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U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan clearly envisions that Palestinians should continue living in Gaza and that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza.” Most of the plan clashes with the goals of the far-right members of Israel’s current ruling coalition, who seek permanent Israeli control of Gaza as part of a “Greater Israel.” However, their vision of a future Gaza in which Israelis replace Palestinians remains very much alive.
Much of the analysis among think tanks and media in the United States, Europe, Israel, and Arab states has focused on the challenges and potential opportunities for moving beyond the immediate ceasefire to implementing more of Trump’s peace plan — including how to disarm Hamas, stabilize and rebuild Gaza, and create conditions for Palestinian statehood. Such analysis contributes to a crucial discussion about how to move forward, and it often acknowledges the serious challenges. However, much of the discussion overlooks the far-right actors who are crucial to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current coalition.
In a New York Times essay, Shira Efron addressed the far-right factor, arguing that the ceasefire represents “a defeat — a necessary and blessed defeat — of this government’s messianic vision.” In her essay, Efron makes many excellent points, including identifying how Netanyahu presents the ceasefire very differently than Trump does, the prime minister’s failure to fulfill his promise of destroying Hamas, and Trump’s crucial role in reaching a ceasefire deal.
However, for Israel’s far right, the ceasefire deal is only a setback — not a defeat. Efron and some other commentators understandably hope to see Israel’s far right pushed back to the fringes of Israeli society. However, to have a realistic chance of success, negotiators should be ready for the far right to attempt to spoil peace efforts. It is crucial not to underestimate the determination and capabilities of the far-right movement.
Israel’s Far Right
The current ruling coalition is the most extreme right-wing government in Israel’s history. However, it draws on a long legacy of a far-right movement that often received varying levels of official support under right-wing governments led by the Likud party. The far-right settler movement seeks to expand Jewish settlement in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza and ensure permanent Israeli control over those areas. The current Israeli government, which took power in late 2022, includes several far-right figures. Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich are the most prominent, and others include Minister of Innovation, Science, and Technology Gila Gamliel and Minister of Heritage Amichai Eliyahu. Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and others have opposed any deal that would cede Israeli control over Gaza, calling instead for permanent Israeli control and settlement. They pushed Netanyahu — who agrees with them on many points and has long flirted with the far right — to prioritize control over Gaza above negotiating the release of hostages, and were very successful until the recent ceasefire. At the same time, they have pushed an aggressive expansion of Israeli control over the West Bank, including expanding settlements, pursuing military operations that have displaced thousands of Palestinians, and changing legal and governance structures to facilitate Israeli control.
Those who would like to see Israel’s far right lose influence have reason to hope that the ceasefire and potential peace plan represent a thorough defeat. Indeed, Trump’s plan is directly at odds with those Israelis who sought to use the war that followed the Hamas-led attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, to force Palestinians out of Gaza and ensure long-term Israeli control. If the ceasefire evolves into a longer-term peace process under the Trump plan, then the far right would suffer a major defeat.
However, the far-right movement accomplished much in the three years that it has been a key part of the ruling coalition and sees an opportunity to keep moving toward de facto annexation of the West Bank and permanent control over Gaza. The U.S. government is unlikely to take concrete steps to stop it, leaving the Israeli public as the only actor that could turn this setback into a more lasting defeat.
Far-Right Spoilers
The far-right settler movement has long sought to ensure Jewish settlement in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. Jerusalem and the West Bank have greater historical, religious, and symbolic importance for most Jews, but the hardcore settlement movement always sought to settle Gaza as well. Some Israeli leaders — notably former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon — came to believe that there was a tradeoff. The thinking was that abandoning Gaza would allow Israel to focus security and diplomatic resources on settlement expansion in the West Bank, which was a major reason why Sharon dismantled Israeli settlements in Gaza in 2005. However, much of the settlement movement never accepted that logic, and far-right leaders such as Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and Knesset member Limor Son Har-Melech started calling for a return to Gaza settlement after the Oct. 7 attack and saw an opportunity to undo what they saw as a foolish decision to withdraw in 2005.
The Israeli settler movement was a key spoiler throughout the Oslo Accords process, constantly working to undermine any opportunity to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank. The movement has successfully created so many settlements and supporting infrastructure that a territorially contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank is now nearly impossible. Furthermore, Netanyahu was a highly successful spoiler in the Oslo Accords implementation process — as he has bragged. As new peace efforts begin, the reality is that the current Israeli government is led by politicians who have taken pride in spoiling previous peace processes and blocking the establishment of a functioning Palestinian state. Notably, Hamas was the other major spoiler undermining the Oslo Accords, and it remains the most significant Palestinian actor in Gaza — yet another reason for skepticism about the future.
Far-Right Power
The ceasefire and (so far) agreement to Trump’s plan is not what the Israeli far right wants. However, the movement is closer to reaching its objectives of settling and permanently controlling the West Bank and Gaza than it has been in decades.
While many observers focused on the horrors of the Oct. 7 attack and then the nightmare of overwhelming bombardment, displacement, and famine in Gaza, far-right ministers and settlers accelerated the expansion and consolidation of Israeli control of the West Bank. Since 1967, the Israeli settler movement has gradually taken more and more land in the West Bank. Sometimes, the government directly assisted in creating and subsidizing settlements. In other cases, settlers grabbed hilltops and other strategic areas even when the government officially forbade it. Occasionally the military removed such “illegal” outposts, but, more often, the Israeli government protected the settlements, connected them to infrastructure, and retroactively recognized them. With direct or indirect government support — and even when facing government objections — settlement in the West Bank proceeded. Under the current government, official and unofficial settlement expansion has intensified.
The settler movement was less successful in maintaining settlements in Gaza. However, the ongoing widespread destruction of Palestinian society offers an unprecedented opportunity for the far right to gradually consolidate military control over part or all of Gaza and begin reintroducing Israeli settlements.
Under the ceasefire terms, the Israeli military withdrew from parts of Gaza, but it still occupies about 53 percent of the territory. In a future scenario in which the military maintains control of large amounts of land, the Israeli settler movement could try to use a similar playbook to the one that has worked so well for them in the West Bank. Settlers could start trying to establish small outposts in the Israeli-controlled area, where relatively few Palestinians currently live, and there is extensive rubble on which to build. There would be challenges, including the reality that a fortified wall surrounds Gaza, making the situation somewhat different than earlier periods in Gaza and the West Bank, when there were fewer physical barriers that might block settlers. Nonetheless, the settler movement is very adept at working around such difficulties. If the current or future Israeli government openly supports the settlers — or looks the other way while publicly opposing settlement (which has happened in the West Bank repeatedly) — then there would be little to stop them.
Overreliance on the United States
The United States remains the only power that can effectively pressure Israel, and the Trump administration played a major role in achieving the ceasefire. Nearly everyone who is optimistic — even just cautiously so — puts most of their faith in the idea that Trump will ensure that Israel and Hamas both stick to his plan. As David Miliband, head of the International Rescue Committee, recently said, Trump deserves credit and, “It’s now his plan. And, when something is his, he’s really committed to it.” Similarly, Efron wrote that the idea of settlements in Gaza is “Abandoned, according to the plan” and that West Bank annexation is “Shelved after Mr. Trump said on Sept. 25 that he would not allow it.” In The Atlantic, Yair Rosenberg wrote about the risk that Israel will delay implementing the peace deal and therefore provide “a window for the settlers and their political allies to try to insinuate themselves into those parts of Gaza,” saying that “Only Trump can stop this from happening—at least until Israel holds new elections next year that could boot Netanyahu and his partners from power.”
However, the assumption that Trump will ensure that Israel and Hamas move forward according to his plan is on very thin ice. Some skeptics reasonably express concern that Trump will lose interest in personally engaging in the type of lengthy, detailed process that would be required to sustain peace between Israelis and Palestinians. But the strongest reason for skepticism runs far deeper in U.S. history than the current president’s personal interests.
For decades, the United States opposed expanding Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the forced displacement of Palestinians, and intentional efforts to choke off the fledging Palestinian economy — but Washington never used its main source of leverage to try to force Israel into implementing such demands. If the United States was never willing, over decades, to seriously cut more than $3 billion in annual military aid to Israel (with the exception of President George H.W. Bush’s withholding loan guarantees), why would it do so now? Even during the extraordinary destruction of Gaza after the Oct. 7 attack, President Joseph Biden didn’t do more than stop a delivery of 2,000 pound bombs while significantly increasing other military aid. What evidence is there that the United States would truly push Israel to follow through on any American president’s demands?
Given its successful West Bank playbook, Israel’s far-right movement could use the devastation of Gaza and the ongoing partial military presence there to quietly start building homes and infrastructure for Israeli settlers and to begin moving people into parts of Gaza. What would the United States do? Complain, probably. But use the hard leverage it has? Not likely.
Leaders in the far-right movement do not believe that they need to make concessions to Washington — as they clearly demonstrated on Oct. 22, when they voted for initial legislation to annex large parts of the West Bank, defying Netanyahu and provoking U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, who was visiting Israel at the time. Despite Vance’s expression of annoyance, there is little evidence to suggest the U.S. government would cut military aid to Israel in response to Israeli pursuit of far-right objectives in the West Bank or Gaza. Without a credible threat of losing such support, the far right will proceed as it wishes.
Netanyahu has years of experience with U.S. presidents. He agreed to the deal now because he politically had to — thanks partly to Trump. But Netanyahu is a master at dragging things out. Going forward, he will likely praise Trump’s peace efforts in public while simultaneously sabotaging negotiations and blaming the Palestinians for any setbacks. Meanwhile, he’ll pursue his own political interests of remaining in power.
The Israeli Electorate
Washington is unlikely to force Netanyahu to act against the interests of his far-right allies for long, but it is not the only actor with that ability. Netanyahu must respond to the Israeli electorate. Although Israeli public opinion has shifted strongly toward the political right in recent years, it was one of the factors pressuring Netanyahu to agree to the ceasefire. A majority of Israelis wanted the war to end and wanted to prioritize bringing home the hostages.
In accordance with the ceasefire deal, Hamas released the remaining Israeli hostages who were still alive and is in the process of returning the remains of others. With the hostages home, will most Israelis lose interest in the war in Gaza and allow their government to indefinitely occupy part or all of the territory? Or will much of the public — already exhausted from fighting on several fronts and relying on overstretched reserve forces — force the government to pursue peace?
When there were still Israeli hostages held captive in Gaza, polling found that a majority of Israelis supported a deal involving Israeli withdrawal from the territory in exchange for the release of all hostages. A poll from September found that 60 percent of Jewish Israelis (who make up 74 percent of the Israeli population) said it was time to end the war in Gaza, but most cited the danger to hostages as the main reason to end the war. With the hostages now home, how will the public view any continuing occupation of Gazan territory? A strong majority of Israelis oppose Jewish settlement in Gaza, and the far-right parties have limited support — although, in the Israeli political system, very small parties can still have outsized power in a governing coalition. The real question isn’t whether many Israelis support the far-right settlement movement but rather whether many Israelis will use their votes and voices to actively oppose far-right efforts.
The reality is that the Israeli public is unlikely to direct its energy toward preventing the far right from pursuing its goals in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, a poll from August found that 76 percent of Jewish Israelis agreed that “there are no innocent people in Gaza.” Polling earlier this year found that somewhere between 53 to 82 percent of Jewish Israelis support forcing Palestinians out of Gaza, and there is little support for Palestinian statehood.
The Israeli public could deliver a substantial defeat to the far right by voting them out of power. Regular elections are scheduled for October 2026, but early elections could happen if the current coalition falls apart, Netanyahu pursues early elections, or the Knesset fails to pass an annual budget by the end of March. A recent poll found substantial — though certainly not overwhelming — public support for early elections.
Netanyahu’s current coalition depends on far-right parties, despite their small size, so he has strong reasons to placate them. While many of Netanyahu’s critics hope that the public will oust him, the reality is that Israelis are split in their views of the prime minister, and he still has many supporters. Polls suggest that his right-wing Likud party would still be the largest party in the Knesset if elections were held today. Even if far-right parties lose their roles in the governing coalition, there’s a good chance that a future government would turn a blind eye to settlement expansion or provide quiet support.
Looking Ahead
It is easy but unhelpful to predict doom for the future. Many serious analysts make valid points that the current ceasefire and peace plan offer the best reason for hope. However, Israel’s far right remains in the ruling coalition, with extensive powers to consolidate settlement in the West Bank and to potentially facilitate settlement in Gaza. As long as Netanyahu depends on his far-right allies to hold onto power, then Washington would have to push very hard to force him to curtail settlement efforts and remain involved in a peace process. History suggests that the U.S. government is unlikely to use its full leverage to do so. The Israeli electorate also could try to oust the far right. However, despite the far-right movement’s general unpopularity in Israel, the public is unlikely to devote significant energy to blocking the movement’s efforts against Palestinians.
If any peace plan has a chance to succeed, then stakeholders will need to acknowledge and be prepared for the Israeli far-right movement to take advantage of its progress in recent years to press ahead the minute the world — and perhaps the Israeli public — isn’t closely watching.
Kerry Boyd Anderson is a Membership Editor at War on the Rocks. She previously provided political risk analysis on the Middle East and global security issues to private and public sector clients and wrote a weekly column for Arab News. She received an M.Sc. in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a B.A. in global studies from the University of Iowa. All opinions stated here are her own.
Image: Ashraf Amra via Wikimedia Commons
