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What happens if, in the opening hours of a crisis on the Korean peninsula, U.S. reconnaissance satellites turned their gaze elsewhere? For South Korea, this is not an abstract question, but a pressing national security vulnerability. Despite being a global technology powerhouse, Seoul remains heavily dependent on U.S. — and, to a lesser extent, Japanese — intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for early warning and strategic awareness. This dependency is especially perilous given that South Korea faces a nuclear-armed neighbor that has repeatedly threatened the use of such weapons.

A recent acceleration in North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, coupled with intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, has raised concerns in South Korea that the intelligence assets of allies — especially satellites — might be re-prioritized if a crisis erupts. Satellites are unique among collection platforms: They can deliver persistent, wide area coverage, forming the backbone of an independent strategic intelligence-gathering capability.

To address the vulnerability, South Korea should invest in reconnaissance satellite technology. This technology should be complemented by a comprehensive satellite sustainment ecosystem, underpinned by robust policies, contracting mechanisms, and civil-military cooperation. This supporting architecture is as critical as satellite hardware for ensuring long-term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resilience.

Conventionally Capable, Strategically Dependent

While South Korea has strong conventional forces, including missile defense systems; high-precision ballistic and cruise missiles; and complex command, control, communications, and computers, its independent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity remains limited. This means Seoul can monitor North Korean activity intermittently and often through U.S. feeds, yet it cannot conduct continuous, sovereign surveillance of missile sites or nuclear facilities. In a fast-moving crisis, this gap could leave decision-makers in Seoul vulnerable to delays and external dependencies.

At present, South Korea operates a small fleet of E-737 airborne early-warning aircraft and a handful of reconnaissance planes, while relying heavily on U.S. satellite imagery and signals intelligence. Its first military reconnaissance satellite was only launched in 2023, and full constellation coverage is still years away. Even with high-altitude unmanned systems like the RQ-4 Global Hawk, persistent monitoring and rapid targeting depend on data streams provided by the United States — and, increasingly, Japan. This dependence underscores South Korea’s vulnerability: Unlike partners such as France or Japan, which maintain autonomous surveillance baselines, Seoul has yet to secure an independent reconnaissance satellite architecture.

Meanwhile, South Korea has made remarkable progress in developing and producing commercial satellites over the past three decades. Seoul started to build out its capacity in the space field with its first small satellite, KITSAT-1, launched in 1992. Since then, South Korea’s technical prowess has advanced significantly. For example, KOMPSAT-3A, a multipurpose low earth orbit satellite launched in 2015, has a 144-fold better resolution than KOMPSAT-1, a predecessor. Today, South Korea has a satellite lineup consisting of low earth orbit satellites with optical, infrared, and radar payloads, as well as geosynchronous earth orbit satellites with communication, ocean, and meteorological payloads.

However, in the area of national security — particularly military reconnaissance satellites — the country lags behind regional peers like Japan as well as global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance leaders such as the United States and Israel. This lag is due to many factors: historical underinvestment in space, policy fragmentation between defense and science ministries, and a longstanding reliance on the United States for security and intelligence.

Until 2024, space-related policy and research and development in South Korea were scattered across multiple ministries, leading to fragmented budgets and policy implementation. This structure, split between the Ministries of Science and Information and Communication Technology, the Ministry of National Defense, and private space research institutes, inevitably weakened the driving force for reconnaissance satellite investment. In 2024, South Korea established its first space agency, the Korea AeroSpace Administration, to integrate and manage all these functions.

Encouragingly, the satellite-related defense industry is beginning to evolve. South Korean companies that participated in early reconnaissance satellite programs now contribute to advanced follow-on systems, including microsatellite constellations in low earth orbit. This expansion marks a major milestone, positioning South Korea to use commercial innovation for defense purposes. Still, the infrastructure to sustain these systems throughout their lifespan — from mission design and launch to secure data transmission, sensor calibration, orbital correction, and eventual decommissioning — remains underdeveloped.

Building the Ecosystem

Reconnaissance satellites are not stand-alone assets. Instead, they depend on an integrated sustainment ecosystem. Secure communications, orbital stability, anomaly recovery, and long-term sensor performance should be managed cohesively. For South Korea, this requires moving from project-based acquisitions to a systemic approach that involves both military and civilian stakeholders. The commercial sector can provide agility and innovation, while the military ensures security and mission alignment. Achieving this balance between the public and private sectors demands progress on four pillars: technology, operations, contracts, and legal systems. Procurement strategies should evolve beyond short-term contracts to stable, long-term arrangements that encourage industrial investment and innovation.

International Approaches

To address the challenge facing South Korea, it is useful to examine how major countries sustain their reconnaissance satellites. Each model reflects distinct national approaches — based in part on prevailing security concerns, technical and economic capacities, and strategic cultures — yet all prioritize mission success and availability.

The U.S. military integrates intelligence operations into a full-spectrum command and control architecture which supports global situational awareness and response. At the heart of this capability is a robust satellite-based surveillance infrastructure. The United States employs long-term contracting that blends performance-based logistics with contractor logistics support. This ensures budget predictability, continuity of technology, and reduced lifecycle costs while maintaining operational stability.

Japan takes a state-led approach and embeds resilience into system design, emphasizing end-to-end encryption, AI-based monitoring, and hardened electronic warfare defense.

Israel uses small, high-performance satellites and integrates contractor logistics support with export packages, enabling a package model that strengthens both intelligence autonomy and defense exports.

While these approaches differ in contract structures, civil-military cooperation, and export strategies, they collectively highlight that sustainment — not acquisition alone — is the linchpin of a resilient reconnaissance satellite capability. For South Korea, these cases illustrate potential pathways: expanding civil–military partnerships, adopting integrated product support-based maintenance, embedding AI-enabled security, and exploring export-linked sustainment models. These are not prescriptive solutions but viable options tailored to South Korea’s emerging space ambitions.

Implications and Recommendations

To build a resilient and self-sufficient reconnaissance satellite ecosystem, South Korea should move beyond simple acquisition and focus on establishing a comprehensive sustainment strategy. This requires a systemic approach that integrates policy, technology, and contracting, drawing lessons from international approaches while tailoring them to South Korea’s specific needs.

First, South Korea should prioritize an operational system centered on mission success and availability rather than merely extending a satellite’s lifespan. Like the United States, Israel, and Japan, South Korea can ensure this through long-term technical support, structured training programs, a robust system for spare parts management, routine software upgrades, and real-time satellite health monitoring.

Second, to improve efficiency and reduce lifecycle costs, South Korea should expand integrated product support and performance-based logistics. The U.S. model shows how long-term performance-based logistics contracts with industry can provide stability and curb expenses, a strategy South Korea could adapt for its own reconnaissance satellite program.

Third, public-private partnerships combined with long-term maintenance contracts, as seen in France, are critical. Given South Korea’s growing private-sector expertise, expanding these partnerships would not only spread costs — thus decreasing the economic burden on any single entity — but also accelerate technological innovation, fostering a collaborative environment.

Fourth, South Korea should follow the lead of Israel and Japan by integrating end-to-end encryption, AI-based anomaly detection, and hardened relay networks from the design stage to reduce vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Strengthening cyber and electronic warfare resilience is indispensable.

Fifth, South Korea should seek satellite logistics independence. Without indigenous sustainment, South Korea risks becoming even more dependent on external parties for its intelligence needs. Israel, France, and Japan demonstrate how combining satellite exports with sustainment packages can enhance both autonomy and competitiveness. For South Korea, building an integrated capability across design, operation, and logistics could lay the foundation for future export models.

Sixth, to institutionalize these efforts, South Korea should establish a legal framework for sustainable logistics support. This includes incorporating military reconnaissance satellite logistics into South Korea’s defense support program, which would provide a legal foundation for civil-military cooperation. Contracts for this cooperation should be both short-term and long-term, using single-vendor contracts for sensitive areas like secure communications and competitive bidding for standardized areas such as training and spare parts.

Finally, a civil-military consortium is essential for applying advanced technology and ensuring continuous updates. This collaborative hub would keep sensor technologies like electro-optical imaging, infrared sensing, and synthetic aperture radar current, granting the military access to commercial innovation. Ultimately, fostering a sustainable satellite ecosystem requires integrating operational models, contracting mechanisms, and legal frameworks, with a civil-military consortium serving as a central point of coordination. Seoul’s overarching goal should be to achieve resilient, responsive, and persistent intelligence capabilities that align with the country’s strategic posture.

Conclusion

As the Indo-Pacific security environment grows more complex, South Korea cannot afford to remain dependent on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance priorities of external partners. The current reliance on foreign systems and fragmented policy structures leaves critical vulnerabilities in both deterrence and crisis response. These gaps have significant implications: Without resilient and autonomous reconnaissance satellite capabilities, South Korea risks strategic blind spots that could undermine national sovereignty and weaken deterrence.

Addressing these challenges requires more than technological upgrades. It calls for building a sustainable national ecosystem that integrates operational models, contracting mechanisms, and legal frameworks, supported by civil–military partnerships and innovative sustainment practices. Such an approach would not only reduce lifecycle costs and improve readiness but also anchor South Korea’s sovereignty in space.

While no single model fits all, the lessons from the United States, France, Japan, and Israel demonstrate viable pathways. For Seoul, the way forward is to adapt these approaches into a tailored strategy — expanding partnerships, embedding resilience in system design, and linking sustainment with long-term strategic objectives. In doing so, South Korea can ensure its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are not only functional but resilient, responsive, and firmly aligned with its strategic posture.

Chang-young Lee is a researcher at Security Management Institute in Seoul, specializing in the defense industry and sustainment logistics. A retired Republic of Korea Air Force lieutenant colonel, he served as an F-4 weapon selector officer and in the avionics, maintenance, and logistics fields.

Image: Midjourney