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Could China replace the United States atop the target list of transnational jihadist groups like al-Qaeda? A recent statement released by Sheikh Saad bin Atef al Awlaqi, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, directly threatened China, labeling its government as a “pagan, infidel” enemy whose actions against Uyghur Muslims justify future attacks. The statement marks a clear escalation in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s anti-China rhetoric. But will it lead to a shift in operational goals?

Jihadist groups have long exaggerated their capabilities, using their media and propaganda platforms to issue wide-ranging threats against an expansive list of adversaries, both the “near enemy” and the “far enemy.” In practice, jihadist attacks against Chinese targets have mostly been sporadic and opportunistic. Unlike Western nations, Chinese internal security services maintain draconian surveillance over the population, making terrorist attacks on Chinese territory extremely rare. Even when they do occur, the media reporting is limited and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. 

Yet even if al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s operational capabilities remain unchanged, and thus limited in reach, the message expansion is notable. Historically, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s propaganda has mostly been targeted at local rivals, including the Yemeni government and other regional enemies. This shift to focus on China is a way for the jihadist chapter to energize new recruits while signaling its relevance and inserting itself into the anti-great-power narrative, a space inhabited by a range of other non-state actors, including groups like the Baluchistan Liberation Army in Pakistan and the Islamic State Khorasan Province in Afghanistan, both of which have repeatedly targeted Chinese interests in South Asia. 

What Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Is Saying

While Jews and Americans are still frequently referenced as the “Crusader-Zionist Alliance” and a “dual evil” in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s propaganda, China is no longer treated merely as a peripheral actor. On the contrary, Beijing is now singled out as a regime whose “every move” is being monitored and that will be “held accountable” for abuses in Xinjiang, a province in western China home to the country’s Uyghur minority. This represents the acceleration of a broader trend in which al-Qaeda branches increasingly frame China’s domestic repression and global footprint, especially in Muslim-majority regions, as legitimate grounds for perpetrating jihadist violence.

Awlaqi’s latest statement begins by praising “heroic operations” against Jews and Americans, but then pivots to China and embeds Beijing directly into al-Qaeda’s justificatory narrative. Awlaqi accuses China of persecuting “our Uyghur Muslim brothers,” portraying China not simply as a distant non-Muslim power but as an active oppressor of Muslims whose behavior demands an eventual response. The promise that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will “go beyond targeting interests on land and sea” if China does not change its “behavior and practices” is a deliberately expansive formulation that could encompass diplomatic facilities, commercial shipping, overseas workers, or critical infrastructure linked to Chinese projects abroad. The escalation in rhetoric evokes a similar trajectory in al-Qaeda’s anti-American messaging, with the group’s longtime leader, Osama bin Laden, narrowing his focus to the United States in communiques throughout the late 1990s, in the period that preceded the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. 

By framing potential attacks as a form of accountability for China’s repressive actions against Uyghurs, the statement recasts China from a secondary background actor into a central antagonist in a narrative of the global persecution of Muslims, a similar narrative to what bin Laden frequently revisited in his speeches. The closing assertion that “Tomorrow is near for those who wait. So wait, for we too are waiting” conveys that retaliation against China is not hypothetical but imminent, even if the exact timing and location remain unspecified. This preserves operational ambiguity while reinforcing the idea that Chinese interests now coalesce with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s declared target set. And while jihadist statements can at times be hyperbolic, these groups operate on extended time horizons, playing the long game and positioning themselves to exact revenge on those countries and governments it excoriates in its messaging. 

The way China is introduced and described is different in tone from most previous jihadist propaganda. The shift clearly demonstrates that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is deliberately elevating Beijing within al-Qaeda’s enemy hierarchy. Earlier jihadist materials mentioned China only obliquely when cataloguing states that oppress Muslims, especially in “East Turkestan,” but without a detailed focus or clear operational intent. In this latest statement, by contrast, China receives its own dedicated section, is labeled “pagan” and “infidel,” and is tied explicitly to a concrete grievance set: the treatment of Uyghur Muslims. This signals that Beijing is no longer just part of an abstract category of non-Muslim powers but a clearly defined adversary whose specific policies in Xinjiang are sufficient to justify violence. The insistence that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is monitoring “every move” China makes against Uyghurs also implies that further repression or high-profile incidents in Xinjiang could be used as a tripwire for future operations.

The statement’s China-specific language is carefully defensive in tone, designed to present any attack on Chinese interests as the result of Beijing’s own actions. Awlaqi does not speak of attacking China for ideological reasons alone. Instead, he anchors the threat in a promise to hold China “accountable” for its “behavior and practices” toward Uyghurs, which have included extreme surveillance, religious persecution, and even sending Uyghurs to indoctrination camps in Xinjiang province. This suggests that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s leaders seek to frame terrorist violence as revenge, a response to injustice rather than as unprovoked aggression. This mirrors broader al-Qaeda messaging that positions China as a persecutor of Muslims at home and a supporter of hostile regimes abroad, especially in regions where Beijing has deepened its political and economic footprint. The reference to targeting Chinese “interests on land and sea” is particularly significant for a Yemen-based group whose theater borders vital maritime routes, hinting that Chinese commercial shipping or port-linked activity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden could be portrayed as legitimate targets if al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula chooses to act.

The China-specific content is aimed not only at Beijing but also at a wider jihadist and sympathizer audience. By foregrounding Uyghur suffering and vowing to hold the Chinese regime accountable, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula positions itself as a champion of Muslims whom many perceive as abandoned by major states and international institutions. This allows al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to align with, and compete against, other jihadist actors who have made Xinjiang central to their propaganda, and to encourage supporters in regions where China’s presence is more visible, such as Pakistan, East Africa, or the Sahel, to view attacks on Chinese projects and personnel as consistent with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s call. 

The threat to Chinese interests “on land and sea” thus serves as a strategic signal that Chinese nationals and infrastructure worldwide are increasingly seen, within al-Qaeda’s ideological framework, as legitimate and symbolically powerful targets. From a counter-terrorism perspective, the strategic conclusion to draw is that, as groups like al-Qaeda attempt to strengthen their organizational and operational capabilities, Chinese personnel and property abroad could become more attractive targets for jihadist groups. Accordingly, China will need to augment its global counter-terrorism capabilities and perhaps adopt a more robust force posture. This can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. A more visible and muscular Chinese security presence, especially in the Middle East, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, could provoke more attacks. The United States has grappled with this dynamic for decades, suffering terrorist attacks against American personnel and interests in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and many other countries. 

The Evolution of Al-Qaeda’s Anti-China Rhetoric

Over more than three decades, al-Qaeda’s attitude toward China has shifted from relative indifference and occasional tactical accommodation to increasingly hostile rhetoric, explicit threats, and support for attacks on Chinese nationals and interests. In the 1990s, the organization focused primarily on the United States, its Western allies, and local “apostate” regimes, generally treating China as a secondary actor whose foreign policy appeared less directly interventionist in Muslim lands. Bin Laden even hinted at a potential alignment with Beijing against Washington, warning China about U.S. and Israeli intentions while publicly claiming to know little about Uyghur grievances in Xinjiang.

Within the broader jihadist milieu, however, some figures highlighted Chinese repression earlier than al-Qaeda’s core leadership. Abu Musab al Suri’s 1999 work on Central Asia portrayed Xinjiang or “East Turkestan” as occupied Muslim territory and argued that the region represented a strategic weak point for Islam’s enemies, while Jalaluddin Haqqani reportedly hosted Uyghur fighters in Afghan camps and championed their cause. These remained minority positions. During the post–Cold War “unipolar moment,” al-Qaeda’s leadership largely prioritized confrontation with the United States and its partners rather than with the rising but still less prominent China.

By the mid-2000s, as China’s global profile grew, al-Qaeda’s rhetoric began to harden. In 2006, bin Laden condemned the United Nations as a “hegemonic organization of universal infidelity,” describing the U.N. Security Council as dominated by “Crusader International and pagan Buddhism” and assigning China the role of representing “Buddhists and pagans of the world.” Ayman al Zawahiri started referencing “East Turkestan” in his messages, while jihadist intellectual Akram Hijazi warned that China could supplant the United States as the new “head of the snake,” a theme later echoed in al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent publications. The 2009 Urumqi riots and ensuing crackdowns marked a decisive inflection point: Abu Yahya al Libi urged Uyghurs to wage war on Beijing, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb threatened Chinese workers in Algeria, and extremist forums circulated calls to kill Han Chinese in retaliation for the repression. At the same time, the Turkestan Islamic Party emerged as a prominent Uyghur jihadist group closely linked to al-Qaeda, using al-Fajr Media Centre and its own outlets to spotlight Xinjiang and frame “East Turkestan” as a core jihadist front.

In the early 2010s, media such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent’s Resurgence and Hitteen, and the Pakistani Taliban’s Azan regularly highlighted Uyghur suffering, helping internationalize the East Turkestan cause. The Turkestan Islamic Party’s expansion into Syria and continued presence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region reinforced these narratives, and in 2016, its emir, Abdul Haq al Turkistani, publicly reaffirmed allegiance to al-Qaeda. Zawahiri praised East Turkestan militants as part of a pantheon of jihadist heroes and labeled China’s government “atheist occupiers” and “Chinese invaders,” explicitly linking repression in Xinjiang to a broader struggle against an international anti-Islam order. South Asian jihadist media, especially Urdu language outlets like Nawai Afghan Jihad (later Nawai Ghazwa e Hind) and Hitteen, deepened these themes with historical accounts of Chinese control over Xinjiang, descriptions of internment and surveillance, and emotive testimonies about Uyghur women and families, while also accusing Pakistani elites of trading support for Beijing’s Xinjiang and Syrian policies for economic benefits through projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East Africa affiliate, has become one of the most aggressive branches in pairing anti-China messaging with violence. Its Shahada News Agency has condemned the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa as exploitative, warned of alleged Chinese plans for military bases in Somalia, and denounced Chinese military aid to Somali forces, while regularly citing abuses against Uyghurs to link local grievances in Somalia and Kenya to events in Xinjiang. Operationally, al-Shabaab claimed the 2015 bombing of Mogadishu’s Jazeera Palace Hotel and said it intended to hit Chinese embassy staff, and it has raided China Communications Construction Company worksites and convoys in Kenya, including along the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia Transit Corridor. In June 2025, Shahada warned against “covert” Chinese influence in Somalia, accusing Beijing of “debt trap diplomacy,” economic domination, and support for Somali security forces, and again invoked Uyghur repression to justify treating Chinese interests as legitimate targets.

The COVID-19 pandemic offered jihadists a new frame to deepen anti-China narratives. As the virus spread from Wuhan, several outlets depicted the outbreak as divine retribution for Beijing’s persecution of Muslims, particularly in Xinjiang and Myanmar. In February 2020, the Turkestan Islamic Party’s Islam Awazi released a video titled “The Perspective of the Mujahideen Regarding the Corona Outbreak in China,” portraying the virus as God’s “vengeance” for Chinese actions in Xinjiang. Tehrir-e-Taliban’s Maktaba e Umar newsletter carried editorials by Mufti Usman Mansoor and Sheikh Gul Muhammad Bajauri, likening COVID-19 to the plagues of Pharaoh, arguing that China had “enslaved” Uyghurs and Rohingya and was now being punished, and criticizing Pakistani clerics who aligned with Beijing on political questions. As the pandemic normalized, al-Qaeda and its allies folded COVID-19 into a broader narrative of divine retribution but refocused on concrete Chinese policies rather than the virus itself.

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 created a strategic dilemma for al-Qaeda: China’s repression in Xinjiang and expanding regional presence kept it a central rhetorical target, yet the Taliban quickly sought Chinese recognition and investment, especially in infrastructure and mining. Al-Qaeda’s leadership responded by intensifying criticism of Chinese policy while carefully avoiding overt mention of Taliban-Chinese relations. In July 2021, an as Sahab video denounced “corporate robber barons in Communist China,” and a 9/11 anniversary production with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Khalid Batarfi expressed solidarity with “Turkestan” and condemned Xinjiang repression without referencing Kabul’s outreach to Beijing. Batarfi repeated these themes in a November 2021 al-Malahem interview, and Zawahiri briefly mentioned Turkestan in a March 2022 series, again sidestepping Taliban-Chinese ties.

While the aforementioned examples may seem uncoordinated or simply reactive to current events, another vantage point shows an escalation in both frequency and the visceral nature of these threats. These are indications that if certain jihadist groups’ latent operational capabilities improve, this could very well translate into a higher operational tempo of plots and attacks directed at China and Chinese interests. 

China as Jihadist Enemy Number One?

Within this evolving environment, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has taken an increasingly prominent role. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s chief propagandist, the late Anwar al Awlaki, had already listed China among states “occupying Muslim lands,” grouping it with the United States and Russia. Under Batarfi, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issued statements of solidarity with “Turkestan” and framed Xinjiang as part of a global war on Islam. The latest statement by current emir Awlaqi escalates further, praising “heroic operations” against Jews and Americans and then warning that the “pagan, infidel Chinese regime” is being monitored for every move against “our Uyghur Muslim brothers,” promising that if Beijing does not change course al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will “hold it accountable” and “go beyond targeting interests on land and sea” because “tomorrow is near for those who wait.” This explicit elevation of China to enemy status and threat to strike Chinese interests aligns with the broader al-Qaeda shift from episodic references to a sustained, operationally tinged hostility.

Elsewhere, al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch, Jamaa Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin, has attacked industrial sites and kidnapped foreign workers, including Chinese staff, though it has not yet built a distinct anti-China propaganda line, treating Chinese nationals as part of a wider pool of foreign targets. Islamic State branches, particularly Islamic State Khorasan Province, have likewise capitalized on abuses in Xinjiang and Beijing’s ties to the Taliban, explicitly calling for attacks on Chinese nationals. In mid-January, the Islamic State Khorasan Province claimed a bombing attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul that killed seven and wounded more than a dozen. Meanwhile, non-jihadist groups such as Baloch separatists and Philippine Maoist guerrillas have adopted anti-China themes around China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects and maritime disputes. This convergence of grievances suggests that as China’s power and presence expand, attacks on Chinese interests are likely to increase in frequency and geographic scope.

Awlaqi’s threats against China represent something of a continued evolution of how al-Qaeda views its enemies, particularly within the group’s broader global network. For years, most anti-China propaganda emanated from al-Qaeda core and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Over time, al-Shabaab began to direct its ire toward Beijing as well. But now, with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula focusing more on China, it means that one of the organization’s most capable branches now has the Chinese Communist Party in its crosshairs. A recent report by the U.N. Monitoring Team covering al-Qaeda and the Islamic State noted increasing cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Houthis, as well as between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis. While it may be premature to speculate on operational coordination against targets, the changing dynamics of these relationships warrant note. As a proxy of Iran, it seems unlikely that the Houthis would engage in anti-Chinese activity, but if the situation continues to escalate, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula could seek to attack Chinese shipping interests near the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, or the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Chinese embassies, hotels that cater to Chinese businessmen and government officials, and other Chinese infrastructure abroad could also be targeted.  

Beijing’s elevation to the pantheon of al-Qaeda’s enemies may outpace the capabilities of jihadist groups to mount operations against Chinese interests around the globe. But as history has shown, jihadist groups are patient. As it continues to expand its footprint abroad, whether through its Belt and Road Initiative or through political, diplomatic, and military engagements throughout the Global South, China’s status as a great power will inevitably make it a focus of transnational terrorist and insurgent narratives and propaganda. China’s treatment of its Uyghur Muslim population evokes tangible grievances among the umma, or worldwide community of Muslims, a catch-all term that groups like al-Qaeda see themselves as defending. 

Over time, as groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula rebound and rebuild operational capacity, the result could be an increase in terrorist attacks against Chinese targets in the Middle East, especially in areas where jihadist groups remain active. 

Lucas Webber is a researcher focused on global security issues and violent non-state actors. He is co-founder/editor at militantwire.com, senior threat intelligence analyst at Tech Against Terrorism, and research fellow at the Soufan Center.

Colin P. Clarke is the executive director of the Soufan Center, where he studies terrorism, insurgency, and armed conflict.

Image: Albertaont via Wikimedia Commons