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Explosions over Kyiv and other Ukrainian population centers are daily reminders that Russia’s missiles can reach deep and strike hard. Beyond the immediate implications for the war in Ukraine, these barrages raise a sharper question for Europe: how to respond to a Russia that wields conventional long-range strike power as a tool of coercion and war.

There is now broad agreement among policymakers and analysts that Russia’s missile buildup cannot go unanswered. In response, European states have embarked on a major expansion of their missile defenses, covering short-, medium-, and long-range systems designed to counter everything from low-flying drones and cruise missiles to high-altitude short and medium-range ballistic missiles. But Europe’s current emphasis on missile defense is a losing strategy.

Despite increased missile defense production in Europe and among allies, they are not keeping up with Russian missile output. While Russia produces roughly one-and-a-half to two times as many ballistic and cruise missiles as Europe produces interceptors, it is far outpacing Europe in long-range drone production. Moreover, the reliance on expensive current-generation interceptors renders Europe’s missile defense strategy inherently cost-inefficient and unsustainable in the long run.

Given the size of Russia’s missile arsenal and the absence of effective means to defend against it, a denial-based missile defense strategy is therefore no longer viable. Europe should instead adopt a punishment-based conventional counterstrike strategy that deters Russia by demonstrating the ability to respond in kind to coercive or large-scale missile use. While such a strategy entails risks and challenges both in implementation and in managing Russian reactions, it remains the best option among a set of limited choices.

Russian Missile Buildup

Russia spent the two decades prior to the war in Ukraine modernizing and expanding its conventional missile arsenal. By the time the war began, it deployed a formidable array of air- and surface-launched cruise missiles, complemented by a growing inventory of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Qualitatively, Russian missiles do not match the technological sophistication of some Western systems. This became apparent early in the conflict, when Russian missiles exhibited relatively high systemic error rates as well as a lack of accuracy. But Russia enjoyed one decisive advantage: established production lines that could be scaled rapidly. Before the war, Russia was estimated to produce around 72 9M723 short-range ballistic missiles annually. By June 2025, this figure had risen to at least 720. Similarly, pre-war production of Kh-101 cruise missiles stood at about 56 per year, a number that has now grown to over 700.

In total, Russia now likely produces up to 2,000 cruise missiles annually, optimized or adapted for land-attack purposes, including other types such as the 3M-14 Kalibr, Kh-59, and P-800 Oniks. In addition, Russia produces around 800 to 1,000 9M723 and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal short- and medium-range ballistic missiles each year.

Another major success of Russia’s industrial ramp-up has been long-range one-way attack drone production. Today, Russia is estimated to produce over 30,000 Geran-2 drones annually (with plans to grow production by an additional 40 percent), along with a growing number of Gerbera decoy drones designed specifically to saturate and overwhelm enemy air and missile defenses.

While Russian missiles and long-range drones have not succeeded in breaking Ukraine’s warfighting capacity or its spirit, they have posed a major obstacle to Ukraine’s defense. Russia’s constant drone and missile attacks force Ukraine to disperse scarce air and missile defense assets away from the frontline, leaving troops and equipment exposed to Russian glide bombs and short-range ballistic missiles. Russia has also used its missile arsenal fairly effectively to suppress Ukraine’s arms industry, at times causing major shutdowns and disruptions. In addition, Russian conventional long-range strikes against critical and civilian infrastructure have placed a heavy psychological burden on Ukraine’s population.

Today, Ukraine’s missile defense is in a precarious position. While not yet on the verge of arsenal depletion, Ukraine is forced to contend with the constant need to resupply scarce missile defense interceptors while at the same time expanding the overall number of missile defense systems deployed to increase the defendable footprint across its vast territory.

Europe’s Response

To respond to the growing Russian missile threat, Europe has almost exclusively focused on acquiring large numbers of missile defense systems. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Germany and Poland have placed significant orders for Patriot fire units. Seven European countries have acquired infrared imaging system tail/thrust vector-controlled surface-to-air medium-range launched fire units, and four have procured National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System air and missile defense systems. France and Italy bought additional surface-to-air medium-range/land-based fire units, while several other European countries — Finland, Germany, and Slovakia — opted for Israeli systems to strengthen their medium- and long-range missile defense capabilities.

Unfortunately for Europe, its ambitious missile defense acquisitions do little to comprehensively mitigate the threat. There are three reasons for this.

First, Europe faces a shortage of interceptors, particularly for ballistic missile defense. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon currently produce around 850 to 900 interceptors annually, but only 400 to 500 of these reach Europe, with the rest remaining in the United States or going to other export customers. Even when combined with European production of ballistic missile interceptors, notably the Aster 30B1 and Aster 30B1NT used in SAMP/T, annual availability in Europe stands at no more than 600–700. Given that operators would likely need to allocate at least two interceptors per incoming ballistic missile to achieve high intercept probabilities, annual availability falls far short of Russia’s output of 800–1,000 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. In addition, since ballistic missile defense interceptors are several times more expensive than the ballistic missiles Russia produces, this strategy is inherently cost-ineffective. Similar issues exist for cruise missile defense, though the production and cost discrepancies are less severe.

Second, even if the interceptor shortage were resolved, Europe would still face a shortage of fire and launcher units, which limits the overall defendable footprint. Germany, for example, plans to deploy up to 17 Patriot fire units and likely more than a dozen IRIS-T SLM fire units by the end of the 2020s, yet this will be far from sufficient to cover its entire territory. In fact, while available missile defense assets in Europe will allow effective point or limited area defense of critical military and civilian targets, they will not provide comprehensive coverage. This means that some attack vectors and targets will necessarily stay unprotected.

Third, existing and planned European missile defense capabilities appear unable to address the severe threat posed by Russian long-range drones. Similar to Ukraine, Europe in a war with Russia would likely face the choice of expending scarce and expensive interceptors against cheap Shahed-type drones or letting them slip through. While European states have begun developing and acquiring specialized systems to counter the long-range drone threat more cost-effectively, these solutions are not yet produced and procured at the necessary scale. Overall, this means that Europe’s denial-based missile defense-centric strategy cannot cope with the threat posed by Russia’s missile arsenal.

Shooting the Archer?

As the scale of Russia’s missile ramp-up became clear, along with Ukraine’s struggles to sustain its missile defenses and the enormous costs of Europe’s own missile defense plans, European focus shifted toward complementing missile defense assets with a preemptive strike capability — at least rhetorically — following the motto “shoot the archer, not the arrow”.

For example, the website of the German armed forces recently cited the need to destroy “launchers of long-range missiles” as an important reason for acquiring a deep-strike capability. Suppressing enemy long-range fires is reportedly also a key mission of the Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system scheduled for deployment to Germany from 2026 onward. Analysts have further pointed out that a long-range strike capability is needed to “cut through Russia’s … ground and sea-launched missiles”. Others emphasize that a central task of medium-range missiles in Europe is to target mobile launchers to demonstrate that NATO can “massively constrain Russia’s ability to continue hostilities”. But is this a realistic proposition?

Likely not. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued difficulty of targeting mobile assets. In roughly three-and-a-half years of war and extensive Russian use of mobile launcher systems, Ukraine has achieved only one visually confirmed kill of such a system. Even semi-mobile targets have proven elusive. For instance, since Patriot systems were first deployed to Ukraine in April 2023, Russia has only scored two confirmed kills of M902/M903 launcher units. Similarly, Russia has only managed to achieve two confirmed kills against TRML-4D mobile air and missile defense radars (part of IRIS-T SLM fire units or operating independently), even though they are unquestionably high-priority targets.

What this indicates is that in modern warfare, closing the kill chain against mobile targets remains a major challenge, particularly at stand-off ranges of hundreds of kilometers. The same would likely hold true for European states, which neither possess a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructure nor the necessary types and numbers of high-velocity and retargetable missile systems to perform this task effectively, especially given the large number of Russian surface- and air-based launchers that would require continuous suppression.

In fact, the only plausible way to achieve this objective would be by establishing air superiority, enabling fighter jets to penetrate deep into Russian airspace and hunt mobile launchers with direct attack munitions, similar to how Israeli operators eliminated a large number of Iranian launchers during the 12-Day War. Whether European NATO states possess the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses and supporting capabilities to conduct such an air interdiction campaign effectively, particularly in a scenario without U.S. support, is doubtful.

Moreover, there is a serious question whether achieving this level of air dominance over Russian territory, even if possible, might trigger Russian non-strategic or strategic nuclear use. Considerations over Russian nuclear use should, of course, not automatically rule out the option for European states, but they are important to weigh when evaluating alternatives. Overall, a denial posture aimed at preemptively interdicting Russian missile launchers appears equally non-credible or suboptimal.

Toward a Conventional Counterstrike Posture

What then is Europe’s best alternative to deter Russia’s growing industrial-scale missile threat? Since a deterrence posture aimed at denying Russia the benefits of its missile arsenal — either by intercepting long-range strike weapons midair or interdicting their launchers — is not credible, Europe should change course and move towards a punishment-based conventional counterstrike strategy.

In essence, this posture centers on signaling that the benefits of coercive or large-scale Russian missile use are outweighed by the costs, since it would be met with punishment in kind, if not several times over. Rather than relying on missile defense or a preemptive strike capability that cannot protect Europe’s critical and civilian infrastructure effectively, Europe would deter by threatening retaliatory strikes against Russian high-value targets. Europe’s targeting strategy would not mirror Russia’s one-to-one, and certain categories of targets, most notably population centers, would remain off limits even if Russia threatened or struck them. Europe’s deterrence posture should focus on threatening value, not lives. At the same time, however, Europe would make clear that Russia’s war-sustaining industries — both those directly supporting its armed forces and those contributing to its state budget, most notably its oil and gas infrastructure — are not off limits and would be targeted in response to Russian coercive or large-scale missile use against Europe.

This type of punishment-based strategy is not without challenges and risks. Just as Europe cannot magically fill its arsenals with missile defense interceptors, it cannot simply conjure the missile arsenals required to operationalize such a conventional counterstrike posture. Europe would need to complement existing stocks with hundreds, if not thousands, of long- and deep-strike weapons, while also investing in the necessary storage facilities and logistics. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance would be less of an issue, given that virtually all realistic targets are stationary and well-mapped in advance. This will take time and require resources.

But there are reasons to be optimistic. Europe’s missile industry remains under-mobilized in the offensive missile segment. In addition, recent years have seen the development and rapid production scaling of several types of low-cost missiles, including mini-cruise missiles and long-range drones. While lower cost comes at the expense of capability — such as stealth features, velocity, or payload capacity — Ukraine is currently demonstrating that Russia’s ability to counter these systems is limited, especially when they arrive in sufficient mass. As such, a mass acquisition strategy for conventional long- and deep-strike weapons appears more feasible and goal-oriented than an approach focused almost exclusively on expensive, hard-to-manufacture interceptors. It is also a more effective deterrence strategy than relying on overwhelming punishment from Europe’s nuclear arsenal, whose use lacks credibility except in the most extreme scenarios.

To avoid misinterpretation, European NATO states will need to clearly link their conventional missile acquisitions with signaling and rhetoric, stressing that while NATO has no interest in fighting a war with Russia or using this arsenal preemptively, it will be fully prepared to respond to limited or large-scale Russian missile use with overwhelming conventional force to negate any potential gains. Discriminating between European conventional and nuclear missiles should also remain straightforward, since most missile systems would likely be acquired by Europe’s non-nuclear powers like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, , Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Poland, and Romania as well as  others. The buildup would also not necessarily coincide with an increase in nuclear warhead production, and even if it did, integrating these warheads into new delivery vehicles is not straightforward and, for some types of missiles like mini cruise missiles or long-range drones, unsuitable. Even so, the deployment of substantial missile arsenals may not necessarily appear stabilizing. This is arguably a broader consequence of the conventional missile age we are entering, in which the wide proliferation of conventional long-range strike weapons undermines crisis stability.

In the end, there are also no real alternatives. As outlined above, a denial-based strategy is bound to fail in the short to medium term. And while a missile arms control agreement, in which European NATO states and Russia limit their conventional arsenals, may appear an option in theory, Russia’s record of non-compliance and refusal to acknowledge its blatant breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty makes a follow-on treaty unlikely to succeed from the outset. Unless the broader security environment changes alongside domestic shifts within Russia, arms control with Moscow is not a feasible path.

If deterrence is the only realistic alternative, a punishment rather than denial posture in the missile domain appears the best among suboptimal options. While associated with its own risks and challenges, it can help convince Russia that aggression against NATO is not worth the costs. If war nonetheless breaks out, it plays a key role in deterring Russian horizontal escalation against European civilian infrastructure and population centers to prevent the atrocities we are currently witnessing in Ukraine.

Fabian Hoffmann is a doctoral research fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project of the University of Oslo and a non-resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C. His research focuses on missile technology, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence. He has published widely on these topics, including in academic journals, scientific reports, and magazines. He is also the author of Missile Matters, a professional blog providing timely analysis of missile technology and nuclear-related events in Ukraine, Europe, and beyond.

Image: Lance Cpl. Eric Dmochowski via Wikimedia Commons