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In 2021, Thomas Spahr wrote “Adapting Intelligence to the New Afghanistan,” where he argued that U.S. intelligence strategies and operations in Afghanistan should adapt to the country’s altered political landscape since the infamous 2021 withdrawal, especially given terror groups’ heightened ability to gain a foothold in the country. In the age of a “New Afghanistan”, we invited Thomas back to reflect on his article.Read more below:Image: U.S. Air Force (Photo by Master Sgt. Wolfram M. Stumpf)In your 2021 article, “Adapting Intelligence to the New Afghanistan”, you argue that the threat of terror groups’ resurgence in the country merits a need to readdress U.S. intelligence priorities, as it has generally shifted to combat the China and Russia threats. Given today’s global threat landscape, should Afghanistan still be near the top of the list for prioritization?The United States tends to do geopolitical strategy in extremes. We invaded Afghanistan in 2001 with maximum force, left completely in 2021, and now dedicate very little strategic energy and resources to the region. Yet the threat is still there, with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan still intent on attacking the United States, the Islamic State in Afghanistan demonstrating capability with recent attacks against Russia and Iran and thwarted attempts on the United States and Europe, notably on U.S. persons attending the World Cup in Qatar. U.S. Central Command regularly reports attacks on ISIL in Iraq and Syria, but rarely in Afghanistan. While Afghanistan shouldn’t be a top priority for intelligence, it must be on the list.The U.S. overcorrected its military focus on China, and then world events pulled it into Ukraine and Gaza, leaving few resources or bandwidth to monitor terrorism in Afghanistan. Ignoring the violent extremism emanating from Afghanistan risks a large terrorist attack that could force the United States to act,