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In 2021, David Auerswald wrote, “A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic,” which argued America’s current strategy in the Arctic was not sufficient to take on threats by China and Russia. With these risks still looming and a new U.S. administration in place, we invited David to revisit his article.Image: Russian Ministry of DefenseIn your 2021 article, “A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic,” you described the need for an updated Arctic Strategy. Last June, the Department of Defense unveiled its 2024 Arctic Strategy, which indicates the need for enhanced missile warning and observational systems, specifically space-based systems. Do you believe space-based solutions are the best way to circumnavigate the region’s harsh terrain and weather conditions you mention in your article and, more broadly, what do you believe the high and low points of the new strategy are?Space-based solutions are an important way of enhancing Arctic domain awareness and communications but are certainly not the only way. The 2024 Arctic Strategy also discussed manned and unmanned aerial systems, ground-based sensors, and terrestrial infrastructure. All have a place in improving Arctic operations and domain awareness.I give the 2024 strategy positive marks. It contained a good situational assessment that covered most of the major developments in the region to that point. It balanced ends and means. In my 2021 article, I argued that future Arctic strategy had to be resourced within constrained national budgets and integrate efforts across the U.S. government and the private sector. The 2024 strategy recognized that reality and established very limited ends: regional stability and a secure U.S. homeland. It had a reasonable theory of success, arguing that enhancements to sensors and information, engagement with allies and partners, and a U.S. presence in the Arctic could help achieve these goals. These were similar to the goals I put forward in