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Editor’s Note: A Ukrainian language version of this article is available / Будь ласка, зверніть увагу, що українська версія цієї статті доступна.

I do not know the origins of the Trump administration’s 28-point peace plan to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian War, but I can safely say it has caused quite a stir in Kyiv, in the capitals of our European military allies, and among American legislators — including many Senate Republicans who find the document at best risible and at worst a product of Russian authorship.

It also contains some oddities: There are references to START I, a treaty that no longer exists and has already been replaced. There are also holes you could drive a truck through — or even a swarm of drones — such as restricting Ukraine from firing long-range missiles at St. Petersburg and Moscow while saying nothing about rockets or drones.

Setting these aside, the more serious problem with the document is that it tries to settle major issues up front that should be settled only through sustained and serious negotiation. It would be much more effective to have a list of principles for negotiation that each side must agree to before real negotiations can actually proceed.

For example, the 28-point plan calls for the immediate withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donetsk to create a specific demilitarized buffer zone, when instead it should establish the principle that any ceasefire line may be provisional and distinct from questions of legal sovereignty, freezing positions to stop the fighting while deferring the final status of disputed territory to a separate, longer-term diplomatic track that will require difficult compromises from both sides. Instead of this approach, we see the president’s chief crisis diplomat (a different person from the secretary of state, it seems) trying to impose a fait accompli of sorts before Thanksgiving.

America’s European allies released their counter-proposal, which is essentially a pro-Ukraine version of the Witkoff plan. It keeps the structure of the original document (28 points, the “Board of Peace” chaired by President Donald Trump, the U.S. compensation), but it removes the provisions that amounted to a Ukrainian capitulation — such as demanding that Ukraine withdraw its forces from the approximately 14 percent of the Donbass it still holds and recognize Crimea and the Donbass as “de facto Russian territory.” While it is an improvement on the Witkoff plan, it will likely not be successful as the basis for the beginning of serious negotiations between the belligerents. So, beyond signaling Europe’s resolve to not have the White House’s or perhaps just Witkoff’s will simply imposed (admittedly an important exercise), it otherwise is not useful for negotiations.

The president’s strong desire for a ceasefire and to foster a serious and durable peace is a good one, as the human and economic costs have been enormous and it is unlikely that this war will be settled on the battlefield in the near- or mid-term, but Witkoff’s plan tries to do everything at once. In the face of so much serious opposition — including from its own political allies — perhaps the Trump administration is amenable to a different approach: one that builds momentum by getting to yes on easier concepts and broad principles before tackling the difficult details and most contested disputes.

In that spirit, I offer what principles I think (not what War on the Rocks thinks) Washington ought to be getting Kyiv and Moscow to commit to so that serious negotiations can proceed and succeed. What follows is not a peace treaty, but a set of principles that can get both belligerents to “yes” on structure, process, and some red lines without forcing any side to accept final outcomes in advance.

The right time for my proposed approach might not yet be here. The 28-point plan has already morphed into something else after Secretary Marco Rubio’s meeting with Ukrainian counterparts in Geneva. And it will likely morph again. Russia will probably refuse to engage with the 28 points (or the 19 points it may have been whittled down to) in their next form and there will be a need for a fresh start in the new year, when both sides see how well they have coped with the winter.

Please do not mistake the below for my personal views on how I want the war to end. International diplomacy in war is often about confronting tragic tradeoffs between justice, security, and the lives that can still be saved. This framework is meant to sketch how the United States could structure talks that are militarily realistic, politically survivable for both parties, and at least defensible to its own allies and public. At the end of this article, I close with some more thoughts about what may be required to get Russia to the table and how that is different from the Trump administration’s current approach.

Security and Military Framework

1. Agenda for Mutual Security

Russia and Ukraine agree that the primary objective of the negotiation is to draft a mutual security arrangement in the form of a treaty that ensures neither state can threaten the political independence of the other. This is referred to hereafter as “final settlement.”

2. Limitations on Conventional Forces

Russia and Ukraine agree to the principle that the final settlement will establish specific ceilings on the size, type, and location of military personnel and heavy weaponry. These limits will be reciprocal and subject to verification.

3. Enforceable Security Architecture

As a part of the final settlement, Russia and Ukraine agree to negotiate a U.S.-brokered security architecture that moves beyond the non-binding assurances of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. The new framework will prioritize enforceable guarantees, potentially involving third-party guarantor states with defined mandates.

4. Demilitarized and Buffer Zones

Russia and Ukraine agree to the principle of establishing demilitarized zones along the line of contact. The specific depth and governance of these zones will be determined during technical negotiations.

5. Strategic Stability and Nuclear Safety

Russia and Ukraine reaffirm their commitments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The final settlement will establish a specific protocol for nuclear energy facilities (including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant) to ensure their safety under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Territorial and Political Resolution

6. Separation of Ceasefire Lines from Border Recognition

Russia and Ukraine agree that any initial ceasefire will separate military lines of contact from questions of legal sovereignty and border recognition. Upon such a ceasefire, they commit to a “renunciation of force” principle under which military lines are frozen for the purpose of halting hostilities, without prejudice to either side’s legal positions, including Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. The final status of disputed territories will be addressed on a separate, longer-term diplomatic track, in which all parties acknowledge that a durable, final settlement will require difficult compromises.

7. Protection of Minority Rights

Russia and Ukraine commit to the principle that the final settlement must align with international standards (e.g., Council of Europe) regarding the protection of linguistic and cultural minorities, ensuring that domestic laws in both states reflect these rights.

Humanitarian and Legal Issues

8. Comprehensive Humanitarian Resolution

Russia and Ukraine agree to the objective of an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war and the return of civilian detainees. A specific working group will be established immediately to establish a framework for the reunification of families and children.

9. Differentiated Justice Mechanism

As a part of a final settlement, Russia and Ukraine agree to distinguish between combatant amnesty and command responsibility. While a general amnesty for combatants can be negotiated to ensure peace, the parties agree that specific categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity will be addressed through a designated legal mechanism. However, both countries agree that their heads of state in charge during the war will be exempt from these investigations if a durable final settlement is secured.

Economic and Reconstruction Framework

10. International Reconstruction Investment

Upon final settlement, Ukraine will consent to an internationally managed reconstruction authority. To ensure sustainability, this authority will prioritize return on investment models rather than simple aid, utilizing legally cleared funding sources.

11. Strategic Energy and Resource Partnership

Ukraine agrees that the post-war economic architecture will include specific bilateral agreements with guarantor states (e.g., the United States) to develop, modernize, and secure critical energy infrastructure and strategic mineral resources.

12. Economic Normalization and Sanctions Relief

Russia agrees that the implementation of a peace treaty will be linked to a phased lifting of sanctions. Sanctions relief will not be immediate but will be conditional upon verified compliance with the treaty’s security provisions.

13. Freedom of Navigation and Critical Infrastructure

Upon final settlement, Russia and Ukraine will guarantee the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and access to international waterways, consistent with existing treaties, agreements, and international law.

Implementation and Verification

14. Independent Monitoring and Verification

Upon final settlement, Russia and Ukraine will agree to the creation of a robust, international monitoring mission (e.g., United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or a mixed commission) empowered to verify compliance with ceasefire lines, troop limitations, and heavy weapon withdrawals.

15. Dispute Resolution Mechanism

The parties agree to establish a standing joint commission to resolve disputes arising from the interpretation or implementation of the treaty, ensuring that minor violations do not lead to a resumption of full-scale hostilities.

Some Final Notes on Setting the Stage for Negotiations

Some of these principles are not close to everything those of us who support Ukraine want to see. Perhaps the most difficult principle to accept for those who, like me, want to see Ukraine prevail will be the ninth, which proposes exempting Russian President Vladimir Putin from war crimes investigations if a final settlement is reached. He deserves to be in prison for the rest of his life. But the challenge now is getting meaningful negotiations to start at all. While the first principle listed above might seem underwhelming to some readers, it may be the most challenging for Moscow to accept because it requires the Kremlin to openly express willingness to give up on its maximalist war aims: the toppling of Ukraine’s government and its replacement with a Russian puppet.

Russia will only take negotiations seriously when the alternative looks worse. Getting to talks is not just a matter of drafting the right principles or finding the right mediator. It is a matter of compellence — of convincing Moscow that continuing the war will hurt it more than entering into a legitimate settlement.

The Trump administration has taken some steps in this direction, including tightening sanctions and making Russian oil exports to India more expensive. That is a start, but compellence has to be systemic rather than episodic.

Diplomatically, compellence means convincing Moscow that there is no better deal coming if it stalls, escalates, or seeks to crack Western unity. That requires consistent signals about what Washington will and will not accept, and a clear link between Russian behavior and the political, economic, and military pressure it faces. Every time the Trump administration suddenly hints it might recognize more of Moscow’s gains or force concessions on Kyiv, only to walk it back, it teaches the Kremlin that patience and intransigence are rewarded. That erodes the credibility of U.S. threats, makes assurances to Ukraine and European allies look contingent on the president’s mood, and turns diplomacy from an instrument of compellence into a series of disconnected gambits Moscow can try to game.

On the military side, any negotiation track will be meaningless if the Kremlin believes time is on its side. That means Washington and its allies should sustain a flow of assistance that preserves Ukraine’s ability to hold the line and, where possible, improve its position: intelligence support, air defense, long-range strike, electronic warfare, and the industrial support to keep ammunition and spare parts moving. The point is to deny Moscow confidence that a grinding war of attrition will eventually sort things out in its favor.

Economically, compellence means treating sanctions and export controls as tools to erode Russia’s long-term war potential and bargaining leverage, not just as a moral statement. That includes enforcing existing measures more ruthlessly, closing off the easy workarounds through third-country shipping, insurance, and financial intermediaries, and tightening controls on the components that feed Russia’s missile and drone production. On this front, the Trump administration’s resolve to get India off Russian oil has been positive. But it would also be productive to exert more pressure on the handful of states that are quietly enabling sanctions evasion. The goal is not to collapse the Russian economy overnight, which is not realistic, but to make clear that a long war leads to an inevitable strangling of Russia’s fiscal and technological base.

None of this is about humiliating Russia for its own sake. It is about convincing the Kremlin that the status quo path leads to greater military risk, tighter economic constraints, and growing diplomatic isolation, while a settlement along the lines sketched above offers a way to lock in some security gains and avoid worse outcomes. If Washington rushes to front-load concessions simply to entice Moscow to the table, it will confuse inducement with unilateral concession and undermine the very compellence that gives diplomacy a chance to work. The tragic tradeoff is that compellence itself carries costs, especially for Ukrainians who continue to fight and suffer while pressure builds. The alternative, however, is a process that treats negotiations as a favor to Russia rather than as the least bad option it is forced to accept.

Ryan Evans is the founder of War on the Rocks.

Image: The White House via Wikimedia Commons