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Two shocking stories signal that the use of drones by Latin American criminal groups is entering new and dangerous territory. Most recently, Intelligence Online reported that a joint investigation by Ukraine and Mexico uncovered several cases of individuals linked to Mexican cartels enlisting in the Ukrainian International Legion to gain experience using weaponized aerial drones. Reportedly, the investigation also found signs that members of Colombian insurgent groups may have done the same with the intention of bringing these skills back to the Western Hemisphere. Russia has also allegedly provided training to Colombian nonstate groups.
On July 2 the Colombian navy interdicted for the first time a semi-submersible “narco-submarine” designed to be piloted remotely via a Starlink terminal. Whereas the Mexican cartels learning from the battlefields of Ukraine underscores how global conflicts are feeding into criminal drone tactics, the Colombian underwater drones represent an innovation with deep roots in Latin America’s own criminal dynamics.
Latin America’s criminal networks are not merely copying the rest of the world when it comes to drones. They are important players in the development and refinement of tactics. Governments in the region need to adapt — and fast — or risk having their sovereignty further eroded by heavily armed nonstate groups. The United States, which has signaled a more muscular approach to organized crime in recent months, can play a key role tracking criminal drone operators to cut off the knowledge base for these groups. Furthermore, by partnering with countries like Mexico and Colombia in their fight against illicit drones, the United States can itself gain valuable firsthand data on how these systems are evolving in the hands of adversaries.
First-Person View, Fiber-optics, and New Domains
Criminal organizations are constantly modifying, experimenting, and testing drone tactics in real time. The pace of such innovation is on the order of weeks, if not days.
Most notable is the rapid adoption of first-person view one-way attack drones by both Colombian and Mexican nonstate groups. Unlike drone-dropped munitions, which usually require a drone to fly directly above a target before releasing an unguided explosive like a hand grenade to fall onto the target, one-way attack drones typically carry an explosive that detonates on contact with the target, destroying the drone in the process. This allows operators to fly directly into their targets, navigating vegetation, buildings, and other forms of cover for a high degree of precision.
In Mexico, the first documented one-way attack drone identified by open source analysts was recorded in April 2025. In the months that followed, several more cases cropped up, with these drones now featuring alongside more traditional quadcopter bombers on cartel social media and in equipment seizures by Mexican security forces. One recent video involved alleged Jalisco New Generation Cartel members discussing how to configure drones for one-way attacks.
In Colombia, one of the first documented attacks by an explosive-armed drone was posted to X (formerly Twitter) by the open source intelligence account War Noir on June 12, 2025. On July 20, the National Liberation Army reportedly used a similar drone to attack Colombian forces in the fiercely contested Catatumbo region, killing three and injuring another eight. That same month a different rebel group attacked a Colombian navy riverine patrol boat using an one-way attack drone. While this resulted in minimal damage, it demonstrates the expanding target set for Colombian armed groups. This is further evidenced by yet unconfirmed reports of rebels using a drone to cause a police helicopter to crash in Antioquia — a move which, if corroborated, would mirror tactics employed by insurgents in Myanmar.
While open source reporting does not necessarily reveal the full picture, it is most likely these types of drones are more widespread, not less, among criminal groups than the above analysis would indicate.
One battlefield innovation not yet observed in Latin America is the use of fiber-optic cable to connect the drone to its control system. These thin tethers provide an operator with an unjammable connection to their drone, vital for when the electromagnetic spectrum is contested. Fiber-optic drones, however, sacrifice mobility and flexibility, needing to navigate carefully so that their cables are not tangled or severed — meaning it is usually preferable to use a traditional remote link when jamming is not a serious concern. Latin American militaries currently have limited jamming capacity, so it seems unlikely fiber-optic drones will emerge as a significant force. Nevertheless, this capability is proof that jamming alone is no silver bullet. Even if Latin American militaries and police succeed in denying the electromagnetic spectrum to criminal drones, there is a readily available playbook for these groups to follow in response.
Another key development to watch for will be how these drones continue integrating with cartel armor tactics in Mexico. Improvised armored fighting vehicles, known colloquially as “narco-tanks” or “Monsters,” have gone from tools of propaganda and intimidation to cartel mainstays as fighting in the country’s hinterlands has intensified. While individual narco-tanks differ considerably in their level of sophistication and protection, as early as 2023 one of these vehicles was captured sporting an anti-drone “cope cage” resembling those found on Russian and Ukrainian armor. More advanced models reportedly incorporate their own jammers for further protection. Meanwhile, increasing photographic and video evidence of cartel foot soldiers bearing anti-drone jammers and GPS spoofing systems suggests that drone and counter-drone tactics are a reality these groups are already incorporating into their daily operations.
Reports from the front lines of cartel warfare lend credence to this assessment. In an interview with InSight Crime, a former member of the United Cartels described scenes from a battle with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel that could have been ripped from the trenches of the Donbas:
They’d shot down the drone, and the grenade had not exploded. A few gave a celebratory yell and ran to retrieve it…As they approached the drone, they heard the rumble of the Monsters. There were at least three, Carlos said, each coming from a different angle. The sound of gunfire followed.
In skirmishes across Mexico, cartels have learned to use a combination of improvised explosive devices, trenches and earthworks, armored vehicles, and drones to shape opposing forces and attack from multiple vectors simultaneously. As these groups continue to experiment with this form of crude combined arms, there is a serious risk this may allow them to more effectively challenge the Mexican state itself. Vehicles like the AMX-VCI or Humvee used as transports by the Mexican army are vulnerable to attack against their relatively light top armor, a weakness that drones are particularly well-suited to exploit.
Finally, the seizure of an unmanned narco-sub demonstrates that the air is far from the only environment ripe for illicit drones. As detailed by in a report from Small Wars Journal, drone narco-subs offer many advantages over crewed platforms: a lower profile increasing stealth, more space for cargo due to the elimination of crew, and the ability to loiter at sea for potentially weeks at a time before moving in to deliver their payloads. Especially in wake of the recent U.S. strike on an alleged narcotrafficking boat from Venezuela, interest in unmanned alternatives for drug running is likely to increase significantly among criminal organizations in the region.
Also worth analysis are ground drones which have yet to see notable use by criminal groups in the region. Battery life and mobility limitations, as well as the more limited commercial availability of such equipment, suggest that aerial drones will remain the platform of choice. Nevertheless, it seems realistic that groups may experiment with more limited applications of autonomy, such as remotely operated turrets on narco-tanks. In the Colombian context, improvised ground drones might complement existing car bombs to deliver larger explosive payloads than can be carried by small aerial drones.
Fighting Fire with Fire
Eager to keep up in the drone arms race, Latin American armed forces have ramped up their efforts to acquire and field drones. To date, most of the systems acquired have been unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms like the Airbus SIRTAP purchased by Colombia from Spain in 2024 or the U.S. RQ-1 ScanEagle operated by Brazil. However, as clashes between state forces and criminal groups intensify throughout the region, some governments are seeking to acquire armed optionality as well.
Colombia most recently made headlines for its efforts to build a domestically produced drone bomber. Known as the “Dragom,” the platform is a conventional quadcopter capable of dropping explosives and carrying supplies over challenging terrain, making it a versatile addition to the country’s armed forces. Smaller drones designed to drop grenades are also being experimented with, in part out of necessity, by local security forces in Mexico. These initiatives are laudable, and certainly there is little time to waste in familiarizing armed forces throughout the region with the basics of drone and counter-drone tactics. However, procurement of armed drones by Latin American militaries also opens serious legal and ethical questions.
The emergence of new drone manufacturers and technological innovations has drastically lowered costs, allowing many militaries to procure these systems. But America’s own experience with drone warfare underscores that precision does not always mean discrimination between legitimate targets and noncombatants.
On the African continent in particular, governments facing insurgency have embraced medium altitude long endurance drones like the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. These platforms can loiter with several munitions over a target for extended periods of time, a capability previously the provenance of advanced Western militaries. While a powerful asset, without strict rules of engagement and procedures for assessing collateral damage, these systems have major humanitarian consequences. According to a report from Drone Wars UK, between 2021 and 2024, aerial drones have been responsible for at least 943 civilian deaths in African countries, almost equaling the highest civilian casualty estimates given for the entire U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan.
In the hands of an unscrupulous government like Venezuela, medium altitude long endurance drones could become yet another potent tool for intimidating and victimizing their populace. Without updated training and regulations, the proliferation of weaponized drones could merely intensify the crossfire between criminals and the state, with lethal consequences for civilians caught between the two.
The Shape of Things to Come
Despite the rapid pace of adaptation underway in Latin America’s criminal underworld, the sophistication of these groups’ tactics should not be overstated. They have made rapid leaps in innovation, but their organizational structure, discipline, and doctrine remain haphazard. Expertise is concentrated in a relatively narrow slice of their membership, which can be targeted effectively to have a disproportionate impact on overall capabilities.
The United States neglects the evolving threat of nonstate drone use in Latin America at its own risk. A more aggressive strategy to fight back against this challenge could not only benefit U.S. partners in the region, but might also boost America’s own readiness for future conflict. With the Trump administration urging a greater focus on utilizing military tools against transnational criminals, disrupting illicit drone networks should be a top priority. While Ukraine remains at the bleeding edge in terms of drone tactics, Latin America offers a unique opportunity for U.S. personnel to embed with partner militaries and gain hands-on expertise in counter-drone operations. Such a partnership would also be a valuable step to defuse tensions with countries like Mexico, who are fearful that U.S. counter-crime operations could encroach on their national sovereignty.
One of the other key benefits the United States may offer is in tracking criminal drone operators. As in Ukraine, it is vastly more efficient to eliminate the individuals trained to pilot drones than it is trying to destroy individual drones, which can themselves be cheaper than the munitions expended to take them down. The United States has an array of intelligence assets (including its own advanced reconnaissance drones) which could enable more precise operations by partner forces. Unarmed MQ-9 drones operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have already ranged hundreds of miles into Mexico to conduct reconnaissance of cartel activities, offering a template to build upon.
Finally, the United States and Latin American governments should always be prepared for adaptation. Striking drone operators could increase the demand for autonomous systems that need only be launched to go about their mission without a pilot. These are currently beyond the capabilities of Latin American groups, but as advances in both drones and artificial intelligence continue, the next evolution may be just around the corner.
Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies Americas Program.
Image: Midjourney
