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Israel’s short but destructive summer war against Iran and its brazen military strikes on Doha in September have reignited a debate across the Middle East over the value of nuclear deterrence. Gulf states also now worry that Israel’s aggression could push the Iranian leadership to finally make the leap to a bomb in order to prevent regime change.
Saudi Arabia has long desired to match the military and nuclear capabilities of its regional rivals — Iran and Israel. In the aftermath of the 12-Day War it now seems to be doubling down on a policy of nuclear ambiguity. The United States should be aware of the change in posture ahead of the visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the White House on Nov. 18, where nuclear cooperation will be at the top of the agenda. The Trump administration should move swiftly to ease the elevated security concerns of Saudi Arabia, and offer cooperation on advanced nuclear technology, financing, safety, and training while remaining firmly committed to non-proliferation across the broader Middle East. By cooperating with Saudi Arabia on this issue at this moment of heightened insecurity for Riyadh, Washington could bolster its reliability as a security partner.
Saudi Stance on Nuclear Enrichment
Saudi Arabia has long refused to accept U.S. demands to give up its ability to enrich uranium domestically. This is rooted in concerns over autonomy and independence. The Saudi approach differs from that of the United Arab Emirates, whose leaders signed a “gold standard” version of the so-called 123 Agreement with the United States in 2009, which bans uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing on Emirati soil. This agreement allowed the United Arab Emirates to access U.S. technology to build the Barakah reactors, which rely entirely on imported low-enriched uranium. Constructed by a South Korea-led consortium, Barakah is now the most advanced nuclear power facility in the Arab world. By forgoing domestic enrichment, the United Arab Emirates has positioned itself as a reliable nuclear partner and showcased Barakah as proof of a safe civilian program.
However, Riyadh has rejected adopting the gold standard as an unacceptable demand that puts Saudi Arabia at a competitive disadvantage. Under the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was permitted by world powers to enrich low-level uranium on its soil. The United States has for decades allowed Israel to build up a vast nuclear arsenal. Other U.S. partners, including India, Japan, and South Korea, have advanced nuclear programs. In short, Saudi Arabia refuses to be what it perceives as short-changed and sees the ability to enrich internally as a sovereign right. For Saudi leaders, control over the full nuclear fuel cycle links to pride, status, and the ability to shape the regional balance of power. Such a program would also offer opportunities to train Saudi engineers, build home-grown supply chains, and exploit domestic uranium resources.
Riyadh’s nuclear plans remain modest, centered on two pressurized-water reactors — a technology with limited proliferation risk. Yet, there has been substantial progress on legal, regulatory, and technical foundations. The developing Saudi nuclear program is overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency and is under the purview of the watchdog’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Procurement is ongoing for Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear power plant at Duwaiheen, with bidders from South Korea, China, France, and Russia, and a separate negotiation track with the United States. However, no nuclear reactor is operational yet.
While Riyadh insists on a civilian focus, it cultivates nuclear ambiguity and has refused to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “enhanced additional protocol” monitoring framework. Bin Salman has repeatedly declared that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will follow suit.
The Impact of the War
The recent Israeli strikes on Doha left Gulf monarchies with an increased urgency to reinforce their deterrence power — conventional or not — and to bolster security assurances from the United States.
However, the Israeli-Iranian confrontation also shook convictions that Iran’s nuclear latency brought adequate deterrence. In fact, the war highlighted the opposite lesson: Being a “threshold power” under International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, as Iran was, may invite preemptive attack. Tehran’s ambiguous approach failed to secure regime stability, as 30 senior Iranian officials were killed during the war. Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s decision to abandon his country’s nuclear program in 2003 failed to prevent his eventual downfall. In contrast, nuclear-capable states like North Korea or Pakistan have succeeded in deterring foreign regime change interventions.
In the near term, securing its own nuclear deterrent is unattainable for Saudi Arabia. Besides the tremendous financial bill of building an advanced nuclear program, Riyadh would face heavy political costs from Washington, including likely bipartisan congressional backing of sanctions. Such a move could also invite an Israeli response through sabotage or outright military strikes. As it tries to prepare for all scenarios, from an Iranian regime pivoting toward weaponization to a prolonged Israeli military campaign on its borders, Saudi Arabia is keen to keep doors open and actively explore different options for its deterrence strategy.
A new mutual defense deal with Pakistan is part of this effort. While it has not been publicly disclosed, Saudi Arabia has likely made a bet that nuclear cooperation with Pakistan could provide Riyadh with a security guarantee through the extension of its nuclear umbrella or the transfer of capability if the Kingdom faced an existential threat. This provides Saudi Arabia with a de facto nuclear deterrent without carrying the risks of backlash from Washington, or the risk of inviting attacks from Israel during a protracted weaponization process.
The agreement continues a history of nuclear cooperation between the two countries dating back to the late 1970s. Since then, Saudi Arabia has provided critical financial support to sustain Islamabad’s nuclear program as the founder of the “Islamic bomb.” Over the decades, reports of Pakistani scientists traveling to Saudi Arabia and statements from Saudi officials that Pakistan could give Riyadh the bomb if needed only deepened suspicions that a nuclear safety net quietly bound the two states together — now reinforced by a formal bilateral pact.
For its part, Pakistan could replicate similar defense arrangements with other Gulf partners, such as Qatar. Islamabad’s willingness to extend “capabilities” under formal agreements may open the door for a broader Gulf security framework with Pakistan at its core. This is part of a growing trend whereby Gulf monarchies are diversifying and hedging beyond exclusive reliance on the United States.
What America Can Do
Saudi Arabia’s nuclear rethinking reflects not only the perceived threat posed by Israel but also growing mistrust of U.S. security assurances. Washington’s strikes on Iran in June, over which Saudi Arabia expressed “deep concern,” and Israel’s strike on Qatar confirmed to Arab capitals that America is unreliable. The executive order declaring the U.S. commitment to Qatar’s security is a weaker form of reassurance compared to the formal defense treaty that Saudi Arabia has been pursuing with Washington for years.
And yet, for the Gulf monarchies, the United States remains the preferred partner for nuclear technology. Nuclear cooperation is a key Saudi demand in the “mega deal” negotiations with Washington. Previous negotiations with the Biden administration got stuck over enrichment rights. Donald Trump’s return to the White House reopened an opportunity for a breakthrough. During his first term, Trump had quietly authorized U.S. companies to pursue preparatory nuclear work with Saudi Arabia despite congressional opposition. On his visit to Saudi Arabia in May, Trump signaled willingness to decouple nuclear cooperation from normalization with Israel. His administration has already explored ways to move away from the gold standard, potentially allowing Saudi enrichment under safeguards. Further U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation is expected to be back on the negotiating table at the upcoming White House meeting.
For Saudi Arabia, Trump is seen as the only American president ready to grant more nuclear cooperation without demanding that Riyadh foregoes the capability to enrich uranium on its soil. Trump forcefully shut down any Saudi attempt to leverage the threat of opting for nuclear cooperation with China as a way to push the United States to ease its non-proliferation demands.
Together, rising regional tensions with a nuclear-armed Israel, the potential for Iran to secretly dash for a bomb, and uncertainties over U.S. reliability are likely to push Saudi Arabia closer toward adopting nuclear ambiguity. This is bad news for the long-stated U.S. goal to prevent a nuclear arms race in an already volatile Middle East.
The United States should, however, warn Saudi Arabia about the risks of weaponization. As the Iran case has shown, violating obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty would severely damage relations with both Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress, as well as European capitals. It would also be a lengthy process that might not deter current threats. Indeed, it could even provoke Israel to sabotage or attack nuclear facilities, as it has in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. If in the immediate future Gulf monarchies are looking to Pakistan to provide a nuclear umbrella to shield them from attack, they should be reminded that even two nuclear powers can end up in direct conventional military conflict — as India and Pakistan did this year.
However, the United States will also need to acknowledge the realities of threats facing the Gulf monarchies from Iran and Israel. Stricter American backlash in response to Israel’s regional attacks will be crucial to avoid the temptation of nuclear proliferation amongst Arab partners.
Over time, and if Israeli behavior moderates and Iran’s nuclear program remains contained, Saudi Arabia could shift toward actively supporting a cooperative framework. A regional nuclear consortium among willing states across the Gulf Cooperation Council — possibly with Iranian engagement — could integrate civilian nuclear cooperation, shared safeguards, and coordinated oversight. Such a framework produces transparency, reduces incentives for states to move towards nuclear threshold status, and limits the risk that state collapse allows nuclear materials to fall into the wrong hands.
Washington, with the support of European partners, can reinforce this framework with tiered incentives — advanced civilian nuclear technology, co-financing of reactors, engineer training programs, and regional emergency response systems — ensuring Gulf monarchies feel technologically empowered and diplomatically valued.
Ultimately, the trajectory of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program remains closely tied to future regional dynamics. If Tehran accelerates its path to the bomb, and Israel continues to leverage its own undeclared capabilities to reshape regional geopolitics by force, Riyadh will feel stronger pressure to keep the nuclear option on the agenda.
Ellie Geranmayeh is a senior policy fellow and deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Her work covers Iran’s nuclear program and its regional ramifications, in addition to how the United States and European countries should address threats posed by Iranian behavior.
Cinzia Bianco is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, working on the Arabian Peninsula. She holds a Ph.D. in Middle East Politics from the University of Exeter and is the author of “The Gulf Monarchies After the Arab Spring: Threats and Security” (Manchester University Press, 2024).
Camille Lons is a policy fellow and deputy head of the Paris office at the European Council on Foreign Relations, where she works on geoeconomics and relations between China and the Gulf countries. Previously, she was a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons
