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The air in Iraq is thick these days with political anticipation. On Nov. 11, 2025, Iraqis will head to the polls — for the seventh time since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 — to elect a new 329-seat parliament from among a crowded field of 37 alliances, 38 parties, and nearly 80 candidates running as independents. With more than 21 million registered voters, the contest looms large, stirring talks in coffeehouses, WhatsApp groups, marketplaces, and living rooms across the country.

Atmospherics suggest the opportunity for change, if not a radical one. Voter energy appears renewed, and expectations of higher turnout are real. A government emerging from this election with a stronger popular mandate could offer the political stability necessary for consistent policymaking, credible reform, and a more predictable posture on the international stage. In a polarized Middle East, a functional Iraq could serve as a bridge between rival powers, tempering regional tensions and leveraging its status as both a major energy producer and a geopolitical hinge state.

For the United States, the stakes are particularly high. A more resilient and sufficiently independent Iraq could represent a long-delayed dividend on decades of strategic, political, and military investment and cooperation.

And yet, for all the optimism, the election is unlikely to fundamentally rupture the political order that has defined Iraq since 2003. The system of muhasasa — the power-sharing arrangement that apportions power among Iraq’s three main ethno-sectarian groups — remains deeply entrenched. Once conceived as a safeguard for pluralism, it has become widely viewed as the scaffolding of corruption, collusion, and patronage networks that continues to define Iraqi politics today. While the vote may not undo the muhasasa, it could change the internal balance of power, recalibrating which elites hold the levers of government.

A Third Shiite Path?  

Against this backdrop, marked by the withdrawal of major Shiite players like Muqtada al Sadr’s al-Tayyar al-Watani al-Shiite (the Shiite Patriotic Current) and former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s Tahaluf al-Nasr (Victory Alliance), incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shea al Sudani, a Shiite Muslim, emerges as a defining figure and an election frontrunner. His popular appeal is rooted in his reputation as a pragmatic, managerial, and moderate leader, garnering him rare cross-cutting appeal in a fragmented political field. A key pillar of al Sudani’s growing popularity and legitimacy since taking office in October 2022 has been his ability to balance competing interests while projecting a unifying national vision.

This balance has been achieved through three main mechanisms. The first is his domestic balancing acts, as he is widely seen as a manager of contradictions, attempting to strengthen state institutions while maintaining intimate ties to the very actors who weaken them (as important are his balancing acts with both Washington and Tehran). The second is his appealing nationalist, non-sectarian rhetoric that contrasts with Iraq’s historically sectarian political discourse. Finally,  his tangible track record in public service delivery — energy projects, roads and bridges, refineries, and so on —  has earned him credibility even in non-Shiite majority areas of the country. Together, these have bolstered his position as a pragmatic leader in a deeply fragmented political landscape.

For many Iraqis,  al Sudani represents the hope for a “third Shiite path,” positioned somewhere between the conservatives of the pro-Iran al-Itar al-Tanseqi (the Coordination Framework) and the more religious-nationalist Shiites like al Sadr. It remains to be seen if this hope materializes. At present, it is hard to know without a decisive electoral outcome that could allow al Sudani the time and space to act on his own ideas or ideology. Similarly, it is naturally difficult for him to do so at present, because he still relies on the Coordination Framework to stay in office; his own party, al-Furatayn, has only two members in Parliament. As such, there are limits to how much he can do. That could and should change if he has, say, 70 members in Parliament, and can ally with like-minded parties and individuals. Then we might be able to see his own ideas come to the surface more clearly.

But if one were to judge by al Sudani’s performance over the last two years, and despite his pragmatic and popular approach, it becomes clear that he represents merely a new, younger face of the Coordination Framework. While there has always been fierce competition between al Sudani and other members of the Framework, he is still operating within their established system of formal and informal rules defined by, among other things, patronage networks, sectarianism, and the dominance of political factions with paramilitary wings, which has long shaped Iraq’s governance. In this respect, a win by al Sudani may still reshape elite politics without necessarily or formally disrupting the system.

His newly launched pre-election alliance, Tahaluf al-Immar wa al-Tanmiya (the Reconstruction and Development Alliance) — a broad coalition of technocrats, nationalists, tribal leaders, civil-minded figures, and veterans of traditional Shiite parties such as Members of Parliament Hanan Fatlawi and Aliya Nusaif, formerly of the Itlaf Dawlat al-Qanon (State of Law Alliance) of former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki — represents a bid to consolidate a pragmatic governing base. If translated into electoral capital, it could give him the leverage to build a more coherent governing coalition than his predecessors — if one were to assume that his disparate array of political candidates and entities have come together for the clear purpose of reforming the status quo from within. If this materializes, it will mark no small achievement in a country long plagued by fragile leadership and eroding public trust. By contrast, Iraq’s once unrivaled traditional political heavyweights, such as al Maliki, Sayyed Ammar al Hakim, and Sheikh Qais al Khazeli, are likely to underperform electorally and to see their standing erode over allegations of state capture, and, importantly, an inability to resonate with a largely  younger electorate. Therefore, a significant test for al Sudani would be to show that he is marching on a new path and that his current membership in an alliance dominated by paramilitary groups was no more than an expedient transitory necessity.

Beyond parliamentary arithmetic, the election will likely shape the coalition politics that determine Iraq’s domestic politics and foreign policy orientation. The outcome is expected to influence Iraq’s role in a Middle East that is being reshaped by shifting alliances and regional tensions. For observers abroad, the November vote offers a window into if Iraq can consolidate a measure of political stability, whether it emerges as a more confident regional actor or continues to stumble under the weight of its political traditions, or if elite bargains will once again dilute the promise of change.

Current Political Landscape

The 2025 election will unfold against a backdrop of turbulence. Several key political players have withdrawn from the electoral race, shifting the political landscape, especially in the case of al Sadr. The reintroduction by the Coordination Framework-dominated Parliament of a closed list electoral system, which was used in the recent provincial elections and will be used again for the upcoming parliamentary one after it was abandoned in 2020 in response to protest pressure, returned control back to entrenched elites and will make it harder for smaller parties and individual independents to win seats. At the same time, social and economic inequalities have deepened, with many Iraqis feeling the widening gap between the general population on the one hand and the political class and their cronies and operatives on the other. Meanwhile, fueled by insufficient fiscal management and corruption, Iraq’s economic fragility continues to worsen. All this comes as the country faces urgent environmental crises, including severe drought and water shortage, threatening both the agricultural sector and long-term stability.

Iraq once again finds itself at a familiar crossroads: reformist aspirations colliding with entrenched power. Among other things, the electoral contest pits two broader visions of the future against each other: institutional consolidation versus militia autonomy. A draft law that would have further institutionalized the Popular Mobilization Forces’ place within the state apparatus remains stalled amid fears, both domestic and international, that it would cement Iranian influence through proxy forces. It also pits al Sudani against some unruly militias. Recently, al Sudani has signaled his willingness to check militia power, most dramatically with the removal of senior commanders from Kataib Hezbollah following their deadly clash with the security forces of Interior Ministry in Baghdad.

Beyond the politics of the “Shiite house,” the Sunni and Kurdish houses are also recalibrating their strategies. The once-dominant Taqqadum (Progress) party, led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi, faces fierce competition from rival Sunni groups eager to capture disaffected Sunni voters. In the Kurdish north, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the New Generation movement remain mired in their own internal rivalries, weakening their bargaining positions in Baghdad.

Mechanisms of Power

Beneath Iraq’s fragmented political arena lies a unifying architecture: an informal web of power that blurs the line between state and party, militia and ministry. Political elites of the various ethno-sectarian stripes exercise dominance not merely through ideological outfits but also through control of institutions. Ministries, commissions, and state offices function less as national bureaucracies than as partisan fiefdoms. Ask almost any Iraqi about a public office, and the reply is telling: “it belongs to” a specific party.

Economic clout reinforces this system. Political actors monopolize state contracts, dominate public-sector hiring, and use these levers to reward loyalty and discipline dissent. The media landscape is equally captured: Television networks and news outlets, often owned outright by political elites and parties, curate narratives designed to entrench their patrons’ legitimacy and discredit rivals. The result is a hybridized order that is part bureaucratic, part patronage-based, and part coercive. It is neither purely democratic nor fully authoritarian, but a form of competitive authoritarianism that operates beneath Iraq’s democratic façade.

Al Sudani’s Appeal 

Al Sudani appeal rests not merely on incumbency but also on a record of public service delivery and balancing political acts. This will likely translate into electoral gains in most areas. If his coalition secures 50 to 60 seats, with strong showings in Baghdad and the Shiite heartlands of southern Iraq including Basra, Dhi-Qar, Diwaniyah, Najaf, and Babel, it will enable him to enter post-election coalition negotiations with a decisive first-mover advantage. An endorsement or approval from al Sadr could turn this advantage into a landslide, especially in provinces where al Sadr is historically a dominant player, such as Baghdad, Najaf, and Dhi-Qar. Indeed, even without his formal return to the process, al Sadr remains the wildcard. His likely silence on, say, al Sudani’s campaigning in Sadr City in Baghdad and other Sadr strongholds across the country, may be read as a tacit endorsement, as al Sudani continues to promise a fierce fight against corruption, the subordination of armed factions to the state, and adoption of Iraq-first policies, all things Sadr. That possibility would dramatically marginalize hardline elements of the Coordination Framework and could cement al Sudani as the system’s most indispensable power broker.

Moreover, al Sudani’s popularity extends beyond Shiite provinces. His non-sectarian rhetoric and track record in public service delivery across the country have earned him credibility in Sunni-majority areas like Nineveh and Salah al-Din, though it remains to be seen if this popularity turns into electoral votes in an explicitly sectarian political system. It also remains to be seen whether al Sudani popularity in Shiite places like Kerbala and Diwaniya could pry away seats from former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law bloc and Iran-aligned factions such as Badr and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

A surge in voter turnout, which we expect, could amplify Sudani gains. Many Iraqis appear unwilling to repeat the low-participation missteps of the 2021 election, when boycotts by pro-reform constituencies ceded ground to entrenched partisan parties. The legacy of the 2019 Tishreen (October) protest movement, its frustrations and limitations, has left a growing recognition that only the ballot box can translate popular anger into structural change. For many, al Sudani could be the initial pragmatic vehicle for that possibility.

Should al Sudani consolidate power, the implications are significant. Economically, he is expected to continue channeling investment into public services and infrastructure, while aiming for energy independence by 2027, an achievement that would be transformative for both the economy, political stability, and overall everyday life. On the flip side, with additional investments, public hirings, and expansion of social safety programs, al Sudani has clearly brought the country to a critical financial juncture, and he will likely find himself compelled — or incentivized — to make economic reforms, some of which would be painful to ordinary citizens. These may include lowering the value of the Iraqi dinar, as he will likely find himself in need of financial liquidity, which the government is increasingly struggling with, to pay public salaries and investment projects.

A strong parliamentary base could give al Sudani the legislative cover to resist patronage networks and pursue anti-corruption probes, while gradually reining in militia autonomy through a mix of institutional incentives and selective coercion. Yet the test of consolidation hinges on several critical variables: the size of his paramilitary bloc; al Sadr’s support; the ability of reformist civil lists to disrupt the entrenched powers of traditional parties of old elites in places like Dhi-Qar, Wasit, and Najaf; the response of Najaf’s clerical establishment; and whether anti-reform elites adapt, resist, or slide into irrelevance. The battle for Baghdad’s seat distribution and the ability of independents to siphon votes from entrenched elites may prove the ultimate bellwether.

Al Sudani’s advantage is real but not preordained. His success will hinge on whether Iraqis see in him not just a manager of balancing acts but a leader capable of redefining the political tempo for post-2003 system.

Looking Ahead

A potential al Sudani victory is unlikely to revolutionize Iraq’s political architecture. Known more as a centrist manager than a revolutionary, his second term would probably usher in a period of cautious consolidation rather than dramatic change. Yet in a system long paralyzed by dysfunction, even incremental progress could mark a turning point. Indeed, incrementalism is nothing but a sensible reform mechanism, as reform need not to be treated as either inevitable or impossible. Importantly, power redistribution, even though occurring within the framework of the muhasasa system, and while not revolutionary, could still be meaningful, especially if al Sudani can consolidate his electoral base and marginalize more anti-reform and hardline elements. The real test will be whether this incrementalism, designed to ensure stability, can produce enough visible gains to breathe life into a status quo many consider clinically ailing. This hinges on three important factors: the resilience of Iraq’s institutions, the mobilization of public support, and on regional and international support. Entrenched elites are unlikely to surrender their rents without a fight, and without broad societal and international backing, even modest reforms risk reversal. Iraqis have repeatedly shown, most vividly during the Tishreen protests, that they crave better governance. But unless that energy is channeled into sustained political pressure, the forces of inertia will likely outlast incremental reform.

Ultimately, if it is to last, Iraq’s reform path will have to be decided in Baghdad. Still, if incremental progress holds, it could unlock not only greater stability at home but also new opportunities for a region in search of anchors.

Yasir Kuoti is a Ph.D. student in political science at Boston University and non-resident fellow at the Baghdad-based Bayan Center for Studies and Planning. Follow him on X at @Ykuoti.

Ali Taher al-Hamoud, Ph.D., is a political sociologist and the executive director of the Bayan Center for Studies and Planning.

Image: Wikimedia Commons