Episode Notes:

Aaron sat down again with Michael Koplow, chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum, to discuss the latest news from Israel and Gaza. The conversation touched on the fall-out from the al-Ahli Arab Hospital strike, Israel's preparations for a ground invasion, and the still murky plans for post-combat operations. This podcast was recorded on Oct. 20th.

[:29] Latest news from Israel

[3:16] Planning for post-combat operations

[5:14] Preparing the population for Israeli casualties

[7:32] Horizontal escalation

[9:37] Netanyahu's governing challenges

[12:12] The Defense Minister

[13:26] Biden's visit

[15:20] Future of the Abraham Accords

Episode Transcript

Aaron Stein: My name is Aaron Stein and I am the chief content officer at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the WarCast, the members only podcast for what you need to know now.

Hello and welcome to the WarCast where we're joined once again by Michael Koplow, chief policy officer at the Israel Policy Forum. Mike, it's good to have you back on the show.

Michael Koplow: Thanks, Aaron.

Aaron Stein: We're just going to catch people up on the latest that's been happening in Israel and in the Gaza Strip. For people following the news, I think it's been a action pact news cycle, beginning with, still contested, but I think relatively conclusive evidence that the Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza was tragically struck by friendly fire, albeit kicking you off protests around the region because the strike had been attributed and still is attributed by many governments to Israel then President Joe Biden going and coming back and giving a nationwide address last night on the U.S. response. Let's start with how things are going in Israel. What's been the fallout from the global condemnation over civilian casualties and how has it shaped or not shaped Israeli resolved to launch a grounded vision?

Michael Koplow: Israeli leadership and Israelis themselves I think are certainly feeling it and they're watching it in a disheartening way, particularly because as you say, the issue with the hospital is still contested, but it's contested in the same way that the 2020 election is contested in that there really is no reliable evidence left that this was done by the Israelis versus by a misfired Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket. So Israelis who always have a bunker mentality about the way in which they are perceived or treated by much of the world, while they're literally in bunkers, retreating even more so into that bunker mentality. I don't think that it has done anything to alter Israeli military plans. From what I can see, airstrikes in Gaza are still ongoing at a heavier rate than Israel has ever conducted them. You still have 360,000 reservists who are not all in the south, but many of them in the south massing for a ground operation in Gaza, and I expect that that is going to commence at some time soon.

We actually this morning for the first time had some more specific comments from Yoav Gallant, the defense minister, where he talked about three phases of an operation, military campaign with airstrikes, and then a ground invasion to destroy Hamas and get rid of its infrastructure and personnel. And then he talks about a second phase, which will be lower intensity to eliminate any last pockets that remain, and then a third phase, which he said will be creating a new security regime in Gaza and removing Israel's day-to-day responsibilities for Gaza. So what that looks like, nobody knows, but it doesn't seem as if Israel has changed its plans in response to the criticism or in response to the casualty numbers.

Aaron Stein: Let's go over that three phase because that literally I think came out right before we jumped on the podcast here. They seem to be taking a stab at sort of what we would call phase four, the day after operations, which is putting in place some sort of governing authority. When you hear these words, when you read the Israeli press, is it as nebulous as you just said, some sort of security authority to hand control over to, or are there more specifics?

Michael Koplow: There are some people who were talking about more specifics. Yair Lapid, who is the opposition leader and is not part of this government, has not joined yesterday, said that in his estimation Gaza should be ruled by the Palestinian authority when all of this is over. And there have been some comments from folks in the government indicating that they think that is the correct course of action as well. Whether that is possible on the day after certainly is an open question.

My own analysis is that it's not possible on the day after for all sorts of reasons, starting with politics on the Palestinian side and all sorts of logistical hurdles as well. So I think there's going to have to be some sort of interim provisional government that takes over when Israel decides that it is done with the military operation. And most Israelis don't want to see Israel have any part of that provisional government. And I think that's what Gallant is referencing when he says that phase three in his words is going to be some sort of security regime in Gaza that allows Israel to leave. And I think that if that phase comes too far after Israel has concluded its military operation, if Israel sticks around even for a very short period of time, that will be a mistake and will set the stage for whatever military operation happens to not be as conclusive as I think Israel wants it to be.

Aaron Stein: Is the Israeli government preparing its population for a large number of casualties? Because I think right now, obviously the casualties have been weighted towards the Palestinian side because of the air campaign, but as soon as that ground campaign begins, I at least personally expect perhaps I'm wrong that there'll be large number of IDF casualties because of the dense urban environment in which they will be operating. What is your sense on the local population's willingness to tolerate a large number of either dead or maimed Israeli forces?

Michael Koplow: At the moment, I don't think that anybody has rose-colored glasses on with regard to what a ground operation will mean in terms of casualties on both sides, Palestinian casualties, but also IDF casualties. I think that many Israelis are also prepared for the eventuality that the hostages are not coming back alive. I think furthermore, many Israelis are prepared for the potential opening of a northern front and for casualties there too, because what we've really seen yesterday and even more so today is things which have been heating up in the north every day. It's like a gas stove where you're churning up the dial very, very slowly every day. And today there have been something like 20 to 30 rockets fired across the northern border, which most people think the rockets are being fired by Hamas. And then there have been anti-tank missiles that have been fired. And most people think that those are coming from Hezbollah and you have northern towns being evacuated and the report from the Israeli comptroller that the situation in terms of shelters in the north is completely inadequate.

And so I think Israelis across the board are prepared for this to get a lot messier on their side, both in terms of IDF troops, but also in terms of potential Israeli civilian casualties. And the shock of October 7th has not worn off, and I don't think that not only is nobody discounting the idea that there may be more dead Israelis before this is done. So far, I don't think that's giving people pause. Most Israelis think that Hamas has to be removed no matter what, and they're prepared for the blowback, whatever that looks like.

Aaron Stein: So we've seen indications of horizontal escalation, maybe a return to the Iranian pressure on U.S. forces in the region, one-way drones fired at U.S. bases both in Iraq and Syria and the still murky report coming out Yemen where a U.S. destroyer intercepted Houthi fired cruise missiles. I think the consensus now is those cruise missiles were aimed at Israel. Although the U.S. Navy or at least the U.S. Department of Defense has not ruled out that they maybe perhaps were aimed at the U.S. Navy itself. Regardless, I want to talk about the Israeli perspective here. If this thing goes sideways and this horizontal escalation, do they care? And I don't mean to sound flippant or are they just focused on the mission and if it goes sideways, that will be dealt with as it comes up rather than something that's being forward planned for?

Michael Koplow: I certainly think they care, but they definitely at the moment have a degree of tunnel vision with regard to Gaza while doing everything they can to keep the northern front, the direct northern front with Hezbollah quiet. So it isn't that they don't care. I think that they have a lot on their plate. Remember that Israel's a relatively small country. It's just north of 9 million. You can extend that out to the size of folks in the government. We think about how the U.S. would deal with this versus how Israel would deal with this. It's just a smaller country with fewer resources, many of which now are consumed with the problem with Gaza.

And let's also not forget this, Israeli government is probably the most incompetent and certainly the less experienced before the war cabinet was formed. Certainly less experienced Israeli government that I think has ever been in place in the 75 years of the country. So we can't just ignore that and assume that all of a sudden because there was this horrific attack that the Israeli government is going to operate in a way that instills trust in many Israelis. We're still dealing with this deeply unpopular, deeply unexperienced, deeply reckless government, and that's going to have an impact down the road.

Aaron Stein: People are going to be scratching their heads and they're going to say, "But wait a minute, Netanyahu has been in power basically for the past 20 years, on and off," right? So how is this guy inexperienced, particularly I think he has an IDF background himself. I mean everybody does in Israel, but it's one of his claims to fame. But you take it from there.

Michael Koplow: Netanyahu served in Sayeret Matkal, which is the equivalent effectively of the Navy SEALs. It's not Navy, but it's the most elite special forces unit in the IDF. So he certainly does. And yes, he has been Prime Minister minus 18 months continuously since 2009. We can get into Netanyahu himself by basically all accounts. He's a very different person today than he was 10 years ago and even five years ago. The bigger problem is that because of his lack of ability to take criticism or to brook any type of challenges, he has done two things. One is that he effectively drove out of his only good party, all of the most experienced people. You now have folks at the top who are in jobs that either they've never held before or people who, this is not exaggeration, before this past election, were social media influencers or Twitter trolls, and they're now sitting as members of Knesset and in some cases as ministers.

The other problem is that he formed a government with the two most extreme right-wing parties in Israel and the two ultra Orthodox parties. The folks in the extreme parties also either before were deemed to be so unfit that they weren't even in the Knesset. And then folks who have experience earned jobs they have no business being in. So the finance minister, which traditionally after the defense minister is the next most important minister in Israel. Aside from Prime Minister, of course. The finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich doesn't have even a minute's worth of finance or relevant experience. He's also in the security cabinet, and he served for, I think just over a year in the IDF in a non-combat position. Itamar Ben-Gvir, National Security Minister was deemed so radical at the age of 18 that he wasn't even allowed to enlist in the IDF.

So it's not just Netanyahu, it's that the folks in his cabinet and in his government are woefully unqualified and unprepared for this sort of thing. And we have to remember, Israel is not a presidential system. It's a parliamentary system. As much as we have all tended to look at Netanyahu the same way that we would look at the President of the United States. In Israel, ministers have enormous power and the Prime Minister in many ways really is first among equals, and these other people matter a great deal.

Aaron Stein: What about Gallant? Because he's sort of become the face of this. He's the one who just laid out the three-step plan, even if it's a little murky. What's his experience level?

Michael Koplow: Gallant certainly has lots of experience. He was one of two candidates. There are always two candidates. He was one of two candidates to be the IDF Chief of Staff. He did not get it at the time. He also served as head of Southern Command, which is obviously very relevant at the moment, given what's taking place in Gaza, and he's now defense minister. So I don't think that there are any questions with regard to Gallant's experience or qualifications. There are questions about Gallant's decision-making and temperament, which have always been an issue with him. And he also has a notoriously terrible relationship with Netanyahu. He might have an even worse relationship with both Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot, who Benny Gantz is the third member of this war cabinet next to Netanyahu and Gallant, and Eizenkot is one of the two observers, and both of those guys are former chiefs of staff themselves. So there are definitely questions as to I think, how well Gallant gets along with these guys. And there have always been questions about his own temperament and instincts within Israeli political circles.

Aaron Stein: Well, that's a whole other podcast that perhaps we'll do next week as we watch the ground invasion unfold. But final question I'll ask you is obviously Biden came and went. It was supposed to be wrapped into a broader, I guess, effort, I think to meet with King Abdullah, to meet with the Palestinian authority, to meet with the President El-Sisi of Egypt. But because of the fallout from the hospital strike, those visits were canceled. How are the Israelis viewing Biden? I mean, we talked last time about how basically everybody's super impressed with how he's been handling this. I assume nothing has changed, but what's it been like after the visit?

Michael Koplow: Israelis are enthralled with Biden. They never thought they'd see an American president visit Israel literally in the middle of a war. The things that he says ring true to Israeli ears. He says them in a way that I'm not sure I've ever heard any other president say, not even on American terms, but very much on Israeli terms. He went out of his way to meet with a number of people whose family members are hostages or who survived the assault on October 7th. And Israelis also in some ways view him now almost as a stand in for Netanyahu, not in terms of leading Israel, but in terms of providing the emotional moral support that they expect from their leaders. They really haven't gotten that from Netanyahu. In some ways, he's been absent, and when he hasn't been absent, he just doesn't emote very well. And they look at Biden and they see somebody who seems to really understand what they're going through and not just empathize with them, but deeply sympathize with them. I don't think that you'll find many Israelis at all who have a bad word to say about him post visit.

Aaron Stein: I'm going to ask one last question and tempt the time rules of the WarCast. The Abraham Accords, it does seem like they're holding, but if the ground invasion goes and we see large numbers and sort of the international sort of outrage continues to fulminated, and you have upward pressure on Arab governments, this was supposed to be the feather in the cap of Netanyahu. He had delivered peace with the Arabs. This is looking very tenuous right now. They may hold, they may not. I'm not asking you to look into the future, I'm just saying from an Israeli perspective, are they ready to sacrifice the Abraham Accords for the mission of removing Hamas from power?

Michael Koplow: So I'll predict anyway. I don't think the Abraham Accords are going to fall apart. If there's one party that's going to be the most wobbly, I think it'll be Morocco. I'm actually much more worried about the Israeli relationship with Jordan and Egypt because they are far more sensitive to these issues. But I do think that as this unfolds in some ways, Israel has to choose between a new Gaza versus its vision for a new Middle East. And that doesn't mean that the Abraham Accords are going to collapse, but it does mean that the bilateral relationships contained in each component of them are going to be more difficult.

The idea of further normalization is going to be extremely difficult. And for Israelis who have spent all this time talking about this new Middle East that's emerging and leaving the old strategic environment behind, that's going to be far harder given what Israel wants to do in Gaza. I think that most Israelis, if you put it to them that darkly today would say, "We don't have a choice. We need a new Gaza more than we knew to New Middle East." But I do think that's the choice that's going to be in front of Israeli leaders.

Aaron Stein: All right. Well, that's it for today. Thanks for taking the time again.