Episode Notes:

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Michael Kofman is joined by Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense analyst. Michael and Konrad discussed the threat from Belarus and whether Russian and Belarusian forces will open a new front in the war with Ukraine.

The Russia Contingency is a bi-weekly podcast featuring in-depth analysis of Russia's military power and the war in Ukraine.

Episode Transcript:

Michael Kofman: Hi, welcome to the Russia Contingency, my new members-only podcast with War on the Rocks. My name is Michael Kofman, and today I have a good colleague and friend on the program, his name's Konrad Muzyka. Konrad.

Konrad Muzyka: Hello, thank you for having me, good to be back.

Michael Kofman: Konrad, so I want to talk a little bit about our impressions still from the trip we recently took to Ukraine, but this time I want to talk more specifically about Belarus and the situation with Belarus and how that may affect what's going on in Ukraine and prospects for the future. Coming back from this trip, we both probably had our own inclinations as to how to read the intentions of the Belarusian government, that's military and the state of Russian force in Belarus. But you want to talk a little bit about your insights on what you think you might have learned from this trip.

Konrad Muzyka: I think when we came to Ukraine I had this notion in my head that the Ukrainian government is very much concerned about the developing situation in Belarus and that the Ukrainian military was preparing for some sort of contingency plans should there be another attack into Ukraine from Belarusian territory. And I think having spoken to officials and military commanders, my views were actually confirmed that yes, they are very much concerned about what is going on in Belarus at the moment.

Michael Kofman: So I was definitely a bit more skeptical going in and the reason for that was first the Belarusian military forces in my mind don't add up to a whole lot in terms of offensive combat potential. The Russian forces in Belarus are not that sizable and a lot of it looked like mobilized personnel sent to Belarus for training. And those forces look nowhere in terms of preparation to be able to conduct an offensive operation. But the real challenge for me was I was struggling to come up with an operational objective for an attack from Belarus. A return to Kyiv doesn't make much sense, to do what? Get stuck again and get annihilated down fairly narrow ground lines of communication trying to make their way through marshes in the north doesn't sound like a very prospective approach for a campaign, especially given how the battle for Kyiv unfolded early on.

Konrad Muzyka: I think it's important to look at the context within which the Belarusian Armed Forces have been operating for the past few months. Because essentially what has happened in Belarus is that since May, the Belarusian Armed Forces have not left the training ranges. I've been following the Belarusian Armed Forces for quite a while and it is clear to me that their exercise tempo has been the highest since the end of the Cold War. So that's the bad news. The good news is, as you mentioned, the Belarusian Armed Forces are actually quite undeveloped and they do not conduct large-scale exercises. They never conduct exercises above battalion level.

So battalion level is max that they can actually conduct. Everything else they conduct jointly with Russia under the Union Shield. Operationally, the Belarusian Armed Forces are subordinated to the Western Military District commands and the Belarusian Armed Forces are not expected to fight on their own. So yes there is, I mean I agree with everything that you said about the Belarusian Armed Forces, but I think my analysis is actually very reactive to the situation on the ground. It is incredibly difficult to predict what is going to happen, but clearly, from my point of view, the activity displayed by Belarusians over the past few months, I think it means more than just an attempt to tie up Ukrainian military potential near the border.

Michael Kofman: Yeah, so that's kind of the question. Is this all a fixing action to try to keep Ukrainian forces up north? And you're thinking that Belarusian activity seems pretty unusual and out of cycle. I guess I'd have to agree. I think that while I'm skeptical still on the prospects of a Russian attack from Belarus, doesn't mean they won't try, but it's also possible that we're maybe thinking about this in the wrong way or at least looking in the wrong place because we're thinking about Kyiv, the capital, and the Ukrainian vulnerability may not be the capital at all. It's quite large and pretty heavily defended. I mean, we were just there. The Ukrainian vulnerability may be something like the main nuclear power plant further up north that's not too far from the border, which actually supplies a lot of electricity to the country, especially the capital and most of, I think a lot of, the critical infrastructure. I think that that might be in the area of strong concern just given that the Russian campaign in recent weeks has clearly been one targeting the Ukrainian electricity grid and Ukrainian critical infrastructure heading into the winter.

Konrad Muzyka: Yes, definitely that would be consistent with the behavior that the Russian Armed Forces have been displaying over the past few weeks. So it is very plausible that Russians and Belarusians can potentially aim for energy infrastructure in the northern parts of Ukraine. That said, I mean, the terrain between the border with Belarus and Ukraine is horrible for the conduct of any offensive operations. I mean, it'll be quite easy for Ukrainians to actually channel the movement of Russian and Belarusian forces into specific directions and then engage them with artillery and anti-tank and so on and so forth. Secondly, Ukrainians have been preparing for this sort of contingency and I'm pretty sure that maybe not the entire border, but the big chunks of the border between the two states are pretty heavily mined. So should there be any military op coming from Belarus, I think it's going to be even more difficult to conduct than what they did in February.

Michael Kofman: Well let's try to ask ourselves as analysts two annoying and nagging questions. The first one is, do we think that an operation like this is in the offing or are we still giving this fairly low probability odds? I've been skeptical, but my concern has grown coming back from Ukraine. I've now had more to think on and more to consider based on what I've learned from this trip. I don't know where you are, Konrad.

Konrad Muzyka: I would judge the probability to be low. I would say it is unlikely currently that Russians can invade from the north again. But as I said, we are paying very close attention to what is going on in Belarus. And one of the indicators I think that would show us that something is up would be joint Russian-Belarusian training exercises. Because we know for a fact that a couple of months ago Belarusians changed their tactical numbers on their vehicles to correspond with Russian signs because previously Belarusian vehicles only had numbers on the side of the vehicle and now they have proper tactical signs, and which are very similar actually to what Russians have.

Now, does that mean a synchronization is currently going on? I don't yet know, but the fact is that Russians are deployed and to training ranges, there are tents, there are camps that house these Russian reservists mostly. Russians came to Ukraine without much heavy equipment, although there were reports in recent days and weeks that some T-72B3s were sent to Belarus as well. So as I stated, we will have to observe the situation very closely in Belarus and see what they are up to there exactly.

Michael Kofman: Two other considerations. One is the potential timeline and my impression is that we're nowhere near something potentially happening from Belarus, that this is not a matter of days or weeks, but maybe months. I don't know what you think on this matter. And the second one is there is a very perspective trajectory, kind of, in this war where if Ukraine slowly pushes Russian forces out of their foothold in Kherson, it's a great success, but then they end up being behind a somewhat defensible natural barrier to the Dnieper River and then they have additional forces to potentially shift over or around to focus on some other axis of attack. Yeah, the Russian military.

Konrad Muzyka: When it comes to timeline, I think what the Russians have shown us so far is that they are perfectly capable of deploying unprepared and untrained forces into combat. So generally I would also say it could be a matter of months, but at the same time I would not at all be surprised if it was a matter of weeks, especially because at least on paper, Russians and Belarusians trained quite a lot. So some sort of interoperability levels, especially at the higher level, is there. Definitely they would need to work on improving interoperability at the tactical level. But again, having seen how Russians have been treating their reservists, I am not necessarily sure whether the Russians are concerned about interoperability at a tactical level.

When it comes to future plans, with Ukraine retaking and liberating more territories, the frontline shrinks, which then increases Russia's force density. So Russians will have more forces to fight along a shorter frontline, which theoretically at least should impact its military operations. But how this will translate into the situation in Belarus, I'm not quite sure, especially because we don't know how many actually Russian forces will be deployed to Belarus ultimately, if it's going to be in low thousands or even up to 10,000. I don't think that they would be up to something bad. But if the numbers keep increasing, then obviously I think we would need to look at different scenarios.

Michael Kofman: Okay. That's fair. Well, look, for me this is something that's probably going to develop over the next couple of months and it's definitely worth tracking. I've gotten a better appreciation of the concerns regarding what role Belarus could play in this war, and I'm now thinking a bit harder about that northern front that I've largely been dismissive of as more of a kind of fixing action or diversionary action by Russian forces. But it was really good to have you here talk to us because I know you focus on Belarus much more than I do, in part by virtue of the fact that you're Poland-based, so I appreciate your insights.

Konrad Muzyka: Thank you very much. Apart from tracking military activities, we've also been tracking 

the speeches of the Belarusian high command, to put it this way, and Lukashenko. And what we've noticed is that over the past couple of months there was a very clear shift in how they shaped or tried to shape the narrative. Because initially what Lukashenko said was that Ukraine should sue for peace and Belarus is ready to be a broker again between Russia and Ukraine and the West and so on and so forth, but this was obviously dismissed by both the West and Ukraine.

And then Lukashenko started saying that Russia actually had no choice, but it had to intervene. It was a preemptive attack on Ukraine, otherwise Ukrainian forces would attack Belarus and Russia had it not been for this attack in February. But now what they're saying is that Ukraine is a threat. Ukraine is again planning an attack on Belarus. Ukraine will organize, or has already even organized, provocations along the border. They are constantly infiltrating the Belarus-Ukrainian border and consequently the Belarusian Armed Forces and its Russian partners have to be prepared to respond to any contingency that may develop along the border essentially. So definitely the rhetoric has changed and it's becoming, I think, more belligerent.

Michael Kofman: Konrad, I only ask here, and this is probably just as much a comment as it is a question. To me, a military invasion of Ukraine by Belarus is about the only risky thing that Lukashenko could do to destabilize his own regime, and I don't know why he would choose to do that unless he had a gun pressed to his head. It's almost puzzling because he in this regard has typically been risk averse. He's much more concerned with regime survival, in my point of view, and throwing the military and potentially losing the military in a war in Ukraine that's not really his war to me seems very uncharacteristic for Lukashenko. But I have a personal bias because I've seen him historically as one of the savviest dictators of the former Soviet Union. I always believe that no matter what happened, even if there was a nuclear war, that Lukashenko's regime would still be standing, somehow Lukashenko would find a way to win and survive no matter how the situation develops, just because he always does. But I know that's an overly deterministic argument.

Konrad Muzyka: To be honest the question whether Lukashenko survival hinges on deployment of his forces into Ukraine, there is no evidence, I think, whatsoever to suggest that this would happen. Let me ask you a question. Do you know how many high ranking Belarusian military officers changed sides after the 2020 presidential elections?

Michael Kofman: I mean, from what I understand, nobody changed sides.

Konrad Muzyka: Exactly. I think he has the full support of the army and he has the full support of the security services. And my concern is that many people in the West who think that if Belarus goes to war then the regime will crumble are actually mirror images because there's absolutely no evidence to suggest that this can potentially happen. The Belarusian society is under his shoe, to put it bluntly.

Michael Kofman: All right. Well, it's a fair argument. I guess I'll keep my day job as not a Belarus expert and stick to what I know. But I thought it was worth asking because there's probably a lot of folks that have the same question on their minds, right? It seems like it would be incredibly reckless for Lukashenko, but my take from what you've said is that his regime is fairly consolidated. It's rather stable and he's not necessarily going to risk it by engaging in a military incursion in support of Russia.

Konrad Muzyka: Of course, of course. But to be absolutely honest, I find it much more difficult to actually understand what Belarus is up to. They are much more difficult to read compared to what Russians do. I think when it comes to maskirovka and deception and organization, Belarusians are actually much better compared to the Russians, which obviously makes it more interesting, but also more complex to analyze.