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In 2018, Alexander Lanoszka and Michael Hunzeker wrote “The Case for a Permanent U.S. Military Presence in Poland,” where they argued that a permanent base in Poland would serve as a deterrent for further Russian aggression in the European theater. Seven years later, we asked them to revisit their arguments.Image: U.S. Army Spc. Aaron GoodIn your 2018 article, “The Case for a Permanent U.S. Military Presence in Poland,” you argue that a permanent base in Poland would signal to Russia that the United States is committed to long-term defense and deterrence in Poland and the Baltic states. The United States adopted permanent bases in Poland in 2023, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Do you think establishing the new bases then was too little, too late?We are skeptical that a permanent U.S. military presence in Poland would have deterred Russia from launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian leaders have long devalued Ukrainian sovereignty and nationhood. They were also too optimistic about subduing that country with brute force after more deniable means of subversion and influence ceased being effective. As a practical matter, the military presence that we advocated would have been primarily defensive. Based in Poland, it also would have been too small and positioned far enough to tip the military balance in Ukraine. As a political matter, even if the U.S. permanent presence had been large and sufficiently offensive-oriented to surge into Ukraine, neither the Biden administration nor European NATO members had much appetite for any such initiative. That Washington and many European capitals worried over possible escalation when it came to supplying military kit to Ukraine suggests that a few thousand more U.S. troops in Poland would not have changed that risk tolerance. Indeed, even the minor presence that we supported was seen by some as too provocative