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Mechanized warfare is not dead. Observers have been debating this topic since the Ukrainian military and volunteers beat back the Russian assault on Kiev in 2022. The professional discourse that has ensued often devolves into disputes about specific technologies or weapon systems and their perceived value on the future battlefield. Everyone is missing the big picture.

Frontlines in Ukraine today present eerie similarities to World War I but with advanced technologies inhibiting mechanized attacks. In rare cases, these same technologies have created windows of opportunity to make mechanized attacks possible. Larger windows create decisive breakthroughs, and smaller windows create suicidal bottlenecks.

We take a different perspective and draw diverging conclusions about offensive mechanized warfare. These are based in part on our own combat experience in Iraq in 2003 and from 20 years leading major Army modernization projects.

We evaluate the data and analyses from the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2022 and derive where and how mechanized forces can be decisive under modern conditions. Our core claim that future armies should create and control windows for mechanized attacks follows directly from these works and from U.S. Army operational lessons.

Modern battlefield conditions now impose inherent structural limits on mechanized attacks. These limits can no longer be dismissed as temporary obstacles or setbacks. They make mechanized warfare conditional rather than obsolete. What is underexamined is not whether mechanized warfare still works, but whether future campaigns can realistically generate, protect, and exploit the narrow conditions under which it works at all.  We strive to test that claim by examining when mechanized forces fail and why, while offering our own fresh insights. Lastly, we offer recommendations for how the U.S. Army can posture its people, processes, and technologies to prepare for the next major war. If the Army misreads mechanized warfare’s future, it risks designing forces for wars that cannot be fought or won.

Windows of Opportunity for Mechanized Attacks

In 2003, the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division executed a 350-mile mechanized attack from Kuwait to Baghdad, toppling Iraq’s regime in 21 days. That success depended on conditions that strongly favored the attacker: overwhelming technological advantages, complete control of the air, clear visibility of the battlefield through intelligence collection and monitoring, and reliable supply lines. Most of those advantages no longer exist today.

The battlefield has become far more complex. Electronic attacks on communications and sensors, once limited, are now common and can disrupt operations as much as land, air, or sea threats. Large armored forces can still be effective, but making them work now requires much more preparation, coordination, and time than it did in Iraq. That campaign is not a model that can simply be repeated. Future operations are more likely to depend on short, intense breakthroughs combined with tightly coordinated actions to overcome evenly matched opponents and heavily contested battlefields.

Evidence from Ukraine shows mechanized forces suffer when commanders fail to dominate with firepower, intelligence, and electronic warfare. A 2022 assessment noted that strong enemy surveillance and precision strikes shorten the attacker’s decision time and make it hard to mass forces. But it also found that when attackers create brief windows of deception, surprise, isolation, firepower dominance, and combined-arms coordination, mechanized breakthroughs still succeed. U.S. Army lessons from Ukraine’s failed summer 2023 offensive emphasize that success depends on disrupting enemy surveillance, synchronizing electronic warfare, using smoke and deception, and breaching obstacles quickly and at the right moment. A recent 2025 analysis agrees, highlighting autonomy, information dominance, electronic warfare, contested logistics, and evolving air defense as key conditions for maneuver.

In Ukraine, success depends on brief openings in time and space. Since 2022, those openings have been too brief and too small for either side to make many major, lasting breakthroughs. Neither side controls the air, and both can see and strike each other with similar effectiveness, broadly speaking. Drones, loitering munitions, and precision fires have exposed vulnerabilities and limited the utility of mechanized forces. Under these conditions, large armored attacks are extremely costly and hard to exploit. At this point, armored vehicles rarely reach the front lines, let alone break through enemy defenses.

Ukraine’s failed 2023 offensive underscored this reality. Russian forces had layered and formidable defenses as well as the ability to see Ukrainian forces coming. As a result, Ukraine could not achieve operational surprise. By contrast, Ukraine’s temporary success in Russia’s Kursk region the next year came only after it found a weak point and briefly blinded Russian sensing and communications. However, this was the exception to the new rule: The battlefield is so transparent now that surprise and rapid exploitation are usually impossible, except in rare cases. Success now depends less on mechanized formations themselves and more on the ability to rapidly create and exploit rare openings through deception, disruption, and concentrated support. In future wars, such opportunities are likely to be even fewer, shorter, and more localized. The burden is shifting from concealment of forces to concealment of intent. This favors forces designed for episodic concentration rather than sustained armored campaigning.

Armies spend most of their time on defense, but, ultimately, offensive actions are required to end wars. The U.S. Army’s credibility and deterrence against future land wars will be diminished once it loses its ability to mount an attack to seize and hold ground. Consequently, the Army ought to apply the right lessons to the right resources and investments now to preserve mechanized warfare for future generations.

Preparing for the Next War

The U.S. Army should learn lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War, but it should be careful and selective in how it applies those lessons to its future investment strategies, training, force structure, and doctrinal changes.

First, the Army needs a better balance in its investments. Right now, most funding goes to upgrading tanks and other traditional platforms, while spending on unmanned systems and electronic warfare lags behind. Mechanized forces have delivered decisive results in past wars, so the Army should keep improving them — but not in isolation. Upgrades like better protection, reduced visibility to sensors, and the ability to work with unmanned systems are important. However, the chances to use large armored attacks are shrinking, not growing. To keep mechanized forces relevant, armies need to shift from perfecting platforms to enabling short bursts of overwhelming power at the right moment. That means investing in technologies that can create and control those brief windows through deception, electronic warfare, and rapid coordination so mechanized attacks can still succeed when conditions allow.

Investing in unmanned systems and electronic warfare, especially when paired with advanced information technology and AI, can make mechanized attacks far more effective. AI-powered command systems can quickly process data from drones, satellites, and sensors to spot targets, predict enemy moves, and suggest actions in seconds. This gives commanders a huge edge in decision-making. Unmanned systems also help create surprise, aid in deception, and can take on the riskiest jobs, like clearing obstacles and minefields under fire. The Army should also prioritize first-person-view drones that can fly farther, see more clearly, resist jamming, and deliver powerful strikes. The trade-offs can be simple. For example, skipping one major vehicle upgrade could fund thousands of these drones. These investments would make future mechanized forces faster, more precise, and harder to stop. Some worry this approach could weaken the Army for long wars, and that’s a valid concern. But building for a big armored push that never happens is an even bigger risk.

Second, the ability to adapt and innovate will decide who sets the pace in future wars and who can create openings for mechanized attacks. The side that can quickly integrate new technologies will have the edge. For example, Ukraine built a huge domestic drone industry with hundreds of manufacturers producing millions of drones for scouting, precision strikes, and electronic warfare. What really matters is speed. Ukrainian forces can tweak drone software and hardware in just days to counter Russian jamming. This rapid innovation has helped Ukraine open a window for a mechanized attack by knocking out artillery and disrupting Russian units deep behind the front lines.

New reforms in how the U.S. military buys equipment are essential for success on future battlefields. The Army needs faster delivery, flexible requirements, and funding that can adjust as conditions change so it doesn’t waste time building the wrong things. The Army and its stakeholders also need to accept that there is no perfect solution for every possible fight over the next 50 years. Trying to achieve that has led to long delays, cost overruns, and gear that doesn’t fit the mission. Instead, the Army should focus on modular designs that soldiers can upgrade or adapt quickly in the field. Rather than chasing perfection, we need platforms that can be configured for specific situations. Soldiers should have the tools and interfaces to modify hardware and software as conditions change. And “right to repair” should mean more than fixing broken parts: It should allow soldiers to adapt equipment that no longer works for the fight they are in. In the next National Defense Authorization Act, Congress should weigh this requirement more heavily than the defense industry’s fight to protect intellectual property.

Third, the Army needs to prepare better for mechanized attacks. Technology alone won’t win wars. Trained leaders and soldiers using that technology will. As the Army works to develop new game-changing tools, it should also adapt how it organizes and fights. If the Army fails to update force structure, doctrine, and training, even the best technology will fall short. One report on the Russo-Ukraine War emphasizes that people and processes are required to adapt to technology, not the other way around. We agree. Yet the Army sometimes does the opposite, hesitating to scale new roles, unit structures, and tactics, even during active conflicts.

Old doctrine assumes maneuver is the default way to fight. Future doctrine should treat it as a rare, deliberate act that is planned, resourced, and protected. “Cover and concealment” now means more than hiding vehicles: It includes deception and protection from enemy sensors on land, in the air, and across the electromagnetic spectrum. Speed alone no longer guarantees success. Constant movement can expose attackers instead of overwhelming defenders. Mechanized attacks should use speed only when the conditions are right — striking hard across multiple domains at the right moment, then dispersing before the enemy reacts. Winning may take several blows, not one big push. U.S. Army force structure should reflect this by shifting toward electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integrated into smaller, more agile mechanized units. Success doesn’t happen by chance. Ukraine’s failed 2023 offensive showed what happens when troops lack training and struggle with new technology. In 2003, before the invasion of Iraq, American armor units drilled repeatedly on breaching defenses and seizing ground. That fight was far simpler than what’s coming. Future mechanized warfare will require mastery of combined arms across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Large-scale, realistic training is essential.

Future mechanized units won’t have the time or the safety to prepare in the open like our unit did before the 2003 Iraq invasion. Back then, our rehearsals were effectively invisible. Today, they would be spotted by commercial satellites and disrupted by drones and long-range strikes. The answer may be advanced synthetic training environments. These tools can speed up preparation and give soldiers and leaders realistic battlefield practice on demand and in secure settings where the enemy can’t watch. Cloud-based simulations linked to real vehicles, weapons, and soldier devices could replace many live exercises. They should update constantly with the latest intelligence so training reflects real battlefield conditions. And they shouldn’t just teach tactics, they should also account for the human toll of combat. Reports like “Conflict in Focus: Lessons from Russia-Ukraine” offer insights to help make these simulations more realistic and human-centered.

Fourth, logistics still wins wars. If mechanized warfare depends on narrow windows of opportunity, logistics often decides how long those windows stay open. Success may hinge less on enemy resistance and more on whether U.S. forces can keep fuel, ammunition, and repair moving under constant enemy surveillance and attack. Mechanized offensives fail when supply can’t keep up. Early Russian attacks in 2022 collapsed because their columns outran their fuel and repair support. Ukraine faced similar problems in 2023 when its forces broke through defenses but couldn’t push farther because ammunition and recovery vehicles lagged behind. To avoid this, the Army should invest in fuel-efficient vehicles, autonomous resupply, modular systems, and even 3D-printed parts, while training to sustain mechanized forces under fire.

Conclusion

Picture a future war where both sides have equal surveillance and electronic warfare capabilities. Decisions will need to be made in minutes, and chances to strike may last only hours. Mechanized forces will win only if they move immediately, use deception, and coordinate firepower at lightning speed. The next war will favor armies that act in seconds — not those that spend weeks planning.

Critics argue the Russo-Ukrainian War shows mechanized forces have lost their edge. A battlefield filled with drones and sensors punishes large armored formations, favors defense, and makes surprise nearly impossible. First-person-view drones and precision strikes exploit weaknesses while artillery remains the top killer. Without air superiority, breaking through defenses under constant surveillance becomes extremely costly, as Ukraine’s 2023 offensive proved. Every meter gained came at a heavy price. These realities lead some to claim that tanks are relics in an age of attrition and sensors.

Yet this conclusion misreads the evidence. Mechanized warfare is conditional, not obsolete. It may no longer define entire campaigns, but it can still deliver decisive results under rare, carefully created conditions. Recognizing this is critical to avoid preparing for a war that can’t be fought or won. Wars are still decided by who controls ground at key moments, not by who dominates sensors forever. Mechanized forces can still matter, but without the right conditions, today’s battlefield sharply limits what they can achieve. Ukraine’s success at Kursk proved that when attackers disrupt enemy surveillance or use electronic warfare, deception, and coordinated firepower, mechanized breakthroughs remain possible. Now more than ever, success depends on creating or exploiting brief windows of opportunity. When those windows open, mechanized formations are still the only force that can deliver speed, shock, and seize terrain at scale. But they should evolve by integrating new technologies, using speed and deception, adapting force structure and doctrine, and training hard for complex operations. Tomorrow’s battlefield will punish slow learners. The side that can set conditions, mass mechanized forces, and strike decisively will win.

Scott Rutter served over 20 years in the U.S. Army, culminating as a battalion commander during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He is a former Fox News military analyst and currently works in the medical and defense industries. He is the president of Valor Network Inc (which has no business interests related to the arguments above).

Matthew C. Paul is an Army officer with a combined 27 years of service in infantry and acquisition assignments, including multiple combat tours in the Middle East. His career as a former infantry commander and current acquisition project manager spans leadership in ground combat and modernization efforts across the Army.

Rutter and Paul are co-authors of Damn Fine Soldiers.

The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: U.S. Army