Episode Notes:

To discuss the latest news from Saudi Arabia, we’re joined today by Steven Cook. Steven is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East.

[:38] Saudi-Iranian relations

[2:11] Saudi goals

[4:16] U.S. attitude

[6:14] Saudi-China

[7:38] Abraham Accords

[9:27] U.S.-Saudi angle

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the Warcast, a members-only podcast for what you need to know, now.

To discuss the latest news from Saudi Arabia, we're joined today by Stephen Cook. Stephen is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's also the author most recently of False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East. Welcome to the Warcast.

Stephen Cook: Hey, great to be with you, Nick.

Nicholas Danforth: Tell us about the latest in Saudi Iranian relations.

Stephen Cook: Well, just this past weekend, the Saudi Foreign Minister was in Tehran for meetings with his Iranian counterpart. This is all part of this process of reopening embassies and naming and ambassadors to Riyadh and Tehran respectively. And by all measures, the meetings were cordial and there is a spirit of cooperation and the desire to ensure maritime security and things along those lines. Although it's fairly clear that none of the real issues between the two governments have been resolved. This is an attempt to set the stage for perhaps some sort of change.

But you could see in this encounter that these tides remain, for lack of a better term, quite tense. The meeting and the presser afterwards was supposed to happen in a room where there was a large photograph of Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, which was the mastermind behind all of these proxy conflicts around the region, which had back targeted Saudi Arabia and its allies. So the foreign minister refused to do the meeting or the pressor in that room. And the Iranians, to their credit, complied and changed location. But just the fact that they initially believed that they could have a meeting in such a room would suggest that these two governments aren't necessarily on the same page.

Nicholas Danforth: Now, realistically, the cordiality of the most recent visit aside, where do both countries hope to see this go? What are the kind of actual objectives? How realistic are those?

Stephen Cook: Well, I think there's the public objectives, the objectives of deescalation and their resumption of relations, and cooperation, and investment. But I think really in terms of, for example, what the Saudis are thinking, is that this resumption of diplomatic ties buys them some time, buys them a number of years in which they can get their house in order and more adequately arm themselves and prepare themselves for what they see as inevitable conflicts with Iran. Not just because they're two big powers across from each other in the Gulf and have very different views of what the rules of the road are and the game is in the Gulf, but also because I think the Saudis think that at some point in the relatively near future, they'll normalize relations with Israel, and they'll make them a target for Iran and its proxies.

I think the Iranians see the normalization of relations as a way in which to take the Saudis essentially off the table, and then to press their advantage around the region. The Saudis essentially gave up in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, even Iraq. Even though there is a flowering of relations between Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi government, it's no match for, it's no match for Iran's influence in Baghdad. And so the Iranians see that they have an opportunity here to press their advantage either against the United States and or Israel. And there's lots of evidence that they have been doing just that, whether it's the harassing of tankers in the Gulf, whether it's the IRGC Quds Force Commander meeting with resistance, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and encourage them to coordinate attacks on Israel. Those kinds of things are happening. The Iranians want to make sure that the expansion of the Abraham Accords, it does not happen.

Nicholas Danforth: Now, I want to get back to the expansion of the Abraham Accords in just a second. But first, how is Washington viewing the Saudi Arabian rapprochement?

Stephen Cook: Well, when it first happened, the administration said, "Look, if this is going to lead to deescalation in the region, we welcome it. If it's going to lead to Saudi Arabia being able to withdraw from Yemen and have secure borders, we support it." And I think that's really the only thing that the administration could say about it. This was a deal that was brokered by the Chinese. It was a deal that the United States could not broker because we don't really talk directly to the Iranians.

I think the question before the administration is this, is there actually deescalation? My answer is no. There hasn't been. There may be deescalation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but around the region, the Iranians, as I said before, are looking to press their advantage. But it does seem that the administration is seeking to capitalize on this and renew indirect negotiations with Iran over somehow limiting Iran's nuclear development and to win the release of a number of Americans who are held hostage in Iran.

There's some indication in the press that these talks are progressing, but it does include releasing a limited amount of resources to the Iranians in terms of billions of dollars, which I think is not necessarily something that even the Saudis at this point, given their normalization, look kindly upon. Because there is the view, and it's the same view that they had in 2015, that these resources, this money will be used not for the development of the Iranian economy, but will go to the Quds force to spread around to proxies in the region. And the Saudis are all about stability in the region now, and developing Saudi Arabia, and all of that would be bad for them. And they're joined in that concern with the Emirates, obviously the Israelis, and a number of others.

Nicholas Danforth: So both Riyadh and Washington are in some ways trying to seek rapprochement with Tehran while also worrying about the other country's efforts to do so.

Stephen Cook: I think that's the case. I'm not entirely convinced that Washington is worried about Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran. I think the issue for Washington is that this was brokered by the Chinese, and that the Saudis have clearly made it a policy to develop their relations with Beijing. They just hosted the 10th annual Arab Chinese Summit, billions of dollars of deals where were signed. Now, of course, this was the 10th annual of it, but it also comes on the heels of a late 2022 meeting, which Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia.

There's lots of Chinese activity in the Gulf, and I think that the administration has gone from wanting to deemphasize the region, to see opportunities in the region, to challenge or confront the Chinese. I don't get the sense that America's friends and partners in the Gulf necessarily want to make that choice. I think they see China as the single largest investor in the region, provider of services, infrastructure development, a buyer of their oil. And the United States doesn't have much to offer other than security cooperation. So I think that they want the best of both worlds, what the Chinese can offer as well as the United, and they don't want to be forced into a choice.

Nicholas Danforth: Now, what about the Abraham Accords? There was some reporting from the New York Times about the administration's continued efforts to bring Saudi Arabia on board. Where does that stand?

Stephen Cook: It's quite interesting and quite startling when you talk to Saudi officials, and they talk about normalization with Israel, not if, but when. And they're open about it. They see Israel as an integral part of the region and that they would like to normalize, but at the same time, they have some requirements. Their requirements at a basic level is for Saudi Arabia to get more than what the UAE got for normalization. The UAE got ostensibly a halt to Israeli annexation of the West Bank.

Now, I'm not sure given current events that the Israelis are sticking to that. Clearly the Israeli government is continuing to move forward with settlement expansion and has prominent ministers who speak openly about annexing territory. So the Saudis are going to have to get something more than a commitment from the Israelis to annex territory. They seem to have dropped the idea that there has to be a Palestinian state or that they're sticking specifically to the Arab Peace Initiative from 2002. They're a little coy about. It seems they need to get more.

And that doesn't mean that they've dropped their criticism of Israel. The Saudi foreign Ministry issued a stinging indictment of Israeli operations in the West Bank just the other day. But it is clear that they see Israel as important to the economic development and advancement of not only Saudi Arabia, but the region more generally. And there have been steps towards normalization, but they're holding back. And I think that they want the United States to sweeten the deal for them.

Nicholas Danforth: Well, I was going to ask about their asks from the United States.

Stephen Cook: Right. So their asks are for ironclad security guarantees, nuclear technology. It's a very, very steep price. My sense is that's an opening ask to see what the United States is going to. But major steps like committing the United States to defend Saudi Arabia in writing is something that Congress is going to have to get involved in. And Congress remains deeply hostile to Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince over a number of issues, whether it's the invasion of Yemen... Well, invasion... The intervention in Yemen. I mean, it was mostly by air. So it's not really an invasion. The murder of Jamal Khashoggi. But I think those things may be kind of proximate causes of congressional concern about Saudi Arabia. I think that there's a desire to re-litigate US Saudi relations, broadly speaking, going back to 9/11, the question of oil supplies, things along those lines.

So I think that it's going to be hard for the administration to encourage Congress, even when it comes to something as historic as normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. I still think it's somewhat of a steep climb to get Congress to agree that American forces should, by treaty, defend Saudi Arabia, or that we should give it nuclear technology. Which is, we have these agreements with the UAE in which we have cooperated with them and help them with their own civilian nuclear program. It's not something that's unheard of, but the Saudis have been resistant to signing on to the IAEA's additional protocol, which would provide further and more stringent monitoring of their program, which suggest to people that they would like a nuclear option. And it makes sense for them to want to have a nuclear option given that they're sitting across from the Iranians. But clearly, regardless of what is happening, is clearly driving towards having nuclear weapons […]

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you for joining us on the Warcast.

Stephen Cook: It's a great pleasure, Nick.