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In 2022, Yun Sun wrote “China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than You Think,” where she argued that the geopolitical alignment of Russia and China was more nuanced than the widespread perception of pundits and analysts of a “burgeoning relationship.” Three years later, we asked her to reflect on her article given the significant geopolitical shifts surrounding the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.Image: TASS (Photo by Mikhail Metzel)In your 2022 article, “China’s Strategic Assessment of Russia: More Complicated Than You Think,” you argued that China and Russia are brought together by two fundamental issues — their shared enemy in the United States and nostalgia for the former Sino-Soviet partnership. Three years later, do you still assess these two issues as the primary factors pushing the two countries together?Three years later, geopolitics has emerged as the primary driving factor for Sino-Russian partnership, as vividly demonstrated by China’s pro-Russia neutrality after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. China does not support the invasion — a position it has alluded to on many occasions since the war started by articulating its support of sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. From Beijing’s perspective, the Biden administration’s ardent pursuit of strategic competition with China from the beginning of its term left Beijing no choice but to maintain its alignment with Russia despite the Ukraine war. A popular sentiment constantly reiterated by Chinese interlocutors has been “if we help the United States to tackle Russia now, we will be the next target on Washington’s list and no one will have our back.”These geopolitical factors have driven the relationship, more so than Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s favorable position toward Russia. Despite some minor internal criticism of China’s support of Russia in the Ukraine war, Xi has not needed to spend political capital