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What if the “counternarcotics” strikes against boats suspected of moving drugs aren’t really about cocaine at all, but about toppling Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro?

What’s happening now in the Caribbean — repeated airstrikes, detainee transfers to third countries, public hints of covert authorities, and a military build-up — looks like scaffolding for something larger. U.S. forces have been gathering in the Caribbean for weeks, suggesting an effort to overthrow Maduro may be on the horizon soon.

If the Trump administration drifts from interdiction to regime change, it will be forced to confront three hard truths. First, a quick win is unlikely, because any operation would face a larger, more entrenched security ecosystem than past U.S. interventions in Latin America have. Second, Maduro has spent a decade “coup-proofing” his regime by building overlapping structures that can survive leadership decapitation. Finally, the aftermath will be a political project for Venezuelans as much as a security mission for a foreign military force. The opposition and any transition government would carry the heaviest load — and face the highest risks — once the shooting stops.

Not a Quick Win

Venezuela fields more than 100,000 military and paramilitary personnel and sits behind one of the densest integrated air defense networks in the hemisphere. Its S-300VM and Buk-M2 surface-to-air systems, paired with Su-30MK2 fighters, would make the early phases of any intervention — especially the fight for air superiority — slow, costly, and politically fraught. Even optimistic planners estimate that a minimally viable invasion and stabilization force would require upwards of 50,000 troops. Securing Caracas, sealing porous borders, and guarding key infrastructure would demand far more.

With no U.S. basing rights in Venezuela, every sortie, surveillance mission, medevac, and resupply run would have to launch from ships offshore or from reluctant third countries. And “reluctant” may be generous — no Latin American state is likely to support a ground invasion.

Toppling Maduro is the easy part. What follows is the hard strategic slog of policing a sprawling, heavily armed society where state services have collapsed and regime loyalists, criminal syndicates, and colectivos — pro-government armed groups that police neighborhoods and terrorize dissidents — all compete for turf. Colombia’s National Liberation Army and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia factions operate openly from Venezuelan safe havens, running mining and smuggling routes, recruiting, and staging cross-border attacks. They would not go quietly.

Regionally, Washington would face stiff diplomatic headwinds. Brazil and Colombia have already bristled at recent U.S. maritime enforcement actions, telegraphing the political costs of a wider campaign. Overflight rights, third-country basing, intelligence cooperation, and status-of-forces agreements would almost certainly be withheld. Any assistance that materializes would be narrow, conditional, and transactional — border deconfliction, refugee management, maybe limited police cooperation. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s offer to mediate between Washington and Caracas signals just how far Brazil is from anything resembling operational support.

A major conflict would trigger large-scale civilian flight, pushing fragile neighbors toward humanitarian crisis and political instability.

External actors would further complicate the picture. Russia and Cuba are deeply embedded in Venezuela’s security and intelligence apparatus. Moscow, Caracas’ primary military patron, is unlikely to deploy combat forces, but it doesn’t have to. Intelligence sharing, electronic warfare support, and discreet logistics could raise operational costs. Russian aircraft deliveries in late October — after an unusually circuitous flight path — underscore that quiet resupply continues. Russian weaponry anchors Venezuela’s air defenses, air force, and small-arms production, and Russian technicians remain integral to keeping much of it running. Wagner-linked contractors have reinforced Maduro’s security detail during past crises, and that footprint could expand if fighting intensifies.

Cuban advisers, long woven into Venezuela’s intelligence and counterintelligence services, wouldn’t bring battalions — but they don’t need to. Havana can shape surveillance, internal coordination, and regime cohesion in ways that matter when a government is under military and political stress.

Some advocates now insist the Maduro regime could “collapse” without a single U.S. boot on the ground: A wave of inland kinetic strikes on military installations, command-and-control nodes, leadership compounds, and cartel-linked targets is supposed to trigger elite splits and prompt the armed forces to move against Maduro. But a regime collapse engineered by bombardment is still regime change by force, and you don’t escape the Pottery Barn problem by keeping troops offshore — you simply outsource the chaos to Venezuelans and their neighbors while betting the local military will finish your work for you.

Maduro’s System is Hard to Break

The heart of the problem in Maduro’s Venezuela is “coup-proofing” — how rulers configure coercive institutions so no single betrayal or external shock brings them down. Autocrats tend to stack the deck with competing security bodies, cultivate overlapping intelligence services, and reward loyalists with patronage and illicit rents. Erica de Bruin shows that removing dictators rarely ends with toppling one man. Lasting transitions require overwhelming security forces, police-heavy stabilization, and durable institutions that don’t currently exist in the country

Venezuela is a textbook case of coup-proofing with local twists. Since the Hugo Chávez years of 1999 to 2013, Maduro has organized military and paramilitary forces into a layer cake of security and repression, involving the regular armed forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana), the Bolivarian National Guard, competing intelligence agencies (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional and Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar), and colectivos.

These parallel forces not only deter external threats but also monitor each other and the armed forces, thereby making coordinated rebellion more difficult. On top of that, the regime has bound senior military officers to its survival through criminal rents — from illegal gold mining to smuggling and drug logistics — so that a post-Maduro future looks less like exile and more like prison. This is precisely the kind of elite-loyalty market that sustains authoritarian endurance.

This baked-in structural insulation helps explain why escalating pressure, whether through sanctions, kinetic strikes, or psychological operations, has repeatedly failed to produce decisive fractures among Venezuelan elites. Indeed, the April 30, 2019 military uprising fizzled and the 2020 “Operation Gideon” seaborne raid collapsed immediately. The military is entangled in a web of mutual surveillance, criminal rents, and institutional overlap, all designed to punish defection. Even targeted violence or the threat of regime decapitation does not shift the internal balance when those being pressured see no viable path to personal safety, power, or immunity. Without holding territory or the means to offer credible guarantees, external actors cannot broker elite realignments from offshore. In this environment, the idea that outside pressure alone will catalyze regime collapse is not a strategy — it’s wishful thinking.

Decades of abuses by security and intelligence forces have narrowed safe exit options for regime officials. Research on autocratization and civil-military relations shows that human rights abuses raise the cost of defection and entrench loyalty by fear. Security forces and colectivos have been implicated in killings of protesters and widespread repression. Courts lack independence and reinforce impunity. Harold Trinkunas’ study of the armed forces across the Punto Fijo era from 1958 to 1998 and the Bolivarian revolution of 1998–2004 explains how attempts to embed civilian control within the armed forces left pockets of politicized coercion that later became levers for an authoritarian turn.

Decapitation doesn’t end repression. Remove the leadership, and you are left with armed fragments: colectivos, loyalist police splinters, intelligence units with their own files and grudges, and cross-border insurgent dissidents who don’t take orders from Caracas. That environment punishes naivety and rewards careful political planning.

The Day After: González, Machado, and the Toil of Governing

On July 28, 2024, independent tallies showed Edmundo González Urrutia won the presidential election, with María Corina Machado as the architect and mobilizer calling the shots. Several countries have formally recognized González as Venezuela’s legitimate president-elect, including the United States, Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. The European Parliament also passed a resolution recognizing him. Machado’s 2025 Nobel Peace Prize expanded the duo’s reach internationally, bringing moral authority and media influence.

External recognition matters politically and financially. It opens doors to high-level engagement with leaders of powerful countries and can unlock control over certain state assets abroad and sanctions licensing. Yet, by itself it does not transfer control over territory, security forces, or ministries inside Venezuela.

Think of the transition as a tandem bike. If González and Machado ride in rhythm, they can turn a moral victory into a governing coalition. If they drift apart, the corrupted system they inherit will exploit every gap.

González’s diplomatic experience as the former Venezuelan ambassador to Argentina and technocratic profile reassures moderates, public servants, and nervous neighbors. He can be a president who communicates measurable objectives and the trade-offs and timelines to achieve them. That matters to public servants who must keep the state running and to neighboring countries who must police porous borders. The risk is to seem like a figurehead. He needs to demonstrate ownership of day-one deliverables — power stabilization targets, police vetting criteria, accessible humanitarian corridors — so Venezuelans see a government, not a personality cult.

Machado brings energy, clarity, and a national network that has already shown it can mobilize voters, monitor polling stations, and absorb regime pressure. Her Nobel Prize provides a platform and international contacts from Brussels to Brasília, crucial for garnering initial humanitarian aid and early investor interest — if security on the ground holds. Her clear communication can keep a broad coalition united during the difficult early months. The danger is polarization: Regime hardliners will label every move as a foreign imposition, and some undecided parties will interpret reform as retribution when the government announces changes. Her challenge is to defuse this narrative by sharing credit, highlighting credible moderates, and appearing in locales that didn’t vote for her.

A Machado-González-led government should focus on several key tasks to stabilize the country after foreign military intervention or regime collapse.

Build a New Government that Reflects the People

For starters, the cabinet should be ideologically diverse and capable. This means putting key Democratic Unitary Platform parties in government positions, placing respected independents in justice and finance, and keeping on pragmatic Chavista technocrats who accept the new rules of the game. Doing so will cool tensions among those who did not vote for the opposition and prevents spoilers from claiming that “the victors are here to purge.” Machado’s win opens doors, and González’s temperament helps keep them open.

Strike a Security Bargain that Shrinks the Battlefield

Coup-proofing left Venezuela with rival security organs, colectivos, and criminal‑political hybrid groups. The transition requires a visible, credible offer to mid-level officers and rank-and-file police: stay, help restore order, and keep your career, provided you have clean hands. At the same time, the new government should draw clear red lines for torture and repression, with early, fair prosecutions for the worst crimes. Appoint a defense minister and an interior minister who can communicate effectively with both the armed forces and victims’ families, thereby carrying legitimacy in both worlds. Promise amnesty for disarmament to low-level colectivo members. Ensure speedy trials for those who keep shooting. Make the incentives obvious.

Maintain Peace by Protecting People’s Routines Immediately

Revenge politics destroys countries. The transition should depoliticize, not eliminate, the social programs that millions depend on. Keep food distribution running under neutral management. Prioritize electricity, water, clinics, and transit. Quickly put vetted and supervised police back on the streets. Publish daily dashboards: fewer blackouts, more clinic stockpiles, fewer homicides, and reopened schools. The public will accept slow reforms, but they won’t tolerate chaos.

Sequence Justice so it Heals Instead of Harms

Venezuela needs justice for torture, disappearances, and corruption. It also needs to avoid the Iraq trap: Purge too broadly and you create an insurgency. Start with the worst offenders prosecuted by revitalized independent courts. Establish a “truth commission,” similar to other cases of post-conflict transitions, with victim participation to ensure families are heard and the record is set. Offer conditional amnesty to lesser offenders who disarm and tell the truth. Use hybrid or internationalized mechanisms to bolster due process until national courts are rebuilt.

Stabilize Wallets While Stabilizing Streets

With U.S. sanctions likely lifting as the new government comes to power, act quickly on an emergency stabilization kit: Initiate temporary cash transfers to the poorest households; prioritize fuel for hospitals, food distribution, and water systems; and unify the exchange rate under a simple, transparent rule with a rebuilt, independent central bank. Treat early oil and donor inflows as bridge financing, not patronage. Publish where every dollar goes and audit major purchases. Use Machado’s Nobel profile to convene a donors’ roundtable with the Interamerican Development Bank, World Bank, Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean, and International Monetary Fund to sequence emergency grants. Mobilize the diaspora for skills and short-term projects back home and expedite credentialing and match remittances to local initiatives so goodwill translates into payrolls and infrastructure.

Own the Day After

There will always be a temptation to act fast — strike, claim victory, and hand off governance. Maduro’s Venezuela punishes that kind of wishful thinking. The military problem can be solved. The political situation is the real challenge.

A solid plan starts with what comes after regime change: A transition cabinet representing the whole country; restoring public order in days, not months; delivering justice that punishes the worst human rights abuses without creating martyrs or mass outcasts; neutralizing external rogue actors; and providing immediate relief that shows up in households first — cash transfers, food stocks, and fuel for water, power, and clinics — before any new debt-service outlays or bondholder deals. The plan should involve local partners who can spot trouble before a foreign patrol does: re-vetted municipal police, harbor masters and customs officers, fisher cooperatives, utility and clinic managers, and neighborhood councils that spot anomalies early and route warnings fast to commanders. Honest communication at home about costs and timelines is crucial. Without candor, political support erodes quickly.

If Washington remains focused on counternarcotics, it should shift toward law enforcement that relies on evidence, transparency, and court prosecutions. Even with the current military build-up in the region, there is still time to pivot to restore legal legitimacy and invite regional cooperation. But a pivot seems less likely by the day given the continued gathering of U.S. forces near Venezuela.

If the build-up becomes a full-scale invasion, it would be foolish to assume it would be a weekend mission. Be clear about troop numbers, timelines, and trade-offs, then align resources with goals. If you choose to intervene, do so with appropriate scale because in Venezuela, democracy isn’t just about toppling a regime, but about building a functioning state in the following weeks, months, and years.

Orlando J. Pérez, Ph.D., is a political science professor at the University of North Texas at Dallas. He authored Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Societies: Transforming the Role of the Military in Central America and Political Culture in Panama: Democracy after Invasion; co-authored Making Police Reform Matter in Latin America, and co-edited Democracy and Security in Latin America: State Capacity and Governance under Stress. As a consultant, he has worked on issues of democratization, civil-military relations, and anti-corruption for the United States Agency for International Development and the United Nations Development Program.

Image: Eneas De Troya via Wikimedia Commons