Episode Notes:

On this episode of The Russia Contingency, Aaron and Mike sat down to discuss the start of the Ukrainian military's counter-offensive, the initial impressions of ongoing combat, the impact of the Kakhova dam collapse on Russian defensive lines and what to watch for in the near future.

The Russia Contingency is a bi-weekly podcast featuring in-depth analysis of Russia's military power and the war in Ukraine.

 

Episode Transcript

Aaron Stein: Hello, and welcome to The Russia Contingency, where I am not Michael Kofman, I am Aaron Stein, and that means I am joined by Michael Kofman on his own podcast. Mike, it's good to have you on your own show.

Michael Kofman: Yeah. Hey, thanks for hosting and moderating.

Aaron Stein: The reason why I'm jumping on is that this is one of those episodes where something large is happening in Ukraine and we want your analysis as it unfolds. I believe, maybe a couple nights ago, we started exchanging WhatsApp messages about the latest on the Ukrainian counteroffensive, or offensive, and we thought it'd be good to just put it all on the show.

So what's been going on, basically, since the last episode where we were talking about shaping operations, towards where I think you think the actual operation has started?

Michael Kofman: I think that, as of just a couple of days ago, and we're about two days into this, the fighting that we've seen at the front has taken a markedly qualitative turn, in that it looks like Ukraine has launched a series of offensive operations around Velyka Novosilka, west of Vuhledar, and a couple of other points in southern Donetsk and just around the border with Zaporizhzhia there. These attacks, I don't believe to be the main offensive effort, but they mark what I think is the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive. This is now beyond shaping operations. They are attacks with multiple brigades. They dented Russian lines in and around Velyka Novosilka.

The evidence I think we have so far, two days in, reflects significant fighting. I think its probably beyond something like recon by force or just probing efforts at this point, but they are not by the main brigades that have been equipped and trained by Western countries. So if you're sort of wondering, well, how do we know that this isn't the main offense?

Well first, the forces we expected to be used in that operation, those brigades are not a part of this effort. These seem to be a combination of naval infantry and regular mechanized infantry on the Ukrainian side, but they're not the forces one would have anticipated to see in the main effort.

There have also been continued Ukrainian attacks to try to push back Russian lines around Bakhmut and at Soledar. I don't think those have made significant breakthroughs, but they're ongoing. And in general, there's sort of this, I think, sense of anticipation in that we're probably not far off from seeing a major offensive play out, but you have to keep in mind this is going to run over the course of probably several months rather than just days or weeks. And it's likely to be multiple offensive operations and they could be geographically quite separated, so folks have to be careful with any assumptions about what it is they expect to see.

And I often have a disappointing answer whenever somebody asks, "Well, how do we know when we're seeing the main effort?" And my answer is, "You'll know it when you'll see it." Okay? It'll be clear. You'll have a good sense of what you're looking at when it happens and this does not appear to be it yet.

Aaron Stein: It differs a little bit. In our previous conversations, I think it was clear that they were doing shaping operations in that they were striking rear areas and were, as this is a little bit qualitatively different in terms of where they're going, even if as you just said, they're perhaps holding back some of their Western kitted-out brigades or units that they would then throw into this fight as well.

So what triggered in your brain the difference between, say, where we were a couple of weeks ago versus where we are now?

Michael Kofman: So first, the Ukrainian ground force attack is significant. I haven't seen something on this size or scale from the Ukrainian military probably, to be honest, since the end of November. This attack kind of pairs with the so-called defensive operation or the localized counter-attack in and around Bakhmut. You've had a lot of Ukrainian troop movements recently. You've had a lot of Ukrainian official statements basically telling people to be quiet about the operation. You've had a churn in the recent rhetoric as well at the sort of higher political levels from, "Ukraine doesn't have what it needs. It's not good to go," which I don't think was really necessarily reflective of either way of the exact state of preparation, to "Ukraine does have what it needs."

And beyond that, you've had a lot of strikes in the run-up to this operation and Russian forces reporting a significant level of electronic warfare and jamming being used against them, attempts to fragment their command and control. So this looks like an initial effort that is probably the early stages of the offensive.

Aaron Stein: I think you were talking a little bit about tempering expectations, and you mentioned it in your opening as well, in that I think a lot of people want this to go really quickly and to see a rapid take-back of territory that Russia now holds. And I know that you've been tamping the brakes on that for a long time in terms of how to properly expectation set as these multiple offensives sort of all rolled into the, let's call it, the broad counter offensive takes shape. Is there anything that you're looking for in terms of what would set the pace or the tone for how this is going this early on, or are we really just still in the wait-and-see?

Michael Kofman: Look, the problem with watching an offensive is, as an analyst, you have to say, "What are you selecting for as evidence?" And typically, the one thing you can see is territory changing hands, right? So the number one thing you end up looking for is whether you have reporting a significant shift in the lines of Russian forces retreating or giving up towns and positions. And the way you mark that typically is not just through statements, but through visual evidence. You have photos and footage of fighting, you can geolocate it, it gives you a rough sense of where people are. So if you have fighting south of a town that's supposed to be a Russian-held position, then you know that means the Russians have already retreated from it and Ukrainian forces have advanced to it and what have you.

And I'm just giving a very basic cursory example, and unfortunately, most of the indicators you have, they lag the reality of what's happening in the war. And I think it's remarkable that even a day or two or three later, we can have decent visual evidence today in 2023 as to what is happening in the conflict. Can you imagine in previous wars or other conflicts, your open-source available evidence was pretty limited, it would often be one-sided, and would be very late. You would be tracking developments quite far behind what's actually happening given the pace of modern combat.

So I think to me, as always, I look for the locations where the fighting's taking place and the units involved are often a good indicator. Also, the degree to which either side is willing to release information about how they're doing. Initially, both sides typically suppress information pretty heavily and don't want to discuss. So I mean, that's the best I can do.

I think the problem unfortunately is that you often don't have a great sense of what's going on in either force in the middle of a major operation, and so you have to drive a lot of inference based on what you're seeing as to how they may be doing. And often, you're looking at lagging indicators and you don't have a good sense of the soft factors or the intangibles. Like, how's Russia morale doing? Well, it depends where, at what point, and which unit, and how do you assess that?

Aaron Stein: I think some of the listeners probably have questions about some of the fighting in and around Bakhmut. That one, it does look like there's been some territory that's changed hands, at least in these early days. And we've also had our favorite Prigozhin coming out and essentially admitting that there's been some territory lost, and even going as far as to claim that as his forces were leaving, elements of the regular Russian military fired on them. And I think there was even a Russian taken prisoner, obviously beaten, and admitting this live to tape.

Now, I don't want to turn this into the Prigozhin hour, but I do think it's pertinent to the offensive because it is an area where fighting was ongoing, and it does seem that this was one of the initial places where the Ukrainian counteroffensive or attack took place. So, what are your thoughts on all of that?

Michael Kofman: Around Bakhmut, I think the challenge there is that Ukrainian forces are being used to try to push the Russian flanks or the units that have been deployed there all along, and they're not well built-out for conducting major offensive operations. It's like 3rd Assault Brigade, for example. So they've pushed the Russian lines some square kilometers in the south and north of Bakhmut, and they're taking advantage of the fact that Wagner's departing, there's a rotation of forces, and the Russian units taking over Wagner positions aren't particularly good.

That said, I suspect, I don't know but I suspect it's going to be slow-going there for a Ukrainian localized counterattack. I think part of its goal is to fix Russian forces. And the irony is that while Wagner was fighting for Bakhmut backed by the Russian Airborne Division, there wasn't really that much of the regular Russian military fixed in those positions. Now that Bakhmut's been taken and Wagner's withdrawing, probably going to reconstitute, the Russian military has had to pull forces from the south, pull units out of the south, take an airborne brigade, elements of the 31st Air Assault, and basically moved them into position. And so now, Bakhmut actually is becoming a drain on the overall Russian capacity to defend other fronts.

I could be completely wrong on this, but I'm skeptical that Bakhmut or the area around it is going to be the focus of the main Ukrainian offensive, just in part because even though Bakhmut is politically significant for Ukraine and clearly they want the city back just because of the kind of stakes that have been layered on top of this battle despite its questionable strategic significance from a military perspective, I think at the end of the day, I've not encountered anyone who believes that what happens with Bakhmut is going to be decisive for the overall war or that it'll be used by anyone to evaluate whether or not Ukraine's offensive is a success. I just don't think it really falls into that criteria in terms of expectations.

Aaron Stein: You did set up a logical next question is that you don't think Bakhmut is going to be the sort of main fulcrum of Ukraine's counteroffensive. What do you think will be where they focus their forces and how they try and ultimately go about doing this?

Michael Kofman: Well, I was just saying that given the situation around Bakhmut, who controls Bakhmut ultimately isn't that significant from a military perspective, and the Russian military had no momentum either way after capturing Bakhmut, which was not just predictable but predicted many months in advance when folks were discussing this battle back over the winter.

To me, a much more significant, or let's say strategically relevant objective, would be, let's say, in Luhansk, if Ukrainian forces could break through the swath of a Crimean line to Starobilsk, the logistical hub, or let's say somewhere in the south to essentially be able to sever Russian ground lines of communication, get to the coast, to the Sea of Azov, be able to range the main ground road and rail linkages coming out of Crimea, this could then put the Russian military in a precarious position in the south and ultimately move Ukraine significantly towards its goals of liberating both the southern occupied territories, and then having the ability to pressure Russian forces in Crimea down the line.

So these are kind of examples of things that would have a real significance as opposed to retaking the destroyed city of Bakhmut.

Aaron Stein: That's a natural segue to another question I had, which is that either you're like Rob Lee and were probably up tweeting about it, or you were like me and you were asleep and you woke up to it, which is news that, for whatever reason, and I don't want to point fingers yet, not because I'm not sympathetic to the Ukrainian's explanation of what happened, but because this is the fog of war, and certain, sometimes stories change or more information comes to light after the fact, but for whatever reason, the dam that was holding back large elements of the Dnipro River went up in smoke. Not to be too crass about it. And we have large-scale flooding, a humanitarian catastrophe.

How does this factor in perhaps the operational planning, beyond the emergency and humanitarian aspects to it, to any future planned Ukrainian offensive and either by choice, if the Russians were to have been behind the dam explosion, or by accident because of haphazard management? Does it impact their defenses, perhaps even down the line towards Crimea or in this planned offensive?

Michael Kofman: I was up late enough last night to read the news of the dam being destroyed, but then I went to sleep because I'm not an expert on dams and I didn't think it was going to get solved on Twitter over the course of the night. And I woke up discovering that the matter had not been resolved as to what exactly happened.

Aaron Stein: Sleep's important, my friend.

Michael Kofman: Yeah, yeah.

Aaron Stein: I was asleep before it went off, but that's just a glimpse into my life.

Michael Kofman: Right, right. And for folks, for a glimpse into my life, I travel a lot. I've only been back from Europe as of a few days. And yeah, sleep is important and sometimes you see a major, major event develop and you have to say, "Is my expertise relevant to this? No. Am I going to crack the code on the situation in the middle of this night? I am not. In fact, I'll be better off thinking about it tomorrow with a couple extra hours of sleep as opposed to being sleep-deprived." This is the joy of life in your 40s.

With that preface, I'd say that it's not clear whether the dam was destroyed as a deliberate act or as the result of gross negligence and prior damage. Either way, Russia's responsible because in the first instance, then they've committed a banal act of sabotage, and to some extent, self-sabotage because the dam will substantially flood the Russian-controlled part of Kherson much more than the Ukrainian part. It will wash away Russia's initial line of defense along the river. It will damage water supply for agriculture and drinking water. It will damage water supply to Crimea as well, widen the canal. So this is an act of sort of cutting off your nose to spite your face. It's almost banal in terms of the real, as I said, the impact on Russian-occupied territory.

Now, as an act of negligence, here the alternative explanation simply is that given prior damage, the damage Russian military inflicted on the dam when they blew the road on it, when they were retreating from Kherson in November, and other incidents and negligence, that they may have lost the ability to effectively control water flow, and then over course of spring, the rain built up and the water level and the reservoir behind the dam dramatically increased, and then the combination of pressure and other problems that had accumulated leading the dam to deteriorate and then steadily disintegrate.

Now, I don't know which of those is true, to be honest. I think either way, Russia's responsible because the dam's principally Russian-controlled and the end outcome is the result of Russian actions in Ukraine. So whether you think they intentionally destroyed it or whether you think it's just a result of negligence and recklessness, it's still Russia's responsibility. But I think that's a sort of rapidly developing situation. By the time this podcast comes out, we might have much better evidence or the US might declassify intelligence showing that the dam was destroyed. And I think that that's quite possible too.

Why? Because even though I think that this is probably an act that can best describe as one of sheer stupidity, it doesn't mean the Russians wouldn't have done it.

Aaron Stein: Certainly not. I mean, we've seen other stupid acts throughout this war.

Michael Kofman: Yeah, absolutely. And I remember being asked about this back last fall in October, and I said that this would be akin to Russia blowing off its foot because it's going to flood their occupied territory much more than the Ukrainian side of the river, and it's going to hurt their interest much more, and it's going to have a lot of downstream effects on the Russian position in the south of Ukraine and Crimea. But okay, it doesn't mean that they wouldn't do it. And I remember discussing this all the way back then.

So regarding its implications for the military offensive and the military situation writ large, so believe it or not, I actually don't think they're that significant.

First, the likelihood of a major Ukrainian crossover operation was low. It would've been a counterpart at best to a major offensive operation in the south. It would also have been very risky and Russia had the defenses roughly in place, I think, to deal with that.

Second, some of the cross-river raids that have garnered attention over the course of the past several months were just small special forces teams raiding in the islands between the two banks. So if this is a solution to the threat of a Ukrainian cross-river operation, it's not a very sensible solution because that threat was always low. It destroys Russian defenses on that side of the river as well. It doesn't do anything for its Operation PP, which is north of the dam. And thankfully, I think that as best I've read, I'm not an expert on this issue, but as best as I've been able to interpret the writing of others, that there is sufficient water to maintain cooling at that plant for quite a few months. So this disaster does not immediately create a crisis there. And so we shouldn't take the worst-case interpretation of the implications of this dam being destroyed for its Operation PP.

So at least from my point of view, it's a little too early to tell what the implications are. Why? Because, well, we haven't seen the extent of the flooding and other things, and a lot of the models that I had previously seen in the fall were not based on a water level built up this high in the reservoir, if that makes sense.

Aaron Stein: Yeah. Yeah, it does.

Michael Kofman: So if the question is, do you know for a fact what the end result will be? My answer is no, I don't. And most of the modeling was not based off of this water level. So it's going to be... Let's put it this way. I think it's going to be worse than what people expected in the earlier models and projections. That's probably the best answer I can make. And it's already flooded towns and communities along the Russian-held side. It's already flooded parts of Kherson City on the Ukrainian-held side. And who knows what it'll ultimately look like before the water recedes?

Aaron Stein: Yeah, no. I mean, I think it goes without saying that it's a humanitarian tragedy, but it's interesting to hear because you saw a lot of speculation, at least on Twitter, at the beginning, that there may have some major impacts on the fighting. But when you sketch it out, that actually did make sense is that it may not have direct impact on the Ukrainian offensive because of the low likelihood of a major cross-river operation.

So one of the questions that we were batting around last week was also as part of the shaping operations, the Ukrainians, again, unacknowledged, but I think it's fairly safe to say, is that the Ukrainians have sought to launch and have succeeded in launching harassment attacks on Moscow itself. And you may get into this in the flagship show next week, you're doing another one, and I had wanted you to talk a little bit about when the last time Moscow was actually attacked from the air, even if these are a small drones. You may not know the answer off the top of your head, and I think the question is that it's been a long time, in any case.

What's your read on the situation of some of these more daring Ukrainian attacks onto Russian soil proper? And the reason I'm bringing this up is because regardless of whether through Russian negligence the dam collapsed or through Russian act of official explosion, it was destroyed, the catastrophe may sort of incentivize more risk-taking behavior on the part of Ukrainians to attack Russian rear lines, perhaps even as far as the capital.

Michael Kofman: Okay, so regarding your first question, I don't think that Moscow had been attack from the air since World War II. Right?

Aaron Stein: I don't think so, but maybe there's some weird one that flops out there that I've never heard of, but it's got to be World War II.

Michael Kofman: My memory's obviously not great to admit as evidence, but I can't think of an episode like that. I mean, people may think of Mathias Rust, that German gentleman landing his single-engine aircraft on the Red Square, but I would call that an attack on the reputation of Soviet Air Defence much more than an actual attack on Moscow.

Beyond that, I think that a lot of these attacks are, to me, they're the most likely the work of who are Ukrainian military intelligence. And some of them, like the early attacks ahead of the May 9th Russian parade, were probably launched within Russia because the drones were very small and lack the range endurance. And some of the other ones, the one we saw most recently are probably launched from Ukraine with fairly long-range drones, probably not a significant payload, but sufficient enough to inflict real damage to Russian reputation, to challenge Russian Air Defence there, and by challenge, what I mean is to create a contingency for the Russian military where they have to focus much more on air defense in and around Moscow.

And I think one of the longstanding Ukrainian objectives has been to do injury to the mythos of Russian power, to bring the war to Russia, to make clear to Russian leadership and the Russian public that they are not invulnerable, that they cannot conduct regular attacks in Ukraine, that Ukraine has the ability to retaliate. And unsurprisingly, that most recent attack was clearly launched in retaliation for a series of strikes including daytime strikes in Kyiv by the Russian military. So it's very hard not to connect the two and assume that they were coincidental.

Aaron Stein: Yeah, that's my final question here, unless I missed anything you want to circle back to, is that there's this constant chatter is that Russia's running out of PGMs, is that they're facing debilitating shortages in long-range cruise missiles. And as the offensive has gotten closer and closer, the intensity of Russian bombardment of the capital with these same systems has increased, right? I mean, it does seem like they're able to continue to launch relatively large salvos against Ukraine proper and as deep as into the capital in Kyiv.

What's your take on all this and how it maybe pertains to the future of the conflict here?

Michael Kofman: Okay. Here, I think we have to be careful on how we interpret the evidence, right? Because it's clear that Russia had spent the stocks they had at the outset of the war, but they have the capacity to make X-number of missiles, let's say, on a monthly basis. And what I think folks had assumed perhaps is that that capacity would also decrease, although I was always a skeptic on the immediate effects of sanctions and export controls, whereas in fact, it's likely to be maintained steady for some time, if not perhaps increase due to Russian mobilization efforts and attempts to increase production.

So what I think may be happening is that the attacks may appear larger in scale, but are probably less frequent, and we're seeing the Russian military hold back resources to launch these attacks.

Secondarily, when it comes to the question of using drones, things like Shahed 136s, here I think it's worth debating whether or not we're going to see big fluctuations in Russian strike capacity because every time they receive a shipment from Iran, they can then begin bombarding until they run low and then they have to wait until the next shipment. But I also wonder whether or not we're seeing numbers of Iranian drones used that exceed supply, which is to say, we may be seeing the result of Russia beginning to produce these locally, essentially license, produce. These are not complex machines.

Aaron Stein: No, not at all.

Michael Kofman: Let's just be clear. This is nothing. There's nothing complicated about Iranian drones. And for Russia to be able to organize a local production capacity with Iranian help, I don't think it's going to be a tremendous lift, and so we may be seeing them increasingly assemble drones or produce their own license, sort of produce versions, and that can be one of the explanations for increased availability.

And this is the way to square the circle up. Look, Russia's not going to run out of missiles or drones or artillery ammunition. Okay? It's going to run low, then it's going to try to increase production. That's what's been taking place. In some areas, it will be more successful, and in other areas, it will be less successful, but they'll be able to continue sustaining this war for some time. And I think it's important to change the conversation from, "Oh, they're running low and they're running out," to, "No, they're going to fall to a certain rate of use, but they're probably going to be able to sustain."

Aaron Stein: We've come basically to the end here. Before we do the next Russia Contingency, which may be a week, which may be a couple of days, I know you're doing a flagship next week, what are the things that you're going to be watching out for so that listeners who are listening to this can try and follow along with how you're going to do your analysis?

Michael Kofman: Well, first, this is a disclaimer. After the dam being destroyed last night, you don't even know what to expect, right?

Aaron Stein: That's true.

Michael Kofman: There's all sorts of shoes might drop in this conflict. I'm not even so confident about what can or may not happen with this Operation PP. Right?

So with that in mind, one, I'm just keeping my mind open in terms of expectations. The Ukrainian offensive may be fitful, it may be very successful, it could be a lot shorter than people expect. It depends on what happens in the interaction between Ukrainian and Russian forces. I make no assumptions the Russian military won't collapse or deteriorate. I'm just being upfront about my biases as an analyst. You tend to be conservative and you don't expect to win the lottery, so you always sort of plan for the fact that the best-case scenario is going to be one of the lower likely ones, but it's certainly well within the realm of possibility.

I think in general, I've become much more optimistic about the Ukraine offense over the last two months, both because they've taken a lot more time to prepare it. They've waited for better weather. There's been a real gap in between the Russian offensive in the winter through April and when Ukrainians launched this operation. And in general, I think the Russian military looks worse heading into June, than it did, let's say, back in March.

So if I was sort of cautiously optimistic, which is typically what I say and have said over the past several months, I think in general, I'm more positive on Ukrainian prospects just looking at the last couple of months of developments. But I wouldn't, as I always say, I wouldn't take that as being predictive of outcomes.

As we like to say on the show, war is very contingent, and hence one of the reasons for the name. And you have to keep in mind that a lot of the forces involved in this current operation, they're basically newly mobilized, trained, and equipped, and you just haven't seen them fight before. So you have to disabuse yourself of the notion that you're seeing the same two militaries fight for 15 months. You're actually seeing two forces that have changed significantly over the time period. And it's very easy as an analyst to make predictions based on the last two fights, based on Kherson, or based on Kharkiv. It might not be representative of either. It might not follow logically and look very differently depending on how things shake out.

So sorry for that kind of indeterminate statement, but those are my thoughts, at least right now. I just think, in general, it's definitely going to be a very eventful June and July.

Aaron Stein: Yeah. And maybe just to put a fine point on it, because you've said it a few times, is while it's contingent, I'll use the show title, this could take a very long time and we're at the start here. And so I think the good news for listeners is that that means we'll be having regular updates, but I think the bad news for war optimists is that this may not go as fast as perhaps we all would want it to.

So is there anything else you think that we should hit before we sign off here?

Michael Kofman: I think we're good. And I think that we don't need to let the best be the enemy of the concise.

Aaron Stein: Yeah, that's a worthwhile lesson for any PhD students out there. Just get it finished.

But with that, Mike, I want to thank you for coming on. I know that you are recording a main show next week, and we should have it out that same week as well. And as the offensive continues to play out, we're certain to have more updates here on The Russia Contingency and on other War on the Rocks products.

So Mike, thanks for joining your own show and thanks everybody for listening.