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The war with Iran is into its fifth week, and despite much of its military power being destroyed by U.S. and Israeli strikes, Tehran has yet to give in or show any signs of external vulnerability or internal destabilization. If anything, it is increasingly convinced that whenever the guns fall silent, it will come out on top.

The main source of Iran’s confidence is its upper hand in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints and aortic valves of globalized production.

In response to U.S. and Israeli attacks, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has closed the strait to any ships not explicitly granted permission by Tehran. This has led to a spike in global oil prices and a significant disruption to energy supplies that executives of the world’s most influential oil and gas companies are saying may not be temporary.

With the price of Brent oil now above $100 per barrel, President Donald Trump is feeling the political heat at home. He has threatened to “completely obliterate” Iran’s energy and water infrastructure if it refuses to reopen the strait, all while his advisors are reportedly negotiating with the Iranians on the terms for ending the war.

One option Trump is considering to force Iran to concede on the strait and possibly other U.S. demands is to seize Kharg Island, which provides a seaport for roughly 90 percent of the country’s oil exports. The idea is that if the U.S. military could occupy the tiny but strategically significant island, it could kill two birds with one stone: remove an economic lifeline for the regime — and perhaps lower its chances of survival — and stabilize global energy markets.

Some 2,000 U.S. marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, traveling aboard the USS Tripoli, have already arrived in the region. They will be joined soon by another 2,500 from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard the USS Boxer, and possibly thousands of paratroopers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. In total, there are now over 50,000 U.S. troops in the Middle East.

While U.S. forces will undoubtedly encounter a range of risks in their mission, they are capable of seizing the island. These specialized units are designed for a broad spectrum of operations, including forcible entry. The far more challenging question is what happens if they succeed, but Iran still doesn’t budge, or worse, responds by escalating? What does Trump do then?

The operational risks of taking over Kharg are not small, but they’re also not insurmountable. The troops have two options to get there: by air or by sea. By air, V-22 Osprey aircraft or CH-53 Super Stallions would take off from the USS Tripoli and USS Boxer, which most likely would remain beyond the Gulf, and transport the troops to the island. By sea, the ships would have to traverse the strait all the way up to the northern edge of the Gulf and drop the Marines off along with their equipment — armored vehicles, artillery, rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons, and air defense batteries — on the island.

Deploying from a staging area on land in nearby Kuwait, for example, is another possibility. But Washington would have to get permission from a host nation that may not provide it due to fears of further Iranian retaliation. Iran has already struck targets in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf.

Both the aerial and maritime options would have to contend with an array of Iranian defenses, including long-range artillery, surface-to-air missiles, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles, fast boats, and various drones, in addition to mines possibly already laid in the water. If the Marines are to get there by sea, the Navy first might have to conduct long and laborious demining operations, most likely under Iranian attack. The problem is that U.S. minesweeping capabilities have atrophied for years and are now extremely limited.

In preparation for such an operation, the U.S. military has bombed 90 targets in Kharg, including “naval mine storage facilities, missile storage bunkers, and multiple other military sites.” U.S. Central Command has had the island under near-constant overhead surveillance to track any possible arrival of new defenses. The operation would also hinge on whether the United States has achieved air superiority over Iran, which the Pentagon says it has.

The challenge, however, is that Iran still has plenty of firepower on the mainland that can easily reach the island with a high level of precision and lethality (enhanced by Russian targeting and intelligence support). Therefore, the perimeter of U.S. destruction of Iranian military capacity cannot be limited to the island and its vicinity. That would be a lot of area to cover.

Iran may not want to fiercely bomb the island once U.S. forces land because that would risk destroying its critical infrastructure there, and rebuilding that will cost a lot and take many years. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps doesn’t have to adopt a scorched-earth policy. It has enough precise, GPS-guided weapons to kill enough American troops to force Trump to withdraw or reconsider.

The argument that the Marines would be sitting ducks the moment they land on the island is overstated. Each Marine Expeditionary Unit will be well-equipped to defend itself and will have superior close air support from aircraft and ships already deployed in the region.

But it’s one thing to seize an island and another altogether to hold it — under enemy fire no less. Inevitably, the longer U.S. troops hold Kharg, the more complicated sustainment operations will be.

One successful Iranian strike against the Marines that leads to heavy casualties, and Trump will be in an impossible position. Staying after such a deadly attack and possibly sending reinforcements would guarantee mission creep, while withdrawing would be politically suicidal and strategically disastrous.

If the whole point of seizing Kharg — operationally feasible — is to crush or significantly degrade Iran’s ability to disrupt oil traffic through the strait, it may not work because Iran will still have asymmetric military capabilities to do just that.

Furthermore, Iran has threatened to attack the Gulf countries’ energy infrastructure — an outcome that most likely will raise the price of oil further. And Iran’s ally in Yemen, the Houthis, have decided to join the fight. If they resume their disruption of shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, through which 10–12 percent of the world’s oil trade passes, expect more mayhem in the global energy markets.

Trump is banking on Iran’s resolve to continue fighting to diminish after losing Kharg, but he may want to reconsider that assumption. Iran has already been heavily bombed by the United States and Israel, and all that has done is reinforce a siege mentality. Unlike the United States and Israel, the war is an existential fight for the Iranian regime. To make matters worse, Iran feels, rightly or wrongly, that it is winning the war, so its appetite for concessions is decreasing by the day.

It’s true that the U.S. seizure of Kharg would deal a massive blow to Iran’s economy, but the effects won’t be immediate. Iran will still be able to survive for months before it runs out of money, and during that period, it will undoubtedly escalate, forcing Trump and the world economy to absorb far more economic pain and regional instability than what’s been experienced thus far.

If ordered, the Marines will display operational brilliance and take over Kharg. But the strategic objective of stabilizing the world’s energy market and keeping 20 percent of its oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz may not be achieved.

Trump’s handling of this war has been questionable because of his unclear strategy and flawed assumptions about the nature of the Iranian regime. Sending the Marines into a dangerous operating environment under such circumstances, no matter how brave and skilled they are, is as reckless as it is counterproductive.

Bilal Y. Saab is the senior managing director of TRENDS US, an associate fellow with Chatham House, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He currently is the international security advisor of U.N. Secretary General candidate Ambassador Ivonne A-Baki. He was a Pentagon official in the first Trump administration with oversight responsibilities for U.S. security cooperation in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. 

Image: Reza Hatami via Wikimedia Commons