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In 2024, Lami Kim wrote “South Korea’s Nuclear Latency Dilemma,” where she argued that while South Korean attitudes toward nuclear latency were growing more favorable, the United States still disapproved of the move. Since that time, the conversation appears to be moving in a different direction. In light of these changes, we asked Lami to revisit her article.Image: Juanita White via DVIDSIn your 2024 article, “South Korea’s Nuclear Latency Dilemma,” you wrote about the strict nature of the American stance on anti-nuclear latency in South Korea. What geopolitical developments do you believe are the most concerning to South Korea over the past year? Do you think they are more willing to take a more hardened stance on developing their own nuclear capabilities in light of this threat landscape?So much has changed since I wrote the piece in September 2024. The most notable development has been U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House. During his first term, he proposed withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula and pressed Seoul to assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Although Trump explicitly reaffirmed the U.S. extended deterrence commitment during his February 2025 meeting with the leaders of Japan and South Korea, the credibility of that commitment has nonetheless been increasingly questioned.In addition, South Koreans are concerned that the Trump administration might strike a deal with North Korea that eliminates nuclear threats to the U.S. mainland while leaving South Korea’s security concerns unaddressed. Only days into his second term, Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power,” a formulation that could signal tacit U.S. acceptance of Pyongyang as a nuclear-armed state.While doubts about Washington’s security commitments have been increasing, North Korea’s threat profile has also intensified, bolstered by its expanding ties with Russia. In return