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It seems natural to assume that relentless pressure will force authoritarian leaders to yield, yet the opposite is often true. When survival is at stake, backing down can be more dangerous than standing firm. This counterintuitive logic has played out repeatedly in the Persian Gulf. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein refused to leave Kuwait in 1991 to avoid humiliation, defections and the threat of a coup. Today, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei faces a similar trap, as giving in to U.S. pressure could weaken his hold at home. History shows that extreme pressure can embolden defiance and absorbing blows can be politically safer than capitulation.

During his State of the Union Speech on Feb. 24, U.S. President Donald Trump boasted that the June 2025 Operation Midnight Hammer had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, just the weekend before, Steve Witkoff — his special envoy to the Middle East —  inadvertently revealed on Fox News that the program had not been entirely destroyed, and asked in frustration why Iran’s leaders “haven’t capitulated … with the amount of naval power over there” and why they haven’t simply declared they do not seek a nuclear weapon. Trump’s Republican predecessors, Presidents George H. W. and George W. Bush, asked the same question. Saddam might have the answer. 

In 1991 and 2003, massive American military forces were arrayed in the Persian Gulf to compel Saddam to abandon his alleged stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and, in the earlier case, withdraw from Kuwait. Yet, Saddam stayed in Kuwait after the U.N. deadline passed on Jan. 15, 1991, despite facing a U.S.-led coalition of more than 40 nations far superior to his forces. Withdrawing under an ultimatum would have signaled weakness at home and risked a coup from his inner circle. 

Iran faces a similar dilemma today. If Khamenei were seen as yielding, it could erode his authority not only among protesters on the streets but also within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. As a New York Times headline noted on Feb. 23, “For Iran’s Rulers, Refusing U.S. Demands Is a Risk Worth Taking,” with the clerical leadership viewing concessions as a greater threat to regime survival than the prospect of war. In both cases, the logic of survival makes punishment politically safer than surrender. Saddam chose to fight rather than retreat, hoping to inflict U.S. casualties, prolong the conflict and raise political costs for Washington. 

Captured documents from Iraq demonstrate that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam admitted that the Iraqi military could not stand up against the superior military assets of the U.S.-led coalition, particularly its stealth fighters and aircraft carriers. Political elites in Iran have surely come to the same realization after facing the brunt of U.S. military strikes during the 12-Day War of June 2025.

Back in 1991, Saddam calculated it was better to fight, with even a slim chance of inflicting fatalities on U.S. forces, than to withdraw in the face of American intimidation. His ultimate strategy relied on war weariness. By raising the cost in American lives, public opinion might turn against the conflict, as it had decades earlier in Vietnam. 

In the same way, Iran may see it as preferable to weather another round of strikes rather than succumb to Trump’s demands. Even though U.S. threats today are of greater scale and scope, they also present the possibility for Iran to inflict casualties, while prolonging the conflict drives up oil prices and complicates Trump’s political standing ahead of the midterms.

Prolonging the conflict may offer tactical or symbolic advantages, but it also illustrates that even last minute diplomacy is constrained by the same survival logic that makes backing down politically dangerous. In January 1991, talks in Geneva between Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker sought to avert war, yet the United States refused to offer any concessions — including lifting sanctions — that might have allowed Saddam to save face. 

Today, similar dynamics are at play between the U.S. and Iran, with negotiations in the same city offering no real relief from the existing sanctions that have already battered the Iranian economy. Just as neither side could yield in 1991 without risking domestic or strategic collapse, it seems unlikely in 2026 that either Tehran or Washington can make the first move, reinforcing why withstanding pressure may be politically safer than backing down.

History ought to serve as an oracle for Washington. After the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam declared “dignified victory” despite a military defeat. He had survived, while Bush faced a recession at home, failing to win reelection against Bill Clinton who swept to victory with the phrase, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Even with Iraq’s armed forces devastated, Saddam framed this military defeat as success because a coalition of more than 40 nations could not unseat him. 

Again, Khamenei faces a similar dynamic. The scale of damage to Iran’s military or nuclear program matters less politically than survival itself. U.S. sanctions strain the economy, but as in Iraq, elites can manage or even benefit, while the population bears the costs. While the Islamic Republic is facing a nationwide protest movement combined with the threat of military strikes, Saddam endured six weeks of air strikes, a ground invasion, and then an uprising that swept through 15 of Iraq’s 18 provinces in 1991 and still prevailed. Military might alone does not guarantee regime change. Interventions in the Persian Gulf, whether in 1991 or today, risk prolonged conflict, regional destabilization and economic disruption. Washington may possess unmatched firepower, but history shows the outcome is the same. Force rarely produces rapid, decisive political outcomes in the Persian Gulf.

Tanya Goudsouzian is a Canadian journalist who has covered Afghanistan and the Middle East for more than two decades. She has held senior editorial roles at major international media outlets, including serving as opinion editor at Al Jazeera English.

Ibrahim al-Marashi is an associate professor of Middle East history at California State University, and visiting faculty at the American College of the Mediterranean and the Department of International Relations at Central European University. His publications include Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History (2008), The Modern History of Iraq (2017), and A Concise History of the Middle East (2024).

Image: khamenei.ir via Wikimedia Commons