Episode Notes:

On Sunday, Houthi forces seized an Israeli-linked cargo ship in the Red Sea. Here to tell us what happened and what it means for regional escalation, we’re joined by Thomas Juneau. Thomas is an associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and a non-resident fellow with the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.

[:42] Nature of the attack

[2:08] Houthi escalation

[4:16] Goals

[5:54] Preventive measures

[7:13] Broader Houthi strategy

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth, and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to The Warcast. The members only podcast for what you need to know, now.

On Sunday, Houthis forces seized an Israeli linked cargo ship in the Red Sea. Here to tell us what happened and what it means for regional escalation, we're joined by Thomas Juneau. Thomas is an associate professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and a non-resident fellow with a Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies. Welcome to The Warcast.

Thomas Juneau: Thanks for having me.

Nicholas Danforth: Before we get into the geopolitics of all this, tell us about the attack itself. What actually happened?

Thomas Juneau: So what happened is that an Israeli-owned, apparently ship, but flagged in The Bahamas and owned by a Japanese company, was seized by the Houthis. Some small fast boats swarmed the ship and Houthis fighters got on it. There was also a helicopter that landed on the ship and then they forced the ship back to Hudaydah, which is the main port in Yemen on the Red Sea. It is not the first time that the Houthis do something in the Red Sea, but it is an escalation. It's a spectacular incident, especially in the current context. So it's really something that could have important consequences.

Nicholas Danforth: So, and I guess the footage that showed up on Twitter was all of the helicopter angle, but you're saying it was actually boats that were the main part of the seizure?

Thomas Juneau: I wouldn't say the main part, I'd say there were both. There were boats and there was the helicopter. The video that we've seen a lot on Twitter that was circulated a lot is interesting because it is a fairly slick propaganda video that does show how the Houthis have evolved on this point. Just a few years ago, they would do far less of this, and it was far more simple. Now can see the extent of the cooperation the Houthis have had in particular with Hezbollah, to really improve their capability to produce videos and just exploit media and social media in general to show off their capabilities and just like that, to send a fairly powerful message.

Nicholas Danforth: Tell us about the evolution of these attacks, because you said, right? This isn't the first time they've targeted shipping, but this is a much more dramatic example of it.

Thomas Juneau: The Houthis have been in control of Sana'a, the capital of Yemen since 2014. And they've really, in the years in particular since the launch of the military intervention by Saudi Arabia in 2015, they've actually consolidated and somewhat expanded the control of territory they have in Northwest Yemen. There's been a land component to that, of course, now, as we've seen a lot, they have missiles and drones that can reach deep into Saudi Arabia in the UAE, and now Israel, which is itself a significant development. But another aspect of the expansion of Houthis capabilities that attracted less attention than the missiles and drones is on the naval side. So they have developed significant capabilities, mostly in the Red Sea because that's the only coast they have, they don't have access to the coast on the southern side of Yemen. They have naval mines, they've developed a significant capability in terms of small fast boats, they can either use themselves to swarm targets, or that they can use as drone boats with improvised explosive devices to target ships also.

They also have some capability in terms of short-to-sea missiles that can have access to significant portions of the Red Sea. They've significantly expanded their capabilities on the Western or the northern half of the western coast of Yemen, including on some islands. There's an island called Kamarān on the Western coast. I went on that island years ago. It has some of the nicest beaches I've ever seen. And they've developed their bases on that island and along the coast. And that really has been an under-studied aspect of the expansion of Houthis power. And now, and a number of us have been warning about this for a while, now they have the clear ability to significantly hurt shipping in the southern half of the Red Sea, including in the Bab-el-Mandeb, which is the strait that links the South of the Red Sea, out into the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. And that's a big problem. And it's something that now we have no choice but to talk about because of the recent event, but it's something that really had been building for a while.

Nicholas Danforth: And so with this attack itself, what was the immediate goal? What did it be? What have they actually done with the ship? What did they claim was the rationale for launching the attack? And, are they threatening further similar attacks?

Thomas Juneau: Absolutely are threatening further similar attacks. They have said in the last few days that any ship that is linked to Israel is a target for them. In this case, it appears that the ship is owned or partly owned by a very rich Israeli businessman. Prime Minister Netanyahu have said that this is not true, but media reports have generally said that it is the case. So I think there is still a bit of a lack of clarity here. But they've said that ships that have Israeli crews are targets, this one does not. Ships that are owned or flagged in Israel, this one is flagged in The Bahamas. So there's a chance that it happens again. And the problem is what do we do? It's really not clear what can be done. It's not clear what the objective is. There's a message that is being sent.

There probably is an attempt to disrupt Israeli shipping to force very long detours away from the Red Sea, which could be very costly for the Israeli economy, in a context where the Israeli economy is already suffering from the fact that more than 300,000 soldiers have been mobilized for the war. And I think one other objective might actually be to try to suck Israel into retaliating, to drag Israel into hitting back at the Houthis, which is going to be tempting for Israel. The more the Houthis do this and launch missiles and drones. And the Houthis, to be blunt, would love this, because this would just give them a great propaganda victory domestically and regionally.

Nicholas Danforth: So then what actually is being done to prevent more incidents like this from taking place? Are ships going to start avoiding the Red Sea?

Thomas Juneau: So that's the million-dollar question. And I don't know what can be done at this level because the obvious solution is for naval escorts. But Israel, my understanding is that they can't really spare a number of ships to go into the southern part of the Red Sea. That would be very costly as they are consumed by the war in Gaza and the possible expansion of the war in Lebanon and so on. And would also put them at risk of Houthis strikes. Can American ships in the Red Sea escort Israeli and other ships? That would be very consuming in terms of resources and so on and expose American ships to escalation. Can the Houthis be deterred? That would be difficult. One example that we can give here is that in 2016, the Houthis actually targeted an American non-military ship in the south of the Red Sea. And the Americans retaliated by destroying, by hitting and destroying a handful of Houthis radars on the western coast. And since then, the Houthis have not touched American ships in the Red Sea.

So in that sense, they've been deterred, but that was the US that was not Israel. So I think we can assume that some of the discussions between the US and Israel will use that example from the past to see what can be done. But that's hard.

Nicholas Danforth: You mentioned that the Houthis would've been thrilled if Israel had retaliated directly against them. We've had some other pieces, and War on the Rocks recently talking about how different nodes in the access of resistance, including the Houthis forces in Yemen, have tried to manage their policies in response to the Gaza War. Take a step back and give us a sense of what the broader political goals here are for Houthis forces.

Thomas Juneau: So I think that the Houthis objectives right now in the Gaza War are both domestic and regional. And the domestic aspect matters, it always does. And for a group like the Houthis, we sometimes tend to neglect that. The Houthis have basically won the war, right? In Yemen. And I've written for War on the Rocks I think a couple of times on this topic. Now they are trying to negotiate with Saudi Arabia, not a peace process, but Saudi Arabia's withdrawal from Yemen. The de facto result of that will be the consolidation of Houthis power, at least in northwest Yemen. So the Houthis right now, they are thinking very hard in terms of how do we consolidate our power? How do we further establish ourselves as the de facto legitimate governing authority in Northwest Yemen? They are aware of some vulnerabilities. They have proven to be extremely bad managers of the economy. And in a post-war scenario, that will be very difficult. This is a country that is extremely poor, ravaged by war.

So anytime they do something like provoking Israel, seizing a ship, sending missiles and drones, you have to assume that an element here is to boost popular support, in a country in Yemen where pro-Palestinian feeling is extremely, extremely strong and motivated right now. So that domestic angle matters, right? The power consolidation dimension. Beyond that, what we've seen in recent years is the Houthis emerge as being alongside Hezbollah, maybe the most important partner in what they call the axis of resistance, right? The Houthis are not a domestic Yemeni player anymore. They are a regional power, and that's an important evolution that now everybody can see. But that we've seen building in the last few years in the Red Sea, but also through their ability to send missiles and drones on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which gives them significant leverage on these two countries, and now also on Israel.

So, part of the rationale for the seizing of ships and for the striking of Israel with missiles and drones is to send this message of support for the cause of 'regional resistance' to support Hamas, and to tell the world that now we are a regional power, we can hit you. And that provides us with significant leverage.

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you so much for joining us in The Warcast.

Thomas Juneau: Thank you.

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth, and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to The Warcast. The members only podcast for what you need to know, now.

On Sunday, Houthis forces seized an Israeli linked cargo ship in the Red Sea. Here to tell us what happened and what it means for regional escalation, we're joined by Thomas Juneau. Thomas is an associate professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and a non-resident fellow with a Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies. Welcome to The Warcast.

Thomas Juneau: Thanks for having me.

Nicholas Danforth: Before we get into the geopolitics of all this, tell us about the attack itself. What actually happened?

Thomas Juneau: So what happened is that an Israeli-owned, apparently ship, but flagged in The Bahamas and owned by a Japanese company, was seized by the Houthis. Some small fast boats swarmed the ship and Houthis fighters got on it. There was also a helicopter that landed on the ship and then they forced the ship back to Hudaydah, which is the main port in Yemen on the Red Sea. It is not the first time that the Houthis do something in the Red Sea, but it is an escalation. It's a spectacular incident, especially in the current context. So it's really something that could have important consequences.

Nicholas Danforth: So, and I guess the footage that showed up on Twitter was all of the helicopter angle, but you're saying it was actually boats that were the main part of the seizure?

Thomas Juneau: I wouldn't say the main part, I'd say there were both. There were boats and there was the helicopter. The video that we've seen a lot on Twitter that was circulated a lot is interesting because it is a fairly slick propaganda video that does show how the Houthis have evolved on this point. Just a few years ago, they would do far less of this, and it was far more simple. Now can see the extent of the cooperation the Houthis have had in particular with Hezbollah, to really improve their capability to produce videos and just exploit media and social media in general to show off their capabilities and just like that, to send a fairly powerful message.

Nicholas Danforth: Tell us about the evolution of these attacks, because you said, right? This isn't the first time they've targeted shipping, but this is a much more dramatic example of it.

Thomas Juneau: The Houthis have been in control of Sana'a, the capital of Yemen since 2014. And they've really, in the years in particular since the launch of the military intervention by Saudi Arabia in 2015, they've actually consolidated and somewhat expanded the control of territory they have in Northwest Yemen. There's been a land component to that, of course, now, as we've seen a lot, they have missiles and drones that can reach deep into Saudi Arabia in the UAE, and now Israel, which is itself a significant development. But another aspect of the expansion of Houthis capabilities that attracted less attention than the missiles and drones is on the naval side. So they have developed significant capabilities, mostly in the Red Sea because that's the only coast they have, they don't have access to the coast on the southern side of Yemen. They have naval mines, they've developed a significant capability in terms of small fast boats, they can either use themselves to swarm targets, or that they can use as drone boats with improvised explosive devices to target ships also.

They also have some capability in terms of short-to-sea missiles that can have access to significant portions of the Red Sea. They've significantly expanded their capabilities on the Western or the northern half of the western coast of Yemen, including on some islands. There's an island called Kamarān on the Western coast. I went on that island years ago. It has some of the nicest beaches I've ever seen. And they've developed their bases on that island and along the coast. And that really has been an under-studied aspect of the expansion of Houthis power. And now, and a number of us have been warning about this for a while, now they have the clear ability to significantly hurt shipping in the southern half of the Red Sea, including in the Bab-el-Mandeb, which is the strait that links the South of the Red Sea, out into the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. And that's a big problem. And it's something that now we have no choice but to talk about because of the recent event, but it's something that really had been building for a while.

Nicholas Danforth: And so with this attack itself, what was the immediate goal? What did it be? What have they actually done with the ship? What did they claim was the rationale for launching the attack? And, are they threatening further similar attacks?

Thomas Juneau: Absolutely are threatening further similar attacks. They have said in the last few days that any ship that is linked to Israel is a target for them. In this case, it appears that the ship is owned or partly owned by a very rich Israeli businessman. Prime Minister Netanyahu have said that this is not true, but media reports have generally said that it is the case. So I think there is still a bit of a lack of clarity here. But they've said that ships that have Israeli crews are targets, this one does not. Ships that are owned or flagged in Israel, this one is flagged in The Bahamas. So there's a chance that it happens again. And the problem is what do we do? It's really not clear what can be done. It's not clear what the objective is. There's a message that is being sent.

There probably is an attempt to disrupt Israeli shipping to force very long detours away from the Red Sea, which could be very costly for the Israeli economy, in a context where the Israeli economy is already suffering from the fact that more than 300,000 soldiers have been mobilized for the war. And I think one other objective might actually be to try to suck Israel into retaliating, to drag Israel into hitting back at the Houthis, which is going to be tempting for Israel. The more the Houthis do this and launch missiles and drones. And the Houthis, to be blunt, would love this, because this would just give them a great propaganda victory domestically and regionally.

Nicholas Danforth: So then what actually is being done to prevent more incidents like this from taking place? Are ships going to start avoiding the Red Sea?

Thomas Juneau: So that's the million-dollar question. And I don't know what can be done at this level because the obvious solution is for naval escorts. But Israel, my understanding is that they can't really spare a number of ships to go into the southern part of the Red Sea. That would be very costly as they are consumed by the war in Gaza and the possible expansion of the war in Lebanon and so on. And would also put them at risk of Houthis strikes. Can American ships in the Red Sea escort Israeli and other ships? That would be very consuming in terms of resources and so on and expose American ships to escalation. Can the Houthis be deterred? That would be difficult. One example that we can give here is that in 2016, the Houthis actually targeted an American non-military ship in the south of the Red Sea. And the Americans retaliated by destroying, by hitting and destroying a handful of Houthis radars on the western coast. And since then, the Houthis have not touched American ships in the Red Sea.

So in that sense, they've been deterred, but that was the US that was not Israel. So I think we can assume that some of the discussions between the US and Israel will use that example from the past to see what can be done. But that's hard.

Nicholas Danforth: You mentioned that the Houthis would've been thrilled if Israel had retaliated directly against them. We've had some other pieces, and War on the Rocks recently talking about how different nodes in the access of resistance, including the Houthis forces in Yemen, have tried to manage their policies in response to the Gaza War. Take a step back and give us a sense of what the broader political goals here are for Houthis forces.

Thomas Juneau: So I think that the Houthis objectives right now in the Gaza War are both domestic and regional. And the domestic aspect matters, it always does. And for a group like the Houthis, we sometimes tend to neglect that. The Houthis have basically won the war, right? In Yemen. And I've written for War on the Rocks I think a couple of times on this topic. Now they are trying to negotiate with Saudi Arabia, not a peace process, but Saudi Arabia's withdrawal from Yemen. The de facto result of that will be the consolidation of Houthis power, at least in northwest Yemen. So the Houthis right now, they are thinking very hard in terms of how do we consolidate our power? How do we further establish ourselves as the de facto legitimate governing authority in Northwest Yemen? They are aware of some vulnerabilities. They have proven to be extremely bad managers of the economy. And in a post-war scenario, that will be very difficult. This is a country that is extremely poor, ravaged by war.

So anytime they do something like provoking Israel, seizing a ship, sending missiles and drones, you have to assume that an element here is to boost popular support, in a country in Yemen where pro-Palestinian feeling is extremely, extremely strong and motivated right now. So that domestic angle matters, right? The power consolidation dimension. Beyond that, what we've seen in recent years is the Houthis emerge as being alongside Hezbollah, maybe the most important partner in what they call the axis of resistance, right? The Houthis are not a domestic Yemeni player anymore. They are a regional power, and that's an important evolution that now everybody can see. But that we've seen building in the last few years in the Red Sea, but also through their ability to send missiles and drones on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which gives them significant leverage on these two countries, and now also on Israel.

So, part of the rationale for the seizing of ships and for the striking of Israel with missiles and drones is to send this message of support for the cause of 'regional resistance' to support Hamas, and to tell the world that now we are a regional power, we can hit you. And that provides us with significant leverage.

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you so much for joining us in The Warcast.

Thomas Juneau: Thank you.