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The Marine Corps relies on a sense of crisis to promote and prevent change more than any other institution I’ve come across. As one well-known Marine leader wrote over 40 years ago “the continuous struggle for a viable existence fixed clearly one of the distinguishing characteristics of the Corps — a sensitive paranoia, sometimes justified, sometimes not.” Indeed, many times throughout the history of our country, leaders have called into question whether the Marine Corps should exist. But this has not happened in any serious way for many decades. The paranoia has long since veered into the “not justified” category. Yet it persists.

For those of you who haven’t been following the biggest family feud the Marine Corps has had in generations, let me quickly catch you up. In response to congressional scrutiny, presidential policy, and secretary of defense guidance, Gen. (ret.) David Berger, as commandant, launched ambitious reforms known as Force Design 2030, beginning in 2019. A key objective was to position the Marine Corps to win as a part of a joint campaign to defeat China and defend key treaty allies as well as Taiwan. Since then, a small but vocal group of retired Marine officers have howled about Berger miring the Marine Corps in a crisis. They call themselves “Chowder II” after the Chowder Society, an informal group of Marine officers formed in 1946 to defend the institutional independence and future of the U.S. Marine Corps after World War II. Their methods have been unprecedented. They have employed doomsday rhetoric and distortions with such shameless fervor you’d think Force Design 2030 was a Chinese plot and not a strategy to stop one. Neither Congress nor three presidential administrations (Trump I, Biden, and Trump II) have found any merit in the arguments of the Chowderites.

But the critics will not let that get in the way of their narrative.

It is important to engage in reasoned debate on issues of defense policy. However, unless critics of the Marine Corps can produce evidence of some sort of actual crisis — something yet to occur in six years of sustained critique — Marine leaders should remain focused on preparing for the future fight as instructed by presidents and Congress. Force Design 2030 is now simply called Force Design and is owned by Commandant Eric Smith, a leader who I know and admire.

Under his leadership, however, Force Design has recently taken a puzzling diversion. It is not easy for me to say this, but I find the commandant’s renewed focus on the Marine expeditionary unit replete with opportunity costs. The stand-in force remains the most important part of the future Marine Corps, not the Marine expeditionary unit. If a war with China or any other adversary along key maritime terrain takes place, I firmly believe the stand-in force will be decisive in bringing the fight to the adversary alongside U.S. allies and other elements of the U.S. military. Gen. Smith should lean into the stand-in force and champion more aggressive changes, focusing his efforts on obtaining maritime capabilities independent of the U.S. Navy to ensure drone-equipped Marine units can move safely and swiftly across contested waters to fight America’s adversaries.

The Crisis Myth

The Marine Corps has weathered difficult internal debates before. Across generations, Marine fault-finders with dire predictions have underestimated both the service’s proven ability to successfully reform itself and the extent to which megaphone critics damage the institution far more than the things they are criticizing.

We recently published a three–part series, which I edited and approved for publication, by my friend Ben Connable. His argument rests on the idea of a Marine Corps in crisis to the extent that the service is under existential threat. Even though I disagree with Connable’s argument (as I often do with articles we publish), I felt it was important to air the other side of the Force Design debate. Connable is among a vanishingly small group of critics who hold themselves to a real standard of professionalism. Unlike other critics, who regularly vilify the current commandant and his predecessor, and make outrageous claims about their integrity, Connable has a constructive aim and calls for people to rally behind Smith.

Still, he holds to the narrative of an existential crisis: Connable finds the origin of this supposed crisis in the Global War on Terror. During the 9/11 wars, the service was pushed away from its traditional role as the nation’s premier crisis response force, with that mission being increasingly taken over by U.S. Special Operations Command. This loss of a core purpose, he argues, has been compounded by a decline in the Marine Corps’ cultural significance and support.

The facts say otherwise.

Marine crisis response units, to include Marine expeditionary units, which are commonly referred to as the “crown jewel” of the Corps, were repeatedly launched into the most challenging crises of the 9/11 era. Examples include Najaf, southern Baghdad, and Fallujah in 2004; as well as Afghanistan in 2008 and 2011. Another Marine expeditionary unit fought fiercely against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria. And it was a Marine expeditionary unit that helped spearhead the Kabul evacuation efforts in 2021.

While it is certainly true that U.S. special operations forces assumed a more prominent role than they had before, taking on missions once typically conducted by the Marine Corps (for the good of the country, it should be said), this started before 9/11. It was really the result of the flowering of the reforms initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) and Nunn-Cohen Amendment (1987), which led to the creation of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Connable neglects to note that the Marine Corps played an enormously important role in the campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan, doing things that special operators could never have done. He also neglects to mention that Marine special operators, or Raiders, still executed many of these crisis response missions, even if often as part of combined joint special operations task forces.

As far as a loss of cultural significance and support, his only evidence is the lower number of Marine veterans in Congress and the declining appearance of Marine heroes in Hollywood films. I don’t find that persuasive.

To agree with Connable, you also have to ignore that the American people and their elected representatives have shown more support for the Marine Corps than any other U.S. armed service in the last six years. This includes almost unanimous support in Congress and across multiple presidential administrations for the bold path charted by Berger as commandant. The Marine Corps struggled much less than any of the other services during the recent recruiting crisis. And leaders across the aisle have openly praised the Marine Corps for making hard choices, exercising fiscal discipline, and adapting for the future of warfare, encouraging senior Marine leaders to accelerate reform efforts, not to slow them down, and certainly not to go backward. None of the other services have anywhere near this level of support and goodwill.

The crisis only exists in the minds of a largely retired coterie of Marine leaders (including Gen. Charles Krulak, the son of Lt. Gen. Victor “Brute” Krulak, who I quote in the opening of this article). I have great respect for my friend Ben — a retired Marine officer and a serious scholar. He brings so much to the table and I know he is motivated by making the Marine Corps better. But once the fake crisis block in the Jenga tower of his argument is removed, much of the rest falls apart.

What does this tell us about the direction of the Marine Corps in the context of America’s military needs?

The Needs of the Nation and the Character of War

If you read this publication, you’ve likely encountered the concept known as the “character of war,” derived from Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. He tells us that the nature of war is immutable: always violent and always political. Its character, or the way it presents in the world, can change in accordance with the “spirit of the age.” This accounts for things like “technology, law, ethics, culture, methods of social, political, and military organization, and other factors that change across time and place,” as described by Christopher Mewett in these pages years ago.

Book 3, Chapter 17 of On War opens with a demand to understand this: “All planning, particularly strategic planning, must pay attention to the character of contemporary warfare.” Connable rejects the idea of a universally applicable changing character of warfare. Whether he’s correct or not, it’s not the right question. At issue is whether there are consistencies in the character of war as it is being planned for and practiced by our adversaries, and there are.

When one examines how China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran plan for war, there are of course differences, but there are important consistencies. First, they all emphasize military forces reliant on missiles and — increasingly — drones integrated with cyber operations, disinformation, and political subversion to undermine enemy cohesion and exploit societal divisions. Further, with the possible exception of North Korea, they all prominently feature deniable or semi-deniable forces, including Iran’s Islamist proxies, China’s maritime militia, and Russia’s private military companies and paramilitary groups.

When considering future conflicts, it is crucial to analyze how technology and geography intersect, especially in key maritime areas. This approach, championed by Olivia Garard in 2018, ensures we understand the likely character of these wars, which are likely to be fought against China in the first island chain, Russia in the Baltic and Black Seas, Iran in and through the Strait of Hormuz, and North Korea in the maritime approaches surrounding the Korean Peninsula, particularly the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, and adjacent littoral areas.

In each of these geographies, adversaries plan to leverage constrained waterways, island features, and proximity to their own shores, employing missiles, drones, mines, surface ships and submarines, and anti-ship capabilities to attack allies and U.S. forces while denying access and complicating U.S. freedom of action. Understanding this interplay between technology and geography underscores the contemporary character of war, emphasizing precision, contested maritime environments, and the challenge of projecting power into highly defended waters.

This demands reforms to the U.S. armed services. One has to give congressional leaders credit for when they occasionally see a bit further than the rest of us. In 2017, the Senate Armed Services Committee required the Marine Corps to rethink the two Marine expeditionary brigade joint forcible entry operation as an organizing principle, leading to Marine thinkers developing the “Warbot” concept that helped inform Force Design 2030. And this is why, in respect to these reforms, the Marine Corps is ahead of the other services, but not yet far enough along.

The Right Lessons Lead to the Stand-In Force

While the grueling ground-pounding across the vast steppes that stretch across much of Ukraine have captivated both the public and most military analysts, some of the most important tactical and operational lessons over the last few years have been in littoral zones, or those stretches of water within reach of the shore. From the Black Sea to the Red Sea, we have seen the intersection of desperation and determination fuel innovation and adaptation. As a team of Marine writers pointed out in these very pages in early 2024, in both of theaters, the Ukrainian armed forces and the Houthis have proven the indispensability of stand-off drone and missile strikes against larger foes. Other key insights include the strategic leverage of denial and disruption over control, the power of asymmetric tactics to impose costs on superior forces, the value of distributed operations with minimal signatures, and the psychological impact of persistence and unpredictability.

Ukraine’s deft campaign in and along the Black Sea offers a master class in how clever tactics and low-cost technology can harass and humiliate a superior naval force. Despite being vastly outmatched in raw naval power, Ukraine systematically eroded Russia’s maritime freedom of action by leveraging asymmetric tactics, modified commercial drones, unmanned surface vessels, and shore-based anti-ship missiles. Ukraine damaged or sank several key Russian vessels, most notably the Moskva, forcing the Russian Black Sea Fleet to relocate its operations farther from Ukraine’s shores. Ukraine significantly complicated Russia’s ability to maneuver, resupply, and project power along its maritime flank, while simultaneously enabling Kyiv to sustain critical maritime trade. Rather than seeking outright sea control — which was and remains beyond its reach — Ukraine successfully employed denial, persistent harassment, and targeted disruption to impose disproportionately high operational and strategic costs on the Russian navy.

The Houthis have offered a class of their own, although one that has been far less pleasurable for us in the West to watch. For almost two years, the Houthis have threatened key shipping lanes, harbors, and vessels of vastly more powerful adversaries. Employing inexpensive but effective drone boats, anti-ship missiles, sea mines, and explosive-laden aerial drones, they have repeatedly inflicted damage and created uncertainty, forcing their adversaries, including the United States, to expend much more expensive munitions and resources on defensive measures. Through persistence, ingenuity, and unpredictability, the Houthis have imposed outsized costs without ever needing to assert conventional maritime dominance. As Lt. Gen. Frank Donovan, a marine currently serving as vice commander of Special Operations Command, said on our podcast,

I think we should learn the lessons from the Red Sea and what the Houthis are doing to hold us at bay. We’re depleting our magazine racks to fight the Houthis. They’re executing a very effective sea denial, sea control campaign, like we had talked [about] in the past… Are we willing to learn from an adversary that is actually holding ground and pushing back on us?

Following this thread, one can see the logical case for the stand-in force. Berger saw it even earlier than both of these wars. In 2021, Berger envisioned it as the reinvigoration of the Marine Corps’ “role as America’s forward sentinels.” It involves placing Marine units in contested maritime spaces, shoulder to shoulder with allies and partners, acting as the fleet’s persistent eyes and ears within range of adversary sensors. There, marines wage a relentless reconnaissance battle, identifying dangerous enemy behavior before conflict and disrupting the enemy’s efforts to gain the initiative through counter‑reconnaissance and deception. In crisis or war, marines will remain embedded inside contested zones, extending the entire U.S. military’s reach by enabling naval and joint fires and thereby denying the enemy freedom of action.

Bold in concept yet delicate in execution, the stand‑in force is designed to unsettle adversaries at every point on the strategic competition continuum while setting conditions for integration across the joint force and naval campaigning. In March 2022, the 3rd Marine Regiment was redesignated as the 3rd Littoral Regiment, followed shortly thereafter by the redesignation of 12th Marine Regiment to 12th Marine Littoral Regiment. Each of these units is composed of approximately 2,000 marines organized into a littoral combat team, a littoral anti-air battalion, and a combat logistics battalion.

Smith’s strong defense of the stand-in force in Proceedings in 2022 deserves to be revisited. In it, he defends the concept against critics who said that dispersed small units would be vulnerable, explaining that mobility, stealth, and integration with naval and allied forces significantly reduces risk. He also rejected criticism that the new approach overly focuses on China, clarifying that these units can be adapted to multiple theaters without sacrificing global expeditionary roles, which the service learned while employing reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance forces with Task Force 61/2 in the Baltic and Aegean Seas a few years ago. Additionally, Smith argued that modern combined arms warfare no longer demands heavy armor and traditional artillery, as much as diverse precision fires and unmanned capabilities to effectively confront future threats.

Dispensing with Cockamamie Ideas about Defensive Warfare

In the weeks before Russia was about to invade Ukraine in 2022, I remember asking a U.S. Army infantry officer friend of mine which side he’d rather be on, not morally, but strictly from a military balance perspective. He replied, “I’d always rather be on the offensive.” This is a deep and abiding part of military culture (not just in the United States), and to an extent it is a healthy thing. But when it dismisses military goals and sensible strategy, it can lead to disaster. And we can see how Russia’s misbegotten offensive operation to topple the Ukrainian government in mere weeks worked out.

This issue is at the center of most objections to Force Design, and it is deeply emotional. Being an offensive force is especially ingrained in the traditional Marine Corps identity, at least since the early 1940s. Aggression is central to Marine identity. U.S. marines pride themselves on being America’s most forward-deployed force, being willing to seize and hold ground under fierce enemy fire, constantly push the initiative, turn defensive positions into offensive opportunities, and assert dominance on the battlefield. Aggression has also been at the core of the Corps’ historical role in spearheading critical assaults, from Iwo Jima to Fallujah, where decisive and relentless attack was essential to victory.

Critics of Force Design argue the stand-in force concept has compromised the aggressive essence of the Marine Corps. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Paul Van Riper, for example, has inaccurately dismissed the stand-in force as sitting “on the defense on isolated islands waiting for an enemy ship to pass by,” claiming this will change “the very ethos of the Corps and not to the good.” Even Connable advances a version of this critique, calling it “uninspiring and uncharacteristically passive.” In evaluating these claims, it is important to consider the relationship between defensive and offensive operations, the intensity and aggression involved in defensive operations, and what the American people are asking the Marine Corps to do through their elected leaders.

Defense and Offense in Marine and Military Thought

The Marine Corps’ original maneuver warfare manual, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, was published in 1989 under the intellectual leadership of Gen. Alfred Gray. Its successor, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, developed under the guidance of Charles Krulak and released in 1997, retained and expanded these foundational principles. Both manuals, simply titled Warfighting, speak of the non-exclusivity and inseparability of offense and defense. For example, the first manual explains “defense cannot be purely passive resistance. An effective defense must assume an offensive character, striking at the enemy at the moment of his greatest vulnerability.” Quoting Clausewitz, it continues, explaining that the defense is “not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows.”

Krulak’s newer manual largely retains the same language, but leans further into this theme with a passage on the dynamism of defense that Van Riper has perhaps forgotten:

Because we typically think of the defense as waiting for the enemy to strike, we often associate the defense with response rather than initiative. This is not necessarily true. We do not necessarily assume the defensive only out of weakness. For example, the defense may confer the initiative if the enemy is compelled to attack into the strength of our defense. Under such conditions, we may have the positive aim of destroying the enemy. Similarly, a defender waiting in ambush may have the initiative if the enemy can be brought into the trap. The defense may be another way of striking at the enemy.

In fact, I find it hard to believe this exact passage of Warfighting wasn’t front of mind while the expeditionary advanced base operations concept was being tested through wargaming several years ago. This is, in sum, the intent of the stand-in force: a “Clausewitzian attack defense.”

Defensive Warfare is Not for Lesser Warriors

Perhaps the most storied battle in the history of the world took place in a slender passage hemmed by steep cliffs and mountains in Greece. It was there that a small Spartan force held off wave after wave of Persian attacks. Though eventually betrayed and surrounded, the Spartans’ sacrifice burned itself into history, a timeless testament to courage, duty, and defiance in the face of impossible odds. Their bravery gave the Greeks the precious time needed to gather strength, unite their scattered city-states, and ultimately repel the Persian invasion, safeguarding the cradle of Western civilization. Thermopylae thus became more than a battle — it became a symbol of the power of sacrifice to alter history’s course. It was also undeniably a defensive battle.

The 2006 film 300 presents this tale in stylized, graphic-novel-inspired visuals. It resonated deeply in popular military culture, particularly among marines, who often see themselves in the Spartans’ fierce resolve. Marines frequently evoke the film’s iconic imagery, adopting Spartan helmets and shields in tattoos as permanent symbols of discipline, warrior ethos, and brotherhood under fire. Key exercises at Twentynine Palms are called “Spartan Resolve” and “Spartan Advance.” Also, in a nod to the film, a perfect score on the Marine Corps’ Physical Fitness Test and Combat Fitness Test is, yes, 300.

The defiant stand at Thermopylae is shorthand for unwavering courage and tenacity in defense, highlighting an ethos where holding ground — aggressively and unflinchingly — defines the warrior spirit as vividly today as it did thousands of years ago.

And there is indeed a proud history of defensive sacrifice in the Marine Corps. In 1941, as Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor, they also launched another operation over two thousand miles away against Wake Island. It was there that 450 marines, including a Marine fighter squadron, augmented by 200 civilian volunteers, held off the much larger Japanese force for nearly two weeks, killing 600 of them. The marines defeated the first Japanese amphibious assault while under constant aerial bombardment. They also sank at least three Japanese ships and damaged others. The unit succumbed to the second major assault, but their stalwart defense served as a potent symbol of American and Marine tenacity for a nation still licking its wounds and standing back up to take the fight to Imperial Japan.

During the fight for Guadalcanal, the Marine Corps fought and won two primarily defensive battles: Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge, which were critical to prevailing in the Solomon Islands and the war in the Pacific. And let’s not forget the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir against China during the Korean War. For those who say the Marine Corps only finds true meaning in the offensive, the least offensive thing I can say in reply is this: Read a book!

Defense, Offense, and the Stand-In Force

The fact is, American leaders today, across party lines, are explicitly ordering the Marine Corps, and the other services, to be primarily prepared for what will start as a defensive campaign against China in the Indo-Pacific in the first island chain: to defend and fight alongside allies and partners from their territory and beyond, and in doing so defeat China’s fleet, exhaust its batteries, and destroy its capacity to wage war beyond Chinese shores. Thought of another way, American leaders are ordering the Marine Corps to do everything possible to prevent the country from having to cede to the Chinese Communist Party the very territory that marines of the World War II generation fought so hard to seize eight decades ago.

And, of course, as already mentioned, defensive and offensive operations flow into each other. Marines remain ready to go to war from Okinawa. There are near daily rotational Marine deployments to allied soil in the Indo-Pacific. Amphibious Squadron 11 is embarked for half of the year in the Indo-Pacific. Third Marine Littoral Regiment is training to do things like seizing airfields within 100 miles of Taiwan to throw off a Chinese invasion. They are establishing anti-ship missile capabilities in the middle of the Luzon Strait. In other words, since 2019, the Marine Corps has reshaped itself to carry out operations across the Indo-Pacific, as directed. These changes strengthen deterrence and, if deterrence fails, help ensure victory.

What if the Marine Corps downgrades or gives up on the stand-in force and the littoral regiments as some critics would have it do? Ironically, this critical mission would likely be picked up by Special Operations Command, as best as it could, and the Army’s multi-domain task forces.

Even though I disagree with Connable’s diagnosis of the stand-in force as it pertains to the defense and aggression, I find his proposed solution un-objectionable:

Marine leaders should rename the stand-in force concept and recenter it on its most aggressive, most compelling subordinate mission set: seizing and defending advanced bases.
…
The good news? Marine littoral regiment units are already practicing these operations.

I recommend retiring the term “stand-in force” and adopting a term more benefitting the aggressive culture of the Marine Corps — perhaps something like an expeditionary assault force.

What About the Marine Expeditionary Unit?

I was honored to attend the Marine Corps Association Ground Awards Dinner, where Smith delivered the keynote address. I have to admit, I was surprised by his speech. It focused on the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit. He said he will be championing the need for “three consistently deployed, three-ship formations — heel to toe. One from the east coast, one from the west coast, and one episodically deployed from Okinawa, Japan,” He calls this a “3.0 ARG/MEU presence.” Today, the Navy-Marine Corps team can only sustain one reliably.

He didn’t mention the stand-in force or the Marine littoral regiment once.

The Marine expeditionary unit and the stand-in force reflect fundamentally different operational philosophies and are each optimized for distinct threat environments. The Marine expeditionary unit has long been the Marine Corps’ signature global crisis-response formation, flexibly responding to short-notice crises worldwide. Typically comprising around 2,200 marines and sailors afloat on ships, these units combine infantry, aviation, logistics, and command capabilities, allowing them to independently carry out missions ranging from combat operations to humanitarian assistance. Marine expeditionary units are heavily dependent on $2 billion to more than $4 billion Navy amphibious ships. In his speech, Smith lamented the insufficient number of amphibious ships, which constrains the Corps’ ability to project power globally at short notice. Reinforcing Marine expeditionary units without enough amphibious ships could unintentionally worsen current shortages, increasing the gap between what the corps aims to do and the resources it actually has.

In contrast, stand-in forces require specialized capabilities such as more capable and experienced infantry formations, drones, advanced missile systems, survivable logistics, resilient communications networks, and hardened basing infrastructure. The stand-in force is designed explicitly to provide persistent presence, resilience, and lethality across strategically critical island chains, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Stand-in forces, while still reliant on the Navy for mobility (for now), demand a more dispersed maritime posture, potentially leveraging smaller, lower cost, and lower manpower-intensive vessels, lighter amphibious platforms, and intra-theater connectors. This approach demands immediate and significant investments. It aligns directly with the strategic priorities set forth clearly by both congressional mandate and presidential guidance. The stand-in force is what will allow the Marine Corps to complicate Beijing’s planning and decision-making and to live up to its legacy of being “first to fight” in a high-end maritime conflict, which would inevitably be waged heavily in and around key maritime terrain.

If Smith intends to avoid sacrificing strategic clarity for operational versatility, he should ensure Marine expeditionary unit modernization complements rather than competes with stand-in force priorities. This could mean reevaluating how Marine expeditionary units deploy, train, and operate, orienting their capabilities toward scenarios that directly reinforce the stand-in force concept. Otherwise, attempting to prioritize the Marine expeditionary unit risks undermining the strategic coherence that he and his predecessor carefully cultivated, generating confusion within the service about its primary focus at a time when strategic clarity is critical. It also risks diverting attention, senior leader time, and resources away from the more strategically essential — and demanding — task of fully operationalizing the stand-in force in the Indo-Pacific.

While Marine expeditionary units are important and are built for versatility across a wide array of contingencies, they are not tailored for operations inside enemy missile range. To be sure, their survivability is not fixed but conditional — affected by task organization, escort presence, and employment concepts: precisely the conditions that are becoming harder to guarantee in contested maritime theaters where adversaries can saturate defenses and exploit even brief lapses in coverage, especially as advanced missile and drone technologies proliferate even among small powers and non-state actors. As a result, relying too heavily on large, high-signature platforms to operate close to enemy shores invites unacceptable constraints at best and disaster at worst.

I do not know why the commandant is focusing on the Marine expeditionary unit and have not yet had the opportunity to ask him. I hope he is not doing this to somehow seek a compromise with the most unreasonable and vociferous critics of Force Design: Van Riper, Charles Krulak, and Gen. (ret.) Anthony Zinni (who dishonestly count other living former commandants and former Secretary of Defense James Mattis among their ranks). Nothing less than a complete reversal of Berger’s reforms will satisfy these critics, so any compromise will be fruitless in terms of defanging their brutal, unprofessional, and unethical public and private campaign of agitation.

Regardless, Congress isn’t buying it. As Adm. Daryl Caudle — soon to be chief of naval operations — pointed out in his recent confirmation hearing, the last time the United States had three amphibious ready groups and Marine expeditionary units decades ago, it took 37 to 40 amphibious ships. The Navy can’t or won’t even get to the current congressionally mandated requirement for 31 (more on this later). And neither the House or Senate defense budgets include funds for the construction of new Landing Helicopter Assault or Landing Platform Dock vessels, the specific types of amphibious ships required to meet Smith’s 3.0 presence vision.

The bottom line is this: Properly manned, trained, and equipped Marine littoral regiments are what will allow the Marine Corps to be first to fight against China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea — not Marine expeditionary units. Investments in equipping America’s Marine littoral regiments with drones and missiles, as well as the training and concepts of operation necessary to enable marines to successfully use them in combat, ought to be the top priority, alongside solving the littoral mobility problem. The Marine Corps should, of course, also be able to save an embassy in Africa or Latin America or launch a sustained assault against a terrorist group. That’s good and proper, but that’s not what the fate of the nation hangs on.

The Littoral Mobility Problem

In terms of force structure, the biggest problem facing the Marine Corps is its dependence on the Navy for amphibious operations, whether it’s the Marine expeditionary unit or the Marine littoral regiment. The Marine Corps has been locked in a seemingly endless fight with the Navy about the number of amphibious ships it should have. The debate is mostly about L-class ships: the America– and Wasp-class amphibious ships, which are among the largest vessels in the Navy. They have large, flat flight decks for launching and recovering helicopters and vertical take-off jets, expansive hangar spaces, medical facilities, and command-and-control centers.

Marine leaders have insisted that at least 31 L-class amphibious ships are necessary to meet global operational demands. In contrast, the Navy has advocated for a smaller number, typically around 24 amphibious ships, citing budgetary pressures, competing priorities, and limited shipyard capacity.

However, Marine littoral regiments are to rely more on the smaller, faster, and less conspicuous new Medium Landing Ship. It has a modest footprint, relatively lower crew requirements, and a shallow draft that enables it to operate closer to shore and land directly on beaches or austere landing sites. It features a prominent bow ramp allowing marines to quickly drive vehicles — such as tactical trucks, missile launchers, and other lighter equipment — directly onto shore. It does not have the expansive flight decks or aviation facilities of larger ships, focusing instead on simplicity, speed, and ease of movement to reduce vulnerability and logistical demands.

What all these amphibious programs have in common though, is they are Navy programs and Navy ships, crewed by sailors. And as long as the Marine Corps is reliant on the Navy for these critical capabilities, the Navy will keep disappointing the Marine Corps because the same presidential administrations and Congresses that have directed the Marine Corps to change have also directed the Navy to prioritize different capabilities, such as revitalizing the undersea component of the U.S. nuclear triad, fast-attack submarines, ballistic and cruise missile defense, and much more.

Something has to change.

The Marine Corps needs a new family of ships to operate in littoral environments, whether it’s the South China Sea, the Baltic Sea, or the Arabian Gulf. These ships would be designed to complement each other and to work together as a part of a concept of employment, nested in the stand-in force concept and expeditionary advanced base operations manual. The smaller ship design needs to be premised on the idea that marines will need to be able to fight with what they already have in place or with what they can get into the fight extremely quickly through a contested environment. This is not a call to entirely replace traditional amphibious ships, which still have a role to play. Rather, the Marine Corps ought to have additional vessels for contested littorals, that could complement more traditional amphibious ships in more contested crisis response scenarios.

What should these ships be? They should be fast, stealthy, and survivable small ships and boats specifically designed for contested amphibious maneuver. While the Medium Landing Ship is a good first step toward tactical mobility and distributed operations due to its ability to operate near shorelines, it is not ideal for a contested environment. It is too slow and easily detectable. The Marine Corps needs additional low-observable fast transports capable of moving up to three platoons, with their gear, over 1,000 nautical miles at speeds up to 35 knots. This would ensure they could, for example, travel from Palawan in the Philippines to Taiwan before an adversary could successfully establish a blockade.

These types of ships or vessels could also carry one or two smaller landing survivable littoral landing craft. These would not be traditional landing craft. Each would carry one squad with equipment and a light vehicle. Aside from deploying from low-observable fast transports, they could also launch from concealed positions along coasts and rivers. The new ship-to-shore connector cannot do these things. It is certainly fast and carries more, but it is also loud and hot, making it ill-suited for going up against any enemy with modern surveillance systems, infrared sensors, or anti-ship missiles.

To better ensure the marines are able to make it from Palawan to Taiwan and to move along island chains safely, there should also be uncrewed littoral screening and deception vessels. Those on the diversion mission mimic the signatures of larger transports and landing craft, going elsewhere and broadcasting false signals — generally creating confusion for enemy surveillance systems and drawing fire away from actual forces. Those masking would carry electronic warfare payloads to jam sensors or disrupt communications, feeding the adversary a noisy, misleading picture of the battlespace. Strong candidates for this include the Devil Ray T24 and T38, which have been tested by the Navy in the Middle East and Baltic Sea (the United States recently funded a purchase of a smaller variant by the Philippines) or Textron’s Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle, which is already fielded by the Navy.

Sustainment in contested littorals is no small task. The service has been experimenting with uncrewed, low-profile vessels inspired by drug traffickers’ semi-submersible “narco-submarines” — a design perfected by cartels to evade detection across thousands of miles of ocean. As far as I can tell, this was first envisioned by three marines in War on the Rocks five years ago. Built by Leidos, these vessels are now being tested, with trials underway in Okinawa and during joint experimentation exercises such as Project Convergence. Brig. Gen. Simon Doran described the project:

We stole the idea from friends down south. And so, this is 55 feet long, completely autonomous. It’s able to go hundreds or thousands of miles. It’s able to carry weapon systems that we have that are new … It can carry pretty much anything you want to put in it.

Finally, these ships should programmatically belong to the Marine Corps, not the Navy. There is an old joke that the Marine Corps is America’s second army with its own air force. It’s time for the marines to have their own navy as well. Historically, the Marine Corps operated smaller landing craft independently during critical wartime operations, proving this model viable. Today’s littoral ships should similarly be Marine-led programs, perhaps under a new deputy commandant. And the ships themselves should be crewed entirely by marines, ensuring the service has direct control over the maritime mobility and responsiveness it requires. To be sure, this would be a major change in the Department of the Navy, but a necessary one for the country, the joint force, and the Marine Corps.

The Proper Place of Critique of Military Reform

I appreciate Connable’s contribution to the debate and hope it heralds a more constructive era in the tussle over the future of the Marine Corps. Still, I think he is mostly wrong. The Marine Corps is not in a crisis and won’t be as long as it leans into adapting to the character of war, embracing the stand-in force — whether it is renamed or not. As for the so-called Chowderites, it is worth revisiting the ideas of another friend of mine, Frank Hoffman, another scholar and retired marine officer, who — in conversation with me —described the general thrust of the Chowderite critique as astrategic, ahistorical, and anti-institutional.

The 2018 and 2022 defense strategies explicitly shifted America’s strategic focus toward Asia and China, accepting calculated risk elsewhere. Yet the Chowderites stubbornly cling to outdated models, advocating for yesterday’s force structure against tomorrow’s threats. They consistently ignore clear strategic direction, geography, adversary capabilities, and emerging technologies. That is astrategic.

Second, the critics are notably ahistorical. The Marine Corps has always adapted to the strategic environment of its era — from small wars to major amphibious operations, through the Cold War, and later the counter-insurgency era. While Victor Krulak established institutional mechanisms for adaptation, he (and many others) did not anticipate the scale, sophistication, and challenge of today’s China challenge. True fidelity to Marine Corps heritage means embracing necessary changes rather than rejecting them.

Finally, the Chowderite position is essentially anti-institutional. Standing still has never been part of Marine identity. The Marine Corps exists to serve the United States, not its own parochial interests or nostalgic self-image. The critics advocate for a Marine Corps divorced from strategic reality, current joint doctrine, and policy directives. In doing so, they risk marginalizing the Marine Corps at precisely the moment when America most needs it to be — and has told it to be — relevant, agile, and forward-looking.

It is here where my critique becomes more forceful than Hoffman’s. I focus more sharply on the tactics of the Chowderites, who unprecedently employ lobbyists, smear tactics, and go above the commandant’s head, seeking meetings with senior defense officials and elected officials, including in the White House. This is simply not acceptable. As Bob Work wrote in his essential essay in the Texas National Security Review, their activities have been “highly troubling, raising serious concerns about civil‑military relations and the role of retired general and flag officers in the development of defense programs.” Unelected, unappointed cabals of retired octogenarians and nonagenarians don’t play any legitimate role in running the military services. There is no co-commandant.

Responsible critique is vital, but the criticisms leveled by the Chowderites occupy a land without strategy or context, far from the Corps’ longstanding ethos of innovation and adaptation. The Marine Corps has changed and must continue to change for good reasons. Through the presidents, members of Congress, and senators they have elected on both sides of the aisle, the American people have been loud and clear on the Marine Corps they want: It is the one described in Force Design 2030 and its subsequent annual updates. Americans want a Marine Corps that wins wars, not one only equipped to respond to lesser crises. The critics won’t catch up, so just ignore them and get back on course.

Ryan Evans is the founder of War on the Rocks. In making these arguments, he builds on the work of many thinkers — mostly Marine officers, retired, active duty, and reserve — who have spent years shaping force design to prepare the United States for a war we all hope never comes.

Image: Sgt. Alyssa Chuluda