance, a comparatively open academic environment and generous funding signaled to scholars that the state was open to their input. This changed dramatically after 2016 when ideological tightening reduced scholarly autonomy and opportunities for academic debate. In contrast, from 2015 onward, the Chinese Communist Party focused on strengthening think tanks’ policy role, boosting their budgets, and enhancing their status. In addition to this structural dimension, the state can also signal at different levels for certain topics, primarily through issuing funding calls on these issues.

When Ideas Meet Demand: How Distant Experts Shape Policy

Experts working at think tanks relatively distant from the state influenced the Chinese government’s increased focus on reforming the global economic governance system, as the Chinese state signaled a strong demand for their expertise, both thematically and structurally.

China has steadily elevated global economic governance reform as a foreign policy priority under Xi. Since 2016, senior officials and policy documents have emphasized China’s ambition to shape a fairer and more equitable international economic order. Xi’s speeches at major international forums, including the World Economic Forum, BRICS Summit, and the Import-Export Expo, frame global governance reform as both urgently needed and aligned with China’s rise as a major power. Beijing argues that emerging markets and developing countries deserve a greater voice and calls for transparent, rules-based global economic and trade systems. Chinese leaders present China as a constructive force advocating equality, inclusiveness, and shared development, while promoting new institutional mechanisms and financial reforms. Over time, the tone has shifted from broad commitments to more modest but sustained calls for long-term improvements to global economic governance, underscoring China’s intention to shape, rather than overturn, the existing system.

Analysts working at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and the Guangdong Institute for International Strategies influenced the Chinese government’s increased focus on global economic governance reform. By identifying problems with the current global economic governance system, think tank analysts’ reports provided the Chinese government with the rationale to reform it. Analysts also detailed how the transformation could be undertaken, highlighting the inclusive character of the Belt and Road Initiative by describing it as open to states, subnational, supranational, regional, and transnational organizations, and emphasizing the importance of coordination among these organizations.

I categorize these institutes as relatively distant from the state. Falling under provincial or municipal oversight, they maintain limited institutional proximity to the central party-state. Their ties to national-level institutions are largely informal, though each conducts commissioned research and receives occasional recognition, such as being named “Key Cooperation Units” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Leadership participation in government advisory groups is minimal, and interactions with central authorities typically occur only through lower-level seminars.

Nevertheless, they exerted influence because the state signaled a high demand for their expertise. Beginning in 2015, Beijing significantly increased its demand for input from Chinese think tanks. A central government guideline laying out how think tanks should be strengthened and integrated into policymaking clearly signaled this change: think tanks were tasked with supporting party and government decision-making, contributing to governance modernization, and advancing China’s soft power. The document instructed agencies to share policy needs more transparently, engage think tanks through hearings and seminars, and improve mechanisms for incorporating expert advice. Although financial data is difficult to obtain, available evidence suggests increased state funding, especially for designated high-end institutions. Broader political signals, such as Xi’s publicized meetings with experts and repeated references to think-tank development in major party documents, further reinforced the impression that the leadership sought more systematic, policy-relevant expertise.

When Proximity Prevails: How Close Scholars Shape China’s Global Initiatives

Chinese foreign policy experts who are relatively close to the state can exert influence even when the state’s signaled demand for expertise is fairly low. Several Chinese international relations scholars’ influence on the Chinese government’s increased emphasis on new initiatives in international politics is a case in point.

Over the past decade, China’s official foreign policy statements have increasingly portrayed Beijing as a generator of major international initiatives. Early references centered on the Belt and Road Initiative, which Xi framed as complementary to existing regional mechanisms. Soon, however, he signaled a broader ambition for China to introduce more concepts and initiatives aligned with global trends. This shift materialized from 2021 onward with the rollout of the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, both repeatedly highlighted in Xi’s speeches at the U.N. General Assembly, G20, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, and the China-Arab Summit, as well as in key government work reports. In 2023, Beijing added the Global Civilization Initiative, further expanding its portfolio of global proposals. Together, these initiatives reflect China’s effort to position itself as a norm-setter in international politics and to demonstrate its willingness to shape global governance in partnership with other states.

During a period when Beijing signaled relatively low demand for expertise, some scholars nevertheless shaped the emerging narrative that China should put forward new international initiatives. As the government began moving beyond the Belt and Road Initiative after 2015, scholars similarly broadened their focus. Wang Yiwei, for example, argued in 2016 that China should learn from America’s approach to building global influence by offering widely applicable, forward-looking solutions to international challenges. He framed U.S. leadership in international security cooperation as a model for how a rising power can gain discourse power and advance national interests, implicitly calling on China to play a more proactive, agenda-setting role.

Similarly, Guo Shuyong influenced a policy shift that described the Chinese government’s increased participation in global security governance. He described the international environment for global security governance after the end of the Cold War and its implications for China. He identified a “new and not-so-long” period of strategic opportunity but acknowledged that it is marked by instability and uncertainty. Besides, he described China’s growing ability to participate in global security governance, mainly attributing it to its rising maritime military power. These scholarly arguments resonated with the government’s later rollout of the Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilization Initiatives, reinforcing China’s ambition to act as a provider of global public goods.

Based on their strong institutional ties and frequent interactions with party-state organs, I categorize these scholars as close to the state. Their backgrounds link them directly to government institutions, including prior service in the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Central Foreign Affairs Office. Most serve on government advisory committees, providing expertise to ministries and provincial authorities, and all have received state-funded research grants. The party-state has formally recognized them through State Council special allowances, talent program selections, or ministerial commendations, which underscores their political relevance. Their proximity is also reflected in regular engagement with officials through professional associations and, in some cases, briefings to the Politburo.

After 2016, the Chinese state sent increasingly clear signals that it was less interested in scholars’ expertise. Xi’s 2016 speech on ideological and political work in universities intensified political control over academic life, recasting faculty as “engineers of the human soul” whose primary task was to safeguard party leadership and instill Marxist–Leninist values. Implementation quickly extended beyond the classroom. Universities faced growing scrutiny, and retaliatory action against individual scholars, ranging from investigations to dismissals, rose sharply from 2017 onward. Restrictions multiplied: limits on overseas collaboration, tightened rules for international travel and meetings with foreigners, and heightened vetting of domestic and international publications. Together, these developments reshaped the academic environment, signaling that political reliability mattered more than analytical expertise. Funding patterns reinforced this shift. While the National Social Science Fund of China had expanded international relations topics between 2013 and 2016, the proportion of such topics declined steadily thereafter, and calls increasingly incorporated explicit ideological language. The steep rise in references to party concepts after 2018 indicated that securing prestigious “major project” grants now required close alignment with state ideology rather than original academic insight. Combined, these trends conveyed to scholars that the state’s demand for their expertise had markedly decreased.

Tracing how and when specific ideas, including the expansion of China’s national security concept, a renewed emphasis on regional diplomacy, or ideas for reforming global governance, transitioned from expert debates into official rhetoric, allows me to demonstrate how scholars and think-tank analysts act as intermediaries between party leadership and policy implementation, translating broad ambitions into actionable concepts.

Across think tank analysts and scholars, influence proved conditional rather than constant. The Chinese state’s demand for expertise fluctuated structurally and thematically, redistributing influence between scholars and think tanks. This dynamic shows that China’s foreign policy ecosystem is neither monolithic nor purely top-down: It is a responsive network in which timing, institutional proximity, and thematic alignment jointly determine which ideas shape Beijing’s foreign policy rhetoric.

Implications for Understanding China’s Foreign Policy

In China’s authoritarian system, no expert operates fully independently from the state. Treating them as politically embedded actors means recognizing the multiple functions they serve, rather than treating their work as objective scholarship. Some observers might view these experts primarily as instruments of state messaging or even as influence assets, especially given the recent ideological tightening. Their work, however, serves several co-existing functions: shaping policy, reproducing official narratives, and communicating China’s positions externally. It is worth paying close attention to because it reflects the incentives and constraints imposed by the party-state.

The analysis of key instances in which Chinese foreign policy experts influenced China’s foreign policy rhetoric shows that China’s foreign policy is shaped not only by top leaders and core party-state institutions but also by a wider ecosystem of experts who influence policy in structured and conditional ways. Scholars and think tanks help translate leadership slogans into implementable concepts, offering analytical framing, policy rationales, and concrete proposals. Tracing how ideas move from expert debates into official rhetoric demonstrates that foreign policy directions often originate outside the innermost decision-making circle. However, expert influence is never automatic. It depends on political opportunity structures shaped by the state’s institutional rules, resource allocations, and policy environment. The state’s signaled demand for expertise, expressed through funding, official documents, and leadership speeches, determines whether expert ideas resonate or are ignored. For foreign observers, this means that understanding China’s foreign policy therefore requires analyzing not only what Beijing says, but also the domestic conditions that determine when experts matter.

The findings also suggest that China’s foreign policy apparatus is more adaptive and dynamic than often portrayed. Influence shifts between “close” and “distant” experts depending on whether the state seeks conceptual innovation, legitimacy for new directions, or greater bureaucratic coherence. During periods of high demand, even think tanks and scholars that are distant from the state can shape policy by offering timely, actionable ideas, as seen in the case of global economic governance reform. Conversely, ideological tightening after 2016 reduced scholarly space and curtailed scholars’ impact. These fluctuations reveal that China’s major foreign policy initiatives, from the Belt and Road to the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives, are not isolated slogans but products of a structured idea-generation process involving experts at varying distances from the state.

For governments and analysts abroad, this has direct practical implications. First, Chinese experts should be treated as politically embedded counterparts whose influence depends on their institutional position and the timing of state demand rather than interchangeable commentators. Mapping who is speaking, from where, is essential for judging which arguments have policy traction. Second, monitoring the Chinese government’s demand signals provides an early indication of where its foreign policy is heading. Funding patterns, leadership speeches, and changes in the state’s treatment of scholars and think tanks often foreshadow shifts months before they appear in official documents. Third, policy dialogues with Chinese institutions should differentiate between participants: Insights from more distant think tanks during high-demand periods may matter more than commentary from close scholars during low-demand ones.

Grasping China’s foreign policy requires understanding its expert ecosystem. For Western governments seeking to anticipate China’s next moves, the key is not only to follow official statements but to watch who shapes them, when their ideas resonate, and why.

Sabine Mokry, Ph.D., is a researcher at the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Previously, she was a postdoctoral fellow in the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program. She obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands. Her book, Chinese Scholars and Think Tanks’ Constructions of China’s National Interest – Hidden Hand on Demand, was recently published with Routledge.

Image: Midjourney