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As China modernizes its military for a forceful reunification with Taiwan, U.S. planners continue to seek insight into how the People’s Liberation Army will implement its core operational concept. While exercises and translated academic writings provide some understanding, The Coming Wave (明日浪潮), a commercial wargame by Kilovolt Studios, provides a unique opportunity to experience multi-domain precision warfare from a Chinese perspective. In providing this perspective, it exposes a weakness inherent in Chinese doctrine: Planners and units facing China who reduce the level of decision-making authority and embrace the principles of mission command will react and generate effects faster than Chinese planners anticipate.
China’s Vision for War on the Tabletop
“Multi-domain precision warfare” (多域精确战) is the core operational concept for China’s military. Originating in 2021, it intends to “leverage a [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] network” to “rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.” In addition to its widespread adoption in China’s military, multi-domain precision warfare has begun to affect the peripheral cultures outside but closely related to the military, including the small but growing community of wargamers.
The Chinese wargaming community is closely connected with the Chinese military, with events like national wargaming competitions including teams from state military schools and serving as a test bed for doctrine. The Coming Wave is unique in that it is the first domestically designed Chinese wargame produced for a domestic audience that addresses modern conflict, including scenarios of an invasion of Taiwan and war on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, The Coming Wave provides an interactive interpretation of how China might apply multi-domain precision warfare in a future conflict
The professional framework of multi-domain precision warfare permeates The Coming Wave’s commercial design (which I review in more detail in Paxsims) including explicit references in the design notes, indicating that this core concept has been widely adopted outside of the academic circles of the People’s Liberation Army. However, as The Coming Wave is a commercial product, it is best utilized as an insight into how some Chinese planners and academics understand multi-domain precision warfare, rather than proof of specific doctrinal assumptions and applications. Included in this insight is the role of platforms within a system of systems, the utilization of joint fires, the importance placed on the level of a unit’s technology integration, and how units that have a technological disadvantage but take initiative may disrupt the plans of Chinese forces. The Coming Wave seeks to model the evolution of conflict from the Cold War doctrine of massed battles into the multi-domain operations of modern war. When elaborating his design philosophy, the designer of the game Zhou Tianze describes how current Western-designed wargames, such as Next War or Asian Fleet, fail to model modern conflict accurately. He states that current modern wargames are stuck in a “Western mentality,” meaning that they focus primarily on land-based maneuver warfare, with other domains serving supporting roles, if they are represented at all. Zhou then posits, similarly to the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army when designing multi-domain precision warfare, that a fundamental shift in design is needed, one that emphasizes the electromagnetic environment and the importance of “the two dimensions of detection and strike.” This design commentary reinforces that The Coming Wave is intended to be a wargame that illustrates and embodies the principles of multi-domain precision warfare, providing the players the opportunity to test the framework for themselves.
A central component of China’s multi-domain precision warfare is the concept of system on system confrontation, which involves multiple networked systems working together to achieve information dominance. The goal of this networking is to achieve coherent joint operations so that the combined forces are “greater than the sum of its subsystem parts,” or put simply, “1+1>2.” The Coming Wave illustrates how some in China may perceive this through its representation of the units themselves in the context of its “detection-strike” mechanics. In The Coming Wave, great emphasis is placed on the fact that every unit is a sensor first and can share data with other units to coordinate joint firepower strikes. The best example of this emphasis is in the depiction of naval units and task forces. All naval units have the same number of strikes they can launch against air and ground targets, regardless of the tonnage or specific weaponry of the combatant represented. This means that a Chinese Type 055 destroyer may conduct as many attacks as a U.S. Constellation-class frigate, even though in real life these combatants vary greatly in their weaponry and magazine depths. The Coming Wave instead models their differences in their detection capabilities, with the Type 055 able to detect naval units farther out. In the greater context, this portrayal reveals a stark contrast in how assets are utilized by the U.S. and Chinese militaries.
To U.S. planners, a Type 055 destroyer is considered a capital ship and a target to be prioritized due to its wide range of capabilities. Some Chinese planners, as portrayed in The Coming Wave, view the Type 055 as a node and sensor first, with strike capabilities as a secondary, yet important, function. This indicates to planners that information synthesis nodes, such as command and communication centers, should take higher priority than leading-edge assets traditionally classified as high value, such as the Type 055.
The sensor-shooter dynamic is further reinforced by the importance of joint firepower strikes, both in multi-domain precision warfare and The Coming Wave. Chinese writing has described joint strike operations as central to a conflict over Taiwan, and joint strikes feature prominently in military exercises. This nests with the doctrine of system on system confrontation, as these strikes seek to rapidly destroy an enemy’s will and ability to fight via simultaneous air-, sea-, and land-based attacks. Within The Coming Wave, players may experience the importance of these strikes themselves, as they cause outsized amounts of damage on enemy forces with minimal use of command power. Furthermore, these strikes capitalize on the use of tactical aircraft and ships as distributed sensors to find enemy centers of gravity, as they can use assets from every domain — such as strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, tactical aircraft and ships — to mass fires. This portrayal of the system on system confrontation aspect of multi-domain precision warfare helps to illustrate the greater doctrine as a whole and provides the opportunity for players to experiment with its implementation. Specifically, planners may wish to experiment with how far down joint firepower assets may be allocated, so that an appropriate level of firepower may be used by commanders closer to the leading edge of the fight. For instance, should a commander of a forward-positioned brigade be delegated authority over joint strike assets, rather than a component headquarters? This shift would require significant advanced planning but would result in a shortened Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loop, or the ability of a unit or leader to react to new circumstances, that would provide an advantage as both sides race to collect, synthesize, and act on information. At the very least, the joint forces commander should ensure that their critical and time-sensitive targets are cleared down to the lowest possible level and allow lower level commanders broader authority in assigning forces to targets or missions, so that they gain the advantage in the reaction competition.
Informatization features prominently in Chinese doctrine and is given great deference in The Coming Wave. Within Chinese doctrine, they distinguish between “informatization,” which is the proliferation of technology to operational units that creates a system of systems, and “intelligentization,” or the use of AI and other cutting-edge technology to enable decision-making at every level. Chinese doctrine states that informatization has become “a dominant essential factor that commands material and energy.” Furthermore, the Chinese military believes that success in future conflicts depends “on the acquisition and dissemination of vast quantities of high-fidelity information using advanced information technology and automated command systems.” To achieve this goal, the Chinese military is currently adopting AI in support roles and is developing new technologies and doctrines for military use. This drive towards informatization serves the greater goal of achieving joint operations, so that multiple domains may be brought to bear and achieve an effect on another. In The Coming Wave, the designers implement this concept thoroughly. All units are rated based on informatization, and the impact is most stark on the ground units. Ground units with minimal informatization, regardless of size or weaponry, are inflexible and unable to maneuver effectively, whereas units with high informatization are extremely valuable, able to maneuver freely, and are more effective at detection. In practice, this raises an interesting dynamic: While large, heavily armed ground forces can cause great damage when they engage enemy forces, it is difficult for them to reach an engagement and are often degraded before they arrive. Smaller, more modern units better serve as a node for sensing and coordinating fires. This portrayal highlights how some Chinese planners account for less modern forces: While their firepower may be formidable on paper, the lack of modernization makes them irrelevant when fighting a smaller but more integrated force. In turn, this leaves their plans vulnerable to less-informatized units that enact the principles of mission command and utilize initiative to act in the absence of direction from higher headquarters.
Multi-domain precision warfare seeks to minimize the slower OODA loop resulting from the doctrine of top-down control in the People’s Liberation Army. While multi-domain precision warfare and the broader goal of informatization may expedite the flow of information up and down the chain of command, those with command authority remain at higher echelons, and subordinates are rarely empowered or encouraged to take initiative. While the People’s Liberation Army has discussed and experimented with allowing some autonomy, there is no evidence of it being widespread, and it directly conflicts with General Secretary Xi Jinping’s vision for the military. This contrasts heavily with the U.S. military, where subordinates are encouraged to make their own decisions to achieve the commander’s intent in a decentralized command structure as outlined in Army, Navy, and Air Force doctrine. The U.S. Army’s doctrine on mission command explicitly states the following: “Subordinates do not wait for a breakdown in communications or a crisis to learn how to act within the commander’s intent. Subordinates look for every opportunity to demonstrate and exercise initiative.” This level of authority delegated to junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and junior enlisted soldiers is unheard of in most units of the Chinese military. This absence is felt in The Coming Wave as well, as the less informatized Taiwanese units have little ability to act or react, even though current trends in the Taiwanese army indicate that units are moving towards greater decentralization of command and control. While these units may not be able to react as effectively as a heavily “informatized” unit, they would still be able to carry out orders with a commander’s intent, increasing their mobility and initiative in response to an invasion. Expediting the implementation of these principles in the Taiwanese military and continuing to reinforce their importance in the U.S. military will provide an edge in future conflicts with top-down directed militaries like the Chinese.
The omission of any formal reference to mission command in multi-domain precision warfare and Chinese doctrine is especially interesting when considering large-scale joint operations like a contested amphibious landing. Mission command proved essential to success during the amphibious landings at Normandy, one of the only operations of comparable size to a potential invasion of Taiwan. On Omaha Beach, small groups of disorganized soldiers formed assault groups that breached the defenses, often without explicit orders from officers higher than company-grade. At Utah Beach, Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt decided to advance inland even though he landed 2,000 yards south of the landing zone. These decisions, made in the absence of higher headquarters, enabled the success of the greater operation. By refusing to incorporate this approach, the People’s Liberation Army limits how much they can reduce their OODA loop, as they can only expedite the flow of information up to the decision maker. By reducing the level at which decisions are made and reinforcing the culture of mission command, the United States and its allies may shorten the loop in two stages: reducing how far the information must flow and reducing the time it takes to synthesize and transmit guidance up and down the chain of command.
To experience how this change in doctrine would affect the battle, strategists may modify the rules in The Coming Wave to account for a more mission command-oriented force and compare the results of the games they play with the modified rules to the rules that exemplify multi-domain precision warfare. In doing so, they may gain firsthand insight into how doctrinal changes affect the greater battle and find further weaknesses in Chinese doctrine. It would therefore be worthwhile for military organizations that focus on red teaming, such as the Air University’s Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute, or professional military educational facilities, such as the Naval War College, to obtain, translate, and use The Coming Wave. This would provide them the capability to both gain a greater understanding of the Chinese doctrine of multi-domain precision warfare and to experiment with implementing plans to counter Chinese doctrine. In doing so, these institutions will gain an experiential learning tool to augment their capabilities and understanding, in turn providing a greater understanding of the forces they seek to represent and plan against.
As planners prepare for future conflict against the People’s Liberation Army, they should gain an in-depth understanding of how China will fight future conflicts to find and exploit its weaknesses. The Coming Wave provides a unique and interactive approach to understanding and experimenting with the Chinese core operational concept, as its design is based on the principles that define multi-domain precision warfare. Through the emphasis of system on system confrontation, informatization, and joint strikes, The Coming Wave demonstrates how crucial these principles are to Chinese planners. However, The Coming Wave also exposes an inherent weakness of Chinese doctrine to the Western principles of mission command. Units which take initiative and allow leaders to assume risk act and react faster than Chinese planners expect, causing significant disruption to Chinese planning. In turn, this requires high-level Chinese leadership to intervene and lengthens the Chinese OODA loop, providing an advantage to those fighting against them. Planners preparing for future conflict and those seeking a better understanding of Chinese doctrine, including professional military educational institutions, should obtain and translate a copy so that students and strategists can experiment using their plans in The Coming Wave. By doing so, they will gain a greater understanding of how to win a future conflict with China, without having to rely solely on the traditional analysis from exercises and translated doctrine.
Louis “Cornell” Fuka is the lead wargame designer and analyst at SURVICE Engineering, specializing in developing educational and digital wargames. Previously, he served as an artillery officer in the U.S. Army. The views expressed here are his own and not those of SURVICE Engineering or any of its clients.
The author thanks Kevin Malmquist of the U.S. Army, Jennifer Thurman of the U.S. Air Force, Philip Bolger-Cortez, Mike Bradley, Thomas Barnaby, and Benjamin Scheppke for their insights, expertise, and editorial assistance.
Image: China News Service via Wikimedia Commons
