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What happens when a country at war stops seriously debating its own strategy and goals?
In Israel today, that scenario is no longer theoretical. In the aftermath of Hamas’ surprise attack on Oct. 7, 2023, and the subsequent conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Israel’s strategic decision-making ecosystem has been progressively undermined by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political associates.
Netanyahu has surrounded himself with pliable officials and supportive voices, including the defense minister and the leaders of the Mossad and the Internal Security Agency (Shin Bet). He has become increasingly dependent on extreme coalition partners who constrain the parameters of strategic decision-making to preferences that suit their ideological perspectives. Consequently, strategic decision-making is increasingly taking place in an echo chamber, with growing uniformity in support for Netanyahu’s policy choices and a narrowing of the range of strategic views. The prime minister’s political-criminal predicament has exacerbated the situation. Opposition parties have refused to serve under him, given his criminal status and ongoing trial. This has resulted in a more aggressive regional posture that favors sustaining perpetual military conflict over pursuing diplomatic resolutions.
Crucial decisions, such as initiating a new war against Iran alongside the United States, have been made in the absence of a true reckoning with alternative viewpoints or lessons of past strategic failures. Continued erosion of strategic planning may lead to further aimless wars and missed diplomatic opportunities, increasing regional instability and necessitating continuous U.S. military intervention.
Necessary course correction is implausible under the current government. At best, current strategic planning capabilities may survive. In the longer term, under a different government, the National Security Council can play a significant role in reinvigorating Israel’s strategic planning ecosystem through a newly mandated process to formulate a grand strategy.
Decision outcomes are not always determined by the quality of the decision-making procedures that precede them. Factors such as luck, chance, and the consequences of strategic interaction may also influence results. Nonetheless, over the long term, a correlation exists between failures in the substantive quality of decisions and the processes through which they are made. Deficiencies within decision-making processes significantly contribute to such failures.
Security policy decisions involve political-ideological factors. However, they should also be grounded in a strategic operational framework supported by a comprehensive infrastructure of detailed knowledge and experience. This includes setting a clear strategic vision, formulating goals and objectives, analyzing the relationship between goals and the means to achieve them, effectively integrating various approaches to attain objectives, and considering relevant end-states, including an estimated timetable.
For all these aspects, it is essential that political leaders rely on specialized professional bodies. This is a continuous rather than one-time process of developing thinking and analytical skills, ultimately resulting in the creation of an appropriate cognitive infrastructure that enables the formulation of the most suitable decision given the circumstances. These institutional decision-making procedures are designed to provide decision-makers with tools intended to structure and regulate judgment, thereby reducing the risks associated with excessive dependence on emotion, intuition, impulsiveness, or personal and political considerations that could lead to undesirable outcomes.
Israel has never truly excelled in strategy formulation. Constant and persistent security threats and crises have promoted a short-term, responsive outlook at the expense of long-term grand strategic planning. This outlook, however, does not stem just from “shadow of the present” threats outweighing “shadow of the future” ones, but also from a strategic-cultural predisposition for an inductive logical-analytical cognitive style that prioritizes praxis over strategic thinking. This orientation aligns with an anti-intellectual perspective that undermines the value of vision preceding action.
The politicization of Israel’s national security decision-making process — a consequence of its coalition government system — reinforces the predominance of short-term, reactive planning. Ideological considerations, with a bias toward the Palestinian issue, prevent any professional discussion of a whole range of specific strategic avenues from even getting off the ground.
The Second Lebanon War of 2006, for example, is indicative of the deficiencies in this decision-making system. In its wake, a five-person commission of inquiry, led by retired Judge Eliyahu Winograd, faulted both the government and the Israel Defense Forces, concluding their decision-making and performance during the war and in preceding years led to Israel’s failures. The commission then recommended improving Israel’s strategic decision-making processes by enhancing staff work, political-military exchange, and the cabinet’s standard operating procedures. Afterwards, the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister’s Office enhanced their administrative capabilities to support strategic planning.
Still, these administrative fixes have been repeatedly undermined and circumvented. For example, according to the interim report of a State Commission of Inquiry probing decision-making surrounding some $2 billion worth of deals with German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp that have been under scrutiny for possible corruption and bribery, Netanyahu and his staff worked repeatedly from 2009 to 2017 to undermine strategic staff work rather than enhance it. According to the Sept. 2025 interim report, the prime minister and his staff, led by the National Security Council, undermined the security decision-making process by bypassing the normal approval processes of the security establishment and the government, thereby neutralizing their ability to influence issues central to Israel’s national security.
Prime ministers in the Israeli governmental system are supreme in strategic and security decision-making. However, they typically convene small groups of loyal and trusted advisers who are privy to their preferences and help them navigate the decision-making process. In Hebrew, this group is referred to as a “kitchenette” because Prime Minister Golda Meir used to convene her trusted advisors in her kitchen. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it functioned as a war cabinet.
While this type of closed discussion is accommodating for the prime minister, it discourages debate and contestation and inevitably culminates in a self-sustained dynamic of groupthink. This feature of Israeli strategic decision-making has intensified during Netanyahu’s present government, with him relying on a small number of aides and three or four loyal officials, including the recently sacked head of the National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, and the retired Minister of Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer.
Though far from perfect, strategic planning from the 1973 Yom Kippur War until the formation of the sixth Netanyahu government in 2022 was relatively professional and institutionalized. Various strategic planning bodies, usually led by the Strategic Planning Division of the Israel Defense Forces or the National Security Council (since the late 1990s), initiated or were tasked with developing and presenting strategic recommendations to political leaders through established procedures. Though not necessarily adopted by the prime minister and the cabinet, they served as reference points for strategy making.
From its inception, the present Netanyahu coalition government has actively diluted the strategic planning ecosystem. Strategic issues have been perceived as linked to an obstructive left-leaning “deep state” that has opposed the more controversial ideological and political priorities being proposed by the more extreme members of the government. Strategic issues were also perceived as being linked to the government’s judicial overhaul agenda — also rejected by the so-called deep state.
Thus, strategy and domestic politics have become deeply entangled, leading to growing gatekeeping by the political echelon and a reduction in the influence of the strategic analysis planning process. In the wake of the Oct. 7 attack, strategic planning institutions and the government attempted to blame one another for the tragedy, further undermining trust between them. Netanyahu and his supporters have repeatedly emphasized intelligence and operational failures inside the Israel Defense Forces and security agencies rather than accept personal responsibility. The Israel Defense Forces’ own review cited some internal military failures, but it also pushed for an external inquiry to identify systemic issues across the government.
Following decades of personal involvement in strategic planning across the Israel Defense Forces, the Ministry of Defense, and the National Security Council, I am troubled by the present state of strategic thinking and planning in Israel. The growing lack of trust on the part of the political leadership in organizations involved in strategic planning has undermined the strategic planning process. The relevant entities have either had their roles reshaped or been taken over by Netanyahu-appointed loyalists to head them. In the process, valuable expertise has been squandered and ultimately lost as these organizations lose professional relevance in the decision-making processes.
The Israel Defense Forces
Strategic planning staff work has, since the Yom Kippur War in 1973, been dominated by the Planning Branch (J5) of the Israel Defense Forces, with a corresponding lack of effective civilian strategic policy-making inputs. For most of this period, civilian strategic planning in the Ministry of Defense and the prime minister’s office was partial and less influential than that of the military.
One reason for the prominent role the J5 played in strategic decision-making processes is politics. Prime ministers typically resisted bolstering the positions of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defense in strategic decision-making. These ministers tend to be rivals, either within their own parties or among competing parties in the governing coalition. Conversely, Israel Defense Forces officers pose no immediate political risk.
Over time, criticism grew over the Israel Defense Forces’ oversized role in strategic matters, especially given its role in the negotiation process with the Palestinians over the Oslo Accords. And increasingly following the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel Defense Forces chiefs of staff chose to reduce the J5’s role in strategic decision-making and boost its role in providing strategic context to operational planning and decision-making. In part, they justified this by pointing to the creation of civilian bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister’s Office as an alternative to the Israel Defense Forces’ primary staff role in strategic decision-making.
Ministry of Defense
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz (2002 to 2006), having previously served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, set up a Political-Military Bureau to advise him on strategic issues, thereby reducing his reliance on the J5. However, due to a lack of civilian staffing slots, the Israel Defense Forces provided much of the staffing for the Bureau’s strategic work by loaning former J5 officers. The result was a lack of divergence between the Israel Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense on strategic matters.
Over time, the Ministry of Defense directed the Political-Military Bureau’s staff work to support the Ministry’s roles in the attenuation of strategic planning. Consequently, the Ministry of Defense’s role in strategic planning remained limited.
Recently, with the appointment of Israel Katz as Minister of Defense in Nov. 2024, the role of the Political-Military Bureau in strategic planning has diminished further. Katz, a loyal supporter of the prime minister, is advancing the government’s stated preference to weaken the so-called deep state by undermining the standing of the chief of staff and the Israel Defense Forces’ role in strategic staff work. Accordingly, the independence of the Political-Military Bureau in strategic issues has been curtailed to reflect the positions of the defense minister and the prime minister.
The National Security Council
According to the National Security Law of 2008, which established the National Security Council as a statutory body within the Prime Minister’s Office, it, among other duties, is charged with presenting policy alternatives, along with reasoned recommendations, to the prime minister and the cabinet on strategic issues.
The National Security Council has inconsistently discharged this function in accordance with the wishes of the Council head and the prime minister. The heads of the National Security Council also serve as the prime minister’s national security advisor — this dual role has often led them to favor policy recommendations aligned with their boss’s preferences rather than those grounded in the National Security Council’s professional staff work.
This predisposition intensified under Tzachi Hanegbi, the first political appointee to serve as National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council (2023 to 2025). He undercut strategic policy staff work, demanded compliance with the prime minister’s policy preferences, and purged the National Security Council of independent thinkers. He also instituted a system in which careers in the Council depended on sycophancy rather than expertise.
Netanyahu fired Hanegbi on Oct. 21, 2025. According to media reports, the dismissal was the result of Hanegbi cautioning against the plan to conquer Gaza City and the attack against the Hamas leadership in Qatar. Ironically, then, Hanegbi was sacked for finally fulfilling his duty of introducing more than one policy alternative to the cabinet and thereby fostering a policy debate on substantial strategic decisions. His dismissal for not toeing the party line illustrates how far Netanyahu has emasculated strategic thinking, especially if it does not correspond with his views.
Foreign Ministry
Traditionally, the Foreign Ministry has not played a central role in national strategic planning due to political considerations and limited access to classified information gathered by Israel’s intelligence agencies. In Nov. 2025, Gideon Sa’ar was appointed foreign minister after joining the ruling coalition from the opposition (Sept. 2024). He largely ignores the professional echelon in the ministry and advances his own agenda in support of the government.
Mossad and the Internal Security Agency
Both intelligence agencies are professional organizations that weigh in on strategic issues as they arise and as they relate to their functional operations. Netanyahu recently appointed David Zini as head of the Internal Security Agency. Previously, Zini was serving as an Israel Defense Forces general with negligible knowledge of intelligence work. As an outsider, he owes his appointment solely to Netanyahu, raising fears that he will be loyal to the prime minister and his preferences rather than to his organization’s professional recommendations.
The recent announcement that Netanyahu is appointing his current military secretary, Maj. Gen. Roman Goffman, as the new head of the Mossad, again raises concerns about the appointment of loyal outsiders to lead professional organizations at the center of Israel’s security establishment.
Netanyahu’s coalition has kneecapped the national security organizations responsible for strategic planning by appointing loyalists to lead them. In so doing, top-down predominance has replaced bottom-up strategic planning. Given their increasing decline, conscientious strategic analysts are leaving the government. Meanwhile, new ones refrain from entering, creating a shortage of trained analysts that will take time to fill once circumstances change.
Moreover, the personalization of Israel’s strategic planning has started to undermine public trust in these state institutions, with potential long-term consequences. According to a Dec. 2025 poll conducted by the Institute of National Security Studies, only a third of the Israeli public believes that the prime minister’s appointment of his military secretary, Goffman, as Mossad chief is based primarily on security considerations and national interest. And about 80 percent of people on both the right and center-left agree that there is politicization in the Israel Defense Forces, with external actors seeking to influence the military and cause it to act based on political, rather than professional considerations.
The Israeli public and international stakeholders believe that decisions to undertake significant diplomatic or military actions are based on a process of professional strategic planning. This is increasingly not the case under Netanyahu.
The government’s response to the Oct. 7 attack and the subsequent military campaigns has been to adopt a more revisionist outlook based on the use of force to shape the regional security environment. This has been done without a specific strategic debate on the goals and means of this revisionist change, revealing more of an ideological inclination than a strategic blueprint.
Israel’s military campaigns may stimulate positive strategic changes — such as regime change as happened in Syria or future demilitarization of Hamas and Hizballah. Still, these will be knock-on effects not explicitly planned by the government. In the interim, all of Israel’s military fronts remain active and volatile, and subsequently, Israel has become more dependent on the United States.
Regionally, Israel is increasingly perceived as a destabilizing actor and risks being blamed by the Gulf states for the instability that has grown since 2023 and culminated in the current war with Iran, given its intransigence on the Palestinian conflict. The lack of rigorous strategic planning that involves diplomatic follow-through is a contributing factor to the disappointing results of two-plus years of war that have taken their toll on Israeli society.
Even so, under the present government, the demise of Israel’s strategic planning is not reversible. A change in government following the upcoming national election, sometime between September and October, is the best opportunity to revamp the strategic planning ecosystem by removing Netanyahu loyalists who stifle strategic professionalism in their quest for favor.
A recent law mandates any new government to prepare a grand strategy within 150 days of its formation. The National Security Council is tasked with formulating such a document for the new prime minister and the cabinet in consultation with other relevant security and professional organizations. This process could reinvigorate strategic analysis in Israel and cooperation among the different agencies.
A new national security advisor and head of the National Security Council, appointed by an incoming coalition, will serve as the main interlocutor between the various agencies and the prime minister and cabinet, and will have significant responsibility for rebuilding and cultivating Israel’s strategic planning ecosystem.
Finally, new mandatory procedures need to be put in place that will make it harder to circumvent strategic planning in the decision-making process. Such a process will need to define the cabinet’s role in strategic decision-making and require the presentation of multiple options by professional strategic planners led by the National Security Council.
Shimon Arad, Ph.D., is a colonel (reserve) who has held a variety of strategic planning roles in the Israel Defense Forces (J5), the Ministry of Defense, and the National Security Council. He currently works as a security and strategy consultant.
Image: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit photographer via Wikimedia Commons
