Episode Notes:

On Friday, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic ties, in a deal brokered by China. Here to tell us more is Dr. Steven A. Cook. Steven is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars

[:42] What did Iran and Saudi Arabia agree to?

[3:07] Yemen

[4:16] Syria

[6:38] China's role

[9:16] U.S. - Saudi relations

Episode Transcript

Nicholas Danforth: My name is Nicholas Danforth, and I'm an editor at War on the Rocks. You are listening to the Warcast, the members-only podcast for what you need to know — now. On Friday, Iran in Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic ties in a deal brokered by China. Here to tell us more is Dr. Steven Cook. Steven is the Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for the Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations as well as the Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars. Welcome to the Warcast. 

Steven Cook: Hey, thanks Nick. It's great to be here. 

Nicholas Danforth: Alright, tell us what the Iranian and Saudi governments actually agreed to the other day. 

Steven Cook: Yeah, it's super interesting because the way in which the commentary has unfolded isn't exactly true to what was actually agreed upon. The Saudis and the Iranians agreed under Chinese auspices to establish a roadmap for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. And the Iranian interlocutor and Saudi interlocutor agreed to meet again in two months to see where they are in the process. And that may lead to the resumption of diplomatic relations. Let me point out, I think, two glaringly obvious things that have been lost in the sort of excitement and commentary about this development. One, the Saudis and the Iranians have had diplomatic relations through years of tension-filled and frosty relations. Those diplomatic relations ended six years ago over the Saudi execution of a prominent Shia cleric, which subsequently led to an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Obviously, there's been a lot of tension since, but this is not an unprecedented thing. The second thing is that this is a roadmap, and there are things that the Saudis and the Iranians have to fulfill, and both countries have a spotty record in fulfilling their commitment. So this may not actually end up in the resumption of diplomatic ties, although it does seem that leaders in both Tehran and Riyadh have a compelling interest. For the Saudis, de-escalating with the Iranians means, perhaps, an end to the conflict in Yemen, which has been a problem for them. They walked into the Yemeni Civil War and subsequently have not been able to get out, and their population centers are periodically targeted by the Houthis with missiles and drones. And then, for the Iranians, de-escalation may mean relieving pressure domestically on their economy and those types of benefits. Despite the fact that there should be some skepticism, it does look like the two countries are moving in that direction, which would be a breakthrough. But it's not like the Chinese have resolved all the outstanding issues between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

Nicholas Danforth: We'll talk about the Chinese role in just a second, but tell us: What are the further steps on the roadmap? 

Steven Cook: Well, I think that there's going to be a series of confidence-building measures. And one of those is going to be — and it's already begun — negotiations in Yemen to finally bring that conflict to an end. And I think much of it hinges on what's happening in Yemen and the expectation that the Iranians apply pressure on their Yemeni proxy, the Houthis, to negotiate in good faith with the internationally recognized government, which the Saudis have supported. Now, there's one wrinkle here, and that is that while the Emiratis have welcomed the breakthrough between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Emiratis actually support another faction within Yemen. So even if there are these positive negotiations between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government, there is this problem of southern separatists, which means that the conflict in Yemen may not end, though it may not be as direct a security threat to the Saudis as it has been. 

Nicholas Danforth: And is there a link to the situation in Syria? 

Steven Cook: The Saudis and others have moved — but the Saudis much slower than others in the Arab world — to normalize their relations with the Assad regime. Now, there was thinking that this was being done in a way that was seeking to isolate Iranians, and that has been tried over and over again. Turkey tried that in the early 2000s, too. Turkey’s then-Prime Minister Erdogan really engaged in a lot of diplomacy with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in part to kind of peel the Syrians away from the Iranians, and that didn't work. Now, there's been this concerted effort led by the Emiratis, and others — the Egyptian foreign minister has been in Damascus recently — to bring Assad in from the cold, and perhaps that would isolate the Iranians. This suggests, perhaps, that that won't be the case and that de-escalating in the region will then allow for the re-construction and final settlement in Syria, which would be beneficial to the Syrians. I think it might be a strategic blow to those who are hoping to continue to isolate the Iranians and the Assad regime together.

Nicholas Danforth: In a way that would result in the Gulf states getting in, having more of a role in Syria, but not to the exclusion of Iran. 

Steven Cook: Right. That's exactly right. That's what this potentially sets the stage for, which would be a setback for the Israelis as well as for the United States, both of whom would like to see the continued isolation of Iran. Unnamed spokespeople for the National Security Council did say on the announcement of this deal that the United States welcomes de-escalation in the region, though they were skeptical that the Iranians would be able to fulfill whatever commitments they may have. And I think that at this point the Gulf states also welcome an end to the conflict in Syria. The Israelis, for their part, who have become partners of sorts with the Gulf states, and particularly the United Arab Emirates, would like to isolate the Iranians. They are perfectly willing to see Assad prevail in Syria, but they would like that at the expense of the Iranians — not to the benefit of the Iranians. 

Nicholas Danforth: To step back and look at the bigger geopolitical picture, as you alluded to, some of the commentary on this has basically seemed like China has solved the Middle East, China now owns the Middle East, it has displaced the United States, America's moment in the region is over, et cetera. You — based on what you've just said and some of your Twitter commentary that I've seen — are a little skeptical of this view. Tell us what you think China's role in this actually means. 

Steven Cook: Look, it's undoubtedly an achievement for the Chinese, but I'm skeptical that the Chinese actually want to supplant the United States in the Middle East. They have been fairly clear that they are neutral in conflicts around the region. Also, let's keep in mind that the Chinese get a lot of oil from both the Saudis and the Iranians. And so to have those two big countries in the region de-escalate creates a little more stability in Iran, which has become an important supplier for the Chinese, whose prime directive is to ensure that that huge economy runs, and thus far it runs a lot on oil from the Gulf. Now, given the commentary in Washington about China — you know, we are kind of China-crazy here. China is a threat to everything. I just don't see that great-power competition unfolding in the Middle East in the way in which the commentary has played itself out. I think the Chinese have looked very carefully at what the United States has done in the Middle East — in particular, the invasion of Iraq — and see strategic blunders. So why would they want to take over that role for the United States? It strikes me that this agreement is purely one out of self-interest in keeping with their policy of neutrality. The idea that America's moment in the Middle East is over is at this point a theoretical one and one that is subject to a debate in Washington. You know, what to do about the Middle East. Should we stay, should we go? What form of withdrawal? How much? What are our interests there? I'm happy to say that I have a book that'll be published that's on specifically this issue. I hate to kind of, you know, be a shill here. 

Nicholas Danforth: That's what podcasts are for.

Steven Cook: You kind of opened the door for it. But that's a debate and that's going to be up to the United States. I don't think that the Chinese are interested in having that competition in the way in which our commentary imagines it, at least in the Middle East. In Asia, certainly that’s the case. In the Middle East, it's hard to get the logics of that going.

Nicholas Danforth: To conclude, then, let me ask you about U.S.-Saudi ties. That was actually originally what we'd invited you on here to talk about before this most recent news broke. Last week — again, before this — we were talking about Saudi Arabia asking for security guarantees from the United States for its nuclear program, new developments in the Abraham Accords. Give us the latest on that. 

Steven Cook: Well, I think that the Saudis and others in the region have been leaning into their relations with other big powers, the Russians and in particular the Chinese. I think it's no secret that the Saudis have been disappointed in American foreign policy. And this isn't just a function of the Biden administration. If you talk to Saudis, they have a narrative that goes back to 2003, that the United States has done a variety of things that have helped to empower the Iranians at the expense of everybody else in the Gulf. And so they don't really see a trustworthy partner. And so with the rise of China and China being an important economic actor, the single biggest investor in the region, an important customer for Saudi oil, the Saudis and others have begun to lean into their relationship with the Chinese. I think this is mostly a function — in fact, not so much what the Chinese can offer. Certainly, the Chinese would also like to sell weapons. But I think it has to do with a lot of the stupid things that the United States has done in the Middle East that have made China — and to a lesser extent, Russia — appealing options, if not alternatives to America's partners in the region. 

Nicholas Danforth: Thank you so much for joining us on the Warcast.

Steven Cook: It's my pleasure.